More Delay for HS2, and how should we proceed?

[tomuk]

That’s incorrect. It was Treasury insisting on over site development, the proceeds from which would flow to Treasury (not assessed as a benefit of HS2), which led to the changes from the hybrid bill 2-phase, 11-platform station to the 10 platform. It was then the budget insufficient.

Government interference costing time and money.

I mentioned the misappropriation of the oversite proceeds in my previous post. But the inference from the testimonies of from Mark Thurston, the Perm Sec and Mr Over was that the 11 platform design was already over the budget. The budget being intentionally set low as a stretch target. Based on the detailed costings carried out for the 10 platform design the previous estimate for 11 would be higher still if made to the same level of confidence. Or was the more thorough and detail design a polite way of describing the need for incorporating the oversite development (OSD)?

 

[jfowkes]

Pure fiction. Financial institutions and sub-prime loans.

Yes, I agree it was fiction. I didn't mean to imply that it was Labour's fault, just that they got blamed.

 

[Xavi]

the previous estimate for 11 would be higher still if made to the same level of confidence

Which infers any estimate to a greater level of detail will be higher. Very convenient evidence for a blameless DfT / Treasury.

 

[Tezza1978]

If you want to rid hs2 of myths then you're going to have to go to the original brief, and start there.

It's a political project born out of childish ambition and built on top of lies. It's so crudely - or willfully - designed that it has already economically damaged a major city's economy before a track in the north has even been laid, all the while masquerading as something good.

Not only was that unjustifiable (as demonstrated by recently leaked financial data) but that the major city involved also requires significant capacity uplift to allow for increased port functions, and gets zero thanks to this supposed capacity-adding infrastructure, is galling. Especially when mere service configuration changes were always more than feasible for our imperial neighbours to the east.

You may be interested to know that, in place of rail capacity, north Liverpool is set to have one of its few green spaces - Rimrose Valley Country Park - destroyed so that a road can be built through it instead. Again, cut price.

Frankly, I view waving the flag for hs2 as akin to waving the flag for everything and anything that's wrong about the way the country now operates.

Been quite some time since Ive seen such hyperbole as this on here. I dont even know where to start in terms of explaining how wrong you are. You are clearly Esther McVey and I claim my £10

 

[MattRat]

If you want to rid hs2 of myths then you're going to have to go to the original brief, and start there.

It's a political project born out of childish ambition and built on top of lies. It's so crudely - or willfully - designed that it has already economically damaged a major city's economy before a track in the north has even been laid, all the while masquerading as something good.

Not only was that unjustifiable (as demonstrated by recently leaked financial data) but that the major city involved also requires significant capacity uplift to allow for increased port functions, and gets zero thanks to this supposed capacity-adding infrastructure, is galling. Especially when mere service configuration changes were always more than feasible for our imperial neighbours to the east.

You may be interested to know that, in place of rail capacity, north Liverpool is set to have one of its few green spaces - Rimrose Valley Country Park - destroyed so that a road can be built through it instead. Again, cut price.

Frankly, I view waving the flag for hs2 as akin to waving the flag for everything and anything that's wrong about the way the country now operates.

You really need to disconnect HS2 from the politicians that ruined it. High speed rail is sound, as shown by the rest of Europe and Japan. In fact look at Japan's maglev to understand just how much the UK government have messed things up.

We need HS2, in the original form if possible, to free up capacity for other railways. There is no other option. But don't take my word for it, take Gareth Dennis' word, someone who actually works in the rail industry and understands what the railways need. Don't let people use HS2 as their scapegoat, hold politicians to account instead, and find out where they put all that money, followed by replacing all of them at next election. I think you'll find cost drastically decrease when competent people get their hands on the project, just like in other countries.

 

[Pete_uk]

How does the eleven platforms at Euston compare to other high speed terminals in Europe and Asia?

 

[HSTEd]

How does the eleven platforms at Euston compare to other high speed terminals in Europe and Asia?

Tokyo station apparently (although the numbering scheme is a mess!) has ten platforms total for all Shinkansen traffic, and whilst it is not technically a terminal, operationally it is to some extent.

Beijing West has 18 platforms but only 7 of them are for high speed services apparently.

 

[stuu]

Tokyo station apparently (although the numbering scheme is a mess!) has ten platforms total for all Shinkansen traffic, and whilst it is not technically a terminal, operationally it is to some extent.

Operationally it is entirely separate - it's two termini end-on-end. Nothing runs through in service

The Tokaido Shinkansen runs up to 18tph from its 6 platforms, the lines heading north run up to 9tph from the other 4 platforms.

 

[The Ham]

If you want to rid hs2 of myths then you're going to have to go to the original brief, and start there.

It's a political project born out of childish ambition and built on top of lies. It's so crudely - or willfully - designed that it has already economically damaged a major city's economy before a track in the north has even been laid, all the while masquerading as something good.

Not only was that unjustifiable (as demonstrated by recently leaked financial data) but that the major city involved also requires significant capacity uplift to allow for increased port functions, and gets zero thanks to this supposed capacity-adding infrastructure, is galling. Especially when mere service configuration changes were always more than feasible for our imperial neighbours to the east.

You may be interested to know that, in place of rail capacity, north Liverpool is set to have one of its few green spaces - Rimrose Valley Country Park - destroyed so that a road can be built through it instead. Again, cut price.

Frankly, I view waving the flag for hs2 as akin to waving the flag for everything and anything that's wrong about the way the country now operates.

HS2 was always going to have to draw a line somewhere, as such it's an easy target for those from areas (such as Liverpool) which don't benefit from the project.

Obviously for those who have an interest in that area are now likely to not like the project.

Personally I think that Liverpool is one area (another being the cutting of the cycle infrastructure along the route) where the limit was too confined and something better should have been provided.

Even if HS2 wasn't to build the upgrade to Liverpool (for example ensuring it was part of NPR or even part of TPU) having a clear next step as infrastructure upgrades which should be developed because HS2 allows them would have been a good thing to do.

For example (I'm sure others could think of more):
- link to Liverpool to allow more freight from cargo ships as well as better passenger provision
- upgrades north of HS2 infrastructure to further improve journey times to Scotland
- links to allow (for example) NE to SE and NW to SW "XC services" to improve journey times and capacity through the XC core

Whilst not guaranteeing that such projects would come forwards, the fact that consideration was given to them would have likely shifted the perception from "we're being ignored" to "what do we need to do to make these projects happen".

Whilst it would have still allowed the "it's going to cost £1.5 trillion" arguments, there would have likely been less traction as more people would have seen that they could have seen the potential of future upgrades which would only be possible because of the core scheme.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Everywhere north of Crewe (which includes Liverpool) benefits from the authorised sections of HS2.
The Manchester leg, combined with NPR, gets HS infrastructure closer to Liverpool and provides fast trans-Pennine links.
A 400m station in Liverpool for captive HS2 trains would be extremely difficult to engineer, unless it was in one of the disused tunnels from Edge Hill.
Currently, I'd say Bradford has the strongest case to be better served by the current IRP proposals, plus better WCML links north to Scotland if Golborne is to be axed.

 

[eldomtom2]

Myths involving incorrect calculations about the cost per track mile (supposedly that £100bn/140 miles = £714,285,714/mile) factoring in the entire cost rather than the base track cost should also be included.

Could you provide a more detail about what you're arguing?

 

[The Ham]

Could you provide a more detail about what you're arguing?

I read it as those who take the total cost of everything including the cost of the rolling stock and the cut elements of the scheme (sometimes including Crossrail 2 and other "linked" projects) and applying those costs to the cost per mile of the infrastructure.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

The HS2 figures for costs (2019 base) are I think £65 billion for the authorised Euston-Crewe route plus the Birmingham branch.
That buys you 170* miles of new line and 4 new stations, so about £380 million per mile (again, at 2019 prices).
Phase 2a per-mile cost (Lichfield-Crewe) will be much lower relative to phase 1 as no significant tunnelling is needed (just 2x700m around Madeley).
Phase 2b costs (Crewe-Manchester, if authorised) will be relatively expensive with an 8-mile tunnel into Manchester, and a short one at Crewe.

* 160 miles Euston-Crewe, plus 10 miles for the Birmingham branch and delta junction at Water Orton.
The junctions at Handsacre and Calvert will add a couple of miles or so.

 

[eldomtom2]

I read it as those who take the total cost of everything including the cost of the rolling stock and the cut elements of the scheme (sometimes including Crossrail 2 and other "linked" projects) and applying those costs to the cost per mile of the infrastructure.

Surely things like route length are not totally devoid of impact on things like rolling stock cost, though?

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Surely things like route length are not totally devoid of impact on things like rolling stock cost, though?

Rolling stock would normally be leased from manufacturer/finance house/Rosco, so not part of the line's capital investment.
HS1 is rented out to the operator, so once again the cost is not borne wholly by the taxpayer.
That was also the intention for HS2, but so far no deals have been done for private funds to bear any of the cost.
George Osborne had plans for Chinese or other sovereign fund investment in the building of HS2, but that seems off the agenda now.

 

[Energy]

HS1 is rented out to the operator, so once again the cost is not borne wholly by the taxpayer.

Yes and no, while it was originally a private company financing it LCR is now owned by the government after financial issues.

 

[eldomtom2]

Rolling stock would normally be leased from manufacturer/finance house/Rosco, so not part of the line's capital investment.

Well it's still a capital cost that has to be paid...

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Yes and no, while it was originally a private company financing it LCR is now owned by the government after financial issues.

See the Wiki entry on HS1 ownership: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Speed_1

In November 2010, the HS1 concession was awarded for a duration of thirty years to an investment consortium bringing together two Canadian public pension funds: Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (through its subsidiary Borealis Infrastructure), and Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan for £2.1 billion.[48] At the time, UK pension investors had generally limited interest in such long-term, illiquid, 'infrastructure assets'.[102]
In 2017, the sale of the 30 year HS1 concession was announced to funds advised and managed by InfraRed Capital Partners and Equitix Investment Management; participants include HICL Infrastructure (35%), Equitix (35%) and South Korea's National Pension Service (30%), for an enterprise value of £3 billion.[103][104]
The private operator does not hold the freehold or rights to any of the associated land.

The point is that there is income from the concession balancing the original capital cost.

Well it's still a capital cost that has to be paid...

But not by the taxpayer.
It's on the private sector, just as the Hitachi IEP fleet is.
The TOCs pay annual lease charges which are not capital.

 

[Energy]

See the Wiki entry on HS1 ownership: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/High_Speed_1

The point is that there is income from the concession balancing the original capital cost.

Its a concession, at the end HS1 is still owned by the UK government.

But not by the taxpayer.

It is paid by the taxpayer, but over a long time period.

It's on the private sector, just as the Hitachi IEP fleet is.

The IEP contract is different, at the end of the contract the trains remain property of Agility Trains.

 

[LUYMun]

Deleted

 

[daodao]

Phase 2b costs (Crewe-Manchester, if authorised) will be relatively expensive with an 8-mile tunnel into Manchester, and a short one at Crewe.

Phase 2b is poor value for money compared to phases 1 and 2a, and in essence only benefits Greater Manchester. There is already a delay for completing those parts of HS2 which may be of significant wider benefit. Is there any official indication of the timescale for taking stage HS2 phase 2b forward, assuming parliamentary approval is granted?

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

The IEP contract is different, at the end of the contract the trains remain property of Agility Trains.

To the best of my knowledge, the HS2 rolling stock contract is at the preferred-supplier stage with Hitachi/Alstom while it is finalised, and nothing has been said about its financing.
This government would probably favour an IEP-type deal with the manufacturer, or something like the class 700 deal with the Siemens consortium.
Either way the capital cost of the fleet would be off the government's books, and might also include the depot at Washwood Heath.
It's the passengers who will pay (eventually), not the taxpayer.

.

 

[chris2]

Phase 2b is poor value for money compared to phases 1 and 2a, and in essence only benefits Greater Manchester.

Without a more northerly connection to the west coast mainline, this is fairly true as far as the HS2 project is concerned. But it’s also important to remember that the route into Manchester would form a key part of a future NPR route from Liverpool to Leeds.

2035-41 is the timeframe for the completed HS2 route to Manchester and completion of Euston. But everyone assumes early 2040s.

 

[Parjon]

Everywhere north of Crewe (which includes Liverpool) benefits from the authorised sections of HS2.
The Manchester leg, combined with NPR, gets HS infrastructure closer to Liverpool and provides fast trans-Pennine links.
A 400m station in Liverpool for captive HS2 trains would be extremely difficult to engineer, unless it was in one of the disused tunnels from Edge Hill.
Currently, I'd say Bradford has the strongest case to be better served by the current IRP proposals, plus better WCML links north to Scotland if Golborne is to be axed.

Every part of this post is untrue. Including some old myths being repeddled. There are no fewer than 4 central Liverpool sites that have been independently identified as viable and cost effective sites for 400m platforms.

It shows the level of gaslighting that has been going on, that the long standing and expensive rebuttals have had such little attention paid to them.

In fact, the notion of a Liverpool HS2 station needing to be underground was one of the first lies to be uncovered. In similar way that Euston was grossly underestimated to fall within "envelope", a series of nonsense inputs were provided - from "superceded" passenger forecasts, to assertions such as that reiterated above.

Further, it was HS2s own reports (attempted suppress) that confirmed what we already knew: HS2 as is would be economically damaging to our city.

 

[Energy]

To the best of my knowledge, the HS2 rolling stock contract is at the preferred-supplier stage with Hitachi/Alstom while it is finalised, and nothing has been said about its financing.
This government would probably favour an IEP-type deal with the manufacturer, or something like the class 700 deal with the Siemens consortium.

For Thameslink and IEP the tender included financing, its why the bids had financiers involved and were Cross London Trains rather than Siemens and Agility Trains rather than Hitachi.

The HS2 tender includes a minimum 12 years maintanence and depot management agreement and subsequent spare parts supply agreement. It is not a train supply agreement.

The government may subsequently decide to sell and lease back the trains, like TfL and the 345s, or may sort seperate leasing before they are built.

Either way the capital cost of the fleet would be off the government's books, and might also include the depot at Washwood Heath.

HS2 has always included the cost of buying rolling stock, they may choose to sell and lease back later but for now it is on HS2 ltd/HM Government books.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

Every part of this post is untrue.

So you don't think HS2 to Crewe benefits Liverpool at all?
How is it disadvantaged compared to other places north of Crewe?
It will benefit to the same extent as any other station on the WCML north of Crewe, all to be served by 200m trains in current platforms.

 

[The Ham]

Every part of this post is untrue. Including some old myths being repeddled. There are no fewer than 4 central Liverpool sites that have been independently identified as viable and cost effective sites for 400m platforms.

It shows the level of gaslighting that has been going on, that the long standing and expensive rebuttals have had such little attention paid to them.

In fact, the notion of a Liverpool HS2 station needing to be underground was one of the first lies to be uncovered. In similar way that Euston was grossly underestimated to fall within "envelope", a series of nonsense inputs were provided - from "superceded" passenger forecasts, to assertions such as that reiterated above.

Further, it was HS2s own reports (attempted suppress) that confirmed what we already knew: HS2 as is would be economically damaging to our city.

When were these 400m stations announced given that the first meeting about 400m station options was reported in December 2020:

Taskforce to assess options for Liverpool HS2 station - Place North West

The Liverpool City Region Station Commission is drawing up proposals for a rail station that would link Liverpool city centre with High Speed Two and Northern Powerhouse Rail services.

www.placenorthwest.co.uk

The commission, which met for the first time this week, comprises a range of experts from across transport, business and the public sector.

With this report from September 2021 confirming that the commission was still yet to report:

Lime Street or bust? The options for Liverpool’s HS2 station — Liverpolitan

HS2, the planned high speed rail route from London to the North, is a controversial project. National media bombard us with stories of costs out of control, natural habitats being devastated and eco warriors being evicted from tunnels and tree houses. There are also the persistent rumours that all o

www.liverpolitan.co.uk

The commission is chaired by Everton CEO, Denise Barrett-Baxendale who outlined the importance of the project to the whole area: “The city region is faced with the momentous task of rebuilding its economy after the pandemic. This project is exactly what is needed to boost the region and bring much needed jobs and prosperity to the area, something I am extremely passionate about.” No date has yet been announced for the commission to report. That leaves scope for speculation

Therefore it's not unreasonable for not everyone (including myself) to be aware of these suggested sites. Especially given that I've not been able to easily find any follow up information on this commission from the last two years.


As an aside it also reports the economic impact on Liverpool as:

This capacity issue is the likely reason why consultants KPMG, in their 2013 analysis of the GDP uplift attributable to HS2, gave Liverpool a rating varying from 1.2% to -0.5% - lower than some towns and cities not connected to the network.

Whilst that's not a great range of figures to be expected, it's not certain that Liverpool would see a reduction in GDP due to HS2.

However at I've said before, Liverpool is an area where future schemes to connect it to the core HS2/NPR network to overcome these issues should have been put forwards much earlier in the process than now.

 

[Parjon]

Whilst that's not a great range of figures to be expected, it's not certain that Liverpool would see a reduction in GDP due to HS2.

Being that the line was designed to a pre-determined, mysteriously arrived at brief, and justified lack of provision on both faulty costs and revenue/patronage/growth potential data, that only a *potential* reduction in our city's already suppressed GDP is being spoken of as if it's not too bad is really appalling.

The hit the city has already taken from being sidelined has long suggested the long term hit will be at the worst end of the scale.

When the city needs its GDP massively increasing just to pull its citizens up to decent living standards, anything less than investing fully for success is inexcusable, actually.

If you should care to make this point to the British government, you can write to the department of "leveling up" at their new home, in Manchester.

 

[The Ham]

Being that the line was designed to a pre-determined, mysteriously arrived at brief, and justified lack of provision on both faulty costs and revenue/patronage/growth potential data, that only a *potential* reduction in our city's already suppressed GDP is being spoken of as if it's not too bad is really appalling.

The hit the city has already taken from being sidelined has long suggested the long term hit will be at the worst end of the scale.

When the city needs its GDP massively increasing just to pull its citizens up to decent living standards, anything less than investing fully for success is inexcusable, actually.

If you should care to make this point to the British government, you can write to the department of "leveling up" at their new home, in Manchester.

When was the announcement from the commission on the sites of the 400m platforms?

That was the main element of my post and you chose to only pick up on a secondary point, with no evidence to back it up does make me question how reliable your statement about the station locations is.

As to where HS2 should serve, let's look at it from the perspective of a different line serving a different selection of stations. If HS5 was to connect to Bristol and Exeter (both fairly stable towns in the Southwest) based on the current frequency of services should this be swapped around so that Exeter got 3tph (rather than 1tph) and Bristol 1tph (rather than 3tph) or do the two keep their current frequency?

As I've said, Liverpool certainly should have been looked at for what to do next before now. To ensure that it does as best at it can. However, (assuming that the commission hasn't reported - which is why you've not given details in your response the the question) it doesn't appear that Liverpool is helping itself overly much (14 years from when HS2 was announced to now and no clear recommendation for where the station should be.

Even the article I linked to provided several locations and the advantages and disadvantages - however the ultimate conclusion was that none was Ideal and whichever you opted for there would be comprises - when this needs to be something which is good for the city for the next 60 years (if not the next 120 years).

Part of why Liverpool may be (but without data to confirm, we just have to take your word for it) but doing as well as it could be, could very well be down to this lack of progress.

If Liverpool had identified a few potential sites, had detailed why each site was worth considering, had shown how it all tied together with NPR, had talked up the benefits (i.e. the reduced journey times - even if not at much as people would have liked) and so on; then it would have been seen as a proactive city when it comes to getting the best for the city. Conversely, it could be seen as inactive and therefore not the stort of place people wish to invest.

As such it becomes a self fulfilling prophecy, which results in business thinking it's not a place they want to be.

Also, whilst your are clearly passionate about Liverpool; by not replying to direct questions (especially given the question is from someone who agrees that Liverpool should have better) some may start to doubt the statements you make - which isn't going to help get others to (at the very least) have the view that Liverpool should be high on the list for future infrastructure to enable it to be the best city it could be.

 

[Parjon]

While I'm happy to invest moderate amounts of time to not allow a disgraceful issue to be swept under the carpet, I'm not going to invest the sorts of time and energy wasting engagement that I saw sapping others a number of years ago. As I said earlier, Liverpool has been gaslit for years.

Indeed, by yourself extolling such effort to seemingly only come up with reasons why the current situation is Liverpool's own fault (when those 14 years have been filled with proactive multi-party effort) some may start to doubt the statements you make.