I have been responsible (in the past) for both maintaining level crossings and the risk assessments of them; my signature is on the front of hundreds of Level Crossing risk assessments.
I agree with
@Annetts key that the railway should maintain the requisite sighting distance (noting this can vary over time as right of way usage changes), and indeed this is an absolute - the crossing is either compliant with the sighting standard or it is not. If it is not then mitigation must be assessed and deployed as appropriate.
But sighting distance is not a factor in the risk assessment - it is either sufficient or it is not.
Sighting
layout is a factor in the risk assessment, eg the orientation of the crossing, any skew, position of crossing with relevance to a low sun, where the assumed sighting point is, etc.
Whilst I don’t know the details of the Go Op requirements, my educated guess is that the issue is about the proposed increase in rail services. As stated above, this tips some of the crossings over into a higher risk category, and that means additional assessments and potentially mitigation needs to be completed. In some cases the mitigation can be very straightforward. In some cases it isn’t. Level Crossing Risk Assessment is a complex area, and whilst the ALCRM model does have some blunt features, it is the best tool available out there, and the one relied on by the relevant standards, and the courts.
But the important thing is that the risk is to both users of the right of way
and users of the railway. This is a particular issue at farm crossings, where heavy machinery can potentially cross, and this will be captured in the risk assessment through discussion with the authorised user(s) of the crossing. Essentially if the number of rail services on the crossing increases by, say, 50%, then the chances of collision increases by (very roughly) 50%, all else being equal. Whilst the probability is extremely small, if a train hits a tractor towing several tonnes of agricultural produce, or a tanker of some sort, it is likely to end up badly for passengers and staff on the train, as previous incidents have shown.
And, again, whilst such incidents are thankfully rare, they do happen. That means if nothing is done to consider how to mitigate the increased risk, and mitigation implemented where reasonably practical (as defined by ORRs guidance), then the relevant individual responsible for operational safety for the level crossing concerned will find themselves in the dock facing a judge in the event that an incident does occur and someone is hurt, or worse.
