RAIB: Fatal accident on WCML near Roade 8/4/20

[Trackman]

Track worker struck and fatally injured.

[Withdrawn] Fatal accident near Roade

Investigation into a fatal accident near Roade, Northamptonshire, 8 April 2020.

www.gov.uk

At around 10:52 hrs on 8 April 2020, a track worker was struck and fatally injured by a passenger train on the West Coast Main Line near to the village of Roade. The track worker was part of a group that were undertaking civil engineering work at the location. At the time of the accident the line was open to traffic.

The train was travelling from Northampton to London (Euston), at around 90 mph (145 km/h) when its driver saw the track worker on the line ahead, sounded the train horn and applied the emergency brakes.

Our investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the accident

It has been publicly confirmed the person involved was Aden Ashurst in his 50s from Wigan and was employed by AmcoGiffen carrying work out for Network Rail.

My thoughts are with his family, friends and colleagues.

 

[Horizon22]

Thoughts with the family of the individual.

Track work is quickly becoming Network Rail's safety liability. It seems almost every month there are RAIB digests about near-misses, often involving lack of safety critical communication or correct procedures. Might be linked with the outsourcing culture but correlation doesn't equal causation.

 

[Ken Hughes]

How tragic. I hope we can learn from this. My commisserations to the family and friends.

 

[Class 170101]

How many incidents of a similar nature is that in the UK this year? Is it me or do we seem to be hearing a lot more about them than we did before?

 

[markymark2000]

I'm interested to know how this is happening when elsewhere, lines get closed to do works which could be done trackside. Here we have the opposite.

We need a balance between the two. Without closing the railway every time a bit of work needs doing, what more can be done. There are warning systems generally in place but they seem to be ineffective.

 

[al78]

I'm interested to know how this is happening when elsewhere, lines get closed to do works which could be done trackside. Here we have the opposite.

We need a balance between the two. Without closing the railway every time a bit of work needs doing, what more can be done. There are warning systems generally in place but they seem to be ineffective.

Ineffective, or not perfect? Can any set of safety proceedures ever be perfect? What matters is how the accident happened and whether it points to a flaw in proceedure that can be corrected or improved. If it was a result of carelessness then no set of rules can completely eliminate bad consequences, they can at best reduce the risk of bad consequences, carelessness will always happen occasionally, hopefully very rarely.

 

[PG]

How many incidents of a similar nature is that in the UK this year? Is it me or do we seem to be hearing a lot more about them than we did before?

I despair each time I read of another RAIB investigation into either a near miss or fatality, even one is too many and there do seem to have been more over the past year or so, sadly.

Once again my thoughts to all who knew the deceased.

 

[Bald Rick]

How many incidents of a similar nature is that in the UK this year? Is it me or do we seem to be hearing a lot more about them than we did before?

Too many. There has unquestionably been an increase in workforce fatalities in the last couple of years, however there are a number of similar incidents each year which are very, very near misses.

I'm interested to know how this is happening when elsewhere, lines get closed to do works which could be done trackside. Here we have the opposite.

There is a huge amount to say here, but I’ll keep it brief. If work can be done safely with trains running, then it is permitted anywhere on the network. In some areas it can’t be done safely with trains running, so it isn’t!

There are very clear procedures for instituting safe methods of work with trains running, and in every incident, either the work has been planned incorrectly, or executed at variance to the agreed plan, or both.

 

[edwin_m]

There are very clear procedures for instituting safe methods of work with trains running, and in every incident, either the work has been planned incorrectly, or executed at variance to the agreed plan, or both.

Which could (and I'm not expressing an opinion on whether this is so) be an indication that the planning process is just too complex to be done and followed reliably.

 

[causton]

Which could (and I'm not expressing an opinion on whether this is so) be an indication that the planning process is just too complex to be done and followed reliably.

Simplifying it could result in less work getting done without more line closures, however.

 

[PG]

Simplifying it could result in less work getting done without more line closures, however.

*I'm not intending this as an anti privatisation post*

Maybe that is what is needed given that the number of actual and near miss incidents seem to be increasing.

As a railway outsider I've no knowledge of the number of incidents/near misses which happened prior to privatisation and whether it was more/less/equal than now?

I know the railway is busier now then it was so to some extent its possibly not a fair comparison but as @edwin_m says maybe simplicity is the key to safety? From reading RAIB reports it seems like nothing gets done on track without a good few folk with various acronym titles making a good few documents that are called by more acronyms - were things less safe and did we have such a plethora of acronyms years ago?

 

[causton]

The problem is that there is so much work that goes on when lines are open and to close the line while e.g. a track patrol takes place would mean having to sacrifice services somewhere on a frequent basis, all across the country.

And people are always comparing the British railways to ones on the continent that are always open, lots more overnight services, never rail replacement buses...

We can't have it both ways.

 

[markymark2000]

The problem is that there is so much work that goes on when lines are open and to close the line while e.g. a track patrol takes place would mean having to sacrifice services somewhere on a frequent basis, all across the country.

And people are always comparing the British railways to ones on the continent that are always open, lots more overnight services, never rail replacement buses...

We can't have it both ways.

How does the continent do their track repairs/upgrades?

 

[Bald Rick]

*I'm not intending this as an anti privatisation post*

Maybe that is what is needed given that the number of actual and near miss incidents seem to be increasing.

As a railway outsider I've no knowledge of the number of incidents/near misses which happened prior to privatisation and whether it was more/less/equal than now?

I know the railway is busier now then it was so to some extent its possibly not a fair comparison but as @edwin_m says maybe simplicity is the key to safety? From reading RAIB reports it seems like nothing gets done on track without a good few folk with various acronym titles making a good few documents that are called by more acronyms - were things less safe and did we have such a plethora of acronyms years ago?

There were many more incidents pre privatisation. Pretty much everyone I know who was trackside pre 1990 has had a close shave themselves. None of it was reported though.

How does the continent do their track repairs/upgrades?

Well ‘the continent’ is a big and varied place, but there are a variety of ways, some or all of the following apply

They don’t have as much traffic, thereby need less track maintenance, and can work more easily between trains

They don’t have such high axle loads, thereby needing less track maintenance

Extensive bidi signalling so that trains can be routed around

More ‘no trains’ periods (France still has them in the middle of the day), but particularly overnight. Try getting a TGV out of Gate de Lyon after 2030 at night...

Maintenance standards are lower

 

[alxndr]

...maybe simplicity is the key to safety? From reading RAIB reports it seems like nothing gets done on track without a good few folk with various acronym titles making a good few documents that are called by more acronyms - were things less safe and did we have such a plethora of acronyms years ago?

I wasn't around years ago so can't comment on what it was like then, however, even in the last couple of years new roles and acronyms have been introduced, supposedly to make it all clearer. It doesn't.

 

[PG]

There were many more incidents pre privatisation. Pretty much everyone I know who was trackside pre 1990 has had a close shave themselves. None of it was reported though.

I'm glad (as much as one can be) that things are safer nowadays and that we just didn't hear about it years ago hence why it seems as though it's more of a problem now.

I wasn't around years ago so can't comment on what it was like then, however, even in the last couple of years new roles and acronyms have been introduced, supposedly to make it all clearer. It doesn't.

That's what needs fixing then though I don't know how. Too many people doing too many different things.

 

[markymark2000]

Well ‘the continent’ is a big and varied place, but there are a variety of ways, some or all of the following apply

They don’t have as much traffic, thereby need less track maintenance, and can work more easily between trains

They don’t have such high axle loads, thereby needing less track maintenance

Extensive bidi signalling so that trains can be routed around

More ‘no trains’ periods (France still has them in the middle of the day), but particularly overnight. Try getting a TGV out of Gate de Lyon after 2030 at night...

Maintenance standards are lower

Fair enough. I can't see us adapting any of those things to make things easier for us. BiDi is only useful when there are less trains. No train periods would cause issues with early and late workers. I think the only thing that could be done then is in areas where there are more tracks is post 9pm, try to reign in services so they can cope with less track (even if a few trains have to still use the 'closed' line due to conflicts like freight, a vast reduction in trains will help make it more safe).

 

[Taunton]

Looking at the fundamentals, what really is needing attention is a straightforward 21st century way of letting track gangs know a train is coming. Waving chequered flags from up the line is something from the past, while a more modern approach implicated in a recent event seemed decidedly not thought through. It was telling that another incident with a "modern" warning method was described in the RAIB report as not particularly well regarded by the gang, who found a nearby AHB operating was a much more reliable indication.

Apparently any enthusiast can look at a website now for real time displays of signal and train position, but not the poor gangs actually out on the track.

Another thing noticeable is how few "permanent way slowings" there are nowadays compared to a generation or more ago, when a long distance journey would commonly have one or two such slowings, sometimes down to 20mph. I suspect the delay attribution approach where the infrastructure operator would have to compensate the train operator has something to do with this. What do those involved think?

 

[HSTEd]

Ultimately the only way to prevent track workers being hit is to reduce the amount of work done trackside.

Slab track or similar - however that would cost some hilarious amount of money to implement.

 

[Bald Rick]

Apparently any enthusiast can look at a website now for real time displays of signal and train position, but not the poor gangs actually out on the track.

Unfortunately, such sites can and do regularly display incorrect information. I certainly wouldn’t want to rely on it for warning of a trains approach. Any system used must be failsafe.

 

[BRblue]

Unfortunately, such sites can and do regularly display incorrect information. I certainly wouldn’t want to rely on it for warning of a trains approach. Any system used must be failsafe.

Absolutely... RTT etc use various data feeds from Network Rail, which are only as good as the internet connection they are reliant on.
Only a signaller monitoring the position of trains or the mk 1 eyeball of the lookout should be relied upon.

 

[Taunton]

Yes I wasn't advocating that they should somehow rely on this site, as is, for a critical application (might have thought that was apparent, but whatever ...). But it's driven off the signalling system, which is surely capable of providing fail-safe information. The data is there within the industry.

 

[Dr Hoo]

With regard to Taunton’s question, I thought that most speed restrictions on earlier times were because the track itself was temporarily unfit for normal speeds, e.g. because ballast had been ‘opened out’, welded rail not yet re-stressed, etc. rather than staff safety.

 

[ComUtoR]

etc. rather than staff safety.

Going back a few years... My old PTS mentions different systems of working and how trains running on adjacent lines would have their speed reduced when there is work bring undertaken.

Is it a case of too many Red zones and not enough Green ?

 

[alxndr]

Going back a few years... My old PTS mentions different systems of working and how trains running on adjacent lines would have their speed reduced when there is work bring undertaken.

Not something that I've ever known to happen. Perhaps it happened in your time, but isn't something that happens now, and I can't recall anywhere that it is documented as an option now either.

Is it a case of too many Red zones and not enough Green ?

They've been trying to dramatically reduce the amount of red zone working (now called working with warning) since the fatalities in Margam last year.

However, if you look at the causes of near misses recently there's still quite a few which aren't down to working red zone. There is far more to safety and preventing accidents than simply forcing everything to go green zone (now working with protection). There have been some near misses that simply wouldn't have happened had they been working green zone. The official line says otherwise, but most people out there still feel that as long as you've got a good lookout, nothing beats being able to see that nothing's coming.

Green zone is all well and good providing that workers remain within their green zone, and there is the clear understanding with the signaller or protection staff to ensure that they are indeed working on a portion of line which is blocked. The risk with green zone is that something goes wrong and either they are in the wrong place/on the wrong line/have strayed outside their worksite/don't understand their worksite limits, or there is a miscommunication and they aren't in fact protected. Unfortunately this happens more often than it should, for a variety of factors including poor planning, lack of local knowledge, or incorrect assumptions being made about the site of work.

 

[Bald Rick]

Another thing noticeable is how few "permanent way slowings" there are nowadays compared to a generation or more ago, when a long distance journey would commonly have one or two such slowings, sometimes down to 20mph. I suspect the delay attribution approach where the infrastructure operator would have to compensate the train operator has something to do with this. What do those involved think?

With regard to Taunton’s question, I thought that most speed restrictions on earlier times were because the track itself was temporarily unfit for normal speeds, e.g. because ballast had been ‘opened out’, welded rail not yet re-stressed, etc. rather than staff safety.

Sorry I missed this part. Three main reasons why there are fewer temporary speed restrictions than in the past:

1) the infrastructure is, generally, in a much better state; both in terms of standard of the asset (eg there’s a lot more concrete sleepers and CWR out there now than 40 years ago) but also in how well it is maintained, both in terms of process and knowledge of the assets. This is particularly so on the high speed main lines, where the memories of Hatfield are still very painful.

2) two fundamental changes to track renewal services technology: firstly the introduction of Wacker plates (around 30 years ago?) to consolidate bottom ballast on installation enabled TSRs immediately following work to be at 30/50mph rather than 20mph; second the Dynamic track stabilisers (DTS) and Automatic Finishing Machines (AFMs) used with the high output systems (around 15 years ago) enabled a significant proportion of track renewals work to be handed back at 80mph or higher.

3) rules surrounding working with the ‘Adjacent Line Open’ were changed. Previously, major work could be done on a track immediately adjacent to a line that was open, but with the open line subject to a speed restriction. Several incidents involving collisions between on track plant and trains led to those rules being changed, and this method of working is now much reduced, thereby fewer instances of speed restricti No for that purpose.

 

[Bald Rick]

Yes I wasn't advocating that they should somehow rely on this site, as is, for a critical application (might have thought that was apparent, but whatever ...)

I realise you would know this, but believe me there are people out there who would be tempted to try and use such a system, and I thought I should make it explicitly clear that it is not failsafe!

 

[ComUtoR]

Not something that I've ever known to happen. Perhaps it happened in your time, but isn't something that happens now, and I can't recall anywhere that it is documented as an option now either.

I'm going back 15yrs

3) rules surrounding working with the ‘Adjacent Line Open’ were changed. Previously, major work could be done on a track immediately adjacent to a line that was open, but with the open line subject to a speed restriction.

Any idea when this was changed ? I distinctly remember getting an ESR for works on an adjacent line.

TBH its pretty scary. Even the other day into Vic there were PWay with big boy toys drilling into the 4ft and I went past (albeit at 20mph) and they just carried on working like it was nothing.

 

[Class 170101]

I'm not convinced that NR fully understand and know their assets given the number of late notice possessions that appear or are asked for and refused.

 

[Bald Rick]

I'm going back 15yrs

Any idea when this was changed ? I distinctly remember getting an ESR for works on an adjacent line.

TBH its pretty scary. Even the other day into Vic there were PWay with big boy toys drilling into the 4ft and I went past (albeit at 20mph) and they just carried on working like it was nothing.

Not 100% sure, but it certainly all started kicking off in the mid 2000s. However I remember being trackside doing a heavy maintenance job in 2009 with ALO; and more than one driver only sounded their horn when they were right alongside. Deafening.

I'm not convinced that NR fully understand and know their assets given the number of late notice possessions that appear or are asked for and refused.

That may be so, but NR knows the assets now much better than, say, 20 years ago. And late notice possessions have always been a ‘thing’ - if a crossing deteriorates suddenly there’s not much you can do about it except replace it. And with more and more traffic, more work needs a late notice possession than it would have done 20-30 years ago.