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RAIB report on near miss with trackworkers October 2017

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alastair

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The full report is a truly shocking read. To be honest, sounds like the NR employee should be in court rather than just facing disciplinary action? Or is it more a symptom of a rotten system?

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/...p-of-track-workers-at-egmanton-level-crossing

Report 11/2018: Near miss with a group of track workers at Egmanton level crossing


Summary
At around 11:22 hrs on 5 October 2017, a group of track workers narrowly avoided being struck by a train close to Egmanton level crossing, between Newark North Gate and Retford on the East Coast Main Line. A high speed passenger train was approaching the level crossing on the Down Main line at the maximum permitted line speed of 125 mph (201 km/h), when the driver saw a group of track workers in the distance. He sounded the train’s warning horn, but saw no response from the group. A few seconds later the driver gave a series of short blasts on the train horn as it approached, and passed, the track workers.

The track workers became aware of the train about three seconds before it reached them. One of the group shouted a warning to three others who were between the running rails of the Down Main line. These three workers cleared the track about one second before the train passed them. During this time the driver had continued to sound the horn and made an emergency brake application before the train passed the point where the group had been working, thinking his train might strike one or more of them. The train subsequently came to a stand around 0.75 miles (1.2 km) after passing the site of work.

The immediate cause of the near miss was that the track workers did not move to a position of safety as the train approached. The group had been working under an unsafe and unofficial system of work, set up by the Person in Charge (PiC). Instead of adhering to the correct method of using the Train Operated Warning System (TOWS) by moving his team to, and remaining in, a position of safety while TOWS was warning of an approaching train, the PiC used the audible warning as a cue for the lookout to start looking out for approaching trains in order to maximise the working time of the group on the track. This unsafe system of work broke down when both the lookout and the PiC became distracted and forgot about the TOWS warning them of the approaching train.

Although the PiC was qualified, experienced and was deemed competent by his employer, neither his training nor reassessments had instilled in him an adequate regard for safety and the importance of following the rules and procedures. Additionally, none of the team involved challenged the unsafe system of work that was in place at the time. Even though some were uncomfortable with it, they feared they might lose the work as contractors if they challenged the PiC.

Recommendations
As a result of its investigation the RAIB has made three recommendations. These relate to:

  • strengthening safety leadership behaviour on site and reducing the occurrences of potentially dangerous rule breaking by those responsible for setting up and maintaining safe systems of work
  • mitigating the potentially adverse effect that client-contractor relationships can have on the integrity of the Worksafe procedure such that contractors’ staff feel unable to challenge unsafe systems of work for fear of losing work
  • clarifying to staff how the Train Operated Warning System (TOWS) should be used
The findings of this investigation have also reinforced the importance of railway staff understanding their safety briefings, and challenging any system of work that they believe to be unsafe.

Published 9 August 2018
 
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EveningStar

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The full report is a truly shocking read. To be honest, sounds like the NR employee should be in court rather than just facing disciplinary action? Or is it more a symptom of a rotten system?

Zero hours contract staff accepting what they, correctly, perceive dangerous working conditions because they are more scared for their future employment. Dickensian.

Cannot even begin to imagine how the driver felt, although closing eyes just before what seemed a certain impact and a full emergency call out tells the story. Presumably they were relieved and given support at the earliest possible chance once the train was ready to continue?
 

2HAP

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I read the report. One would hope that the PiC has no further need for a track safety competence certificate, COSSS certificate or any other certificate.
 

misterredmist

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That must have been sickening for the work party staff stood in the way at the time as well as the driver......very, very fortunate that nobody was killed....terrifying incident.......will lessons be learned ?
 
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And that is why you don't f**k about with the rule book.

Truly terrifying reading that report; how nobody was killed God only knows.
 

AngusH

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I'd raise the question as to how such a supervisor came to be trusted to work independently in the first place.

Yes he behaved in negligent way, but why was he allowed to get to that point?
Did he behave better when his work was monitored or was the higher level oversight always lacking?

Also, what motivated him to do this, given that presumably he would also be at risk?
Was he under excessive pressure to complete the work on time?
 

Bald Rick

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I'd raise the question as to how such a supervisor came to be trusted to work independently in the first place.

Yes he behaved in negligent way, but why was he allowed to get to that point?
Did he behave better when his work was monitored or was the higher level oversight always lacking?

Also, what motivated him to do this, given that presumably he would also be at risk?
Was he under excessive pressure to complete the work on time?

One suspects these issues will be tested in a court of law.
 

AngusH

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Yes, absolutely, I don't expect to see answers to any of my questions any time soon.
 

Silverdale

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And that is why you don't f**k about with the rule book.

As the report says; para 109 "The Rule Book, Handbook 7, ‘General duties of a controller of site safety (COSS)’ Issue 5, September 2015, states that TOWS should only be used as a method of warning of approaching trains if a member of the group is competent to use it."

So the rule book is clear enough.

But as the report then says, in the very next sentence of that para, "However, there is no specific competency requirement to use TOWS. Staff are reliant on local, undocumented knowledge when using it, which can vary from depot to depot."

The main conclusions of the report about the cause of the near miss are that the PiC had set up an unsafe system of working, and that those being briefed had not effectively challenged the PiC. I would have been tempted to add to that the fact that the PiC, although certified and tested as a COSS and ES, had not received specific instructions on the use of TOWS generally and the installation at Egmanton, in particular. Yet it is not even recognised as a contributory or underlying factor.

One of the actions noted in the report is that Network Rail plans to update the Track Warning System standard to include TOWS and that it is considering whether to create a training module within the COSS and lookout certification to clarify its correct use.

So, having had this serious near miss with an unsafe use of TOWS, NR is merely considering whether to train those acting as COSS how to use TOWS properly. #facepalm
 

alxndr

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The main conclusions of the report about the cause of the near miss are that the PiC had set up an unsafe system of working, and that those being briefed had not effectively challenged the PiC. I would have been tempted to add to that the fact that the PiC, although certified and tested as a COSS and ES, had not received specific instructions on the use of TOWS generally and the installation at Egmanton, in particular. Yet it is not even recognised as a contributory or underlying factor.

One of the actions noted in the report is that Network Rail plans to update the Track Warning System standard to include TOWS and that it is considering whether to create a training module within the COSS and lookout certification to clarify its correct use.

So, having had this serious near miss with an unsafe use of TOWS, NR is merely considering whether to train those acting as COSS how to use TOWS properly. #facepalm

I agree. TOWS is only any good if you know how to operate it, use it appropriately, and where the effective limits of that installation are. There are subtle differences at each installation, so local knowledge is imperative.

More general knowledge is also vital, the question of whether a "listen-out" should be used for example. I know I prefer having one as after a while the noise can get tuned out, or work/ambient noise drowns it out. If a failure occurs it can also take a moment to twig that it's gone silent as the noise sticks in your head.
 

jon0844

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Watching that really made me wince.

Seeing that Daily Mail logo .. Urgh.
 

Bayum

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Forward facing is on youtube.


S**t. You read through the report and think, ‘Christ, what on Earth were they thinking?’ I genuinely don’t think anyone on the forum has any idea just how close they were to being splattered over the next half mile.
 

Bayum

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Each time I watch it I’m just laid here repeating, ‘Jesus Christ’ each time. It doesn’t look as if they’ve even registered there’s a train coming on any level whatsoever.
 

muz379

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I'd raise the question as to how such a supervisor came to be trusted to work independently in the first place.

Yes he behaved in negligent way, but why was he allowed to get to that point?
Did he behave better when his work was monitored or was the higher level oversight always lacking?

Also, what motivated him to do this, given that presumably he would also be at risk?
Was he under excessive pressure to complete the work on time?
I think another important consideration is if there have been similar occurrences that had not been reported . Maybe other near misses not quite as near as this , or regular use of an unsafe system of work such as this . If that is the case then that can breed complacency
 

Bayum

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Let me get this straight.

The TOWS gives an audible warning of an approaching train, at which point the track workers leave the track until the noise stops.

However, what was happening was that the noise would start and one of the workers would then visually check how long they could stay working on the track for?
 

causton

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Let me get this straight.

The TOWS gives an audible warning of an approaching train, at which point the track workers leave the track until the noise stops.

However, what was happening was that the noise would start and one of the workers would then visually check how long they could stay working on the track for?

And then they moved to a different site and the 'one of the workers' stopped doing even that.
Paragraph 66 said:
The lookout claimed that he had been stood down from his duties by the PiC at the third site of work and was accordingly not acting as a lookout. The PiC stated that this was not so.

PS @alastair The link to the PDF no longer works for me so might be best to link to the page for the incident instead:

https://www.gov.uk/raib-reports/rep...p-of-track-workers-at-egmanton-level-crossing
 

alxndr

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Let me get this straight.

The TOWS gives an audible warning of an approaching train, at which point the track workers leave the track until the noise stops.

However, what was happening was that the noise would start and one of the workers would then visually check how long they could stay working on the track for?

Sort of.

They begun their work at their second site using TOWS properly by standing clear every time the warning sounded, for as long as it sounded. Then they started using the TOWS as the time that the "lookout" should start looking for trains on the down road only, and only standing clear for trains on the down. This would essentially be like working with a lookout, except the "lookout" is only looking when the TOWS goes off. It appears that they started doing this after they got fed up of waiting and using TOWS properly. Other people started using different methods of warning, some using TOWS properly, some listening for the level crossing yodalarms, and some looking at the crossing barriers as an indication to stand clear.

At their third site of work, just the other side of the crossing, the PIC says that they were using the same system with the "lookout" looking when the TOWS sounded a warning. The "lookout" didn't think they were still working that way and so he wasn't looking.

So, the TOWS wasn't being used as the cue to stand clear so no one stood clear.
The "lookout" didn't realise he was supposed to be looking so didn't blow up.
The TOWS was going off, although at this point it was near useless, which probably explains why they didn't hear the train's horn either.
There was general confusion over what should be triggering them to stand clear, and in the end nothing did.

I think another important consideration is if there have been similar occurrences that had not been reported . Maybe other near misses not quite as near as this , or regular use of an unsafe system of work such as this . If that is the case then that can breed complacency

Quite. By the sounds of it they were near to the end of their job "The PIC...told the RAIB that he was waiting for a down train to pass so that he could check that the track levelling work was satisfactory." If they had managed to somehow dodge just one more train none of this calamity of errors might have come to light at all.
 

whhistle

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Not sure if any Train Drivers could wade in on this but would this be an example to hit the "stop all trains" button?
I guess yes. But just wondering how much "admin" is involved when it's pushed to get trains moving again.
 

Bald Rick

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Not sure if any Train Drivers could wade in on this but would this be an example to hit the "stop all trains" button?
I guess yes. But just wondering how much "admin" is involved when it's pushed to get trains moving again.

Yes, this would be an appropriate time to use the Railway Emergency Call (REC) function.

Admin - the signaller needs to reach a clear understanding with the driver that initiated the REC call on the circumstances, and if it is deemed safe for trains to proceed (potentially at caution), then the signaller will communicate that to the drivers concerned. Clearly the more trains that are stopped by the REC, the longer it takes.
 

ComUtoR

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Restarting all trains can be done with a single sentence.
 

Sunset route

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Restarting all trains can be done with a single sentence.

Let’s not get into how hit and miss GSMR is, even with REC calls. At the moment we are spending a lot of time talking to drivers of class 387s nothing unusually about that as they are used on the Gatwick Expresses on the BML, but these ones are painted GWR green and are the Slough/Maidenhead area on the GWML. Also we are picking a lot of trains from the Feltnam ASC area. London Bridge now TBROC Mid Kent line also end up talking to us for some reason.

Not so long ago half the drivers passing through one of our panels received a REC call (and stopped as they should) from an unknown location, but neither the signaller controlling the area or the the fringe panels at the same location and neither the fringes for adjoining ASC & ROC received or sent this REC call. So now your having drivers asking if it’s ok to proceed as other traffic is passing them. To which you say proceed from what, the REC call is the answer, to which was said what REC call!! Nothing happing in this area away you go driver.

Give me back CSR any day.

Don’t get me wrong, there are pluses with the system, as in every cab of every train now has it, so we can talk freight trains and OTMs now which is a huge benefit. It was a right pain in the arse trying to talk to a Virgin Cross Country drivers in a class 220/221 in what was land of near 100% CSR fitted EMUs when all they had was NRN.
 
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jon0844

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I wonder if the lack of security in GSM-R (as in very outdated security that had been compromised) could lead to incidents of falsely sending signals/messages to trains.

It doesn't seem to be something talked about much either because it's advantageous to play down the problems or because the industry isn't fully aware.

Other issues down to the positioning of base stations are of course a separate issue.
 

ComUtoR

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I think Driver side needs to swallow some of that blame. Procedure allows us to continue without needing to call the box. I found it a little odd that the Sig called me up asking if I pressed the SG because of the REC.

I reckon better cell management and call routing will help. Overlapping cells are a nightmare to deal with. London Bridge has 4 panels running through it :/
 
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