SPAD at Loughborough, 20/3/2020

[111-111-1]

Largely depends on the company's competency regime. Forget what it is known as these days but the shidft Duty Manager generally holds a copy of the driver "at risk" register. If the driver in question is on the register, this helps make an informed choice as to whether the train needs relief on site etc. For cause screening would be arranged by most TOCs / FOCs too, but at a recognised location, and based on the facts available. This could involve the driver admitting to mishandling the brakes, and not making any allegation against the traction.

The movement of a train after a Cat A SPAD is very limited. The driver will always be relieved of duty. Every case is different but it would not be further than the nearest point the train could be held to allow the resumption of train running on other lines.

 

[EvoIV]

You won't find AFT cocks in 66's anymore (at least not changeable ones). They were made redundant when modifications were made to the brake pipe pressure control unit (E70). Now if the "E70" is not isolated on a DIT 66 you are not able to create the brake pipe.

I believe some red team locos still have them, whereas all blue and green team locos seem to have had the function of the AFT cock automated such that manual input is no longer required, bar the usual isolation of the E70.

With regard to the naming, my memory is that they were previously labelled as "dead engine cock" but this caused misunderstanding so the name was changed to "assistance to failed train cock". The AFT cock on the 66 has to be across the pipe in normal operation and along the pipe to feed the main res from the brake pipe, differing from nearly every other valve that I can think of.

 

[MarkyT]

I believe some red team locos still have them, whereas all blue and green team locos seem to have had the function of the AFT cock automated such that manual input is no longer required, bar the usual isolation of the E70.

With regard to the naming, my memory is that they were previously labelled as "dead engine cock" but this caused misunderstanding so the name was changed to "assistance to failed train cock". The AFT cock on the 66 has to be across the pipe in normal operation and along the pipe to feed the main res from the brake pipe, differing from nearly every other valve that I can think of.

I suppose AFT is just an established term in UK. To me as non-footplate, 'dead engine cock' sounds perfectly logical, i.e. if THIS engine is dead adjust THIS cock. 'Assistance to failed train cock' sounds like something you might operate on the assisting engine rather than the dead one. Automating the function is the right way forward undoubtedly though.

 

[Mag_seven]

RAIB are investigating a SPAD at Loughborough on 20 March 2020 in which a pair fo Class 57s hauling an unbraked Class 710 overran a signal by 200m .

[Withdrawn] Signal passed at danger near Loughborough

Investigation into a signal being passed at danger (red) near Loughborough, Leicestershire, 26 March 2020.

www.gov.uk

The final report has now been published:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933491/R102020_201109_Loughborough.pdf

At around 10:57 hrs on 26 March 2020, a train formed of two locomotives and an empty, un-braked, passenger multiple unit passed a signal at danger about 0.75 miles (1.2 km) south of Loughborough station. The train passed the signal at a speed of about 20 mph (32 km/h) and came to a stand around 200 metres beyond it. The signal was at danger to protect the movement of a passenger service which was just about to leave Loughborough station. The incident occurred because the train was travelling too fast for its braking capability, and because the braking applied by the driver was insufficient to stop the train from that speed within the available distance.

 

[2HAP]

From the report.

SPAD happened because train was travelling too fast to enable it to stop in time with brake force available. Driver had been given info that he was allowed to travel at 75mph, not the correct 60 mph. Future movements now limited to 45 mph.

 

[MotCO]

From the report.

SPAD happened because train was travelling too fast to enable it to stop in time with brake force available. Driver had been given info that he was allowed to travel at 75mph, not the correct 60 mph. Future movements now limited to 45 mph.

To be pedantic, the driver was not given the correct documentation providing details of the maximum permitted speed of the train - he relied on a document which was not sufficient for this purpose.

 

[Efini92]

From the report.

SPAD happened because train was travelling too fast to enable it to stop in time with brake force available. Driver had been given info that he was allowed to travel at 75mph, not the correct 60 mph. Future movements now limited to 45 mph.

However it states that the line speed there is 65. Whatever excuse the driver is giving doesn’t detract from the fact he was speeding.

 

[MotCO]

However it states that the line speed there is 65. Whatever excuse the driver is giving doesn’t detract from the fact he was speeding.

Para 6 says that the speed limit is 50 mph from about 300 meters before the SPADed signal (LR507), so the driver should have slowed down beforehand. Para 57 deduces that the train was travelling at 50 mph between the yellow (LR503) and the red signal (LR507), so at LR507 the driver was not speeding. He may have been speeding beforehand - it is not clear in the report where the 65 mph limit starts; it may have been higher earlier, in which case the driver may not have been exceeded the permitted speed limit.

 

[Tom Quinne]

Is it any surprise there’s been another SPAD by one of the zero hours part time sign the world outfits?

How long before one of these “minor” incidents becomes a serious accident involving another train.

 

[jfowkes]

If the driver had been speeding I would have expected the report to explicitly say that, but it's weirdly ambiguous as to whether they were or not.

 

[ExRes]

Is it any surprise there’s been another SPAD by one of the zero hours part time sign the world outfits?

How long before one of these “minor” incidents becomes a serious accident involving another train.

Do you have any evidence that ROG employ zero hours drivers? The report states, on page 12, that all of the drivers records of competence were up to date, therefore he signed the route

 

[Efini92]

Without OTDR evidence they can’t say for definite. The braking graph on page 19 suggests that the train was speeding.

 

[londonboi198o5]

As usual the armchair experts are out

 

[Efini92]

More of a sofa person myself

 

[43096]

Without OTDR evidence they can’t say for definite. The braking graph on page 19 suggests that the train was speeding.

As per the report, the speed was captured by lineside equipment (almost certainly Barrow-on-Soar HABD*). Line speed at that point is 65mph.

Indeed the report does make note of the speeding:

Despite the absence of evidence from the train’s on-train data recorder (OTDR; see paragraph 71), there is clear evidence that the train was exceeding its permitted speed on approach to the single yellow signal (LR503). Witness evidence suggests the train speed was between 70-75 mph (113-121 km/h) on this section of line. RAIB’s analysis of signalling data indicates an average speed around 70 mph (113 km/h), and lineside equipment recorded the train passing a point around two miles (3.2 km) before the red signal, at just over 75 mph (121 km/h) (paragraph 28).

* Hot Axle Box Detector

If the driver had been speeding I would have expected the report to explicitly say that, but it's weirdly ambiguous as to whether they were or not.

It does say that.

 

[Tom Quinne]

Do you have any evidence that ROG employ zero hours drivers? The report states, on page 12, that all of the drivers records of competence were up to date, therefore he signed the route

So ROG employ 100% full time staff, not a single as required staff?

As usual the armchair experts are out

Fast approaching two decades of front line operational experience with all the lumps and scares to prove it.

 

[Stewart2887]

Why do they travel with the coaching stock's brakes not working?

 

[ExRes]

So ROG employ 100% full time staff, not a single as required staff?

I have no idea, you're the one making the accusation that a ROG zero hour employee is culpable, do you know that they do employ such drivers or are you making a wild assumption?

 

[Domh245]

It's noticable that there's no comment in there about the employment type of any of the people involved, nor is it identified as playing a part in the incident..

Why do they travel with the coaching stock's brakes not working?

IIRC the braking system is electrically controlled in a way that wouldn't be controllable by the loco, meaning it's easier to haul it dead (and to accommodate the reduced braking performance)

 

[Randomer]

The thing that really struck me from the report was:

These six incidents represent an average rate for ROG over the four-year period of 9.04 signals passed at danger per million train miles; this compares to a freight national average rate of 2.09 over a similar period.

Now I accept it goes on to give mitigation by ROG for this but they wouldn't have been served an improvement notice by ORR a little over a month after the incident for no reason....

I do find it interesting that they in the initial measures to prevent the incident from reoccurring they didn't actually fix the issue at hand (i.e. the maximum speed of the consist being incorrectly stated) by missing out the configuration that caused the incident from the documentation entirely.

I strongly suspect that if people are pointing fingers at anybody at ROG it should probably be towards those who allowed a planning process which didn't follow industry best practice i.e.:

Paragraph 56:

Railway Group Standard GORT3056 defines the requirements for a train document (commonly referred to as a ‘driver’s slip’) that the driver must have in their possession before and during the journey.

Paragraph 60:

However, neither briefings nor train documents were being provided to drivers or shunters.

Could be viewed as more alarming than anything to do with the employment status of the driver or shunter.

Now I'm sure it could be argued that both members of staff should have argued about this further but it doesn't change the problem that this system itself wasn't very good to begin with.

Both taken from the report here: RAIB Report Link

 

[Tom Quinne]

I have no idea, you're the one making the accusation that a ROG zero hour employee is culpable, do you know that they do employ such drivers or are you making a wild assumption?

Id suggest there are crew who work on part time / zero hours basis.

logic would dictate such, there’s very little work to sustain the number of crew they seem to have access to on full time basis.

I have no idea, you're the one making the accusation that a ROG zero hour employee is culpable, do you know that they do employ such drivers or are you making a wild assumption?

Do you have proof of bingo drivers at EWS you suggested happened a few pages ago?

 

[SamYeager]

Id suggest there are crew who work on part time / zero hours basis.

logic would dictate such, there’s very little work to sustain the number of crew they seem to have access to on full time basis.



Do you have proof of bingo drivers at EWS you suggested happened a few pages ago?

Whether or not someone else's claims were correct has no bearing on the validity of your own claim. From the quote above it seems you are inferring the status of the crew rather than having firm evidence of their status. I'm sure if someone made claims regarding signallers based on inference rather than firm evidence then you would be slating them for that fact.

 

[2HAP]

43096:

Despite the absence of evidence from the train’s on-train data recorder (OTDR; see paragraph 71), there is clear evidence that the train was exceeding its permitted speed on approach to the single yellow signal (LR503). Witness evidence suggests the train speed was between 70-75 mph (113-121 km/h) on this section of line. RAIB’s analysis of signalling data indicates an average speed around 70 mph (113 km/h), and lineside equipment recorded the train passing a point around two miles (3.2 km) before the red signal, at just over 75 mph (121 km/h) (paragraph 28).

My understanding of that is the "exceeding its permitted speed" refers to the 60mph that the driver should have been told the train was limited to, not the 75 mph that he had been incorrectly told it was limited to. I don't know whether or not the speed is in excess of the permitted line speed at the location in question. Maybe someone can confirm?

 

[ExRes]

Do you have proof of bingo drivers at EWS you suggested happened a few pages ago?

Obviously not, these were events that took place 20 to 25 years ago with culpability being shared between Drivers, EWS, ASLEF and Railtrack, I could give examples, which you could believe or not, but I think that would be going off thread

 

[MotCO]

As per the report, the speed was captured by lineside equipment (almost certainly Barrow-on-Soar HABD*). Line speed at that point is 65mph.

Indeed the report does make note of the speeding:

Despite the absence of evidence from the train’s on-train data recorder (OTDR; see paragraph 71), there is clear evidence that the train was exceeding its permitted speed on approach to the single yellow signal (LR503). Witness evidence suggests the train speed was between 70-75 mph (113-121 km/h) on this section of line. RAIB’s analysis of signalling data indicates an average speed around 70 mph (113 km/h), and lineside equipment recorded the train passing a point around two miles (3.2 km) before the red signal, at just over 75 mph (121 km/h) (paragraph 28).

* Hot Axle Box Detector


It does say that.

From the report it is not clear whether 'permitted speed' is the line speed limit or the speed limit of the train - if its's the line speed, then that is a problem; if it's the train's permitted speed, then we have seen that there was some confusion about that. Given that the report did not log it as a serious problem, I would assume that 'exceeding its permitted speed' relates to the train's permitted speed.

Edit: just seen that @2HAP has made the same point

 

[43096]

43096:



My understanding of that is the "exceeding its permitted speed" refers to the 60mph that the driver should have been told the train was limited to, not the 75 mph that he had been incorrectly told it was limited to. I don't know whether or not the speed is in excess of the permitted line speed at the location in question. Maybe someone can confirm?

As I posted above, line speed at the HABD, where the 75mph was recorded, is 65mph according to the Sectional Appendix.

The train was therefore 15mph over the train limit and 10mph over the line speed.

I, for one, would be questioning the driver’s competence and route knowledge.

 

[2HAP]

Thank you for that clarification, @43096.

 

[ainsworth74]

As I posted above, line speed at the HABD, where the 75mph was recorded, is 65mph according to the Sectional Appendix.

Seems strange the RAIB didn't address then?

 

[Domh245]

Seems strange the RAIB didn't address then?

They did?

The excessive speed is identified as one of the causal factors, and the specific exceeding of line speed is paragraph 44, and is addressed in learning point 1:

This investigation highlights the importance of being aware of, and adhering to, maximum permissible speeds both for the type of train being operated and for the section of line on which it is being driven, as defined by controlled information sources (such as the Sectional Appendix and a properly formatted train document).

It's by no means the strongest worded they could have been, no doubt because of the lack of evidence, but it's there and also falls more generally under ROG needing to improve their management assurance processes to ensure adherence of drivers to their safety management system

 

[ainsworth74]

They did?

The excessive speed is identified as one of the causal factors, and the specific exceeding of line speed is paragraph 44, and is addressed in learning point 1:



It's by no means the strongest worded they could have been, no doubt because of the lack of evidence, but it's there and also falls more generally under ROG needing to improve their management assurance processes to ensure adherence of drivers to their safety management system

Ah sorry I'd missed that bit where they'd referred to the section of line as well as the permissible speed for the type of train, clearly need to slow down my skim reading!