As somebody who has studied transport planning in Europe, I think there are some fundamental points that have been touched on previously in the thread, but are worth mentioning in more detail.
Fundamentally it comes down to the purpose of a bus system. In the current model, the main motivation for private operators is profit - and generally for the operator alone, not for the network as a whole. In a more centralised, government controlled model you can take a much broader view. The aim of a public transport system as a whole can be summarised as follows:
In most European cities, the public transport network seen in isolation is rarely profitable (a very rough rule of thumb is a cost recovery ratio of about 80%), but the benefits it provides to society as a whole both financially and in terms of public benefit more than make up for this. If people can move around easily, they can earn and spend money more easily too, which stimulates the economy and results in more taxable income, which can then be used for the subsidy, whilst providing societal benefits as well.
This systematic perspective of the transport system is extremely important, but it is extraordinarily difficult to implement in a privatised, unregulated model - precisely because it often conflicts with the pure profit motive of an operator. Obviously there are other issues in Manchester's current bus network that make it function less well than it should, but this single point is so critical it makes solving the other problems much harder
A few examples:
The aim of a franchised bus network is to make it as reliable and useful as a tram (a major reason why trams and trains are seen as more attractive than buses is that their tracks mean a route is unlikely to signficiantly change) and in doing so attract new users out of their cars onto public transport as a whole. Presumably this is where the extra income is expected to come from. This is also likely why TfGM is interested in controlling rail as well. If you make public transport attractive, people will use it instead of driving, but for that to work you have to take a whole-system approach.
Fundamentally it comes down to the purpose of a bus system. In the current model, the main motivation for private operators is profit - and generally for the operator alone, not for the network as a whole. In a more centralised, government controlled model you can take a much broader view. The aim of a public transport system as a whole can be summarised as follows:
- Allow residents to move around to where they need to go - in particular those who have no alternative (e.g. those with disabilities)
- Do so quickly, reliably, predictably, and at an affordable cost for all income levels
- Remove cars from the road, to reduce their environmental impact, congestion, and to improve residents' quality of life (noise, air quality etc)
- Do so at an affordable cost for the taxpayer
In most European cities, the public transport network seen in isolation is rarely profitable (a very rough rule of thumb is a cost recovery ratio of about 80%), but the benefits it provides to society as a whole both financially and in terms of public benefit more than make up for this. If people can move around easily, they can earn and spend money more easily too, which stimulates the economy and results in more taxable income, which can then be used for the subsidy, whilst providing societal benefits as well.
This systematic perspective of the transport system is extremely important, but it is extraordinarily difficult to implement in a privatised, unregulated model - precisely because it often conflicts with the pure profit motive of an operator. Obviously there are other issues in Manchester's current bus network that make it function less well than it should, but this single point is so critical it makes solving the other problems much harder
A few examples:
- Poor integration - a private operator has little incentive to encourage its passengers to use other operators' services
- A corridor has lots of bus services using it, so the local authorities decide to add some bus priority measures to increase reliability. The operator then decides to suddenly change its route to a parallel side street it thinks is slightly less congested, rendering the priority measures useless.
- The operator starts a new bus route. It later decides the route is unprofitable, so ceases to run it, leaving its passengers no alternative but to use a car.
The aim of a franchised bus network is to make it as reliable and useful as a tram (a major reason why trams and trains are seen as more attractive than buses is that their tracks mean a route is unlikely to signficiantly change) and in doing so attract new users out of their cars onto public transport as a whole. Presumably this is where the extra income is expected to come from. This is also likely why TfGM is interested in controlling rail as well. If you make public transport attractive, people will use it instead of driving, but for that to work you have to take a whole-system approach.