Train stopping short & doors been opened

[skyhigh]

Given the doors self close after 30 seconds I suspect the OP saw the door was off, pressed the button to open it from inside themselves and then went out the second door down for their photo - without any attempt themselves to stop anyone falling out or inform the crew by use of the CFA etc.

Unless the OP told the guard and they took long enough to shut the doors again that they could pop down for a photo...

 

[43066]

What a terrible attitude. No, you wouldn't expect the details of any disciplinary action to be passed on, but you would expect an acknowledgment that this is a serious issue that will be investigated, together with an apology.

Do you believe in customer service?

You are, as usual, just criticising for the sake of it.

Customer service does not extend to accommodating people who are repeatedly asking for information they’re not entitled to, and needlessly involving themselves in operational matters.

Given the doors self close after 30 seconds I suspect the OP saw the door was off, pressed the button to open it from inside themselves and then went out the second door down for their photo - without any attempt themselves to stop anyone falling out or inform the crew by use of the CFA etc.

Unless the OP told the guard and they took long enough to shut the doors again that they could pop down for a photo...

Indeed!

 

[357]

Customer service does not extend to accommodating people who are asking for information they’re not entitled to,

May I gently remind people on here of the issues spotters have caused in the past with their knowledge, especially when they get hold of keys etc.

There is a reason that even the FOI Act has restrictions on what can be shared.

 

[RJ]

Presumably the OP feels Northern have fobbed them off with meaningless responses, resulting in the OP making it public to elicit a meaningful response - something that was probably entirely avoidable. And it has worked, as other staff have confirmed that internally, it has been flagged and addressed.

What else is there to say?

 

[coxxy]

Our shortest "development plan" was 1 day.

And that 1 day development plan is still a negative on your safety of the line record.

Yes they do. That's their job.
They're not going to tell you what happened to the staff member, but they really should answer, that's the most basic level of customer service.

They have answered. The OP says he's been given the run around from them awaiting feedback from other departments.

Other than CS acknowledging that a problem occurred and making the relevant parties aware, there really is nothing more to say to the person making the original complaint.

 

[43066]

May I gently remind people on here of the issues spotters have caused in the past with their knowledge, especially when they get hold of keys etc.

There is a reason that even the FOI Act has restrictions on what can be shared.

Yes indeed, and they don’t have a great reputation amongst many staff already. As I mentioned above, the direct result of threads like this is that enthusiasts of all types will be shown less accommodation in future.

It’s very easy for the friendly wave to the guy at the end of the platform to turn into a request for him to be removed because he’s a distraction. As an enthusiast I think that’s a shame, but as a staff member I can absolutely understand it.

No, I believe in being horrible to customers at all times, and am especially cruel to dogs and children.

Time to go driving .

 

[bunnahabhain]

I review incident investigations on a quarterly basis and if that information was being diseminated to the wider public I'd be having words with senior management and putting a stop to it. We go to great pains to ensure the safety culture is just and fair, and not one that attributes blame on an individual for something any one of us could be involved in. If we blame staff and discipline them we end up with a pile under the carpet very high and no ability to see what is becoming a problem. If the OP reported it to the Guard and/or prevented harm to passengers onboard by warning them the door isn't platformed, great stuff. Now move on, let the line managers and/or safety team do their bit now. The industry is very good at learning from mistakes like this and putting actions in place to reduce the occurrence or prevent them entirely, none of which involve disciplinary action.

 

[tspaul26]

There is a reason that even the FOI Act has restrictions on what can be shared.

In this vein, it is not readily apparent which (if any) of the FOIA exemptions would apply should a member of the public request copies of the (anonymised) investigation file in this case.

Accordingly, whilst a number of posters in this thread have made comments to the effect that “it’s none of the OP’s business”, he may well have a right to the information.

 

[Snow1964]

They have answered. The OP says he's been given the run around from them awaiting feedback from other departments.

We don't know how customer services responded, but this suggests they sent an acknowledgment and promised an update within X weeks, which hasn't happened.

So the Op is probably not aware the event has been followed up and acted upon. So if you look at it from the possible scenarios (as far as Op is concerned) either safety concern never got beyond customer services, or the Safety Manager can't be bothered to say it has been followed up and thanking the concerned person for bringing it to their attention.

You have to presume that Ops concerns are that no one in that railway company has thought it sensible or polite to respond to Op saying they will aim to avoid it reoccurring. (And really the local guards office should have checked the item is closed and reply sent to complainant, not taking a not my concern Guv approach)

Sort of smacks of Boeing attitude. Make it look like don't do anything about safety concerns, until get found out by a repeat incident.

 

[Deafdoggie]

No, I believe in being horrible to customers at all times, and am especially cruel to dogs and children.

You should probably ask for a transfer to Blackpool North platform staff

 

[12LDA28C]

Of which I do appreciate. However, if there is no way to tell if you are fully platformed after stopping then human error, then there is evidence that this could be a process or system error.

There should be no circumstances in which there is no way to tell if a train is fully platformed after stopping. This is why platforms have car stop marker boards and drivers and guards have route knowledge. This of course does not prevent mistakes being made by humans.

 

[muz379]

Is there only reactive investigations and not proactive steps taken to prevent incident ?

You could argue that the competence management processes that TOC's use with Guards manage this kind of risk as well , Guards will have practical assessments with someone qualified to assess their competence that may pick up any deficiencies with the door operating procedure, there is also unobtrusive monitoring where Guards have unannounced observations carried out of them performing their door procedures . And then there are also briefings which will include discussions around incidents such as this one which do in some cases help to focus minds .

A huge amount of focus in the industry as a whole is now also placed on non technical skills , and there is a growing understanding about how development of those non technical skills can also help to reduce operational incidents such as these .

Does a blind person automatically need assistance or are the capable of being independent ?

Whilst not all visually impaired people will need assistance getting on and off the train , I would suggest that it would still be sensible of a Guard to be aware of anyone on the train that may be in need of additional support for instance if there was an emergency on board or some service disruption that the person may need help dealing with .

Following on from above. What about "process error" or "system error" ? As already mentioned above; if there are technological solutions, surely that then forms part of the mitigation process ?

If my memory serves me correctly I am sure a few years back Northern painted the end passenger doors on 333's a different colour so that they could be better distinguised as being accomodated on the platform at stations that were tight and with curvature which required the conductor to work from a position other than the very rear of the train . A very low-tech solution but I seem to recall it did actually recieve positive feedback form Guards and reduced incidents .Obviously that is easier to do on a route that only sees one type of traction all of the same length

If you operate ASDO with a Balise which essentially measures how much of the train is accomodated and sets a number of doors to be released accordingly then that can also drastically reduce the risk of this kind of incident , if the system is set up correctly and used as intended by Traincrew then the only risks are some error or failure of the interface between on train equipment and the balaise (but even then that is more likely to fail safe so not enable any doors to be released), or some issue with the platform itself like what happened at Moston in 2015 .

 

[bahnause]

If my memory serves me correctly I am sure a few years back Northern painted the end passenger doors on 333's a different colour so that they could be better distinguised as being accomodated on the platform at stations that were tight and with curvature which required the conductor to work from a position other than the very rear of the train . A very low-tech solution but I seem to recall it did actually recieve positive feedback form Guards and reduced incidents .Obviously that is easier to do on a route that only sees one type of traction all of the same length

A very good example of a simple mitigation strategy used after a risk assessment. It is however important to recognise, that not every (near) incident leads to a new risk assessment. The case brought up by the starter of this thread may fall within the previously defined acceptance criteria and be classified as an “acceptable risk”. This would also be documented accordingly and is a legitimate outcome in a risk assessment.

 

[Twingo37175]

If my memory serves me correctly I am sure a few years back Northern painted the end passenger doors on 333's a different colour so that they could be better distinguised as being accomodated on the platform at stations that were tight and with curvature which required the conductor to work from a position other than the very rear of the train . A very low-tech solution but I seem to recall it did actually recieve positive feedback form Guards and reduced incidents .Obviously that is easier to do on a route that only sees one type of traction all of the same length

Yes - they are painted bright yellow. I commute to Leeds so knew it had been done, but never the reason why. I would assume Shipley (curvature) being one of the main reasons.

 

[Haywain]

May I gently remind people on here of the issues spotters have caused in the past with their knowledge, especially when they get hold of keys etc.

That's very much tarring everybody with the same brush. There are undoubtedly some who act in that way but I am sure there are many cases of enthusiasts encountering issues which they have dealt with correctly. And very many enthusiasts also work in the industry.

 

[DMckduck97]

If you operate ASDO with a Balise which essentially measures how much of the train is accomodated and sets a number of doors to be released accordingly then that can also drastically reduce the risk of this kind of incident , if the system is set up correctly and used as intended by Traincrew then the only risks are some error or failure of the interface between on train equipment and the balaise (but even then that is more likely to fail safe so not enable any doors to be released), or some issue with the platform itself like what happened at Moston in 2015 .

There is some stock in which every coach has a beacon that reads the balise when it goes over it, enabling it for the station. But AFAIK there isn't a system in the UK that measures each coach.

 

[357]

There should be no circumstances in which there is no way to tell if a train is fully platformed after stopping. This is why platforms have car stop marker boards and drivers and guards have route knowledge. This of course does not prevent mistakes being made by humans.

I beg of you to visit Low Moor in person when a longer service is stopping there.

That's very much tarring everybody with the same brush. There are undoubtedly some who act in that way but I am sure there are many cases of enthusiasts encountering issues which they have dealt with correctly. And very many enthusiasts also work in the industry.

Yes I didn't mean all enthusiasts or spotters - but I have found myself dealing with train faults in the past and spotters shoving their cameras in body end cupboards I've opened and isolating doors with T keys. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing in the wrong hands.

I myself am an enthusiast who's now a driver so please don't feel I'm saying all enthusiasts are like this - I'm absolutely not.

 

[Mag_seven]

I think we have all had our chance for a say on this.