You clearly have no understanding of railway operations. Any form of brake application, not initiated by the driver, and you let the train come to a stand, and do not move without permission from the signaller. That is because drivers have been stopped by TPWS, after a SPAD, and have not realised that this is what has happened. A rule that is there for good reason, and one which we all understand.
From the RAIB interim report - it's all there. If you're familiar with the AWS equipment on a steam loco, there is enough information to tell you exactly what has been done, something that has been done explicitly to those who have to take immediate actions after this incident.
"The RAIBs preliminary examination has shown that, at around 17:24 hrs, train 1Z67 was approaching signal SN43 at 59 mph, when it passed over the temporary AWS magnet associated with the TSR. This created both an audible and visual warning in the locomotives cab. However, as the driver did not acknowledge this warning within 2.7 seconds, the AWS system on the locomotive automatically applied the trains brakes. This brake application should have resulted in the train being brought to a stand. In these circumstances, the railway rule book requires that the driver immediately contact the signaller.
The RAIB has found evidence that the driver of 1Z67 did not bring the train to a stand and contact the signaller after experiencing this brake application. Evidence shows that the driver and fireman instead took an action which cancelled the effect of the AWS braking demand after a short period and a reduction in train speed of only around 8 mph. The action taken also had the effect of making subsequent AWS or TPWS brake demands ineffective."
Every driver I know wants to see people like this off the network. It could be one of us coming the other way next time.
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What concerns me more, is that there were two people on that footplate, and they both went along with it.