What happened to Network Rail's HOPS train?

[ABB125]

As the title says, what happened to Network Rail's HOPS train(s)? Did it get used on the GWML electrification project, or is it just say in a siding somewhere rusting away millions of pounds? Am I right in thinking that two were purchased, initially one for Great Western and one for Scotland?
I don't think I've read anything in the railway media other than "electrification train arrives" and "electrification train fails to deliver"; is this a case of no news is good news?

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

I think it's complicated by the HOPS system being in multiple sections with different uses.
Some of the sections were in full use on the logistics of electrification from the Swindon base.
Other sections had to be modified or used in more limited situations than planned.

NR also had a separate wiring train (also from Windhoff) which was purchased for the WCML rewiring in the 2000s.
That (which also had operational problems at the start of its life) was certainly used in the NW electrification projects, and probably elsewhere.
The GE line rewiring has also used similar equipment.
I think also that the Crossrail section of GW (Paddington-Maidenhead) used different equipment based at Langley, so there was more than one "HOPS" on the job.
I also think the section west of Bristol Parkway to Cardiff was done differently (by different contractors).
Scotland had other means too, with a variety of contractors.

So, I don't think it's the case that the new electrification plant was "sat idle" for years, but it certainly didn't do the whole job it was specified to do.
Supposedly, this was one of the factors behind significant cost increase of the GW project.

 

[59CosG95]

I think it's complicated by being in multiple sections with different uses.
Some of the sections were in full use on the logistics of electrification from the Swindon base.
Other sections had to be modified or used in more limited situations than planned.

So, I don't think it's the case that the new electrification plant was "sat idle" for years, but it certainly didn't do the whole job it was specified to do.
Supposedly, this was one of the factors behind significant cost increase of the GW project.

I certainly recall that the piling in the Thames Valley (west of Maidenhead) was impeded due to the lack of buried services information regarding the signalling cables (which I seem to remember were buried in the ground without troughs - an unfortunate legacy of how the Western Region did things in the 60s), so cable strikes were very common indeed. Another more mechanical limitation of the Piling train was (and still is) the lengths of each pile; the length of the wagons means that any pile can only be a maximum of 5.5m per single section before splices were required.

 

[MarkyT]

I certainly recall that the piling in the Thames Valley (west of Maidenhead) was impeded due to the lack of buried services information regarding the signalling cables (which I seem to remember were buried in the ground without troughs - an unfortunate legacy of how the Western Region did things in the 60s), so cable strikes were very common indeed. Another more mechanical limitation of the Piling train was (and still is) the lengths of each pile; the length of the wagons means that any pile can only be a maximum of 5.5m per single section before splices were required.

The particular cables involved were trunk communications cables and power cables most of which called in at very few equipment cabinets and buildings en route. Other cables from cabinet to cabinet were on the surface in concrete troughs and these were very easy to spot and avoid. The big trunk cables were often massive lead sheathed affairs containg large numbers of telecoms pairs and sometimes coaxes. These were used by internal trunk communication and data circuits. Most of those had already migrated away into new digital carriers in fibre optic cables on the surface by the start of GW electrification, but there were still a number of legacy signalling circuits using these cables, notably the critical remote control telemetry for distributed relay interlockings, certain alarm and override functions and a few voice circuits. Burying such cables in the cess was the standard way of installing these cables, working either entirely manually or later with a 'mole plough' machine on a cable laying train. Standard practice on all regions and following similar methods outside the rail industry. In all cases nobody knew EXACTLY where the cables were. They didn't need accessing for maintenance as they were generally 'fit and forget' with an expected life of half a century or more. If you did get a rare unexpected failure and needed to replace a section, you dug a pit to find the cable in question, then excavated a trench along it as required. The big mistake was not to ensure that all circuits involved had been diverted into modern surface cables before starting to pile into the cess, as this led to wide scale blackouts. Some of those circuits would have been difficult to reroute however, particularly the old legacy TDM remote control telemetry, which often needed a dedicated metal circuit pair throughout and couldn't be placed in digital systems. Pretty much everything that went wrong with the project was down to poor planning: changing timescales, changing order of work, redesigns, rescheduled site works and contract claims arising, then resourcing bottlenecks etc etc. The list is endlessly depressing and in the end enormously expensive.

 

[Bald Rick]

It was used extensively and is still being used now.