GWML / Elizabeth line disruption due to OLE down near Paddington

[Sleepy]

And the manager deliberately broke the OHLE how?

If that isn't a complete shambles of a non-story, I don't know what is. How on earth is the driver relevant to a dewirement?

Have it on good authority the train departed Paddington with the wrong pan raised, was attempted to change over on the move. This should only take place stationary (or at low speed in certain special situations when authorised)

 

[AJD]

Internal discussions suggest that a very senior manager was driving and attempts are being made to keep the reasons behind the dewirement under wraps. What has got out is that the 80x pan was not in the correct configuration and an attempt was made to change them over on the move, while traversing a crossover and without slowing down to 20mph. Would certainly be tea and biscuits if an ASLEF member attempted such a thing! If there's truth to any of this then I can see why ASLEF have jumped on it.

As for mobile phones, we get issued them and are allowed to use them in the course of our duties. If the train is at a stand and for whatever reason I have no functioning radio then I'll use the company issue mobile to talk to a signaller and/or control without hesitation. Some companies more progressive than others with this sort of thing.

Have it on good authority the train departed Paddington with the wrong pan raised, was attempted to change over on the move. This should only take place stationary (or at low speed in certain special situations when authorised)

Haha beat me to it as I was typing!

 

[BPN2022]

Internal discussions suggest that a very senior manager was driving and attempts are being made to keep the reasons behind the dewirement under wraps. What has got out is that the 80x pan was not in the correct configuration and an attempt was made to change them over on the move, while traversing a crossover and without slowing down to 20mph. Would certainly be tea and biscuits if an ASLEF member attempted such a thing! If there's truth to any of this then I can see why ASLEF have jumped on it.

Completely disagree, why would it be tea & biscuits? No one would want it to be a driver or manager regardless in that position.

The fact it’s come out this way is shocking from GWR, ASLEF and the paper.

 

[choochoochoo]

Under no circumstances, are you allowed to use a mobile phone in the driving cab of a train so the ability to relay information to the driver of a DOO service is pretty much nil.
The only real line of communication a driver has is with the controlling signaller via the GSMR…. and in situations like this they will be totally snowed under.

At the risk of digressing this topic. Is this an addition to the rule book I’ve missed ? Or is it company specific ?

I was told as long as the train isn’t moving (preferably with DRA in, direction switch in neutral) then that was allowed.

 

[AJD]

Completely disagree, why would it be tea & biscuits? No one would want it to be a driver or manager regardless in that position.

The fact it’s come out this way is shocking from GWR, ASLEF and the paper.

Er, because you've failed to follow a process that you're trained to carry out?

 

[Falcon1200]

On the self evacuation stuff, there’s a big push in Scotland now to take mitigating actions to prevent it occurring on stranded trains, yet to my knowledge it’s never actually been in Issue here.

I dealt with many a stranded train incident in Scotland and agree that self-evacuation was not AFAIK an issue, however there would not normally have been the number of trains, and passengers, involved as on the GWML last night.

It is understandable that passengers stuck on a train, especially with facilities such as toilets non-existent or failing, eventually decide to take matters into their own hands, however detraining onto the ballast, particularly in darkness as yesterday, is fraught with danger; It is surely only a matter of time before a passenger in such an incident sues the railway for injuries sustained tripping over a rail or slipping on a sleeper. Therefore it has to be done as safely as possible, with rail staff assisting, guiding and if appropriate providing some form of lighting; All that takes time to arrange of course.

Information provision is a frequent, and justifiable, complaint when incidents like this occur, however if what people are expecting is definite timescales the problem is that no-one can or will know, there being so many factors and variables to consider, not to mention the fact that all operational staff involved will be constantly reacting and fire-fighting without time to step back and think through what is happening.

The only real line of communication a driver has is with the controlling signaller via the GSMR…. and in situations like this they will be totally snowed under.

As will the Control staff, both NR and TOC; At one serious incident review someone asked 'what could be done to improve Control's performance in similar situations in future', the (possibly facetious) answer was 'provide chamber pots so that we don't even need to leave our desks for a pee....'

Seems ridiculous to me (an electrical engineer) that as mentioned upthread there are no motorised breakers so you need to send out men in vans to do this,

In my experience motorised switches (and earths, also required) are very much a rarity, presumably due to the cost of installing them. But some locations should perhaps have been, or now will be, prioritised for their provision.....

 

[Samzino]

Overhead issues between bond Street and Paddington. A train had departed bond Street in the Paddington direction when a loud bang was heard and power tripping had occurred

 

[class ep-09]

Completely disagree, why would it be tea & biscuits? No one would want it to be a driver or manager regardless in that position.

The fact it’s come out this way is shocking from GWR, ASLEF and the paper.

You must not change configuration / raise pantograph(s) at speeds more than 20mph ( outside locations where high speed rising pantographs is permitted ).

If , as suggested , it did occur to a driver , then tea and biscuits time ( or rather lack of thereof ) during a hearing .

So if it happened ( highly speculative of course in this case ) to a manager who normally conducts such hearings , then tea and biscuits will be served .

 

[thedbdiboy]

Internal discussions suggest that a very senior manager was driving and attempts are being made to keep the reasons behind the dewirement under wraps. What has got out is that the 80x pan was not in the correct configuration and an attempt was made to change them over on the move, while traversing a crossover and without slowing down to 20mph. Would certainly be tea and biscuits if an ASLEF member attempted such a thing! If there's truth to any of this then I can see why ASLEF have jumped on it.

As for mobile phones, we get issued them and are allowed to use them in the course of our duties. If the train is at a stand and for whatever reason I have no functioning radio then I'll use the company issue mobile to talk to a signaller and/or control without hesitation. Some companies more progressive than others with this sort of thing.


Haha beat me to it as I was typing!

I've lost count of the the EMUs that have lost pantographs in the Thameslink core thus trapping pax and causing immense disruption and they were all driven by 'regular' drivers. If it is the case that this incident was caused by human error I would hope that any recommendations go a bit beyond 'well just make sure it's a union person driving next time'. Anything that mitigates the possibility of human error is a beneficial outcome.

 

[notverydeep]

The people on the ground would be following instructions from people in control rooms.

About a decade ago, I visited a control room on the first day of a new timetable that I had specified to see how it performed. Unluckily there was a train fault in the AM peak that caused a huge delay with a train stuck between stations (but with no realistic option to self detrain where the failed train had come to a stand). What really struck me was how short the time taken between the start of the incident and recovering the failed train to a point where it could be detrained seemed from the perspective of the control room, busy with constant activity, constant phone and radio calls to staff on the ground and discussion on how best to resolve the issue within the room. But it had taken two and a half hours to get passengers off. I tried to imagine how long it must have seemed on a very crowded train without toilets and in a tunnel (though no power failure, so passengers did have light and some information), while various avenues were tried to get the train on the move without success, before eventually it was able to move back to the previous station at slow speed.

It seems that it is easy for those working in that environment within control rooms, while clearly doing their best to resolve such failures as quickly as possible, to nevertheless lose track of how long passengers have been stranded. There is also a tendency to be biased towards optimism, believing or hoping that the next technical solution will work and is therefore better option than acknowledging defeat and just getting people safely off trains first, a process that will itself take some time. From memory, these control room issues were remarked on in the Lewisham RAIB report.

 

[DanNCL]

Also this isnt third rail so you dont need overheads off to do an evacuation but they were already off as a result of the incident.

There’s LU fourth rail track in the immediate vicinity, which whilst not directly part of the incident site there would have been the possibility of passengers in an uncontrolled evacuation straying onto the LU fourth rail tracks.

Under no circumstances, are you allowed to use a mobile phone in the driving cab of a train so the ability to relay information to the driver of a DOO service is pretty much nil.
The only real line of communication a driver has is with the controlling signaller via the GSMR…. and in situations like this they will be totally snowed under.

There gets to a point where basic commonsense takes over. If you have literally no other means of communication and are stranded, you’re going to use your mobile phone for communication.

 

[Sly Old Fox]

Running with the pantograph raised at the back isn’t ideal, but far preferable to what happened. I believe LNER run their Class 80x with rear pantograph raised as standard.

 

[FGW_DID]

It seems that it is easy for those working in that environment within control rooms, while clearly doing their best to resolve such failures as quickly as possible, to nevertheless lose track of how long passengers have been stranded. There is also a tendency to be biased towards optimism, believing or hoping that the next technical solution will work and is therefore better option than acknowledging defeat and just getting people safely off trains first, a process that will itself take some time. From memory, these control room issues were remarked on in the Lewisham RAIB report.

Perhaps every control room needs a massive countdown style clock!
It will come to the point were trains are evacuated quickly and then 10 minutes later, normal running will be possible then the control staff get crucified on here for 'overreacting'!

 

[CapabilityB]

A thoughtful and considered post from Andrew Haines on LinkedIn:

Andrew Haines on LinkedIn: #paddington | 503 comments

Yesterday evening was not one of our finest moments. As an industry, we let down thousands of passengers after a hugely disruptive incident just outside of… | 503 comments on LinkedIn

www.linkedin.com

A key point being that the response was a failure of the railway as a system, with too many different parties making their own assessments of risks and responses.

(Apologies I don't seem to be able to copy the text from his post)

 

[AJD]

I've lost count of the the EMUs that have lost pantographs in the Thameslink core thus trapping pax and causing immense disruption and they were all driven by 'regular' drivers. If it is the case that this incident was caused by human error I would hope that any recommendations go a bit beyond 'well just make sure it's a union person driving next time'. Anything that mitigates the possibility of human error is a beneficial outcome.

Yep, and I doubt it would have been smiles and pats on the back in those situations either. With the amount of assessments and competency cycles a driver manager carries out every year, you'd expect them to know and apply the rules so expertly that they set the standard that the rest of us should be striving to meet, right?

 

[Starmill]

As you said, most people.

Once one self evacuates. Others tend to follow.

Indeed but I don't see how that changes anything. The guidance is sound. People will be far less likely to dangerously self-evacuate if they are evacuated safely within reasonable time. The time will vary but for a train without toilets and potentially also with no lighting and PA it would be little more than an hour.

If Network Rail and train operators cannot evacuate people in reasonable time if the train is stranded and entirely without power, they'd be duty bound not to run passenger train services under their licence.

 

[aavm]

Not good for an above ground problem on a brand new state of the art £13 BN railway on a strike day when fewer trains were running. Just imagine the chaos if it had happened on older infrastructure / trains.

I hope less able passengers who were unable to climb down from trains or walk along the track were taken care of.

 

[VP185]

Indeed but I don't see how that changes anything. The guidance is sound. People will be far less likely to dangerously self-evacuate if they are evacuated safely within reasonable time. The time will vary but for a train without toilets and potentially also with no lighting and PA it would be little more than an hour.

If Network Rail and train operators cannot evacuate people in reasonable time if the train is stranded and entirely without power, they'd be duty bound not to run passenger train services under their licence.

What’s the definition of a ‘reasonable time’.

It takes time to gain enough resource and then get them to the site, to then establish a plan, to determine a safe route and a method or plan to move passengers once they are off the train. That will take hours.

There gets to a point where basic commonsense takes over. If you have literally no other means of communication and are stranded, you’re going to use your mobile phone for communication.

Incorrect. Rules are rules and must be followed at all times. There’s no exceptions. You use a mobile phone in the cab and you risk a disciplinary.

 

[AdamWW]

What’s the definition of a ‘reasonable time’.

Before all the lights go out in the train?

 

[VP185]

Before all the lights go out in the train?

That will vary from train to to train, unit to unit, depending on how good the batteries are.

 

[hwl]

Running with the pantograph raised at the back isn’t ideal, but far preferable to what happened. I believe LNER run their Class 80x with rear pantograph raised as standard.

With rear pan up if something goes wrong there is less train to wrap the wire(s) around and less train to damage...

 

[Class 317]

It seems to me a cost saving pennie pinching in the total costs of the GWML electrification in relation to the total costs has created less operational resilience.

In particular being able to remotely and safely isolate smaller sections of route seems to be an issue whenever problems require OHLE to be isolated.

I was at Reading a few months back when the OHLE was isolated Maidenhead to Didcot/ Thatcham I believe due to a problem at Cholsey. This caused no trains on ELl beyond Maidenhead and no trains to Newbury as well.

Seems very short sighted not to have paid for a few more sections that could be safely isolated.

As a question is it possible to remotely isolate the fast lines separately to the reliefs?

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

A thoughtful and considered post from Andrew Haines on LinkedIn:

Andrew Haines on LinkedIn: #paddington | 503 comments

Yesterday evening was not one of our finest moments. As an industry, we let down thousands of passengers after a hugely disruptive incident just outside of… | 503 comments on LinkedIn

www.linkedin.com

A key point being that the response was a failure of the railway as a system, with too many different parties making their own assessments of risks and responses.

(Apologies I don't seem to be able to copy the text from his post)

This has most of it https://twitter.com/RossLydall/status/1733163335296659487 and reinforces the reason why this has generated so much debate on this thread already that this incident needs a thorough investigation which i do hope RAIB undertake.

 

[AJD]

What’s the definition of a ‘reasonable time’.

It takes time to gain enough resource and then get them to the site, to then establish a plan, to determine a safe route and a method or plan to move passengers once they are off the train. That will take hours.



Incorrect. Rules are rules and must be followed at all times. There’s no exceptions. You use a mobile phone in the cab and you risk a disciplinary.

Wouldn't speak for everyone in this case. Certainly is the case with a personal phone, but our company policy contains a clause that supersedes the rulebook. Use of company issued phone is permitted when train is secure, GSM-R unavailable and used in line with duties. Have previously stated in reports that company phone used to contact control staff/signaller and there was zero comeback to it because it was used as prescribed in our local instructions.

My previous TOC had a blanket ban and didn't issue company mobiles, so I didn't even try, whether or not I thought I was being helpful. Policies differ from place to place.

 

[VP185]

With rear pan up if something goes wrong there is less train to wrap the wire(s) around and less train to damage...

But, with the pan on the front three vehicles, there are certain conditions where the train is permitted to coast to a suitable location.
On the rear, the train would be required to stop immediately.

 

[ShadowKnight]

I think the earlier post of

I was on the train last night (as previously stated) and the reason people started to de-train was because of the lack of information. For hours we sat there in the dark. There were many Network Rail staff walking past the train with torches but not once did any of them use a megaphone (or even cupped their hands to shout!) at us inside the train to give us an update as to what was going on.

Absolute shambles and an embarrassment. The western section has long been plagued by issues, it's time now for TfL, Network Rail and whoever else to get together and collectively sort out the mess. Stop the blame game and start to deliver for passengers.

The fact that TfL are now charging automatic max fares for passengers after this, and we are now having to wait 10 days for an email response from TfL to get a refund because their online form doesn't provide a tick box to say 'I didn't actually reach my destination because of an incident' is now the next kick in the teeth. Let alone whether passengers will get taxi, bus, tube, bike refunds that enabled them to get to their final destination.

If this was an airline, there would be enforceable compensation, but what will we get from TfL... nowt.

I think this point of the lack of communication to stranded passengers, particularly when there are workers on the track walking by with no seeming attempts of communication to passengers dose not help at all and only increases the likelihood of passengers making their own way out.
If you are treating the people you are apparently trying to rescue like cattle and not reassure them, then no wonder try to make their own way out.

I think it shows how engineering focused the rail sector is to a detrimental extent, forgetting that there are real people that can be reasoned with who are the ultimate customer

 

[VP185]

Use of company issued phone is permitted when train is secure,

What’s the definition of ‘secure’?

Some TOCs will state this is removing the drivers key.

 

[Starmill]

What’s the definition of a ‘reasonable time’.

It takes time to gain enough resource and then get them to the site, to then establish a plan, to determine a safe route and a method or plan to move passengers once they are off the train. That will take hours.

If you refer to my previous posts you'd see. If there's no HVAC/lighting/toilets approximately one hour. It's unrealistic to expect that you have more than a few minutes longer than that. If there are all of those things, much longer.

 

[Nicholas Lewis]

Standard article has this comment towards the end

On Friday evening as investigations continued GWR said there was "no evidence" any train had caused the wires to come down.

A GWR spokesman said: "We don’t know what has happened yet. However, there is no evidence that any train, let alone a GWR one, caused the wires to come down. On the contrary, the damage to and data from the GWR train indicates it was not even the first to come into contact with the fallen wires. Even the fact that the wires wrapped around the GWR train (including the front of the train) is an indication the wires were down before the train reached it."

 

[43096]

What’s the definition of ‘secure’?

Some TOCs will state this is removing the drivers key.

Funny really. Railway getting its safety-obsessed knickers in a twist about use of mobile phones during a major incident. Probably better to look at the bigger safety issue of passengers not knowing what is going on so deciding to self-evacuate onto the Great Western Main Line.