Northern line train evacuation at Clapham Common

[Somewhere]

And how would opening the doors help? Except on the newest sections there's physically nowhere to go

Better than the alternative. Instructions are to give people a chance to escape

 

[Dstock7080]

And how would opening the doors help? Except on the newest sections there's physically nowhere to go

It’s another escape route and the guidance is for all Lines, Tube tunnels are widest at floor level and sub-surface tunnels give adequate access

 

[Mikey C]

And people, usually beggars, do sometimes use them.

And very occasionally the doors swing open by themselves if the latch isn't working properly.

 

[Daniel]

There is only one lesson to be learned here. When there is smoke and fire on a train and 4 of the carriages are at the platform, don't take 4.5 minutes to open the doors, of those carriages or the passengers on the train and other members of the public will quite rightly action their own evacuation plan for you.

No - the lesson is that the provision of early information and reassurance is key in preventing panic, the consequences of which can be severe.

There was no fire - this is confirmed in the report. The presence of smoke was questioned, whether it be brake dust, smoke, or another phrase used for it. Panic was ramped up by not only announcements being made about a fire - around the same time - which was ongoing at Morden - but also the fire alarms sounding as a result of two call points being activated on the platform.

 

[stuu]

It’s another escape route and the guidance is for all Lines, Tube tunnels are widest at floor level and sub-surface tunnels give adequate access

I understand that about the subsurface lines obviously, but could anyone really get out of a train and away in a deep-level tunnel? I guess you could just about squeeze out if you were agile and there weren't other people trying to do the same

 

[bramling]

No - the lesson is that the provision of early information and reassurance is key in preventing panic, the consequences of which can be severe.

There was no fire - this is confirmed in the report. The presence of smoke was questioned, whether it be brake dust, smoke, or another phrase used for it. Panic was ramped up by not only announcements being made about a fire - around the same time - which was ongoing at Morden - but also the fire alarms sounding as a result of two call points being activated on the platform.

I’m sceptical as to what extent a mere announcement is going to calm people in these sorts of situations.

Perhaps if an announcement had clearly stated that “staff are on route and will be getting the doors open shortly” this might have bought a bit of time, but in a setting of smoke and a supposedly strong smell of burning I do wonder just how much difference this would have made.

And with seemingly none of service control, the train operator or the station staff fully aware of what was actually going on, would that specific announcement have been able to be made in a sufficiently timely manner?

I understand that about the subsurface lines obviously, but could anyone really get out of a train and away in a deep-level tunnel? I guess you could just about squeeze out if you were agile and there weren't other people trying to do the same

Very difficult in a Tube tunnel. Even if able to fit between the train and tunnel ring, there will be numerous obstructions like cables and signage to navigate. A slightly built and very agile person *might* just about manage it with severe difficulty, but that’s about all.

Some sections have slightly larger tunnels, which would help a bit. There’s also the difference between concrete and iron segments,

 

[edwin_m]

And with seemingly none of service control, the train operator or the station staff fully aware of what was actually going on, would that specific announcement have been able to be made in a sufficiently timely manner?

The person on the platform knew what was going on but didn't have the ability to make an announcement. Rather surprising this isn't possible at this hazardous island platform when at other stations the platform staff have radio mikes (but might not have been audible anyway inside a train with doors closed). The platform person also had the ability to resolve the situation by opening the doors, but was prevented from doing so by rules which may or may not have been appropriate.

 

[Daniel]

I’m sceptical as to what extent a mere announcement is going to calm people in these sorts of situations.

I agree with you. When I said the provision of information I didn’t just mean an announcement to customers; I meant the flow of information to staff members for effective decisions to be made in addition to verbal and practical reassurance to customers.

 

[Towers]

The person on the platform knew what was going on but didn't have the ability to make an announcement. Rather surprising this isn't possible at this hazardous island platform when at other stations the platform staff have radio mikes (but might not have been audible anyway inside a train with doors closed). The platform person also had the ability to resolve the situation by opening the doors, but was prevented from doing so by rules which may or may not have been appropriate.

It does seem utterly bizarre that the one person who was in place on the platform in a position to alleviate the issue had to ask several times for permission to do so from other people. Meanwhile passengers are locked inside a train which they genuinely believe may be on fire and are smashing windows to get out. I can understand to some extent the consideration that “the train might move”, but by the time people are climbing through inter-car doors and broken windows surely that ship has sailed and they’re far safer being allowed to exit via open bodyside doors.

Whilst incidents on LUL are mercifully rare, whenever one does occur it’s difficult not to draw the obvious comparisons with heavy rail and feel that, just maybe, they’re flying on a wing and a prayer with some of their safety protocols.

 

[Mojo]

It does seem utterly bizarre that the one person who was in place on the platform in a position to alleviate the issue had to ask several times for permission to do so from other people.

The report includes an extract from the LU Rule Book which makes it clear that he did not have to ask permission in an emergency, however he was in the mistaken belief that he did have to ask permission.

 

[Towers]

The report includes an extract from the LU Rule Book which makes it clear that he did not have to ask permission in an emergency, however he was in the mistaken belief that he did have to ask permission.

I had’t got to that bit, that’s something then!

 

[Mawkie]

The report includes an extract from the LU Rule Book which makes it clear that he did not have to ask permission in an emergency, however he was in the mistaken belief that he did have to ask permission.

I admit I haven't read the report, but I'm not surprised the CSA was hesitant to take any action.

I acknowledge that any safety critical work environment requires a culture of accountability, but put simply, there is a 'blame culture' within LU which can lead to delays in decision making - mainly due to the staff members fearing the endless post incident investigations (which are often worse than the actual consequences of the decision) thereby believing they need to defer up the chain.

If you link this to the well known cost savings* that have reduced on-going training (across all grades) to almost zero, then you have a recipe for a disaster waiting to happen.

*For example:

Station staff now complete online courses on their ipads rather than dedicated training sessions with real life scenarios.

Trains ops used to have 5 days training, including Rules and Procedures, and Stock refreshers on a train. They now have 1 day classroom based training.

 

[WAB]

I admit I haven't read the report, but I'm not surprised the CSA was hesitant to take any action

Yes, and I’d argue that having to revert to control for instructions in normal circumstances means that in emergencies, they aren’t going to be familiar or confident enough with independently making these sorts of decisions.

 

[Towers]

If you link this to the well known cost savings* that have reduced on-going training (across all grades) to almost zero, then you have a recipe for a disaster waiting to happen.

Trains ops used to have 5 days training, including Rules and Procedures, and Stock refreshers on a train. They now have 1 day classroom based training.

LUL Train Operators have ONE DAY of training? That can’t be it, surely!

 

[Mawkie]

LUL Train Operators have ONE DAY of training? That can’t be it, surely!

Ongoing training - Continuous Development Program.

The RMT references changes in 2017 when they were concerned by a reduction from 5 days to 4.

Thursday, 23rd of November '17

Your Health & Safety commitee reps have recently attended a meeting with Learning and development with regard to changes to the Continuous Development Program. We were initially concerned that management were going to try to cut / water it down. This appears not to be on the cards at the moment. Although we still have issues with a number of lines only getting the 4 day rather than the 5 day to complete this vital refresher training.

It's now 1 day.in a classroom - I haven't had any train based training for over 5 years.

This obviously has a deleterious impact on staff's ability to deal with emergency situations.

 

[Dstock7080]

Ongoing training - Continuous Development Program.

It's now 1 day.in a classroom - I haven't had any train based training for over 5 years.

CDP will shortly revert to 3-days standard, 2 classroom days + 1 on-train refresher, with Bakerloo & District being 4-days because of Network Rail.

 

[edwin_m]

The report includes an extract from the LU Rule Book which makes it clear that he did not have to ask permission in an emergency, however he was in the mistaken belief that he did have to ask permission.

It also notes that the training didn't emphasise this factor.

 

[Daniel]

The report includes an extract from the LU Rule Book which makes it clear that (s)he did not have to ask permission in an emergency, however (s)he was in the mistaken belief that (s)he did have to ask permission.

The rule book might say that, but the training material doesn’t. The report confirms that those delivering training reported to the RAIB that permission was always required to operate the outside door valves (see paragraph 123).

 

[bramling]

The rule book might say that, but the training material doesn’t. The report confirms that those delivering training reported to the RAIB that permission was always required to operate the outside door valves (see paragraph 123).

I’d tend to agree with this interpretation. It isn’t so much permission, but certainly there’s an expectation that all parties have come to a full understanding - and importantly that includes the train operator, who is after all in charge of the train.

As regards a blame culture, it doesn’t help that the investigation into the Holland Park incident can essentially be summarised as “blame the driver for not making a PA”.

The problem is that LU expects the system to perform as if staff are plentifully deployed and extensively trained, but yet actually provides thin staffing levels and increasingly skimpy training. We will likely see more and more of these sorts of incidents.