This has all the hallmarks of an interesting debate. Again, so not to offend those who seem so easily offended, allow me to present my
opinion (which is open to change if a coherent, well grounded and rational argument can be presented).
Firstly, we need to recognize that the purpose of byelaw 18(3)(iii) is not to specify who is allowed to give permission to travel, so all discussions around this are maybe irrelevant here (I imagine this is a matter for the management of the railway company). Rather the purpose of byelaw 18(3) is to exclude certain persons who meet the criteria outlined in that byelaw who may otherwise be in breach of byelaws 18(1) and 18(2). Byelaw 18(3)(iii) in particular excludes those who have been given permission by an 'authorised person'.
The purpose of byelaw 25(1)(i) is to define what is meant by an authorized person:
"authorised person” means:
(i) a person acting in the course of his duties who:
(a) is an employee or agent of an Operator, or
(b) any other person authorised by an Operator, or any constable, acting in the execution of his duties upon or in connection with the railway;
It's clear that the phrase "acting in the course of his duties" is the area of contention. This I think comes down to whether we adopt a 'narrow' or 'broad' definition of this phrase. In the 'narrow' conception a person is only permitted to give permission if expressly authorised (and/or not expressly forbidden) to do so by their employing railway company. In the 'broad' conception, the person giving permission simply has to be fulfilling their duties of employment at the time of giving permission (regardless of whether or not they are allowed to give permission).
If we were to take the 'narrow' approach this leads to an additional interesting question around whether or not certain railway employees are expressly forbidden to grant permission to travel. If they are forbidden then, under the 'narrow' interpretation, those employees have acted beyond the course of their duties (which in itself raises questions as to why many seemingly do so when they are not permitted). If they are not expressly forbidden, and in the context of their duties it might be seen as entirely reasonable for those duties to encompass the process of giving permission to travel to passengers (as one might expect ticket office clerks, gateline assistants and guards to be) then we might say they are acting within the course of their duties.
I'm minded to go for the 'broad' definition personally, but on reflection I'm now not too sure. The phrase "acting in the course of his duties" (or similar) appears frequently in legislation, so one would expect a wide range of case law is available to assist our interpretation. Perhaps one of our more learned forum posters is in position to mobilize such case law and inform this interesting debate further.
For now I'll summarize my position (which remains an opinion and open to change) as follows: whether or not a member of gateline staff, ticket office clerk or train guard are actually authorized to give permission is irrelevant in the view of the byelaws (subject to the broad interpretation outlined above). What is relevant is:
- Was the passenger given permission to board a train for the purpose of travel?
- Was the person giving permission an employee or agent of a railway operator?
- Was the person giving permission at the time fulfilling their duties of employment (interpreted broadly)?
I will conclude by simply saying that discussions on whether or not such permission to travel should be phsyically written are irrelevant. The byelaws make no such requirement. This much, at least, I feel confident saying is a matter of fact.
