Indeed, given the basic outline of the network has been known for a while, and there will have been draft timetables for each variation before that, it would have been possible to at least have a rough idea of what was required in terms of driver numbers even with the new driver depot locations. If there were major changes arising from the late handover of the timetable from NR it raises questions over the competence of the planners responsible at GTR and likewise at NR, as you would not expect major changes to occur from the timetable bid/offer process (tweaks certainly but no more...) especially at the stage at which this was happening.
Thanks for the link, interesting that GTR are still trying to pin the blame on NR's late timetable finalisation resulting in a mismatch between the driver competence requirements and the rosters.
It seems that infrastructure such as (but not necessarily limited to) the Canal Tunnels has been constructed without any clear operational competence for actually using it. Either that, or there's some other mystical explanation for knowing something has existed for many years but being completely unable to run trains through it on its first day. *
My rationale for this largely comes from my observations from "the word Go". Sunday 20th May saw the beginning of services starting to unravel because the pilot driver resource through Central London was so tight. Ultimately, traction training (on 700s) is easier than withdrawing each driver for bespoke route learning; the latter has resulted in trains through Central London being hampered by the sheer lack of people trained on a relatively short bit of railway which has been predicted and planned for a very long time indeed. The relatively short time since all infrastructure has been available is in contrast with the amount of time that the aspiration for 24tph through the Core from the MML + ECML has been known about. A plan to recruit - yes, recruit - enough drivers to cover for route learning would have paid dividends. As would better planning of which drivers should be rostered to learn routes. As would biting the bullet and actually opening depots in time vs that railway enemy, "just in time".
Someone has now posted on here that perhaps a "legacy link" should have been kept. I think I agree with this; a completely fresh pool of drivers could have been recruited and trained to run the first phase of Thameslink services through Central London, with their knowledge expanding further on each side of town when the legacy drivers had later had their turn to learn through the middle. The need to have these drivers available was known way before last autumn; it was known once there was any hint of a service plan to match the capabilities of the Core signalling (to handle x number of trains routinely), the Canal Tunnels and suchlike.
* Blame being put on NR for timetabling issues clearly ignores the fact that, in the South of England at least, they have been largely successful in constructing, testing and opening railway facilities through a very busy public transit network in one of the planet's most significant commercial areas. To do this relatively competently - albeit with design and teething niggles here and there - shows that there is some sort of nugget of competence which has been lacking elsewhere.
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Footnote - Someone must question the top-heavy nature of assurance and observational organisations involved with the behemoth which attempted to become RailPlan20/20. Giving executive-level boards lots of job titles and big conference tables clearly does not make a good railway. Anyone with current front-line "operational" knowledge who read the Gibb report could have predicted that its culture of grand overlooking of detail would transfer over to ignoring big elephants in tiny conference rooms on the Thameslink front...