Route closure leading to greatest strategic loss

[Pinza-C55]

Although from a "Diversionary" perspective, the Durham Coast line also fulfills the same purpose as the Leamside line over a longer section of the ECML, just with a slightly higher journey time cost.

The only non-diversion-able section of the northern ECML is Colton Jn-Northallerton, mitigated to some extent by this section being predominantly 4 track anyway.

But the Durham Coast line is electrified at 1500 volts for the Metro and thus cannot be electrified throughout at 25KV whereas the Leamside had existing electrified junctions at either end. It is also pretty much saturated with Metro trains. The only downside to the Leamside was the tight clearances on the Victoria Bridge which led to Washington - Penshaw North being singled in 1982. The Leamside also has considerable traffic potential in its own right (Newcastle - Washington - Penshaw - Fencehouses - possible Durham Parkway at Belmont - Ferryhill - Darlington (and Middlesbrough via reopened Sedgefield line) whereas the Durham Coast already has passenger services.

 

[Irascible]

Does it follow, then, that Dr Beeching got it right?

Have we decided if any of these losses were strategic routes yet? we can't really decide if he got it right until then...

One does wonder who the real villains are - reading around a little in some individual cases BR management seems to have made the decision to drop the axe first & fiddled the numbers to get the decision passed... I suspect that wasn't uncommon at the time. Although that would be the good Dr's responsibility he can only make decisions based on what he's being given. Perhaps a rigorous apolitical review body might have been a good idea - although I don't think anyone had the mindset that a lot of these lines were community assets until after the results of mass closures anyway...

 

[Ianno87]

But the Durham Coast line is electrified at 1500 volts for the Metro and thus cannot be electrified throughout at 25KV whereas the Leamside had existing electrified junctions at either end. It is also pretty much saturated with Metro trains. The only downside to the Leamside was the tight clearances on the Victoria Bridge which led to Washington - Penshaw North being singled in 1982. The Leamside also has considerable traffic potential in its own right (Newcastle - Washington - Penshaw - Fencehouses - possible Durham Parkway at Belmont - Ferryhill - Darlington (and Middlesbrough via reopened Sedgefield line) whereas the Durham Coast already has passenger services.

Bi-mode trains get around the electrification issue these days, and the route isn't "saturated" by the Metro - you can basically run something in between every pair of Metro trains given they run at 12 minute intervals.

 

[Stathern Jc]

One does wonder who the real villains are - reading around a little in some individual cases BR manageent seems to have made the decision to drop the axe first & fiddled the numbers to get the decision passed... I suspect that wasn't uncommon at the time.

Apologies if drifting off thread, but as an example.

My Dad worked in the offices in Nottingham and one of his recollections was having to make a report, on costs and / or passenger numbers (not too sure as very distant now) on the Nottingham to Mansfield route.
On passing the report upwards he mentioned that it was on the basis requested, the service at the time, and suggested that with relatively minor changes such as proper connections to main line services etc the situation in the equivalent report would be significantly improved.
The reply he got was, "No thank you, this will do nicely".
Fortunately that decision was reversed.

 

[alistairlees]

With the possible exception of Cambridge to Oxford I don’t think any route that was strategic has been closed.

Yes, some routes that it would have been good to keep have been closed. But strategic? No.

Had the Serpell report been implemented though then this thread would have many examples of strategic route closures to choose from ...

 

[Pinza-C55]

Bi-mode trains get around the electrification issue these days, and the route isn't "saturated" by the Metro - you can basically run something in between every pair of Metro trains given they run at 12 minute intervals.

12 minute intervals at a low maximum speed (50 MPH) and stopping at every station. Not ideal for use as a "strategic route" or a main line in its own right.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 27 Feb 2021 ==

With the possible exception of Cambridge to Oxford I don’t think any route that was strategic has been closed.

Yes, some routes that it would have been good to keep have been closed. But strategic? No.

Had the Serpell report been implemented though then this thread would have many examples of strategic route closures to choose from ...

How would you define "strategic" ?

 

[Ianno87]

12 minute intervals at a low maximum speed (50 MPH) and stopping at every station. Not ideal for use as a "strategic route" or a main line in its own right.

== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: 27 Feb 2021 ==

Were talking about diversion capability only, when speed isn't the most important aspect.

 

[edwin_m]

How would you define "strategic" ?

Another point of view would be to look at England's strategic roads network - map in Highways England Strategic Road Network Initial Report - Overview (publishing.service.gov.uk)

The following strategic roads don't have reasonable rail connections between the major centres they serve. I've tried to identify them by major centres where the road is the main part of the journey but not necessarily end to end.

• A66 Darlington to Workington (but rail link to Workington from Barrow and Carlisle doesn't have an equivalent strategic road)
• A585 Poulton-Fleetwood
• A14 Rugby-Cambridge (but rail alternative via Peterborough doesn't have an equivalent strategic road)
• A45 Cambridge-Northampton
• A12 Yarmouth-Lowestoft (but rail provides direct link Norwich-Lowestoft)
• A46 Coventry-Cheltenham
• A43 Northampton-Oxford
• A428/A421 Cambridge-MK
• A120 Stansted-Colchester
• A34 Oxford-Winchester
• A35 Weymouth-Exeter

A30 Exter-Bodmin doesn't have a rail equivalent, but doesn't serve any major centre that isn't also linked by rail, so doesn't count by these criteria.

This, I think, brings out that the major gap within England is orbital routes in the counties north and west of London.

I tried to do the same thing with Scotland and Wales, but some of their trunk roads link places that are relatively minor by comparison with those readily identifiable in England, so the result wouldn't really be comparable.

 

[Helvellyn]

Another point of view would be to look at England's strategic roads network - map in Highways England Strategic Road Network Initial Report - Overview (publishing.service.gov.uk)

The following strategic roads don't have reasonable rail connections between the major centres they serve. I've tried to identify them by major centres where the road is the main part of the journey but not necessarily end to end.

• A66 Darlington to Workington (but rail link to Workington from Barrow and Carlisle doesn't have an equivalent strategic road)
• A585 Poulton-Fleetwood
• A14 Rugby-Cambridge (but rail alternative via Peterborough doesn't have an equivalent strategic road)
• A45 Cambridge-Northampton
• A12 Yarmouth-Lowestoft (but rail provides direct link Norwich-Lowestoft)
• A46 Coventry-Cheltenham
• A43 Northampton-Oxford
• A428/A421 Cambridge-MK
• A120 Stansted-Colchester
• A34 Oxford-Winchester
• A35 Weymouth-Exeter

A30 Exter-Bodmin doesn't have a rail equivalent, but doesn't serve any major centre that isn't also linked by rail, so doesn't count by these criteria.

This, I think, brings out that the major gap within England is orbital routes in the counties north and west of London.

I tried to do the same thing with Scotland and Wales, but some of their trunk roads link places that are relatively minor by comparison with those readily identifiable in England, so the result wouldn't really be comparable.

Part of the reason for the closure of the Cockermouth-Keswick-Penrith route was to allow the former track bed to be used for an upgraded A594 (redesignated as the A66 West of Penrith).

The A45 hasn't run to Cambridge since the A14 replaced it as the main route to Ipswich and thence the Suffolk Ports - it now joins the A14 at Thrapston.

The thing with a number of these trunk roads is that they are, in many cases, upgrades or amalgamations of other roads. But much of this happened after the rail route had closed.

 

[Pinza-C55]

Were talking about diversion capability only, when speed isn't the most important aspect.

Speed is a vital aspect when talking about a high speed line like the ECML. As far as I remember, granted that it is 30 long years ago, Leamside added about 20-25 minutes onto a Darlington - Newcastle run whilst running via Sunderland (not including the Metro in those days) and stopping at Eaglescliffe added about 50 minutes onto Newcastle - York and meant missing out Darlington.

"Another point of view would be to look at England's strategic roads network - map in Highways England Strategic Road Network Initial Report - Overview (publishing.service.gov.uk)

The following strategic roads don't have reasonable rail connections between the major centres they serve. I've tried to identify them by major centres where the road is the main part of the journey but not necessarily end to end."

I was meaning more "what does strategic mean ?" than "examples of strategic". I can understand how for example the line to Felixstowe is strategically important in the national sense because it connects an important port to the rest of the country. I watched a documentary on Youtube about the Big freeze of 1962-63 and it made the point repeatedly that the railways by and large stayed open so they were strategically important yet the very next year the Beeching closures started in earnest, which seemed a bit short sighted. They'd have felt silly if really harsh winters had become the norm.

 

[backontrack]

The OP had it right with Glenfarg.

 

[edwin_m]

The A45 hasn't run to Cambridge since the A14 replaced it as the main route to Ipswich and thence the Suffolk Ports - it now joins the A14 at Thrapston.

The thing with a number of these trunk roads is that they are, in many cases, upgrades or amalgamations of other roads. But much of this happened after the rail route had closed.

True but not relevant. As I explained in my post, I was looking for links between pairs of major centres, not somewhere like Thrapston which is of no significance other than that it happens to be the junction of two trunk roads. Cambridge is the next major centre along the A14.

The numbering or history of the roads isn't particularly relevant either - the map shows many three-digit roads as trunks and many of the one-digit roads are no longer trunks. The reason it's relevant here is because it illustrates the routes in England that DfT considers to be strategic. Therefore there's an argument to say that a railway linking the same places is also strategic.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I was meaning more "what does strategic mean ?" than "examples of strategic". I can understand how for example the line to Felixstowe is strategically important in the national sense because it connects an important port to the rest of the country. I watched a documentary on Youtube about the Big freeze of 1962-63 and it made the point repeatedly that the railways by and large stayed open so they were strategically important yet the very next year the Beeching closures started in earnest, which seemed a bit short sighted. They'd have felt silly if really harsh winters had become the norm.

I struggle with the idea that just because a branch line with trains carrying 'two men and a dog' happened to remain open in the January 1963 freeze (thanks to the undoubted devotion and skill of local staff) that somehow makes them of equal importance to (say) the ECML (or even the M1 or A43).

The fact that local lines were often carrying mail, newspapers, parcels and wagonload freight in 1963 obviously means that they provided important facilities at the time that soon migrated to road traffic from much more centralised distribution facilities (or have since largely disappeared, such as newspapers).

 

[Pinza-C55]

I never said the lines were as important as the ECML , M1 or A43. I said that in a particular situation where the whole country was under several feet of snow and yet the railways remained open, they could be regarded as strategically important. Obviously when the lines were closed the traffic they carried had to migrate to other forms of transport so that is irrelevant.

 

[Spamcan81]

Okehampton station is probably a mile higher than the town centre as well!! Have you ever walked it?

Bere Alston station is, like most ex-LSWR stations west of Salisbury, way out in the country, along the bleakest, narrowest Station Road imaginable. Would you send your children off to walk to school along here each day? https://www.google.com/maps/@50.482...4!1ss9GTo28AEXS0KzrTT0YGCg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656

Wow, a 5280ft height difference between the station and the town centre! I think your theodolite needs adjusting.

 

[Dr Hoo]

I'm with Taunton on this one. Only people who have actually walked from the centre of Okehampton to the station (preferably with luggage and in adverse weather) should express an opinion on how 'handy' it is.

Similarly at Bere Alston the full effect can only be appreciated by walking from the far end of the village to the station on a dark night in the hope that the train is running (in the absence of a decent mobile phone signal).

 

[yorksrob]

Apologies if drifting off thread, but as an example.

My Dad worked in the offices in Nottingham and one of his recollections was having to make a report, on costs and / or passenger numbers (not too sure as very distant now) on the Nottingham to Mansfield route.
On passing the report upwards he mentioned that it was on the basis requested, the service at the time, and suggested that with relatively minor changes such as proper connections to main line services etc the situation in the

I'm with Taunton on this one. Only people who have actually walked from the centre of Okehampton to the station (preferably with luggage and in adverse weather) should express an opinion on how 'handy' it is.

Similarly at Bere Alston the full effect can only be appreciated by walking from the far end of the village to the station on a dark night in the hope that the train is running (in the absence of a decent mobile phone signal).

That's lovely, but I've walked from Kirkby Stephen West to the town centre and I'm still glad the station's open.

 

[backontrack]

No, of course not.

The whole concept of removing duplicate lines was flawed.

I agree.

I'd even go as far as to say that it's a bit crayony, to be honest; drawing lines between big places and then removing the ones you think aren't necessary. There was never a sincere attempt to evaluate the unique situation of many lines, leading to a lot of apple/orange comparisons and fudged numbers. As others have said, the decision had already been made, and it was forced through regardless.

I'll say no more on the matter, because that's not what this thread is about. But it's dispiriting to see people derailing this thread to try and vindicate/justify Beeching. It's not a yes/no thing; I think if you spoke to most enthusiasts, you'd get an answer of "some rationalisation was needed, but the eventual cuts were excessive". And then you get into the endless spiralling debate of allocating blame to different parties (Beeching? Marples? Castle? Douglas-Home? Fraser? Wilson? Almiron? Joelinton?).

So let's return to strategic closures. I think Glenfarg does count as strategic - today it'd be a major artery between two of Scotland's second cities, reducing travel times to a third considerably. A retained Glenfarg line would've made Edinburgh-Inverness trains more competitive, possibly leading to the HML being upgraded and potentially being on XC's network (like Aberdeen/Dundee) and having more direct trains to King's Cross. The Dunfermline-Perth corridor would be more populous, too, with the present Cowdenbeath terminators running through to the likes of Kelty/Kinross/Milnathort. It's even possible that there'd be a new Forth rail crossing.

Perth-Ladybank isn't much of a substitute at all.

 

[daodao]

I agree.

I'd even go as far as to say that it's a bit crayony, to be honest; drawing lines between big places and then removing the ones you think aren't necessary. There was never a sincere attempt to evaluate the unique situation of many lines, leading to a lot of apple/orange comparisons and fudged numbers. As others have said, the decision had already been made, and it was forced through regardless.

I'll say no more on the matter, because that's not what this thread is about. But it's dispiriting to see people derailing this thread to try and vindicate/justify Beeching. It's not a yes/no thing; I think if you spoke to most enthusiasts, you'd get an answer of "some rationalisation was needed, but the eventual cuts were excessive". And then you get into the endless spiralling debate of allocating blame to different parties (Beeching? Marples? Castle? Douglas-Home? Fraser? Wilson? Almiron? Joelinton?).

So let's return to strategic closures. I think Glenfarg does count as strategic - today it'd be a major artery between two of Scotland's second cities, reducing travel times to a third considerably. A retained Glenfarg line would've made Edinburgh-Inverness trains more competitive, possibly leading to the HML being upgraded and potentially being on XC's network (like Aberdeen/Dundee) and having more direct trains to King's Cross. The Dunfermline-Perth corridor would be more populous, too, with the present Cowdenbeath terminators running through to the likes of Kelty/Kinross/Milnathort. It's even possible that there'd be a new Forth rail crossing.

Perth-Ladybank isn't much of a substitute at all.

I disagree. Perth-Ladybank, which was re-opened by BR for passenger trains as they realised that the detour via Stirling was suboptimal, is a reasonable substitute, but not ideal as Perth to Edinburgh journeys are 10 miles longer than using the previous route via Kinross and thus about 10-15 minutes slower than they could have been with modern traction on the Kinross line. See my post 139 of this thread: https://www.railforums.co.uk/thread...est-strategic-loss.213379/page-5#post-5002061

However, no major communities lost all their rail services or connectivity as a result of this closure. IMO, a strategic loss is where major long-distance journey opportunities are completely removed, or major regions/significant populations have completely lost access to rail services. Closure of duplicate lines generally doesn't meet these criteria, and is generally economically sensible; the word "duplicate" itself implies superfluity. For example, closure of the Beverley-York line has had little impact on rail connectivity between Hull and York, which remain linked by a good hourly train service.

The best example in the UK and Ireland of a strategic loss is the closure of the Derry Road in 1965. This completed the entire removal of all rail services from 5 or the 9 counties of Ulster, which started in 1957. There really isn't any equivalent loss in GB now that the Waverley route has partly re-opened. The best example is the removal of East-West cross-links across the South Midlands, plus the Leicester-Banbury section of the ex-GCR (if it had been connected to the ex-MR lines south of Leicester), but there are still excellent train services to London from this area. Re-opening of the Varsity line could partly redress this issue, if done with proper connectivity, which this route partly lacked with the ex-GCR, ex-MR and ex-GNR lines when it was previously open. However, I note that there is no intention to build an interchange station between the EWR and new HS2 lines, although I accept that this might have adverse effects on HS2 services.

In Europe, there have been much more significant strategic losses, for example closure of the line from Vilna to Grodno has destroyed the historic strategic route from St Petersburg to Warsaw. Other examples include the direct Madrid-Lisbon route and the removal of all international passenger train services into Bosnia and Greece, and between Slovenia and Italy. [Apologies to nationals of any of the countries referred to for using the Anglicised place names.]

 

[edwin_m]

However, I note that there is no intention to build an interchange station between the EWR and new HS2 lines, although I accept that this might have adverse effects on HS2 services.

This has been discussed on other threads but it would also have close to zero benefit. Anyone from Oxford, Bicester or MK going to Birmingham or London has quicker services via existing routes once the connecting time is taken into account. The few people going beyond Birmingham can change to HS2 at Curzon Street. So only passengers at Winslow and any other minor stations that might be opened on EWR near Calvert have any chance of benefitting.

 

[Diplodicus]

The GC line from Nottingham southwards gets my vote. It was abandoned in favour of the bendy, twisty Midland lines via those "strategic" towns of Market Harborough, Kettering (for Corby) and Wellingborough,. The GC line was straight and whilst Brackley, Banbury are similar in their "strategic" significance, wouldn't the GC trackbed have provided a better infrastucture platform for high-speed connections to the East and North Midlands and South Yorkshire. HS1 and a bit?

 

[tbtc]

I think Glenfarg does count as strategic - today it'd be a major artery between two of Scotland's second cities, reducing travel times to a third considerably. A retained Glenfarg line would've made Edinburgh-Inverness trains more competitive, possibly leading to the HML being upgraded and potentially being on XC's network (like Aberdeen/Dundee) and having more direct trains to King's Cross. The Dunfermline-Perth corridor would be more populous, too, with the present Cowdenbeath terminators running through to the likes of Kelty/Kinross/Milnathort. It's even possible that there'd be a new Forth rail crossing.

Perth-Ladybank isn't much of a substitute at all.

Really?

It means a slightly longer journey time from Inverness/ Perth to Edinburgh but nothing major - there are no significant intermediate places that are now without a train station - there are currently two lines from Perth to Edinburgh so "we need a third line between Perth and Edinburgh" seems a pretty minor priority even to the kind of people who worry about "diversionary resilience" and all of that.

Perth - Ladybank - Inverkeithing is around an hour - but Cowdenbeath to Inverkeithing is around fifteen minutes, so even if you did the (roughly) thirty miles from Perth to Cowdenbeath at an uninterrupted sixty miles an hour (which is doubtful - especially if you want intermediate stops - you've listed three places you think should have stops), the route via Ladybank is only around fifteen minutes longer than the route via Glenfarg.

Add on the twenty minutes from Inverkeithing to Edinburgh and that's a Perth - Edinburgh journey time of at least sixty five minutes via Glenfarg (assuming the sixty miles an hour average speed mentioned above) versus around eighty via Ladybank. The time penalty is even less significant for Inverness - Edinburgh passengers (a maximum fifteen minutes saving on a journey that currently takes around three and a half hours)

If you really think that a time saving of less than ten percent on the Inverness - Edinburgh journey time would be enough to justify an additional Forth Bridge/ increased London services/ new services to places like Birmingham etc then, fair enough, I don't think I'm going to be able to dissuade you from such optimism, but the fifteen minute saving becomes even less significant when you include the journey time all the way to London/ Birmingham - maybe fifteen minutes difference will matter to some people assessing a journey time of best part of eight hours but it wouldn't make much difference to me personally.

Then, there's the populations - both Perth and Inverness have populations of under fifty thousand - unlike Kirkcaldy which has a population of over fifty thousand - Perth and Inverness seem like bigger places than they actually are because they are a long way from anywhere else of size, but not that big in the grand scheme of things. Inverness's population has gone up a lot in recent years, so it was even less significant when the line closed.

If the biggest "strategic" loss that we can come up with is one of the three lines from Perth to Edinburgh and a slightly increased journey time then I can cope with that - just like if the biggest Beeching loss/mistake was one of the two lines from Hull to York then I'm not too worried (given that the Hull - York line that stayed open has only recently managed an hourly Sprinter, so it's not a particularly busy route) - if these are the biggest "errors" that people want to complain about then I think that the cuts look fairly reasonable really.

 

[Irascible]

A30 Exter-Bodmin doesn't have a rail equivalent, but doesn't serve any major centre that isn't also linked by rail, so doesn't count by these criteria.

Launceston, but I don't think anyone's going to argue that either of the routes to there were strategic links! ( being a major centre is pretty debatable - it's a major centre by local population density, certainly not in outright terms ).

Looking at the road map in the south ( I'm not familiar enough with the north, sorry ) the one that sticks out is the A34, Oxford to Southampton ( and if you keep going it aims at Peterborough & there's no rail route that does that - that'd be what's now the Nene Valley railway I think? ). The direct rail line there was only a strategic route in WW2 - I guess given it's the only connection between the M4 & the M3 outside the M25 is what makes this a strategic road rather than it being more or less a straight line, I am guessing the current route through Reading is sufficient.

 

[Taunton]

The GC line from Nottingham southwards gets my vote. It was abandoned in favour of the bendy, twisty Midland lines via those "strategic" towns of Market Harborough, Kettering (for Corby) and Wellingborough,. The GC line was straight

Really? Maybe only on the map. I think it was Dick Hardy, who had been shedmaster at Woodford Halse in early BR days, later much more prominent, who wrote that the reverse curves around the island platforms of all the GC stations could look from the footplate like the track were going sideways ...

 

[edwin_m]

Launceston, but I don't think anyone's going to argue that either of the routes to there were strategic links! ( being a major centre is pretty debatable - it's a major centre by local population density, certainly not in outright terms ).

Looking at the road map in the south ( I'm not familiar enough with the north, sorry ) the one that sticks out is the A34, Oxford to Southampton ( and if you keep going it aims at Peterborough & there's no rail route that does that - that'd be what's now the Nene Valley railway I think? ). The direct rail line there was only a strategic route in WW2 - I guess given it's the only connection between the M4 & the M3 outside the M25 is what makes this a strategic road rather than it being more or less a straight line, I am guessing the current route through Reading is sufficient.

I got the impression the strategic road network puts more emphasis on ports than would be justified by their population alone (see for example Fleetwood and Lowestoft). The same might apply to Southampton, though that is one port big enough to generate enough bulk for rail tranport to be viable. Thinking about it the A34 probably doesn't meet my criteria because it doesn't serve any major place between Oxford and Southampton, which are indeed linked via Reading. The link from Oxford towards Peterborough is more lacking in rail alternative, but EWR partly addresses this.

Really? Maybe only on the map. I think it was Dick Hardy, who had been shedmaster at Woodford Halse in early BR days, later much more prominent, who wrote that the reverse curves around the island platforms of all the GC stations could look from the footplate like the track were going sideways ...

I suspect that when the GC was designed, someone decided that the maximum speed would never be more than something like 90mph and designed all the curves to suit that and no better. Easing the curves round the island platforms would involved re-building (or more likely closing) each station, but also re-building the access bridges or perhaps in some cases realigning the tracks instead (possibly involving land purchase). Curves away from stations would probably be more difficult to deal with.

And those that consider it a substitute for HS2 should note that HS2 does use the GC route for most of the distance between the northern limit of suburban services at Aylesbury, and around Brackley where HS2 diverges towards Birmingham and the GC heads for Leicester. Using more of it would have been going in the wrong direction.

 

[RT4038]

The GC line from Nottingham southwards gets my vote. It was abandoned in favour of the bendy, twisty Midland lines via those "strategic" towns of Market Harborough, Kettering (for Corby) and Wellingborough,. The GC line was straight and whilst Brackley, Banbury are similar in their "strategic" significance, wouldn't the GC trackbed have provided a better infrastucture platform for high-speed connections to the East and North Midlands and South Yorkshire. HS1 and a bit?

Banbury is no more strategically significant than Wellingborough, Kettering or Market Harborough (and is only one town, and is served by 'other lines'); Brackley could not be considered 'strategic' by almost any measure.

The towns/villages north of Aylesbury that were not served by 'other lines' produced negligible traffic, and this could only have been addressed by large scale development at these places, rather than at more developed places on the 'other lines'. However, the GC line had an awkward arrival into the London area and a small, poorly connected terminal station. No doubt something could have been done about these problems with the application of large sums of money, but why would that decision have been taken over development of the 'other lines'?

 

[Merle Haggard]

Really? Maybe only on the map. I think it was Dick Hardy, who had been shedmaster at Woodford Halse in early BR days, later much more prominent, who wrote that the reverse curves around the island platforms of all the GC stations could look from the footplate like the track were going sideways ...

I think I recall (it was long ago!) that the smaller stations on the G.N. - Essendine, Little Bytham for example - had the running lines swerving around the platforms.
All straightened up now - no reason why the same couldn't have happened on the G.C.

 

[Taunton]

Banbury is no more strategically significant than Wellingborough, Kettering or Market Harborough (and is only one town, and is served by 'other lines'); Brackley could not be considered 'strategic' by almost any measure.

However, Banbury was one of the GC's few links, onto the GWR and all points beyond. I think more than half the GC freight went down from Woodford to Banbury, rather than continue towards London, either via Aylesbury or High Wycombe. After the grouping it allowed the GWR to interface long distance north-south freight directly with the LNER, cutting out the LMS altogether, and a lot did. Of course, if we are looking at "strategy" for BR, that didn't matter, it was one system now.

Unfortunately the operating methods left much to be desired. Say household coal from Nottinghamshire to Bristol, a common flow. It would be tripped from the colliery to Annesley, where it would wait to be marshalled into one of the southbound "Windcutter" freights. These were fixed timetable, limited load, so it might wait the best part of a day to get space in one to depart. Although the Windcutter got all the publicity, it only went from Nottinghamshire to Northamptonshire, something that a lorry on the M1 can achieve in an hour. So into Woodford Halse yard, remarshalled into a freight for Banbury, eventually depart for there, no Windcutter speed now, often taken by a WD tender-first. Into the yard at Banbury where it was remarshalled AGAIN. There were a couple of through freights a day on the WR from Banbury to Bristol, via Didcot west curve, so off to Bristol East Depot sidings, where it would finally be remarshalled again for the local trip working.

Meanwhile the LMS/LMR had a couple of through freights a day from Nottingham to Bristol, hangovers of course from the old Midland Railway "anywhere to anywhere". That's the strategic route.

 

[quantinghome]

I'd define the extent of strategic loss by:

1. Population and freight market (no longer) served
2. Ability of other existing routes to compensate

By those measures surely Oxford-Cambridge is the greatest strategic loss. Serving significant population centres in the heart of the country, its loss means there are no east-west routes between London and Leicester. It's no surprise that this is the only long distance route where serious work at reinstatement is being undertaken.

 

[edwin_m]

However, Banbury was one of the GC's few links, onto the GWR and all points beyond. I think more than half the GC freight went down from Woodford to Banbury, rather than continue towards London, either via Aylesbury or High Wycombe. After the grouping it allowed the GWR to interface long distance north-south freight directly with the LNER, cutting out the LMS altogether, and a lot did. Of course, if we are looking at "strategy" for BR, that didn't matter, it was one system now.

This illustrates how the real strategic gap today is for routes in the South Midlands that cut across the lines radiating from London. The GC did this to some extent but every crossing of another line involved a change of stations for passenger interchange, and at most of them it was difficult or impossible for trains to transfer between the routes.