Did sectorisation improve BR?

[devon_belle]

Curious what people think: did Sectorisation improve BR (i.e. claw it back from seemingly terminal decline), or did it act to BR's detriment, such that it made privatisation inevitable?*

I know there probably many other factors involved, but there must have been reasons for making the change to sectorisation. What were they, and did they work? If a thread along this lines exists please direct me to it

*I am too young for the politics of this. Maybe privatisation had less to do with the success/failure of BR and more to do with politics.

 

[30907]

I don't think it made privatisation inevitable, but it may have perhaps influenced its direction (away from the Big 4 model towards the separation of track and train).

It had some flaws/unforeseen consequences in implementation (which the TOC model exacerbated), but given the notion of a profitable Intercity in the 70s something similar was almost inevitable.

Benelux apart, a similar pattern is widespread in Western Europe.

 

[Magdalia]

I worked in management for 25 years, though not on the railway, and my experience of reorganisations is that they are usually more trouble than they are worth.

But looking from the outside I would say that BR sectorisation transformed the railway and mostly for better not worse. It facilitated the shift from being a freight railway that carried some passengers into a passenger railway that carried some freight. Sectorisation gave managers clearer incentives to manage costs and grow revenue. That was a foundation on which a better relationship with government could be built.

In particular, Network South East was a huge success. I doubt that BR would have got new trains, various electrifications, and especially Thameslink, if sectorisation had not happened. It put BR in a much better place to exploit the huge growth in London commuting that followed financial services deregulation in 1986, and generate more revenue from additional leisure travel through initiatives such as Capitalcard and Gold Card.

BR sectorisation began in 1982, before privatisation became a central plank of government policy. That came after the 1983 General Election: the first big privatisation was British Telecom in 1984.

If you want to know more I suggest that you read the two Chris Green and Mike Vincent books The Inter City Story and the Network South East Story.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

It took more than a decade for sectorisation to go the full hog and eliminate the old Regions.
And when that was done in the early 90s the railway was being readied for privatisation.
While I thought at the time that abolishing the Regions was a good thing (finally burying the Big 4 culture), others seem to think that it was the "last straw" for the integrated railway.
What was clear was that the old Regions (and the infrastructure that went with them) was where the bulk of the railway's costs lay.
You can argue that those costs have never been brought under control, as the Sectors never got to grips with them and Railtrack and Network Rail grew back the Regions anyway with generous CP funding.
We need GBR to square the circle and control costs under its new Regional remit.

 

[tbtc]

I guess that it was inevitable, when you start rebranding your flagship operations then you need an identity for everything that didn’t qualify (even though the criteria were a bit wobbly… Gatwick Express was surely NSE whilst the Liverpool - Manchester - Leeds - York - Durham - Newcastle trains surely served sufficient cities to be InterCity… InterCity were running 158s so it was never a consistent level of service…)

I think that it seemed to help focus some bits of the railway, encouraging better marketing by focusing on certain lines (rather than feeling like they needed to reflect everything) - look at the attractiveness of the London Underground maps - ordinary people seem to understand colourful schematic diagrams rather than complicated comprehensive maps

The problem was always Regional Railways/ Provincial. Branding the long distance high speed stuff in a flagship livery seems sensible… branding the remaining London routes as NSE feels hard to argue with (albeit caveats about Exeter etc)… i can’t argue with a focused Scottish brand but then dumping everything else into a “miscellaneous” sector meant that Provincial always felt like a flabby mess

And by putting lightly used routes like the Settle & Carlisle into the same cost centre as the other basket case lines (rather than being part of Eastern Region, where the more viable ECML stuff covers a multitude of sins) meant that it was a lot harder to hide costs, which I’d presumably why BR suddenly wanted to close a number of stations/ routes (or to cut various evening/ Sunday services or replace longer loco hauled sets with two coach DMUs then decide that single coach 153s would be sufficient)… be careful what you wish for!

One other gripe is that the segmented sectors seemed to go against the pragmatic BR approach of earlier years, where spare resources had been well utilised… so an 87-hauled rake that didn’t need to leave Polmedie until after the morning rush hour could be “borrowed” to provide extra capacity on an Ayr-Glasgow diagram (allowing a displaced EMU to strengthen another Strathclyde area commuter service)… the long distance train coming into Leeds in the morning peak could stop at Crossgates to help local passengers… sensible stock allocation… But when you put things into separate Cost codes then you discourage these practical improvements

It’s easy to find some success stories and attribute them to the sectors but London and the South East seeks to get regular waves investment before NSE just like it continues to…

There were certainly some benefits but, like most of BR, this project was a bit of a Curate’s Egg

 

[NorthKent1989]

NSE was in particular very successful, has we not gotten NSE, we’d still be relying on the Northern line to get between North and South London, the CrossRail project - although not a NSE project, it was certainly made possible during that era enough so that even when the project was shelved in the 1990s it still lingered in the backs of every politicians mind well into the 2000s where it was finally pushed through and now up and running in the 2020s.

I’d even say that TfL taking over a few suburban rail lines in London in the mid 2000s with London Overground and the Elizabeth line (aka the aforementioned CrossRail project) was largely inspired by NSE a decade earlier with an iconic livery and refresh of stations they operated.

There were a few oddities, like the Brighton main line service not being intercity while the Gatwick Express was more of Network Express service rather than a true intercity service.

But I do feel that had sectorisation not happen, there would have been another Beeching style set of cuts in the 1980s & 1990s, just look at the Chiltern Main Line, Marylebone was earmarked for closure in the mid 1980s with Banbury services proposed to run into Paddington and the remaining Aylesbury via Harrow service would have seen the return of the Metropolitan line, now its one if NSE’s main success stories.

 

[WAO]

The other less visible change was OFQ - Organising for Quality.

I'll let others explain and assess.

WAO

 

[CE142]

No, shed full of locos 'spare' but can't use those locos as they belong to the wrong sector, train cancelled...

 

[yorksrob]

By and large it was a great benefit to passengers. There was certainly a smartening up around Kent and plenty of marketing expertise brought to the fore. One could argue whether one line should have been in a different sector, but the level of fragmentation was considerably less than today between TOC's.

Did it make privatisation inevitable ? Of course not. Only Tory ideology did that.

 

[Magdalia]

I guess that it was inevitable, when you start rebranding your flagship operations then you need an identity for everything that didn’t qualify (even though the criteria were a bit wobbly… Gatwick Express was surely NSE whilst the Liverpool - Manchester - Leeds - York - Durham - Newcastle trains surely served sufficient cities to be InterCity… InterCity were running 158s so it was never a consistent level of service…)

There were a few oddities, like the Brighton main line service not being intercity while the Gatwick Express was more of Network Express service rather than a true intercity service.

Broadly speaking, InterCity got anything that made a profit and didn't get anything that made a loss.

No, shed full of locos 'spare' but can't use those locos as they belong to the wrong sector, train cancelled

That only came after the allocation of assets to sectors for accounting purposes, around 1987/88.

The other less visible change was OFQ - Organising for Quality.

I don't know much about this, apart from the derision from railway staff regarding the name.

 

[Andy R. A.]

I can remember one specific incident when Sectorisation didn't make things better.

An Inter City train had its Loco fail at point 'A'. 200 yards away sat an identical Loco but now belonging to one of the three Railfreight sectors. No, you can't use that Loco, even if it wasn't going out for a few hours yet. Nearest Inter City allocated Loco sat at point 'S' 60 odd miles away, also of the same type as the other two. Loco sent down from point 'S' and the failed train eventually got underway some 90 minutes late. Before this the nearest Loco would have been used, and the Loco at point 'S' would've been sent down in time to work the Freight service. The failed Inter City train would've probably suffered around 20-30 minutes delays at the most.

Unfortunately this was just one example of the rigidity of Sectorisation produced. I experienced far too many of these 'problems' at the time. Did it improve BR, probably not, at least from my point of view.

 

[Fleetmaster]

As far as I know it definitely helped promote the benefits of the HST and the London commuter services, where clearly the targeted customer was the deep pocketed businessmen (deliberately gendered term, because it was the 80s) with alternative travel means.

This was a nascent sign the corporation was being pivoted to a state where it would see passengers as customers and aim to win their custom via modernising and taking a ruthlessly commercial approach, with a view to one day turning a profit, or at least cross subsidising regional rail.

Sectorisation also seems to have aimed to focus the freight business on either being more innovative and thus competitive as a mode where that applied (parcels, small freight) or simply providing a better service and thus higher fees where BR effectively only had to be better than the customer themselves could arrange via rail (trainload freight).

Privatisation wasn't inevitable. Notably it wasn't the Evil Thatcher but John Major who applied this long standing ideological policy to BR, with things like sectorisation and other planned reforms perhaps persuading Whitehall to take a wait and see approach (busy as they were with far easier and way more lucrative privatisations).

But the sad reality was that for all these changes, the 1992 general was fought to a backdrop of BR subsidy having doubled in just two years, and with the 1980s privatisations by Thatcher having seemingly met their objectives - turning state run loss making monopolies infamous for their poor corner service, into gleaming corporate giants beloved by the stock market (arguably a mirage, but politics is necessarily a short term game).

Major won, and the train set was duly dismantled. It's a long time ago now, so the idea the state of the railways today can be attributed to decisions made thirty years ago, is absurd as arguing the state of BR in the eighties was a result of decisions made in the 50s. In both cases, fault lies in what was being done in the preceding decade (the only realistic planning window for something like a railway).

 

[30907]

One of the other flaws was the rather crude accounting that allocated infrastructure to IC, RR and Freight in that order - leading to timetables based on a "nominal single line" for Settle Jn - Carnforth and the Swinton and Knottingley route through Pontefract. Or so my good friend in RRNE management described it. No doubt there were other examples.

 

[Fleetmaster]

I can remember one specific incident when Sectorisation didn't make things better.

An Inter City train had its Loco fail at point 'A'. 200 yards away sat an identical Loco but now belonging to one of the three Railfreight sectors. No, you can't use that Loco, even if it wasn't going out for a few hours yet. Nearest Inter City allocated Loco sat at point 'S' 60 odd miles away, also of the same type as the other two. Loco sent down from point 'S' and the failed train eventually got underway some 90 minutes late. Before this the nearest Loco would have been used, and the Loco at point 'S' would've been sent down in time to work the Freight service. The failed Inter City train would've probably suffered around 20-30 minutes delays at the most.

Unfortunately this was just one example of the rigidity of Sectorisation produced. I experienced far too many of these 'problems' at the time. Did it improve BR, probably not, at least from my point of view.

I would imagine this sort of rigidity as a means of getting a good handle of what the true costs of things like of providing an InterCity service to a defined minimal standard, was vastly more preferable to either carrying on with the absurdity that the internal flow of money inside blue monolith BR was a literal black box to those signing the cheques, or implementing a bureaucracy where things like costing delay minutes and internal spot hire rates was a thing.

 

[Andy R. A.]

I would imagine this sort of rigidity as a means of getting a good handle of what the true costs of things like of providing an InterCity service to a defined minimal standard, was vastly more preferable to either carrying on with the absurdity that the internal flow of money inside blue monolith BR was a literal black box to those signing the cheques, or implementing a bureaucracy where things like costing delay minutes and internal spot hire rates was a thing.

Unfortunately the 'absurdity' in the case I mentioned not only impacted on the Inter City service, but of non Inter City passengers services delayed as a result. Sadly there was a dramatic culture shift from resolving issues as quickly as possible to the 'blame game' first and foremost in which ultimately there were no winners.

 

[nw1]

As far as I know it definitely helped promote the benefits of the HST and the London commuter services, where clearly the targeted customer was the deep pocketed businessmen (deliberately gendered term, because it was the 80s) with alternative travel means.

Perhaps, but looking at old CWNs from Paddington during the 80s, the HST service out of Paddington was actually best in the early 80s, before sectorisation took place.

In 1981 there were 4 HSTs every hour, all day, and 3tp2h to both Bristol and Cardiff. There was one superfast to Bristol every 2 hours (just Reading, Bath and Bristol) which did Bath in an incredible 1hr10.

Later in the 80s, both pre- and post-sectorisation, this level of service never came back. Indeed even by 1995 I think it was still 3 HSTs per hour at Paddington (one Bristol, one Swansea and one Devon and Cornwall).

That said, NSE definitely seemed like a positive move overall with a string of improvements in the late 80s, early 90s - with the timetables of 1988, 1989 and 1990 all being very notable for various improvements on the lines out of Waterloo.

 

[Bevan Price]

I can remember one specific incident when Sectorisation didn't make things better.

An Inter City train had its Loco fail at point 'A'. 200 yards away sat an identical Loco but now belonging to one of the three Railfreight sectors. No, you can't use that Loco, even if it wasn't going out for a few hours yet. Nearest Inter City allocated Loco sat at point 'S' 60 odd miles away, also of the same type as the other two. Loco sent down from point 'S' and the failed train eventually got underway some 90 minutes late. Before this the nearest Loco would have been used, and the Loco at point 'S' would've been sent down in time to work the Freight service. The failed Inter City train would've probably suffered around 20-30 minutes delays at the most.

Unfortunately this was just one example of the rigidity of Sectorisation produced. I experienced far too many of these 'problems' at the time. Did it improve BR, probably not, at least from my point of view.

And the Freight sector "disconnected" the ETH system from their Class 90s so that Inter City could not (in theory) borrow them.

 

[Magdalia]

the HST service out of Paddington was actually best in the early 80s, before sectorisation took place.

In 1981 there were 4 HSTs every hour, all day, and 3tp2h to both Bristol and Cardiff.

The redeployment of the HST fleet was one of the first big gains from sectorisation. The Midland Mainline got its HST service, without any new trains, by trimming the least profitable HSTs on the Great Western, East Coast and Cross Country routes.

 

[Watershed]

even though the criteria were a bit wobbly… Gatwick Express was surely NSE whilst the Liverpool - Manchester - Leeds - York - Durham - Newcastle trains surely served sufficient cities to be InterCity… InterCity were running 158s so it was never a consistent level of service…)

Doesn't seem all that wobbly to me, even if the outcome was a bit arbitrary. The criteria for being an InterCity service was simply that it was profitable, not necessarily that it served cities.

Gatwick Express was profitable, hence it was hived off from NSE; Liverpool-Newcastle serves weren't, so they remained with Regional Railways (later the RR NE shadow TOC).

IC XC services were generally marginal so it's only through good fortune (and possibly inertia) that they didn't end up lumped together with RR Central, for example.

 

[Helvellyn]

Edinburgh-Glasgow ScotRail Express services and Waterloo-Bournemouth-Weymouth were both considered for inclusion in InterCity at sectorisation. The former might have made sense in the way Gatwick Express was allocated to the sector; the latter would have led to an interesting decision over replacing the 4-REPs/4-TCs because the 442s were arguably a very InterCity design multiple unit (AC versions to replace the 309s or short loco-hauled West Coast services, e.g. Birmingham-Manchester/Liverpool/Glasgow/Edinburgh and Manchester-Glasgow/Edinburgh would have been interesting).

 

[Taunton]

whilst the Liverpool - Manchester - Leeds - York - Durham - Newcastle trains surely served sufficient cities to be InterCity… InterCity were running 158s so it was never a consistent level of service…)

This is reminiscent of a long-ago meeting between BR and the Whitehall Ministry, where the Newcastle to Carlisle rural dmu service was reviewed for support. The civil servant said surely that should be an Inter-City service ... as both Newcastle and Carlisle were cities!

 

[Falcon1200]

An Inter City train had its Loco fail at point 'A'. 200 yards away sat an identical Loco but now belonging to one of the three Railfreight sectors. No, you can't use that Loco, even if it wasn't going out for a few hours yet.

An interesting and rather sad story, but more details are required! Was there a Driver for the nearby freight loco, and was it guaranteed that had it been used, its booked freight service would not have been delayed? One of the results of sectorisation was that no longer were freights (especially ballast/infrastructure trains) treated as the poor relation, liable to have their loco and crew pinched at any moment to cover something else, regardless of the possible effects elsewhere.

 

[Andy R. A.]

An interesting and rather sad story, but more details are required! Was there a Driver for the nearby freight loco, and was it guaranteed that had it been used, its booked freight service would not have been delayed? One of the results of sectorisation was that no longer were freights (especially ballast/infrastructure trains) treated as the poor relation, liable to have their loco and crew pinched at any moment to cover something else, regardless of the possible effects elsewhere.

In this case point 'A' had a Train Crew Depot where there were Drivers trained on the Traction, and available. The incident occurred around midday, and the Freight Loco was not required until around 1600. The Loco could've even worked the failed train to where the next Inter City allocated Loco was, and still have been back in time for its rostered working.

 

[nw1]

Edinburgh-Glasgow ScotRail Express services and Waterloo-Bournemouth-Weymouth were both considered for inclusion in InterCity at sectorisation. The former might have made sense in the way Gatwick Express was allocated to the sector; the latter would have led to an interesting decision over replacing the 4-REPs/4-TCs because the 442s were arguably a very InterCity design multiple unit (AC versions to replace the 309s or short loco-hauled West Coast services, e.g. Birmingham-Manchester/Liverpool/Glasgow/Edinburgh and Manchester-Glasgow/Edinburgh would have been interesting).

I think Gatwick Express in InterCity was a bit silly, as it's clearly NSE-land, and is only 30 mins duration. InterCity does not mean short-distance airport shuttle (or shouldn't).

 

[Meerkat]

I think Gatwick Express in InterCity was a bit silly, as it's clearly NSE-land, and is only 30 mins duration. InterCity does not mean short-distance airport shuttle (or shouldn't). Arguably you could have run it with CIGs, if there were enough to go round.

It was a premium product, so it makes sense to give it a premium brand.

 

[nw1]

It was a premium product, so it makes sense to give it a premium brand.

That I think was the mistake. There isn't room on a busy commuter railway to consume paths with "premium products".

Me, I'd just have run it with CIGs, and later, standard Southern 377s.

 

[Meerkat]

That I think was the mistake. There isn't room on a busy commuter railway to consume paths with "premium products".

Me, I'd just have run it with CIGs, and later, standard Southern 377s.

But a busy commuter railway doesn't matter lots of confused irregulars with loads of baggage mixed in either.

 

[yorksrob]

I'm not sure that there would have been enough CIG's to dedicate to it, bearing in mind they didn't start to go until the last days of the slammers.

They did do something similar previously with the VEG units and the Gatwick HAL's.

 

[LNW-GW Joint]

IC XC services were generally marginal so it's only through good fortune (and possibly inertia) that they didn't end up lumped together with RR Central, for example.

And yet XC was deeply unprofitable when franchised to Virgin in 1996.
It took a long time for XC to get to parity with Arriva, if it really did.
Arguably, the route which Virgin/Avanti retained after the XC dust-up, Birmingham-Preston-Scotland, might have been "tidy" but did nothing for ICWC profitability.
LNER has the advantage over Avanti of not running any pseudo-Regional services.
TPE also has an awkward position with Regional services mixed in with other local TOCs.
There's certainly a case for TPE to merge with Northern, with their WCML services switching to ICWC.
The SRA's "one operator per London terminal" policy, never fully implemented, also seems old hat today with GBR's new Regions in the offing.

 

[Meerkat]

deleted as going off topic (thought this was the TPE one)