There was also a GTR train stranded in this incident (well - a passenger one - and an empty one which doesn’t need discussing) - it was located at the signal on the Down West London Line immediately behind the failed train. Due to the track layout, it had drawn forward from Shepherds Bush station, which has no Down direction starter signals on either platform.
The train conductor was contacted immediately on receipt of news that the LO service ahead was stranded, since although the train mapping software didn’t make its location obvious, it was clear to the GTR controller investigating the delays that their service would have become stranded outside the platforms.
The conductor advised on service loading and acted as a point of contact for the controllers. The GTR train was fully loaded and obviously still very close to Shepherds Bush station, and therefore a prime risk for self-detraining. Based on accurate information about the train’s position and loading, arrangements were made for the train to move back into the station in the nick of time. I can say with 100% certainty that had the controllers and conductor not dealt with this using local route knowledge, and had the driver and signaller not acted on this information, there would have been a significant problem with another 8 coaches’ worth of passengers.
What I would also add is that North Pole is a very risky area due to uneven walking routes and limited clearances, with the third rail being a very potent hazard due to its proximity to potential egress routes in places - but the problem is that the failed train probably stopped alongside or very close to a bridge parapet which looks like a deceptively easy escape route, since it is on a level with train doors if you come to a stand at the power changeover point. There is also a private level crossing at Mitre Bridge, not far away, which is clearly visible on Google Maps et al, and provides more or less unhindered access to the wider world.
Secondly, LU handles incidents in a very different way to Network Rail. Some members of station staff are trained to access the track and can often assist in reassuring passengers or undertaking activities to get trains moving quicker. The smaller scale of the network means that incident response staff don’t have as far to travel (although admittedly that point could just as equally apply to NR/Overground in urban areas) especially the local line managers, or network team who often attend under blue lights driven by police. LU has a clear command structure in place with one organisation running trains and infrastructure, with targets that trains should not be stalled (stuck outside a station) for more than 60 Minutes, whilst this target isn’t always met it’s a benchmark after which people begin to get a bit fed up!
Network Rail infrastructure has all of the above. Many of the station staff I deal with around London are PTS trained, indeed I was assisting one only the other day with arranging a fairly complicated line block in an area not so far from the one in this incident. Not that station staff are much use around North Pole (or within the few miles north of there towards the endless freight yards at Wembley), as there are very few local stations which have practical access to most of the running lines.
NR Mobile Operations Managers work jointly with BTP on the Emergency Intervention Units which regularly run on Immediate / blue-light response to urgent rail incidents. This happened with the incident in question.
There are also far more stringent Stranded Trains Risk Assessments than there used to be, although I’m not convinced the paperwork would have been needed anyway in this case, since the needs of the stranded train would have been painfully obvious to any controller with even a jot of knowledge about the West London Line.
