1960's passenger or ticket sales data

[Argosy]

Not sure on which thread to post this one!

Does anyone know if it is possible to find the ticket sales/passenger usage data data for both pre 1994 and during the 1960's for stations?

I suspect it has all been trashed but I wonder if any stuff survived with the TUCC hearings into station/line closures.

 

[coppercapped]

I suspect that a lot of BR's internal figures have been lost, unless there are some still existing in the National Archives (ex Public Records Office) at Kew.

The report The Reshaping of British Railways (aka the Beeching Report) has some figures for a some lines - rather than individual stations - used as examples. On page 97 are figures for the Gleneagles-Crieff-Comrie line are quoted:

15 miles long with 8 stations. 340,000 passenger-miles a year with 65,000 train miles. On average 5 passengers per train generating £1,900 per year making up about one quarter of the movement expenses. Including terminal, track and signalling expenses receipts covered less than one tenth of the total.

The Thetford-Swaffham route is on page 98:

23 route miles with 6 stations. 86,000 train-miles per year with an average of 9 passengers per train. Total fare income £3,700. Total expenses (movement, terminal, track and signalling) £30,600 so again receipts covered a tenth of the total costs.

Hull-Beverley-York is also given and in this case there was an average of 57 passenger per train. earning amounted to £90,400 but were still £17,100 short of the total costs.

Table 1 on pages 100 and 101 show the analysis of 10 services, but being a paper copy I can't post a link!

Hope this helps!

 

[crehld]

Wasn't the data and subsequent analysis used in Beeching's report found to be flawed due to poor sampling, for example extrapolating passenger figures for a whole week based on 30 minutes' observation at off peak times ... Or is that a myth?

 

[coppercapped]

Wasn't the data and subsequent analysis used in Beeching's report found to be flawed due to poor sampling, for example extrapolating passenger figures for a whole week based on 30 minutes' observation at off peak times ... Or is that a myth?

A myth. Until Beeching carried out the traffic studies there were no, repeat no, detailed management accounting data available at all. All the BRB, and before it the BTC, had to go on were the global figures prepared annually.

The Report itself says on page 5:

The figures presented are those for 1961 and, with minor exceptions, cost figures used throughout the report refer to that year. The reason is that this is the latest year for which fully detailed cost data could be made available during the course of the investigation, and it was also the year in which the special traffic studies were made.

In a situation as changeable as that of the railways, no year can be described as typical. The year 1961 was not a good one from the traffic point of view, because the recession in the steel industry affected the latter half of it. In this respect, therefore, it was worse than 1960, but it was better than 1962, and it is not yet known whether 1963 will be better or worse. Also, although substantial economies were made in 1962, there were two increases in wage rates during that year which amounted to just over 9 per cent and the working week was reduced.

It is known that the conclusions reached would have all been substantially the same had they been based on figures for 1960, and there is no reason to think that they would be different were it possible to use the figures for 1962 or the early part of 1963. Therefore the Railways Board is satisfied that although the figures used throughout the report are not, and could not be, completely up-to-date, they form a sound basis for decision making.

On page 10 it goes on to say:

The traffic surveys, which were made in great detail, extended over only one week, the week ending on 23rd April, 1961, because it was impossible to continue the massive recording effort involved for a longer period. It was realised, therefore, that conclusions about some streams of traffic and about some parts of the system which are affected by seasonal changes could not be based firmly on the traffic surveys alone. Subject to this limitation, however, there can be little doubt about the general reliability of the picture revealed.

Don’t forget that the data collection was essentially done by men with clip boards counting wagons, where they started, where they ran, where they finished, what they were carrying and passengers at each station. These figures were used to generate data about freight ton-miles per mile of route and passenger-miles per mile of route. There were no portable computers to aid data collection or bar codes to scan, it was a labour intensive exercise.

The point to be remembered about the criticisms made of the data gathering was that people were trying to retain their train service. Any half-way valid argument would helpful. But even if the number of passengers on some services were twice what had been counted - as the operating costs of that branch line or section were in some cases 10 times the receipts even doubling the receipts would have made no difference to the conclusions reached.

The figures were accurate enough for the purposes of the Report, but I would suggest that more detailed counts and analysis of the receipts per station should have been made to support the closure proposals. In many cases this was not done laying the railway open to criticism that it was trying to force through the closures. However one cannot blame Beeching for such omissions as by the time the bulk of the closure proposals were being processed he had left the railways - his job done.

 

[crehld]

Thanks, that's really interesting.

 

[yorksrob]

A myth. Until Beeching carried out the traffic studies there were no, repeat no, detailed management accounting data available at all. All the BRB, and before it the BTC, had to go on were the global figures prepared annually.

Was it a myth that stations and routes which relied on incoming visitors were undercounted due to a reliance on receipts (that would show up at the station of origin) whilst other more seasonal services were undercounted due to the survey taking place out of peak season ?

 

[coppercapped]

Was it a myth that stations and routes which relied on incoming visitors were undercounted due to a reliance on receipts (that would show up at the station of origin) whilst other more seasonal services were undercounted due to the survey taking place out of peak season ?

Which bit of

It was realised, therefore, that conclusions about some streams of traffic and about some parts of the system which are affected by seasonal changes could not be based firmly on the traffic surveys alone.

do you have difficulty in understanding?

In any event seasonal traffic was a loss-maker. Do you realise that in 1960 BR had 6,000 coaches on the books of which 2,000 were only used on 10 occasions each year, a further 2,000 were only used on 14 occasions and another 2,000 were only used on 18 occasions each year? The cost of keeping and maintaining these carriages came to £3.4 million and they earned £500,000.

Even if these extra seasonal travellers on the branches were properly accounted for - it would still have been worth dumping the traffic. Costs were in many cases 10 times the receipts.

The traffic surveys made counted passengers (except in very busy areas such as the London terminals as here it was clear there was not such a problem with low receipts), as in passenger 1, passenger 2, passenger 3, etc. - they were not based on ticket receipts. The financial calculations were of course based on the receipts, but the branch was not credited with the income for the whole journey, only that part of it which was made on the branch. The reasoning is as follows.

In other parts of the report it talks about losing that part of the revenue which would go when the branch service was cut. It points out that in many cases not all the revenue would be lost. For an example, consider the Lambourn branch from Newbury. If it closed then all the revenue generated by stations on the branch for journeys to Newbury would be lost. However longer distance journeys might not be so badly affected, people might elect to drive from Lambourn to Reading (if that was their destination) so all the revenue would be lost in this case but if they were going to London then it is likely they would drive to Newbury and take the train from there. In this case only the Lambourn to Newbury fare would be lost. The same is true in the reverse direction, all Newbury to Lambourn business would be lost, but the London to Lambourn business may well have been retained as far as Newbury.

Thus crediting the branch with the revenue of the whole journey would not have allowed for the fact that the passenger journeyed on the branch because he could get there by train from his starting point. Essentially the trunk haul has generated the branch traffic.

A point that should also be made is the numbers of people travelling on the branches was so low that the loss of the branch made little or no difference to the loadings of the longer distance trains at the junction stations as only some of the branch passengers would be changing trains.

There was no conspiracy in the compilation of the report.

 

[infobleep]

As much as a shame I think it is that all the railways had to close, they were often making a loss. Remember some lines closed in the 1950s. Even in the 1930s lines were closing.

 

[yorksrob]

In any event seasonal traffic was a loss-maker. Do you realise that in 1960 BR had 6,000 coaches on the books of which 2,000 were only used on 10 occasions each year, a further 2,000 were only used on 14 occasions and another 2,000 were only used on 18 occasions each year? The cost of keeping and maintaining these carriages came to £3.4 million and they earned £500,000.

And what, pray tell, have carriages only used on ten occasions each year got to do with running a year round service on a local route. An Irrelevance. to my point.

Even if these extra seasonal travellers on the branches were properly accounted for - it would still have been worth dumping the traffic. Costs were in many cases 10 times the receipts.

The traffic surveys made counted passengers (except in very busy areas such as the London terminals as here it was clear there was not such a problem with low receipts), as in passenger 1, passenger 2, passenger 3, etc. - they were not based on ticket receipts.

And what if the count was made at a quiet time of year ? Frankly in any case it would make sense to take surveys at different times of year to get more of an average and a more statistically robust picture of what was happening. You say it wouldn't make any difference. Why should I believe you when the statistics haven't been put together sensibly ?

Conspiracy or cock-up, I still don't trust the statistics

The financial calculations were of course based on the receipts, but the branch was not credited with the income for the whole journey, only that part of it which was made on the branch. The reasoning is as follows.

In other parts of the report it talks about losing that part of the revenue which would go when the branch service was cut. It points out that in many cases not all the revenue would be lost. For an example, consider the Lambourn branch from Newbury. If it closed then all the revenue generated by stations on the branch for journeys to Newbury would be lost. However longer distance journeys might not be so badly affected, people might elect to drive from Lambourn to Reading (if that was their destination) so all the revenue would be lost in this case but if they were going to London then it is likely they would drive to Newbury and take the train from there. In this case only the Lambourn to Newbury fare would be lost. The same is true in the reverse direction, all Newbury to Lambourn business would be lost, but the London to Lambourn business may well have been retained as far as Newbury.

All assumptions that weren't tested. Did they survey any of the routes that had been closed previously to see if this was what actually happened ? Did they do any analysis to see whether the passenger living at the end of the branch drove to the main line to catch a train ? Didn't think so. Even then, this doesn't take account of the passenger who previously would have travelled to Lyme Regis by train. Would they have been expected to go to Axminster and thumb it ?

Thus crediting the branch with the revenue of the whole journey would not have allowed for the fact that the passenger journeyed on the branch because he could get there by train from his starting point. Essentially the trunk haul has generated the branch traffic.

Bit of a nonsense though isn't it. I regularly travel to Whitby from Leeds by train. Which part of that journey is generating the revenue ? Leeds to York ? Leeds to Northallerton?, Leeds to Ruswarp ?

The revenue is generated because I can get from Leeds to Whitby.

A point that should also be made is the numbers of people travelling on the branches was so low that the loss of the branch made little or no difference to the loadings of the longer distance trains at the junction stations as only some of the branch passengers would be changing trains.

Again, where's the evidence ? This is a sweeping statement. Was it true of all lines listed for closure ?

Buxton, Corby, Dunstable, Ilfracombe, Leigh Lancs, Tiverton and Tiverton Junction ? Low numbers of passengers travelling to these places ? I think you're talking out the side of your hat.

 

[coppercapped]

And what, pray tell, have carriages only used on ten occasions each year got to do with running a year round service on a local route. An Irrelevance. to my point.



And what if the count was made at a quiet time of year ? Frankly in any case it would make sense to take surveys at different times of year to get more of an average and a more statistically robust picture of what was happening. You say it wouldn't make any difference. Why should I believe you when the statistics haven't been put together sensibly ?

Conspiracy or cock-up, I still don't trust the statistics



All assumptions that weren't tested. Did they survey any of the routes that had been closed previously to see if this was what actually happened ? Did they do any analysis to see whether the passenger living at the end of the branch drove to the main line to catch a train ? Didn't think so. Even then, this doesn't take account of the passenger who previously would have travelled to Lyme Regis by train. Would they have been expected to go to Axminster and thumb it ?



Bit of a nonsense though isn't it. I regularly travel to Whitby from Leeds by train. Which part of that journey is generating the revenue ? Leeds to York ? Leeds to Northallerton?, Leeds to Ruswarp ?

The revenue is generated because I can get from Leeds to Whitby.



Again, where's the evidence ? This is a sweeping statement. Was it true of all lines listed for closure ?

Buxton, Corby, Dunstable, Ilfracombe, Leigh Lancs, Tiverton and Tiverton Junction ? Low numbers of passengers travelling to these places ? I think you're talking out the side of your hat.

To take your last point first. At the time Beeching presented his report passenger traffic had been falling for five consecutive years. The number of passengers carried each year continued to fall, with the occasional upwards bump, for another twenty years after the report had been published. The nadir was 1981.

If you think that enough passengers were travelling to the places you mention in sufficient numbers to even pay for the movement costs of the trains they were using - then you are living in cloud cuckoo land. Do you remember how slow and dirty the railway was then?

I have now pointed out twice that the traffic studies were done in one week in April 1961. The limitations of that exercise were known and reported on in the Beeching report.

I am not going to waste my time in trying to persuade you that your opinions are incorrect as you have obviously convinced yourself that Beeching didn't have a clue what he was doing. What I recommend is that you read the report yourself. I have done a search and found out that a scanned copy is available on railwayarchives.co.uk.

 

[Argosy]

Would any information be available in the TUCC reports or will they have all been trashed too?

 

[yorksrob]

To take your last point first. At the time Beeching presented his report passenger traffic had been falling for five consecutive years. The number of passengers carried each year continued to fall, with the occasional upwards bump, for another twenty years after the report had been published. The nadir was 1981.

If you think that enough passengers were travelling to the places you mention in sufficient numbers to even pay for the movement costs of the trains they were using - then you are living in cloud cuckoo land. Do you remember how slow and dirty the railway was then?

I have now pointed out twice that the traffic studies were done in one week in April 1961. The limitations of that exercise were known and reported on in the Beeching report.

I am not going to waste my time in trying to persuade you that your opinions are incorrect as you have obviously convinced yourself that Beeching didn't have a clue what he was doing. What I recommend is that you read the report yourself. I have done a search and found out that a scanned copy is available on railwayarchives.co.uk.

So you think you're the only person who's read the Beeching Report. I along with probably every contributor to this forum, have also read the report, including the worked example of the York - Beverley route, which sets out in gory detail how the justification for closure had to be manufactured by discounting through passengers who, it was assumed would travel via Selby - and this before any cost control measures were carried out.

I have now pointed out twice that the traffic studies were done in one week in April 1961. The limitations of that exercise were known and reported on in the Beeching report.

You can point it out as many times as you like. The fact remains it's not good enough to say "by the way, we've calculated this incorrectly and you can't rely on this statistic, but we're going to base our conclusions on it anyway" If I went to my employer with such a report, I'd be told to go back and do it properly.

Still, there's probably little point in getting embroiled in an argument with a Beeching apologist, desperate to keep the flame alive.

 

[infobleep]

So you think you're the only person who's read the Beeching Report. I along with probably every contributor to this forum, have also read the report, including the worked example of the York - Beverley route, which sets out in gory detail how the justification for closure had to be manufactured by discounting through passengers who, it was assumed would travel via Selby - and this before any cost control measures were carried out.



You can point it out as many times as you like. The fact remains it's not good enough to say "by the way, we've calculated this incorrectly and you can't rely on this statistic, but we're going to base our conclusions on it anyway" If I went to my employer with such a report, I'd be told to go back and do it properly.

Still, there's probably little point in getting embroiled in an argument with a Beeching apologist, desperate to keep the flame alive.

I've not read the Beeching report and I contribute to this forum. I suspect many others are in the same boat too.

 

[yorksrob]

I've not read the Beeching report and I contribute to this forum. I suspect many others are in the same boat too.

Well, that was perhaps a slight exaggeration. But I bet lots of us have.

 

[coppercapped]

So you think you're the only person who's read the Beeching Report. I along with probably every contributor to this forum, have also read the report, including the worked example of the York - Beverley route, which sets out in gory detail how the justification for closure had to be manufactured by discounting through passengers who, it was assumed would travel via Selby - and this before any cost control measures were carried out.

BR was losing shedloads of money, and that was a comparatively new experience for both it and the Government - it had been losing money for 10 years, since 1952 to be exact. Until then the railways had been profitable, some more, some less, for some 130 years so this was seen as the natural order of things. However the loss was getting bigger from year to year and passenger numbers were sliding. It was essential to cut costs as the Government was also limited in the amount it could spend on the railways in view of all its other commitments. (Some things never change!)

You suggest that cost control measures should have been tried. There is no denying that BR was sometimes slow in introducing these but one has to consider what was possible in days of jointed bullhead track and manual signalling without spending large sums on continuous welded rail and centralised signalling, and that on a loss-making railway.

Using the figures quoted the route had earnings of £90,400 with movement expenses (direct costs of running the trains) of £84,400. That is, there was a margin of £6,000 per year. (These sums seem small, but £6,000 in 1961 is worth the same as £100,000 now).

The terminal expenses, that is the cost of running the stations including a proportion of the costs of the shared stations, York, Beverley, Cottingham and Hull, amounted to £23,100 and the track and signalling for the 42 miles came to £43,000. Together these two items come to £66,100.

So, in order that people would still be able to travel from York to Hull via Beverley (and vice versa) without sending them via Selby and without them becoming a burden to the taxpayer it would be necessary to make the operation of the route cost neutral, i.e., that BR would not make a loss, but would not make a profit either. If this were to be the case with the revenues and movement costs remaining the same (the trains were mostly newish dmus so the costs of operation had already been reduced), the costs of stations, track and signalling would have to be reduced from £66,100 to £6,000 per year. This is a factor of ten.

I leave it to the reader to work out how this could be done.

 

[yorksrob]

BR was losing shedloads of money, and that was a comparatively new experience for both it and the Government - it had been losing money for 10 years, since 1952 to be exact. Until then the railways had been profitable, some more, some less, for some 130 years so this was seen as the natural order of things. However the loss was getting bigger from year to year and passenger numbers were sliding. It was essential to cut costs as the Government was also limited in the amount it could spend on the railways in view of all its other commitments. (Some things never change!)

You suggest that cost control measures should have been tried. There is no denying that BR was sometimes slow in introducing these but one has to consider what was possible in days of jointed bullhead track and manual signalling without spending large sums on continuous welded rail and centralised signalling, and that on a loss-making railway.

Using the figures quoted the route had earnings of £90,400 with movement expenses (direct costs of running the trains) of £84,400. That is, there was a margin of £6,000 per year. (These sums seem small, but £6,000 in 1961 is worth the same as £100,000 now).

The terminal expenses, that is the cost of running the stations including a proportion of the costs of the shared stations, York, Beverley, Cottingham and Hull, amounted to £23,100 and the track and signalling for the 42 miles came to £43,000. Together these two items come to £66,100.

So, in order that people would still be able to travel from York to Hull via Beverley (and vice versa) without sending them via Selby and without them becoming a burden to the taxpayer it would be necessary to make the operation of the route cost neutral, i.e., that BR would not make a loss, but would not make a profit either. If this were to be the case with the revenues and movement costs remaining the same (the trains were mostly newish dmus so the costs of operation had already been reduced), the costs of stations, track and signalling would have to be reduced from £66,100 to £6,000 per year. This is a factor of ten.

I leave it to the reader to work out how this could be done.

No need to look to the reader. Single the track, rationalise the signalling, automate the level crossings (as was actually planned on the route, to the extent that the equipment had been purchased ready to install)

And all of this before we even consider contributions of passengers at Market Weighton etc travelling from destinations beyond York and the strategic value of having an East/West diversionary route to Hull.

Oh and de-staff the stations (obviously not York, Cottingham and Hull, whose costs have laughably been included in the costs of this section of line).

As contributors on here well know, all these things have been done many times on the railway, by people interested in running a railway more efficiently, rather than Stedeford Committee placemen determined to pursue a poorly considered slash and burn policy at all costs.

And let me just reiterate the point that the earnings quoted by Coppercapped do not include the contribution of passengers travelling between York and Hull and beyond, so in truth these services will have generated more income than quoted.

Funny that they chose to include costs from York and Hull stations, even though these would be unlikely to be reduced by closure, but not earnings from through journeys between the two, even though there was no guarantee that passengers would switch to the route via Selby as they would have fewer trains throughout the day.

 

[coppercapped]

No need to look to the reader. Single the track, rationalise the signalling, automate the level crossings (as was actually planned on the route, to the extent that the equipment had been purchased ready to install)

And all of this before we even consider contributions of passengers at Market Weighton etc travelling from destinations beyond York and the strategic value of having an East/West diversionary route to Hull.

Oh and de-staff the stations (obviously not York, Cottingham and Hull, whose costs have laughably been included in the costs of this section of line).

As contributors on here well know, all these things have been done many times on the railway, by people interested in running a railway more efficiently, rather than Stedeford Committee placemen determined to pursue a poorly considered slash and burn policy at all costs.

And let me just reiterate the point that the earnings quoted by Coppercapped do not include the contribution of passengers travelling between York and Hull and beyond, so in truth these services will have generated more income than quoted.

Funny that they chose to include costs from York and Hull stations, even though these would be unlikely to be reduced by closure, but not earnings from through journeys between the two, even though there was no guarantee that passengers would switch to the route via Selby as they would have fewer trains throughout the day.

Do you really not accept the analysis and conclusions of the 'Reshaping of British Railways' report, or is it specifically with the worked example of the Hull - Beverley - York route?

 

[infobleep]

Do you really not accept the analysis and conclusions of the 'Reshaping of British Railways' report, or is it specifically with the worked example of the Hull - Beverley - York route?

Out of interest, does anyone know why the costs of York and Hull were included with the line?

 

[yorksrob]

Do you really not accept the analysis and conclusions of the 'Reshaping of British Railways' report, or is it specifically with the worked example of the Hull - Beverley - York route?

If they've closed York Beverley on the basis of flawed calculations illustrated by their worked example, one can't help but wonder how many other route closures were justified using similarly dubious calculations.

To be fair the Swaffham - Thetford example suggests that they were on firmer ground with some closures, but how can you trust the process?

What it suggests strongly was that Beeching/Serpell etc had an overreliance on closures. Unfortunately this mindset seems to have infiltrated the whole organisation during the 60's and 70's. There seems to have been a lack of consideration of the purposes of the Regional passenger railway as well as a lack of understanding that the railway is a transport network, rather than a series of unrelated commuter and InterCity railways.

BR at the time strikes as being a bit like what Churchill said of the USA, doing the right thing after trying all the others. It could actually be very effective at rationalising and driving down costs, but it seems that on too many occasions this was only attempted after closure had been rejected by the Minister (The Marshlink is a prime example of this). Beeching and the Stedeford Committee were to blame for this ethos.

 

[Clarence Yard]

The method of apportioning costs was standard for the time. Using an avoidable cost allocation method is a relatively modern approach on the railway, even now the Fixed Track Access charge is apportioned to franchises in a fairly odd way, by percentage. I hate that method.

So, by the standards of the time, the way they did it was understandable. The metrics to allocate cost were fairly crude and yes, there was a policy objective in the 60's to close down local services throughout BR. The concept of a social or contributive railway was still a few years away.

When I joined in the 1970's, there were still "rationalisation" departments and managed decline was obvious in many areas of the business. The treasury used to keep us cash poor so every surplus asset had to be turned quickly into cash or demolished to avoid cost.

What is not, I think, in doubt is that the reduction in both passenger and goods traffic on local lines between the early 50's and the early 60's was so severe and costs were increasing so fast that drastic action was required.

I just wish that the financial basis for closing individual lines was done, at the micro level, by a slightly different method. But that wish is made with the benefit of hindsight (& experience) and not with the tools or challenges of the time.

 

[coppercapped]

Out of interest, does anyone know why the costs of York and Hull were included with the line?

It would seem that there is a confusion between terminal expenses and terminus expenses.

The Reshaping of British Railways report uses the first term consistently to mean the running costs of freight and passenger stations. The worked example of the Hull - Beverley - York route lists 10 stations with terminal expenses of £23,100 per year. That works out to be £2,310 per station per annum - which would seem about right using cost figures for the period.

 

[infobleep]

It would seem that there is a confusion between terminal expenses and terminus expenses.

The Reshaping of British Railways report uses the first term consistently to mean the running costs of freight and passenger stations. The worked example of the Hull - Beverley - York route lists 10 stations with terminal expenses of £23,100 per year. That works out to be £2,310 per station per annum - which would seem about right using cost figures for the period.

So does that mean all the costs of York were included in the Beverley line calculation or just a proportion based on trains coming from Beverley using York station?

It's a shame much of the land couldn't be safeguarded in case of future transport needs but would that have cost to much money or made no profit?

I'm amazed at how some stations and platforms survived but others didn't. Did the ones that get demolished, simply not sell when put up for sale?

 

[yorksrob]

So does that mean all the costs of York were included in the Beverley line calculation or just a proportion based on trains coming from Beverley using York station?

It's a shame much of the land couldn't be safeguarded in case of future transport needs but would that have cost to much money or made no profit?

I'm amazed at how some stations and platforms survived but others didn't. Did the ones that get demolished, simply not sell when put up for sale?

It wouldn't have included all of the costs of those stations. However, I don't see the logic of including even a proportion of the costs. Say you do close York - Beverley, where is this financial saving from the running of stations such as York and Hull going to come from? I'm very sceptical there would have been any saving at all, so the cost shouldn't have been attributed to the service to begin with.

 

[Clarence Yard]

The apportionment of terminal costs could have been done a number of ways, splitting the costs by trains arriving/departing, by vehicle, by staff apportionment by duty, by equipment used - I actually knew someone doing it at a passenger terminal (in the 1980's) by platform occupation time (bonkers!).

Where would the saving at York come from? Well the cynic in me says that they could have been overstaffed anyway and copped the saving on the back of a line closure but in some cases there was no saving to bank. In some there would have been a genuine reduction in staff activity but at York, using an avoidable cost mindset, it is quite hard to see that scale of reduction.

But in the 1960's world of percentage attribution, someone probably would have been on the hook to make that saving at York, one way or another.

 

[coppercapped]

So does that mean all the costs of York were included in the Beverley line calculation or just a proportion based on trains coming from Beverley using York station?

The suggestion was that the costs of both York and Hull were loaded onto the line. However I read it as being a proportion; York station alone would have cost as much as the line's total 'terminal expenses' to run. The Bank of England's inflation calculator reckons that £23,100 is a bit less than £500,000 now. These days that seems low for York, let alone Hull as well!

It's a shame much of the land couldn't be safeguarded in case of future transport needs but would that have cost to much money or made no profit?

Arguably this was a short-sighted decision, but can only be seen as such with the benefit of hindsight. Passenger and freight traffic continued to slide for another 20 years and only 30-odd years later did the passenger numbers start to grow again continuously. During the first few years of this growth the increase could be carried on the existing network. By the time it is clear that some routes could be re-opened you are, in reality, talking 40 to 50 years after the closure.

In the meantime, even if no trains are using the route basic maintenance on cuttings, embankments, drains, tunnels, bridges and viaducts would need to be carried out for safety reasons - the weather never lets up! It would have been unfair on the railways if they had to carry these costs if they no longer needed the route so there would be an argument for setting up a separate Government 'land bank' for these old routes - but I cannot see it being a cheap operation. It would have been a decision the politicians would have to make - spending money on a sort of insurance policy for some time in the future competing with expenditure required now on schools, hospitals, roads or flood defences.

I'm amazed at how some stations and platforms survived but others didn't. Did the ones that get demolished, simply not sell when put up for sale?

Pass! Ask me something easier..!

 

[yorksrob]

The apportionment of terminascope been done a number of ways, splitting the costs by trains arriving/departing, by vehicle, by staff apportionment by duty, by equipment used - I actually knew someone doing it at a passenger terminal (in the 1980's) by platform occupation time (bonkers!).

Where would the saving at York come from? Well the cynic in me says that they could have been overstaffed anyway and copped the saving on the back of a line closure but in some cases there was no saving to bank. In some there would have been a genuine reduction in staff activity but at York, using an avoidable cost mindset, it is quite hard to see that scale of reduction.

But in the 1960's world of percentage attribution, someone probably would have been on the hook to make that saving at York, one way or another.

It's interesting to hear the perspective of someone who was involved at the sharp end in those days.

I see your point that somewhere like York might have had scope for savings anyway. With my scrutinising hat on I would strongly suspect that many such savings could have been achieved regardless of whether Beverley via Market Weighton ran or not, so still shouldn't have been used to justify closure.

 

[Clarence Yard]

I'm not that old, honest! But I did work with people who had done it then and still stuck to their old ways in later years.

From what I was told, I think it was the Broad Street to Richmond closure proposals in the late 1960's that really exposed the problem with percentage allocations and loss of contributory revenue. The proposals got ditched as a result and lessons were learned.

I was an Area Finance Manager in sector days and one of my maintenance depots was a multi sector one. So you had to use avoidable cost allocation for fixed or common costs otherwise any change in marginal workload would make you vulnerable to pushing costs onto other users and they could take your work away as a result.

But getting back to the original question, the best region for surviving revenue figures is WR. The national archives have the HQ divisional books for each station dating from GWR days to about 1959. Similar 1960's figures are hard to come by for any region although I haven't done the surviving regional board papers yet.

 

[yorksrob]

The suggestion was that the costs of both York and Hull were loaded onto the line.

That was never my suggestion. My argument is that it was nonsensical to attribute any costs associated with running stations such as York and Hull to the line as I regard it as highly unlikely that any of those costs would be saved by withdrawing trains via Market Weighton. I was not suggesting that the entire cost of running York and Hull stations had been attributed to the line.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

I'm not that old, honest! But I did work with people who had done it then and still stuck to their old ways in later years.

From what I was told, I think it was the Broad Street to Richmond closure proposals in the late 1960's that really exposed the problem with percentage allocations and loss of contributory revenue. The proposals got ditched as a result and lessons were learned.

I was an Area Finance Manager in sector days and one of my maintenance depots was a multi sector one. So you had to use avoidable cost allocation for fixed or common costs otherwise any change in marginal workload would make you vulnerable to pushing costs onto other users and they could take your work away as a result.

Indeed we were lucky that the North London line led to a reassessment before closure!

I can imagine it must have been a pain trying to divide up every cost at somewhere like Neville Hill between sectors!

 

[coppercapped]

Just to confirm my understanding of the issue concerning allocation of the terminal expenses! I interpreted your statement in post No. 16

Oh and de-staff the stations (obviously not York, Cottingham and Hull, whose costs have laughably been included in the costs of this section of line).

as meaning that the costs for these stations had been included in the terminal expenses in the Beeching report. I'm glad to have read your explanation:

That was never my suggestion. My argument is that it was nonsensical to attribute any costs associated with running stations such as York and Hull to the line as I regard it as highly unlikely that any of those costs would be saved by withdrawing trains via Market Weighton. I was not suggesting that the entire cost of running York and Hull stations had been attributed to the line.

Whew! We're in great danger of agreeing! There are obviously some costs which could be saved in the two termini, but as the bulk of the buildings, track and signalling would remain these would be marginal. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of the two stations shared with the Scarborough services.

However I am still not convinced that all the ways of cost saving you list would have been sufficient to enable the service to have earned enough to cover its costs in the context of the 1960s railway. However, rather than go into chapter and verse on the possible savings and earnings, I suggest that we simple agree to differ!

 

[yorksrob]

Just to confirm my understanding of the issue concerning allocation of the terminal expenses! I interpreted your statement in post No. 16



as meaning that the costs for these stations had been included in the terminal expenses in the Beeching report. I'm glad to have read your explanation:



Whew! We're in great danger of agreeing! There are obviously some costs which could be saved in the two termini, but as the bulk of the buildings, track and signalling would remain these would be marginal. This is also true, but to a lesser extent, of the two stations shared with the Scarborough services.

However I am still not convinced that all the ways of cost saving you list would have been sufficient to enable the service to have earned enough to cover its costs in the context of the 1960s railway. However, rather than go into chapter and verse on the possible savings and earnings, I suggest that we simple agree to differ!

For myself, I think there were flaws in the way the statistics were compiled, however these would not have been so problematic were it not for the major flaws in the interpretation of that data, the conclusions drawn and of course, policy both within the Beeching management of BR, and the Government.

In truth, if you start from a perspective that route closures are the primary way to 'improve' the efficiency of the railway network, and collect statistics to that end, it will inevitably be a disaster for the railway and the country.