Beeching closures

[Grumpy]

O

The railway's profitability had been sliding since the early 1950s. This was worrying for the Government as the dividend (of 3%) on the Government stock which had been issued to the shareholders of the Big 4 on their nationalisation was intended to be paid by the profits made by the British Transport Commission. By 1953 these profits had ceased to exist and the burden of these payments then fell on the taxpayer.



Had the modernisation plan spent the money sensibly, Beeching would be (un)remembered as a former senior manager in ICI.

Edit: added last clause to the final sentence of para. 4 for clarity.

The payment to shareholders was not just for the assets taken over at Nationalisation, but included an element to compensate for wartime use. The nationalised railway had to pay interest on this total sum which was a charge on profits. The problem being that the interest charge was way above what the railway could generate from the clapped out assets. It would have been fairer if the Government had made a separate compensation payment to the shareholders for the wartime use and paid for this directly. The new nationalised railway should have had an opening balance sheet with the taken over assets shown at a realistic value and the equity shown as public dividend capital, not as fixed interest bearing. I seem to recall that the likes of BOAC and BEA were structured this way.

It seems to be a common opinion that the modernisation plan didn't spend the money wisely as the losses went up. I don't really agree with this and would argue that the losses would have been even bigger had not the returns from the investment offset the effects of changes in society. Thus of the total investment how much was really wasted? Yes people can quote the Metrovicks and class 14's etc having short lives but these were a small proportion of the total fleet, with the main classes having long lives. Similarly of the large sums spent on resignalling, electrification, CWR etc what proportion was wasted?
I would suggest that BR's deteriorating finances in the 50's and 60's were as a result of changes in society such as television reducing leisure journeys, rapid increase in motor car ownership, the jet aeroplane, road freight deregulation etc. Full employment meant that BR's labour costs rose significantly-I believe pay rises averaged 3.5% above inflation per annum.

 

[coppercapped]

SNIPPED a big chunk!
Perhaps I'm just old fashioned in that I think it's the business of a railway company to run railways, not to close them.

Coming back to this older post. In principle I agree with you, but I would add the proviso '...it's the business of a railway company to run railways, but not at any cost'.

This is not a new idea. In a speech to the House of Lords in December 1960, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, one of the forces behind the nationalisation of much of British industry in Clem Attlee's post-war Government said:

My Lords, I turn to finance. Let me say straight away that I do not like general subsidies to publicly-owned services and industries. I like them to pay their way; I much prefer them to pay their way. That is why I am partly unhappy about the present situation of British Railways, in particular; because although in some respects their receipts have improved, they are not paying their way, and every year we read in the newspapers that so many millions are required by the British Transport Commission. It is not good for the Commission; it is not good for the management; nor is it good for the morale of the workers in the railway industry. For that reason I do not advocate the Government's saying to the undertaking, "It is all right. If you are in trouble we are standing by you, and what money you lose we will make up". I think it would be wrong to do that if it could possibly be avoided, because it might make management careless. They might say to themselves, "We have the State behind us". It might make the railway workers a little extravagant in their claims if they knew the State was behind them, and they might say, "You can give us what we want". I do not like general subsidies, and I much prefer publicly-owned industries to pay their way, at any rate taking one year with another.

Nuff said!

 

[yorksrob]

Coming back to this older post. In principle I agree with you, but I would add the proviso '...it's the business of a railway company to run railways, but not at any cost'.

This is not a new idea. In a speech to the House of Lords in December 1960, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, one of the forces behind the nationalisation of much of British industry said:


Nuff said!

Well yes, I don't think the Hythe (Kent) branch (closed 1951) would have had much of a future in any scenario.

It just seems that there is a happy medium between keeping passenger lines open "at any cost" and just closing 'unremunerative' lines, and we seem to have taken a particularly convoluted and destructive way of finding it.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Well yes, I don't think the Hythe (Kent) branch (closed 1951) would have had much of a future in any scenario.

It just seems that there is a happy medium between keeping passenger lines open "at any cost" and just closing 'unremunerative' lines, and we seem to have taken a particularly convoluted and destructive way of finding it.

This is a very interesting discussion.

To me one of the most impressive aspects of the Beeching era was that he did genuinely try and take a more analytical and data-driven approach to identifying which lines were actually unremunerative and which ones should be proposed to the Minister for withdrawal. (All the while noting that the passenger closures were actually only 21-25% of the benefits of his overall 'plan'.) Dr B was also well on the ball with appreciation of emerging social cost-benefit thinking and open to the concept of subsidy where justified.

I struggle to see the Reshaping approach as "convoluted". It has always struck me as a model of concise reasoning and exposition. 'Tell 'em what you are going to tell 'em; tell 'em; and tell 'em what you just told 'em'. 'Problem definition > data collection > analysis > conclusion > prescription'.

Accepting that complete withdrawal of passenger services from many lines that were generating around 1% of the total revenue was inevitably going to be "destructive", what alternative did you have in mind? How would your "happy medium" be manifested on a duplicate route like York-Market Weighton-Beverley in the chronic absence of any cash to invest?

 

[yorksrob]

This is a very interesting discussion.

To me one of the most impressive aspects of the Beeching era was that he did genuinely try and take a more analytical and data-driven approach to identifying which lines were actually unremunerative and which ones should be proposed to the Minister for withdrawal. (All the while noting that the passenger closures were actually only 21-25% of the benefits of his overall 'plan'.) Dr B was also well on the ball with appreciation of emerging social cost-benefit thinking and open to the concept of subsidy where justified.

I struggle to see the Reshaping approach as "convoluted". It has always struck me as a model of concise reasoning and exposition. 'Tell 'em what you are going to tell 'em; tell 'em; and tell 'em what you just told 'em'. 'Problem definition > data collection > analysis > conclusion > prescription'.

Accepting that complete withdrawal of passenger services from many lines that were generating around 1% of the total revenue in total was inevitably going to be "destructive", what alternative did you have in mind? How would your "happy medium" be manifested on a duplicate route like York-Market Weighton-Beverley in the chronic absence of any cash to invest?

Well, I look upon the chronic absense of cash to invest as (in large part) a political problem, and that is where the problem begins.

Between doing the sums and working out which routes cost money to run, it seems to have taken twenty years to for the Country to work out in which circumstances a large number needed to be paid for (taking Serpell and the bustitution discussions of the early 1980's as the last time the state was considering mass closures).

In terms of duplicate routes, I think the whole discussion around this was wrong. The Brighton main line problem is what you get without duplicate routes, so the emphasis should have been on trying to find ways to keep them. This is all much longer term than Beeching.

I realise that you will say that "there wasn't the money" but that in itself was a political decision taken by Governments.

I agree that Beeching had his remit of identifying unremunerative lines, The bit that was in his power to do, but that he didn't, was in taking an analytical and data driven approach to driving down costs on marginal lines, with a view to ensuring that routes were kept open where possible in the interests of passengers.

 

[RT4038]

Well, I look upon the chronic absense of cash to invest as (in large part) a political problem, and that is where the problem begins.

Between doing the sums and working out which routes cost money to run, it seems to have taken twenty years to for the Country to work out in which circumstances a large number needed to be paid for (taking Serpell and the bustitution discussions of the early 1980's as the last time the state was considering mass closures).

In terms of duplicate routes, I think the whole discussion around this was wrong. The Brighton main line problem is what you get without duplicate routes, so the emphasis should have been on trying to find ways to keep them. This is all much longer term than Beeching.

I realise that you will say that "there wasn't the money" but that in itself was a political decision taken by Governments.

I agree that Beeching had his remit of identifying unremunerative lines, The bit that was in his power to do, but that he didn't, was in taking an analytical and data driven approach to driving down costs on marginal lines, with a view to ensuring that routes were kept open where possible in the interests of passengers.

If the political decision had been taken that "there wasn't the money", I am unsure about the point is about taking an analytical and data driven approach to driving down costs on marginal lines is. Beeching had already done this - clearly the lines left after the plan was implemented required investment, and this was to funded by the cost cuts and land/scrap sales of the line closure/rationalisation/steam elimination program.
The Bournemouth electrification/power signalling/automatic crossing gates conversion etc of the system that was left had to be paid for, much of that on remaining 'marginal' lines. Beeching did not see the lines that closed as 'marginal', but more as 'hopeless' - much of what was left was 'marginal' and still open today with driven down costs from that era.

 

[yorksrob]

If the political decision had been taken that "there wasn't the money", I am unsure about the point is about taking an analytical and data driven approach to driving down costs on marginal lines is. Beeching had already done this - clearly the lines left after the plan was implemented required investment, and this was to funded by the cost cuts and land/scrap sales of the line closure/rationalisation/steam elimination program.
The Bournemouth electrification/power signalling/automatic crossing gates conversion etc of the system that was left had to be paid for, much of that on remaining 'marginal' lines. Beeching did not see the lines that closed as 'marginal', but more as 'hopeless' - much of what was left was 'marginal' and still open today with driven down costs from that era.

Well no, he didn't drive down costs - many routes were still fully staffed and signalled when they were closed. York - Market Weighton is the prime example.

It's noteable that many of the lines that survive today were only rationalised after they'd been put forward for closure then turned down.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Well no, he didn't drive down costs - many routes were still fully staffed and signalled when they were closed. York - Market Weighton is the prime example.

It's noteable that many of the lines that survive today were only rationalised after they'd been put forward for closure then turned down.

I know that the Market Weighton Line has been discussed before but let’s face it. The route suffered from having no fewer than 24 level crossings at a time when automatic barriers had only just got the first pilot installations in GB. It had already been dieselised, and the service was probably as good as it had ever been (having been increased from eight to ten local trains per day since the mid-1950s. Some wayside ‘no hope’ stations had already gone (Cherry Burton, Londesborough, Fangfoss and Warthill) and Kipling Coates destaffed. An end-to-end stopper had been accelerated from 89 minutes to 69 minutes. The route had hardly been ‘neglected’. Any further economies would have seen significant rationalisation of the resourcing. It is staggering to note that there were four trains in circuit in the peak whilst at other times not a unit was turning a wheel for over an hour.

 

[yorksrob]

I know that the Market Weighton Line has been discussed before but let’s face it. The route suffered from having no fewer than 24 level crossings at a time when automatic barriers had only just got the first pilot installations in GB. It had already been dieselised, and the service was probably as good as it had ever been (having been increased from eight to ten local trains per day since the mid-1950s. Some wayside ‘no hope’ stations had already gone (Cherry Burton, Londesborough, Fangfoss and Warthill) and Kipling Coates destaffed. An end-to-end stopper had been accelerated from 89 minutes to 69 minutes. The route had hardly been ‘neglected’. Any further economies would have seen significant rationalisation of the resourcing. It is staggering to note that there were four trains in circuit in the peak whilst at other times not a unit was turning a wheel for over an hour.

Well, it certainly doesn't sound like the sort of clock-face timetable that I would recognise.

I understand that various automatic equipment had already been purchased for the route, so it could have been an ideal case study of how costs could be driven down, particularly as the route was identified as marginal by Beeching himself. Infact, I would argue that a management looking after the interest of passengers would have done just this. It would have required someone with an open mind and no pre-conceptions.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Well, it certainly doesn't sound like the sort of clock-face timetable that I would recognise.

I understand that various automatic equipment had already been purchased for the route, so it could have been an ideal case study of how costs could be driven down, particularly as the route was identified as marginal by Beeching himself. Infact, I would argue that a management looking after the interest of passengers would have done just this. It would have required someone with an open mind and no pre-conceptions.

I will continue to press on this route.
It is indeed the case that in the Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, of July 1959, it was stated that the centralised traffic control scheme for the line had been “approved”. The track would be singled and some stations closed (as noted in a previous post). However, I have never seen any definitive reference to equipment being purchased. Subsequent Annual Reports mentioned shortages of signalling technical staff and in 1961 it was noted that ambitions for 3,000 single track miles of colour light signalling in 1959-1963 were being scaled back to “rather less than 2,000”. A pilot scheme for ‘electronic’ signalling was commissioned on the Henley-on-Thames branch.
Can any member of this board provide a source for the Market Weighton kit actually being purchased or the scheme getting off the drawing board in any meaningful way?

I am not sure that Dr B ever used the term “marginal”. His case illustration in the Reshaping Report showed a “financial improvement” over over half total direct expenses if the line was closed. (This was partially but by no means totally due to the fact that York-Hull services would still be available via Selby.)

 

[RT4038]

Well no, he didn't drive down costs - many routes were still fully staffed and signalled when they were closed. York - Market Weighton is the prime example.

It's noteable that many of the lines that survive today were only rationalised after they'd been put forward for closure then turned down.

Precisely - the costs couldn't be driven down because to drive down costs needed investment in modern equipment, and this money was not available. York-Market Weighton is a prime example of this. It may have been proposed for investment, but later this was switched elsewhere. presumably to a more deservingcase.

Of course the lines turned down for closure were only rationalised after being turned down. It would be pretty stupid to spend money rationalising lines that were being proposed for closure. Plenty (virtyally all?) of lines not proposed for closure received investment money in one way or another.

 

[yorksrob]

I will continue to press on this route.
It is indeed the case that in the Re-appraisal of the Plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways, of July 1959, it was stated that the centralised traffic control scheme for the line had been “approved”. The track would be singled and some stations closed (as noted in a previous post). However, I have never seen any definitive reference to equipment being purchased. Subsequent Annual Reports mentioned shortages of signalling technical staff and in 1961 it was noted that ambitions for 3,000 single track miles of colour light signalling in 1959-1963 were being scaled back to “rather less than 2,000”. A pilot scheme for ‘electronic’ signalling was commissioned on the Henley-on-Thames branch.
Can any member of this board provide a source for the Market Weighton kit actually being purchased or the scheme getting off the drawing board in any meaningful way?

I am not sure that Dr B ever used the term “marginal”. His case illustration in the Reshaping Report showed a “financial improvement” over over half total direct expenses if the line was closed. (This was partially but by no means totally due to the fact that York-Hull services would still be available via Selby.)

I don't doubt that Dr Beeching didn't use the word 'marginal'. That would have introduced an element of nuance into the description, when he wanted to justify closure. I used the word marginal.

If the line could have been made to cover its costs, this should have been done for the sake of passengers at Market Weighton, rather than sacrificing it to provide a saving to Government.

Put it another way, if Beeching closed all of the lines that were completely unremunerative, but then you close a line that has the potential to be remunerative to make a saving elsewhere, aren't you sacrificing the interests of passengers relying on the potentially remunerative line to prop up other parts of the railway ? Why should these passengers interests be sacrificed if they have the potential to pay their way ?

This is my objection to the whole process. Commitment to passengers interests seems to have been wafer thin, and this was as true for the over-centralised Government far away in London.

 

[yorksrob]

Precisely - the costs couldn't be driven down because to drive down costs needed investment in modern equipment, and this money was not available. York-Market Weighton is a prime example of this. It may have been proposed for investment, but later this was switched elsewhere. presumably to a more deservingcase.

Of course the lines turned down for closure were only rationalised after being turned down. It would be pretty stupid to spend money rationalising lines that were being proposed for closure. Plenty (virtyally all?) of lines not proposed for closure received investment money in one way or another.

My view is that an enlightened Government with the interests of passengers at heart, would have made grant funding available specifically to make the capital investment to make marginal lines remunerative, rather than squandering all the money on roads. An enlightened Dr Beeching could have used his analytical skills to demonstrate exactly how this could be done, so that Government could have provided this investment with the confidence of what it would achieve.

Instead policy makers got trapped in the ever-decreasing circle of an ever-shrinking network that wasn't resolved until the 1980's.

 

[RT4038]

My view is that an enlightened Government with the interests of passengers at heart, would have made grant funding available specifically to make the capital investment to make marginal lines remunerative, rather than squandering all the money on roads. An enlightened Dr Beeching could have used his analytical skills to demonstrate exactly how this could be done, so that Government could have provided this investment with the confidence of what it would achieve.

Instead policy makers got trapped in the ever-decreasing circle of an ever-shrinking network that wasn't resolved until the 1980's.

Quite right. The network was shrunk to the size which the Government (enlightened or otherwise) were prepared to pay for, both in investment funds and operating subsidies. And this is where we are now - Railway management doing the bidding of those who are paying, unable to suspend the laws of economics, just like in 1963.

 

[yorksrob]

Quite right. The network was shrunk to the size which the Government (enlightened or otherwise) were prepared to pay for, both in investment funds and operating subsidies. And this is where we are now - Railway management doing the bidding of those who are paying, unable to suspend the laws of economics, just like in 1963.

But the point is that Dr B had the opportunity to influence Government thinking, and he could have proposed (or at least aquiesced) to the sort of approach I've just outlined on the policy side on Stedeford, and could have implemented it as Chairman.

The railway inevitably has to be the size the Government is prepared to pay for. However, I see little excuse in not trying to get as much passenger railway as possible out of what the Government is prepared for. Not to do so seems negligent.

 

[RT4038]

Put it another way, if Beeching closed all of the lines that were completely unremunerative, but then you close a line that has the potential to be remunerative to make a saving elsewhere, aren't you sacrificing the interests of passengers relying on the potentially remunerative line to prop up other parts of the railway ? Why should these passengers interests be sacrificed if they have the potential to pay their way ?

Presumably they would analyse the two cases -this line with potential vs. the other parts of the railway and decide which is the better investment. Companies do this all the time. In the case of your favourite closed line, presumably it was judged that the other part of the railway was a better investment (possibly more passengers interests than the yours?)

 

[yorksrob]

Presumably they would analyse the two cases -this line with potential vs. the other parts of the railway and decide which is the better investment. Companies do this all the time. In the case of your favourite closed line, presumably it was judged that the other part of the railway was a better investment (possibly more passengers interests than the yours?)

Ultimately those passengers on the route closed would have experienced a far greater deprivation than the gain felt by the passenger on the route receiving investment, yet it seems that this was inadequately accounted for, primarily by Government, but also by some railway management - particularly Dr Beeching, given his almost unique position as both a policy former and implementer (Richard Marsh could also be said to have been in this position, albeit less controversially).

 

[RT4038]

But the point is that Dr B had the opportunity to influence Government thinking, and he could have proposed (or at least aquiesced) to the sort of approach I've just outlined on the policy side on Stedeford, and could have implemented it as Chairman.

I guess you are assuming that Dr B could have influenced the Government (through Stedeford) to spend more money following the 1955 modernisation plan. Dr B. (and others) simply didn't believe that this was the way to deal with the issue, knowing that politically there was no appetite to give the railways more money, so this possibility wouldn't even have come up.

 

[yorksrob]

I guess you are assuming that Dr B could have influenced the Government (through Stedeford) to spend more money following the 1955 modernisation plan. Dr B. (and others) simply didn't believe that this was the way to deal with the issue, knowing that politically there was no appetite to give the railways more money, so this possibility wouldn't even have come up.

There could be an element of that. It could have been that he happenned to agree more with the Ministers thinking.

 

[RT4038]

Ultimately those passengers on the route closed would have experienced a far greater deprivation than the gain felt by the passenger on the route receiving investment, yet it seems that this was inadequately accounted for, primarily by Government, but also by some railway management - particularly Dr Beeching, given his almost unique position as both a policy former and implementer (Richard Marsh could also be said to have been in this position, albeit less controversially).

No more money meant no more money. I think you are getting into a bit of a tangle - not investing in the good and marginal routes will have ultimately led to those becoming hopeless cases and being closed too. There are no clear lines between the different categories (which are mine anyway as an illustration) and obviously there will be some fortunate/unfortunate on the edges.

 

[yorksrob]

No more money meant no more money. I think you are getting into a bit of a tangle - not investing in the good and marginal routes will have ultimately led to those becoming hopeless cases and being closed too. There are no clear lines between the different categories (which are mine anyway as an illustration) and obviously there will be some fortunate/unfortunate on the edges.

"No more money is ultimately a political decision. A good, robust case study showing how costs could be controlled, might have nudged policy in the right direction.

 

[Dr Hoo]

"No more money is ultimately a political decision. A good, robust case study showing how costs could be controlled, might have nudged policy in the right direction.

Sadly the BTC’s ‘Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways’ plan of December 1954 didn’t quite live up to its billing and politicians on all sides were a lot more wary after that.

 

[yorksrob]

Sadly the BTC’s ‘Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways’ plan of December 1954 didn’t quite live up to its billing and politicians on all sides were a lot more wary after that.

True, which is why a costed study employing the Doctor's famous analytical skills on how to reduce costs on a marginal line, such as York - Beverley, could have been very useful.

 

[Dr Hoo]

True, which is why a costed study employing the Doctor's famous analytical skills on how to reduce costs on a marginal line, such as York - Beverley, could have been very useful.

Coming up with ways to reduce costs (bearing in mind that dieselisation had already been done) was always going to be largely a matter of engineering and technical innovation rather than just the number crunching.
Dr B was, of course, well on the ball on cost reduction with the belated switches to air braking and electric train heating, integral coach construction, heavier axle loads for freight, containerisation and so forth. The Derby Research complex was initiated in his era. But as I have commented before, a lot of the developments in level crossing automation, mobile ticketing and telecommunications were still a little way in the future back in 1962.
Specifically in the context of York-Beverley, the Reshaping Report showed total track and signalling expenses as only £43,300p.a., whereas withdrawal would achieve a net betterment of £81,110p.a. So there was no 'profitable' line within reach of singling and level crossing automation even if the investment capital could have been found/spared.
Again, as I have pointed out before, Dr B identified that a minimal proportion of business was conducted on the lines proposed for closure. After ten years of rationalisation (by 1974) the network was around three quarters of the size, the number of stations had gone down significantly and there were more than 100,000 fewer staff but passenger miles were essentially the same despite a massive rise in car ownership in the interim.

 

[yorksrob]

Coming up with ways to reduce costs (bearing in mind that dieselisation had already been done) was always going to be largely a matter of engineering and technical innovation rather than just the number crunching.
Dr B was, of course, well on the ball on cost reduction with the belated switches to air braking and electric train heating, integral coach construction, heavier axle loads for freight, containerisation and so forth. The Derby Research complex was initiated in his era. But as I have commented before, a lot of the developments in level crossing automation, mobile ticketing and telecommunications were still a little way in the future back in 1962.
Specifically in the context of York-Beverley, the Reshaping Report showed total track and signalling expenses as only £43,300p.a., whereas withdrawal would achieve a net betterment of £81,110p.a. So there was no 'profitable' line within reach of singling and level crossing automation even if the investment capital could have been found/spared.
Again, as I have pointed out before, Dr B identified that a minimal proportion of business was conducted on the lines proposed for closure. After ten years of rationalisation (by 1974) the network was around three quarters of the size, the number of stations had gone down significantly and there were more than 100,000 fewer staff but passenger miles were essentially the same despite a massive rise in car ownership in the interim.

But numbers of passenger journeys were going down in all that time. Until about 1982, when the cutting of the network had been largely wound down.

I dispute that there wasn't a potentially profitable line between York and Beverley as the £81k betterment relied on passengers transferring to the other route for through journeys.

It's essentially cooking the books, like saying "we know that x number of fare paying passengers use the line, but we're going to ignore a proportion of these from our calculation as they may or may noot use another route".

 

[The Ham]

Well no, he didn't drive down costs - many routes were still fully staffed and signalled when they were closed. York - Market Weighton is the prime example.

It's noteable that many of the lines that survive today were only rationalised after they'd been put forward for closure then turned down.

Given that a number of lines took several years before they were closed you could have provided some savings by using gaurds to sell tickets (much like bus conductors), even if they could only sell local tickets with a through ticket needing a trip to a ticket office (you could easily cover all the stations on the line plus a good number which could be done with one change.

Yes there would have been the cost of the ticket machines, but that would have been more than paid for by savings in staff costs. Whilst any spare kit from lines which ultimately closed could have been used to replace those on other lines as they broke.

That could have been brought in whist Dr B was writing the report, meaning that there was more money saved to invest.

It could have saved a few lines as they could have been on a list of "let's review in a few years to see how the change has helped control costs". Such lines could be in the, they are making a loss but provide links which would otherwise be lost (such as the Boarders Line) or those which have a lot of outsiders use them (such as those to Minehead and Swanage) or those which although double up a route there could be some value in further evaluation in seeing how useful they are.

Clearly such a list would need to be sold in the understanding that they have been given a stay of execution for now and probably only given to lines where, with further changes, their costs being further reduced.

However it would have also likely meant that some of the lines which were kept would have seen their costs reduced earlier than happened (by the loss of station staff).

 

[yorksrob]

Given that a number of lines took several years before they were closed you could have provided some savings by using gaurds to sell tickets (much like bus conductors), even if they could only sell local tickets with a through ticket needing a trip to a ticket office (you could easily cover all the stations on the line plus a good number which could be done with one change.

Yes there would have been the cost of the ticket machines, but that would have been more than paid for by savings in staff costs. Whilst any spare kit from lines which ultimately closed could have been used to replace those on other lines as they broke.

That could have been brought in whist Dr B was writing the report, meaning that there was more money saved to invest.

It could have saved a few lines as they could have been on a list of "let's review in a few years to see how the change has helped control costs". Such lines could be in the, they are making a loss but provide links which would otherwise be lost (such as the Boarders Line) or those which have a lot of outsiders use them (such as those to Minehead and Swanage) or those which although double up a route there could be some value in further evaluation in seeing how useful they are.

Clearly such a list would need to be sold in the understanding that they have been given a stay of execution for now and probably only given to lines where, with further changes, their costs being further reduced.

However it would have also likely meant that some of the lines which were kept would have seen their costs reduced earlier than happened (by the loss of station staff).

Indeed. And these savings could all have been anylised and recorded at the same time, possibly to form an annexe to the report of some sort.

 

[43096]

The answer was well over 3,000 bhp under the bonnet. Not a problem for electrified railways, but in those days the only answer for diesels was the Deltic. Fiennes wrote:


The Deltics were the only game in town.

Only once electrification had been cancelled.

 

[coppercapped]

Only once electrification had been cancelled.

I am not sure what you are trying to imply. The Modernisation Plan had this to say about main line electrification:

43. It is the intention to electrify two major trunk routes, and one of lesser traffic density, under the Plan. The main line of the Eastern and North Eastern Regions from King's Cross to Doncaster, Leeds and (possibly) York, and the main line of the London Midland Region from Euston to Birmingham, Crewe, Liverpool and Manchester, will comprise the two major schemes. The subsidiary main-line scheme will consist of the extension of the existing electrification from Liverpool Street (which will soon reach Chelmsford) to Ipswich, including the Clacton, Harwich and Felixstowe branches. By these schemes there will be a virtual elimination of steam from important areas of the country.

Contemporary reports show that the East Coast scheme slipped for various reasons - mainly due to the largesse made available in the Modernisation Plan not being sufficient to cover the expenses involved in electrifying all these, and the suburban routes, essentially at the same time as well as the ability of the supply industry to keep up.

In any event it is clear that the East Coast electrification was aimed at Leeds meaning that the most likely end point on the Great Northern would have been Doncaster - the wires would only 'possibly' have reached York.

So then what does one do at Doncaster? Having been whisked at 100mph to that point by an eighty ton 3,300bhp Bo-Bo the contrast would have been dramatic if, after an eight or ten minute wait, the replacement was a 2,000bhp 133 ton diesel for the rest of the journey to Newcastle, Edinburgh or Aberdeen. I think a batch of Deltics would have been almost inevitable.

 

[randyrippley]

I am not sure what you are trying to imply. The Modernisation Plan had this to say about main line electrification:

Contemporary reports show that the East Coast scheme slipped for various reasons - mainly due to the largesse made available in the Modernisation Plan not being sufficient to cover the expenses involved in electrifying all these, and the suburban routes, essentially at the same time as well as the ability of the supply industry to keep up.

In any event it is clear that the East Coast electrification was aimed at Leeds meaning that the most likely end point on the Great Northern would have been Doncaster - the wires would only 'possibly' have reached York.

So then what does one do at Doncaster? Having been whisked at 100mph to that point by an eighty ton 3,300bhp Bo-Bo the contrast would have been dramatic if, after an eight or ten minute wait, the replacement was a 2,000bhp 133 ton diesel for the rest of the journey to Newcastle, Edinburgh or Aberdeen. I think a batch of Deltics would have been almost inevitable.

What would probably have happened was a larger build of something based on the DP2 / class 50 designs - leased (as the 50s were) to avoid goverment spending caps. Its exactly the same scenario as resulted in the 50s being used north of Crewe.

Of course if the Deltics were never built its quite possible that DP2 and the 50s may have had different body construction, more like a 37