Beeching closures

[Sir Felix Pole]

Whatever your view on the Beeching Report - FWIW I think it was a crude and flawed analysis, but that there were clearly a fair few moribund lines that should have been closed years earlier - it was certainly a presentational disaster. Beeching was not used to the intense media scrutiny he came under and quickly became a pantomine villain with his somewhat arrogant and high-handed style. Even today, he is seemingly held responsible for every rail closure that ever happened, although as others have pointed out, it was Barbara Castle who did the real damage after his time, closing strategic main-lines such as Bere Alston / Okehampton, Matlock / Chinley, the Waverley Route and Oxford / Cambridge. Towards the end of his life, in the late Dick Hardy biography, he admitted it had been a dreadful mistake to include the depressingly long list of line closures and stations in the report, which completely overshadowed his positive proposals. It also greatly contributed to the feeling that the railways were finished in the minds of politicians and the travelling public, a sentiment that took decades to turn around.

A consumate politician and operator such as the later chairman Sir Peter Parker - who did favour some 'bustitution' incidentally - would have accentuated the positive, but also quietly accelerated the job of closing hopeless branch lines without the blaze of publicity. The Scottish Region had been doing this very effectively in the 1950s closing a lot of branch lines in the Central Lowlands, rendered redundant from the 1920s onwards by more attractive bus services, and streamlining the duplicated facilities of the pre-grouping companies. Other regions were much more lethargic - was it really necessary to have two stations in Bodmin, Cornwall right to the end in 1967, for example?

 

[RT4038]

An interesting post, but irrelevant to lines such as York- Beverley or Christs Hospital - Shoreham.
The idea of the country branch line, with three maidens taking it to market, and empty the rest of the time, was a useful propaganda tool to try and soften up the public for bad decisions, but the reality shown in the York - Beverly calculation was far from this. In such areas, the railway remained a better option than the bus and remained popular with travellers, but it made no difference. If the Beeching era management thought it could make a saving, it would happily sell those passengers down the river.

These lines are not irrelevant. Yes, they may have been better than the worst, but still only had an average of about 50 passengers per train. The nature of both lines is that the trains would have carried short distance passengers travelling to/from each end, so the average number of passengers on the train at any one time would likely have been about a third less. In other words, a good load on a single decker bus; hardly business that the railway does best with its far greater costs.

 

[yorksrob]

These lines are not irrelevant. Yes, they may have been better than the worst, but still only had an average of about 50 passengers per train. The nature of both lines is that the trains would have carried short distance passengers travelling to/from each end, so the average number of passengers on the train at any one time would likely have been about a third less. In other words, a good load on a single decker bus; hardly business that the railway does best with its far greater costs.

Whilst York - Beverley wasn't the core of the railway, it was an important feeder route, which brought Stamford Bridge, Pocklington, Market Weighton and Beverley within reach of the core railway "doing what it does best".

As I've mentioned before, the philosophy of trying to cut the railway back to a core doing "what it does best" poisoned some parts of railway management and government thinking well into the 1980's, and had it been allowed to continue unchecked, would have destroyed the railway we rely on today.

 

[yorksrob]

These lines are not irrelevant. Yes, they may have been better than the worst, but still only had an average of about 50 passengers per train. The nature of both lines is that the trains would have carried short distance passengers travelling to/from each end, so the average number of passengers on the train at any one time would likely have been about a third less. In other words, a good load on a single decker bus; hardly business that the railway does best with its far greater costs.

Whilst York - Beverley wasn't the core of the railway, it was an important feeder route, which brought Stamford Bridge, Pocklington, Market Weighton and Beverley within reach of the core railway "doing what it does best".

As I've mentioned before, the philosophy of trying to cut the railway back to a core doing "what it does best" poisoned some parts of railway management and government thinking well into the 1980's, and had it been allowed to continue unchecked, would have destroyed the railway we rely on today.

 

[mythrail]

Someone in freight planning/ops at the time, the positive parts - MGR concept and Freightliner's etc was the future.
Nevermind the vast waste of the mega marshalling yards etc.
Forward projection of any traffic (Passenger or Freight) never a good point...... Ok

 

[RT4038]

Whilst York - Beverley wasn't the core of the railway, it was an important feeder route, which brought Stamford Bridge, Pocklington, Market Weighton and Beverley within reach of the core railway "doing what it does best".

As I've mentioned before, the philosophy of trying to cut the railway back to a core doing "what it does best" poisoned some parts of railway management and government thinking well into the 1980's, and had it been allowed to continue unchecked, would have destroyed the railway we rely on today.

Another dose of hyperbole! York-Beverley was a feeder route (as was virtually every line that was shut), but it is too much a stretch of the imagination to call it 'important'. Market Weighton and Pockington were small places; Stamford Bridge only had a few of the trains stopping there. Most of the passengers would have been travelling locally to the line, and all were quite well served by omnibuses. The 'feeding' traffic to the main network can only have been minor. Beverley was not closed, only through passengers to the North East and Scotland [ unlikely to be an 'important' flow] having substantively longer journeys. Travellers from Hull to York were conveyed via another line [falling into the 'what it does best' category] at similar travel times.

 

[yorksrob]

Another dose of hyperbole! York-Beverley was a feeder route (as was virtually every line that was shut), but it is too much a stretch of the imagination to call it 'important'. Market Weighton and Pockington were small places; Stamford Bridge only had a few of the trains stopping there. Most of the passengers would have been travelling locally to the line, and all were quite well served by omnibuses. The 'feeding' traffic to the main network can only have been minor. Beverley was not closed, only through passengers to the North East and Scotland [ unlikely to be an 'important' flow] having substantively longer journeys. Travellers from Hull to York were conveyed via another line [falling into the 'what it does best' category] at similar travel times.

Beverley wasn't closed, but it had it's options severely curtailed when it lost a direct line to York.

It's funny that you should say that the "feeding" traffic was minor:

• by the Dr's own calculations, 70% of revenue directly generated by the route was route specific and didn't transfer to the Selby line.
• Bearing this in mind, he subsequently identified a further 30k worth of traffic that travelled the route and added to revenues of more distant stations.

It seems to me that either:

• That 30k or so was the total of traffic the route generated for outside stations, and he was wildly over-optimistic about the amount that would transfer over, or;
• There was a considerable amount of revenue recorded at stations beyond the route to the intermediate stations on the line that was ignored because it didn't suit the Board's argument.

Put it this way.

The 70% of route specific revenue will undoubtedly include Mrs Miggins in Market Weighton visiting her aunt in Manchester or her Brother in Newcastle.

Where are the figures for the aunt in Manchester or the brother in Newcastle visiting Mrs Miggins in Market Weighton ? They appear to have been ommitted.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Most of the examples in the Reshaping Report were dead end branches with no ‘overlap’, e.g. the Aberdeen-Ballater line. Obviously closure would lose all the revenue on the line.

York-Market Weighton-Beverley-Hull was both a through route (with an alternative, via Selby) and had an overlap between Beverley and Hull. As Beverley-Hull had quite a good local service including the trains from Bridlington, etc. It isn’t surprising that usage on that leg was relatively buoyant. No doubt quite a large slice of the ‘57 passengers per train’ was on that leg.

Reasonably enough some of the Beverley-Hull revenue was allocated to the Market Weighton trains but at least some of this would be retained on Bridlington services.

Most of the point-to-point revenue from Hull-York tickets specifically would be credited to the line as it provided most through services. But a large slice of this would be retained via Selby.

There would be some longer trips, such as Mrs Miggins’ family trips in and out, that were actually related to specific stations on the line. Some of this would be lost (not travel or drive instead) or reduced (bus or taxi to/from York). There would also be some journeys, such as Hull-Edinburgh that would have been partly credited to the line but would probably largely be retained (via Selby).

I am not going to pretend that these figures could have been established with the degree of precision that we can have with modern data capture and analysis systems. But within the limitations of the time the team working on the Report had had the best part of 18 months to crunch the numbers (hardly a ‘knee jerk’) and clearly had a methodology that distinguished between branches and slightly more strategic tertiary feeder routes.

 

[yorksrob]

Most of the examples in the Reshaping Report were dead end branches with no ‘overlap’, e.g. the Aberdeen-Ballater line. Obviously closure would lose all the revenue on the line.

York-Market Weighton-Beverley-Hull was both a through route (with an alternative, via Selby) and had an overlap between Beverley and Hull. As Beverley-Hull had quite a good local service including the trains from Bridlington, etc. It isn’t surprising that usage on that leg was relatively buoyant. No doubt quite a large slice of the ‘57 passengers per train’ was on that leg.

Reasonably enough some of the Beverley-Hull revenue was allocated to the Market Weighton trains but at least some of this would be retained on Bridlington services.

Most of the point-to-point revenue from Hull-York tickets specifically would be credited to the line as it provided most through services. But a large slice of this would be retained via Selby.

There would be some longer trips, such as Mrs Miggins’ family trips in and out, that were actually related to specific stations on the line. Some of this would be lost (not travel or drive instead) or reduced (bus or taxi to/from York). There would also be some journeys, such as Hull-Edinburgh that would have been partly credited to the line but would probably largely be retained (via Selby).

I am not going to pretend that these figures could have been established with the degree of precision that we can have with modern data capture and analysis systems. But within the limitations of the time the team working on the Report had had the best part of 18 months to crunch the numbers (hardly a ‘knee jerk’) and clearly had a methodology that distinguished between branches and slightly more strategic tertiary feeder routes.

But the point is that he was obviously able to attempt to come up with figures where it suited the argument. The 30k contributory revenue to other routes for example (was this add-on provided for seaside branches one wonders).

 

[Bevan Price]

Good grief, you make it sound like he was the leader of some sort of doomsday cult.

There was no anti-railway conspiracy. There was no hidden agenda. There was no gleeful desire to wilfully deprive people of transport.

There was a serious problem, and a genuine attempt to solve.

All the main population centres of this country remain rail-connected.

Not quite correct. Some fairly large towns (populations of 30,000 +) were deprived of rail services.

As for some post-Beeching closures, the Wilson government (including Barbara Castle) did not really want to continue the closures, but due to the financial crisis - (for which Labour were blamed, although financial speculators probably caused most of the problems) - led organisations like the International Moneytary Fund (IMF) to force Labour to reduce public spending, and regrettably proceeding with closures was considered one indicator that Labour were meeting that IMF requirement.

 

[Dr Hoo]

But the point is that he was obviously able to attempt to come up with figures where it suited the argument. The 30k contributory revenue to other routes for example (was this add-on provided for seaside branches one wonders).

Well some routes were shown as having much greater contributory revenue than 'on line' earnings. The short Yatton-Clevedon line had intrinsic revenue of £6,100 (which would all go) but contributory revenue of £22,200 (of which only £1,000 was expected to be lost). Presumably 'railheading' via Yatton was assessed as fairly likely (although I can't immediately find a reference to Dr B actually using the term).

On the rather more remote Banff-Tillynaught branch contributory revenue was assessed as £6,130 but a much larger slice of £4,000 was at risk.

These figures would seem to confirm that a fair degree of market segmentation and analysis was being applied. Route characteristics included rural, commuter, holiday and inter-urban. There was no single, arbitrary proportion applied.

At the risk of stating the obvious, there was around two thirds of the network at the time where similar analysis showed that it was worth keeping (given the understanding of the period).

 

[RT4038]

Beverley wasn't closed, but it had it's options severely curtailed when it lost a direct line to York.

It's funny that you should say that the "feeding" traffic was minor:

• by the Dr's own calculations, 70% of revenue directly generated by the route was route specific and didn't transfer to the Selby line.
• Bearing this in mind, he subsequently identified a further 30k worth of traffic that travelled the route and added to revenues of more distant stations.

It seems to me that either:

• That 30k or so was the total of traffic the route generated for outside stations, and he was wildly over-optimistic about the amount that would transfer over, or;
• There was a considerable amount of revenue recorded at stations beyond the route to the intermediate stations on the line that was ignored because it didn't suit the Board's argument.

Put it this way.

The 70% of route specific revenue will undoubtedly include Mrs Miggins in Market Weighton visiting her aunt in Manchester or her Brother in Newcastle.

Where are the figures for the aunt in Manchester or the brother in Newcastle visiting Mrs Miggins in Market Weighton ? They appear to have been ommitted.

The 'worked example' of the Hull-York via Beverley line is shown on Page 99 of the report, so I will use these figures:

1. The earnings for the service were £90 400
2. £25 600 of these earnings would be retained because of alternative services that would be available.
3. Therefore the earnings of the service to and from intermediate stations was £64 800
4. Passengers using the service as part of their journey it is estimated contribute £37 700 to the revenue of other services. Therefore the total earnings for the line were £128 100
5. £4 900 of this contributory to other services revenue is expected to be lost, so therefore is for tickets to and from intermediate stations.
6. The remainder of this contributory to other services revenue (£32 800) would therefore be retained because of alternative services that would be available. Therefore the total retained revenue because of alternative services available was £58 400.
7. The total revenue loss resulting from withdrawal of the service is estimated at £69 700 (£64 800 + £4 900)
8. The movement expenses were £84 400, the terminal expenses £23 100 and the direct track and signalling expenses £43 300. Total expenses = £150 800
9. The loss of the line on direct expenses (without any allowance for indirect costs) was £30 700 (20%)
10. Owing to the existence of alternative services available for £58 400 worth of revenue, the railway would only lose the £69 700. With costs of £150 800 saved, the railway would be £81 100 [£81 000 in the report] better off with the line closed.

The figures supplied in the report all seem to tie up.

From these figures it would be reasonable to deduce:

• 70% of the earnings for the service originated/terminated at intermediate stations on the line. Of this 70% an additional 7.6% was the value of contributory revenue to other lines of through tickets.
• 30% of the earnings for the service were for through passengers (for whom alternative services would be available). Of this 30% an additional 128% was the value of contributory revenue to other lines of through tickets.
• This shows overwhelmingly that the intermediate station traffic was of a local nature and not an 'important' feeder service.
• There is no evidence in the report concerning the amount of revenue that transferred to the Selby line was 'wildly optimistic'. Perhaps you have some convincing evidence?
• There is no evidence in the report that revenue from tickets from outside the line to intermediate stations on the line were ignored to 'suit the Board's argument'. Perhaps you have some convincing evidence for this? The report just mentions earnings, not 'originating tickets' or some such. It doesn't appear to have been omitted.

I know it may be hard to swallow, but maybe Mrs Miggins really only travelled once in a blue moon to Market Weighton by train by 1963 ..........

 

[yorksrob]

The Clevedon Branch, only 1k of 22.2k expected to be lost.

Dr B was nothing, if not an optimist !

 

[RT4038]

Not quite correct. Some fairly large towns (populations of 30,000 +) were deprived of rail services.

As for some post-Beeching closures, the Wilson government (including Barbara Castle) did not really want to continue the closures, but due to the financial crisis - (for which Labour were blamed, although financial speculators probably caused most of the problems) - led organisations like the International Moneytary Fund (IMF) to force Labour to reduce public spending, and regrettably proceeding with closures was considered one indicator that Labour were meeting that IMF requirement.

Quite so. You need to take into account the wider Political and Financial context when looking at this issue, not look through the prism of 2019. This is 55 years ago, they did things differently then! If the same set of circumstances occurred again, the same result would happen.

 

[Dr Hoo]

The Clevedon Branch, only 1k of 22.2k expected to be lost.

Dr B was nothing, if not an optimist !

As I have frequently said, he envisaged a great future for a British rail network; hence his long-term strategic vision.

 

[Calthrop]

The Clevedon Branch, only 1k of 22.2k expected to be lost.

I initially read this as being about kilometres (not "kilo-£"); was trying to make sense of it, including bringing the defunct Weston, Clevedon & Portishead light railway into the picture: at times, I can be not very bright ...

 

[70014IronDuke]

Whatever your view on the Beeching Report - FWIW I think it was a crude and flawed analysis, but that there were clearly a fair few moribund lines that should have been closed years earlier - it was certainly a presentational disaster. Beeching was not used to the intense media scrutiny he came under and quickly became a pantomine villain with his somewhat arrogant and high-handed style. Even today, he is seemingly held responsible for every rail closure that ever happened, although as others have pointed out, it was Barbara Castle who did the real damage after his time, closing strategic main-lines such as Bere Alston / Okehampton, Matlock / Chinley, the Waverley Route and Oxford / Cambridge. ....

And Corby. Looking back, I'm amazed they allowed that. Corby to Manton, and Melton to Nottingham I understand, but looking back, it's astonishing that they did not incorporate it into the Bedford-St Pancras suburban service, perhaps 1 TP two hours, with shuttle working the other hour. But there again, those DMUs only had one loo per four coaches, so were not really suitable for an 80-mile service taking two hours or so.

TBH, Oxford - Cambridge might be called 'strategic', but it simply was not, in any sense of the words, a 'main-line'.

 

[Dyncymraeg]

When I read Christian Woolmar's book on the history of Britain's railways I recall reading that in the 19th century there was an unregulated railway building boom where vast numbers of line were built. Is it the case that far more railway lines were built than necessary even when railways had a monopoly as a means of transport prior to motor vehicles becoming commonplace. Where there cases of line being under used even when motor vehicles were not available as an alternative.

 

[Bevan Price]

And Corby. Looking back, I'm amazed they allowed that. Corby to Manton, and Melton to Nottingham I understand, but looking back, it's astonishing that they did not incorporate it into the Bedford-St Pancras suburban service, perhaps 1 TP two hours, with shuttle working the other hour. But there again, those DMUs only had one loo per four coaches, so were not really suitable for an 80-mile service taking two hours or so.

TBH, Oxford - Cambridge might be called 'strategic', but it simply was not, in any sense of the words, a 'main-line'.

True. In fact it was two separate branch lines from Bletchley, with very few through trains between Oxford & Cambridge (maybe none at all in some years.), and a timetable that was often "unattractive"

 

[edwin_m]

True. In fact it was two separate branch lines from Bletchley, with very few through trains between Oxford & Cambridge (maybe none at all in some years.), and a timetable that was often "unattractive"

One reason to station codebreakers at Bletchley during WW2 was apparently the rail links to Oxford and Cambridge where many of them were students or fellows. So perhaps if the LNWR had split the service at, say, Bedford instead then they would have been located there.

 

[YorksDMU]

So, back with the Beverley to Market Weighton and York line. I’ve been reading through various books, and found out that, in connection with the CTC scheme, materials, location cabinets, point motors and signal posts had been purchased and delivered to the yards at Stamford Bridge and Pocklington. Indeed, in 1961, S&T teams were having weekend possessions for fitting bonding wires for track circuiting. Track was being worked on with new sleepers and chairs etc., There was to be a profit of £7,000 per annum with the use of CTC.

Of the level crossings, of which there were those infamous 23, 17 were to have been converted to AHB’s. It was those at Haxby Road, Earswick, Barmby, West Green, Pocklington and Market Weighton which were to be continued to be manned owing to high levels of road traffic.


So the Beeching Report, making no mention of all this, as stated previously, used a double track railway and one fully manned too, set of figures. The losses and the savings gained from closure, therefore, coming as no real surprise based upon those figures.
If the CTC scheme had been in place, and in use, then it would have been a totally different ball game, and the Beverley to York line might not even have been in the report.


As it was, it was so short sighted. For with the pause to all work on the CTC scheme, and recovery of all the materials, Dr. Beeching was able to make the case for closure appear so water tight. And based upon the figures given in the report, from that week in April, 1962, it was indeed losing money each year. No argument about that. Again, if the CTC scheme had gone ahead to being put into use, earlier and later trains could have run, making commuting to York and Hull feasible from Market Weighton.


Instead, Market Weighton, in particular, started to decay away after the closure of the line. It started to recover, finally, in the later 1980’s.
The Hull to York service via Selby and Church Fenton is a long way round, and takes longer than going via Market Weighton ever did.

Indeed, my Grandparents, who lived in Market Weighton, in the 50’s to the 80’s, were advised, by BR, to go to York by bus to Beverley, then a train to Hull, and changing into a through train, via Selby, to York. Suffice it to say they never did and used one of the infrequent and uncomfortable local EYMS buses instead.


So, finally, it is now, of course, all history. Decisions were made, at the time, and there can be no going back, even if we wanted to.

 

[yorksrob]

The 'worked example' of the Hull-York via Beverley line is shown on Page 99 of the report, so I will use these figures:

1. The earnings for the service were £90 400
2. £25 600 of these earnings would be retained because of alternative services that would be available.
3. Therefore the earnings of the service to and from intermediate stations was £64 800
4. Passengers using the service as part of their journey it is estimated contribute £37 700 to the revenue of other services. Therefore the total earnings for the line were £128 100
5. £4 900 of this contributory to other services revenue is expected to be lost, so therefore is for tickets to and from intermediate stations.
6. The remainder of this contributory to other services revenue (£32 800) would therefore be retained because of alternative services that would be available. Therefore the total retained revenue because of alternative services available was £58 400.
7. The total revenue loss resulting from withdrawal of the service is estimated at £69 700 (£64 800 + £4 900)
8. The movement expenses were £84 400, the terminal expenses £23 100 and the direct track and signalling expenses £43 300. Total expenses = £150 800
9. The loss of the line on direct expenses (without any allowance for indirect costs) was £30 700 (20%)
10. Owing to the existence of alternative services available for £58 400 worth of revenue, the railway would only lose the £69 700. With costs of £150 800 saved, the railway would be £81 100 [£81 000 in the report] better off with the line closed.

The figures supplied in the report all seem to tie up.

From these figures it would be reasonable to deduce:

• 70% of the earnings for the service originated/terminated at intermediate stations on the line. Of this 70% an additional 7.6% was the value of contributory revenue to other lines of through tickets.
• 30% of the earnings for the service were for through passengers (for whom alternative services would be available). Of this 30% an additional 128% was the value of contributory revenue to other lines of through tickets.
• This shows overwhelmingly that the intermediate station traffic was of a local nature and not an 'important' feeder service.
• There is no evidence in the report concerning the amount of revenue that transferred to the Selby line was 'wildly optimistic'. Perhaps you have some convincing evidence?
• There is no evidence in the report that revenue from tickets from outside the line to intermediate stations on the line were ignored to 'suit the Board's argument'. Perhaps you have some convincing evidence for this? The report just mentions earnings, not 'originating tickets' or some such. It doesn't appear to have been omitted.

I know it may be hard to swallow, but maybe Mrs Miggins really only travelled once in a blue moon to Market Weighton by train by 1963 ..........

My apologies - I'd not spotted the £4,900 contributory revenue that he thought would be lost, which constitute those he thought went to the intermediate stations. But the fact remains that the report doesn't mention the £128,100 total earnings for the line. The £37,700k contributions to other routes are only mentioned to bolster the savings supposedly transferred to other routes.

What it boils down to, once you strip away all of the Doctor's optimistic embellishments of what he though might go via other routes, is that by his own calculations, there was a £37,700 defecit between revenue generated and spent. This on a line which had not undergone staffing, track or signalling rationalisation. It is a reasonable assumption that that deficit could have been brought down or possibly eliminated, had someone taken a pragmatic approach to rationalising the railway, rather than just trying to build cases for closure.

In terms of evidence, there is no evidence in the report as to how he came up with his assumptions as to what traffic would transfer to the Selby route. Were Beverley - York passengers expected to travel that way, on the basis that both stations were still open, I wonder ? If so, I suspect that would have been an optimistic assumption, given the circuitous nature of that journey. I suspect passengers think twice about making it, even today. How did he come up with his £4,900 figure for contributions he expected to be lost ?

I initially read this as being about kilometres (not "kilo-£"); was trying to make sense of it, including bringing the defunct Weston, Clevedon & Portishead light railway into the picture: at times, I can be not very bright ...

I was up since 5:00 yesterday morning, so I can sympathise !

So, back with the Beverley to Market Weighton and York line. I’ve been reading through various books, and found out that, in connection with the CTC scheme, materials, location cabinets, point motors and signal posts had been purchased and delivered to the yards at Stamford Bridge and Pocklington. Indeed, in 1961, S&T teams were having weekend possessions for fitting bonding wires for track circuiting. Track was being worked on with new sleepers and chairs etc., There was to be a profit of £7,000 per annum with the use of CTC.

Of the level crossings, of which there were those infamous 23, 17 were to have been converted to AHB’s. It was those at Haxby Road, Earswick, Barmby, West Green, Pocklington and Market Weighton which were to be continued to be manned owing to high levels of road traffic.


So the Beeching Report, making no mention of all this, as stated previously, used a double track railway and one fully manned too, set of figures. The losses and the savings gained from closure, therefore, coming as no real surprise based upon those figures.
If the CTC scheme had been in place, and in use, then it would have been a totally different ball game, and the Beverley to York line might not even have been in the report.


As it was, it was so short sighted. For with the pause to all work on the CTC scheme, and recovery of all the materials, Dr. Beeching was able to make the case for closure appear so water tight. And based upon the figures given in the report, from that week in April, 1962, it was indeed losing money each year. No argument about that. Again, if the CTC scheme had gone ahead to being put into use, earlier and later trains could have run, making commuting to York and Hull feasible from Market Weighton.


Instead, Market Weighton, in particular, started to decay away after the closure of the line. It started to recover, finally, in the later 1980’s.
The Hull to York service via Selby and Church Fenton is a long way round, and takes longer than going via Market Weighton ever did.

Indeed, my Grandparents, who lived in Market Weighton, in the 50’s to the 80’s, were advised, by BR, to go to York by bus to Beverley, then a train to Hull, and changing into a through train, via Selby, to York. Suffice it to say they never did and used one of the infrequent and uncomfortable local EYMS buses instead.


So, finally, it is now, of course, all history. Decisions were made, at the time, and there can be no going back, even if we wanted to.

Some very interesting observations indeed.

There have been comments in previous threads along the lines that "the financial situation of the railway at the time was so severe that the Beeching management wouldn't have had time to investigate ways of rationalising routes". There were also suggestions that the unions would have obstructed such moves at every step of the way. The fact that Beeching had a ready made rationalisation scheme that could have been completed and evaluated, but which he chose to close down, suggests that it wasn't a case of lack of time or obstinate unions that prevented rationalisation being investigated as a way of keeping routes open for the benefit of passengers, rather a lack of will.

 

[simonw]

When I read Christian Woolmar's book on the history of Britain's railways I recall reading that in the 19th century there was an unregulated railway building boom where vast numbers of line were built. Is it the case that far more railway lines were built than necessary even when railways had a monopoly as a means of transport prior to motor vehicles becoming commonplace. Where there cases of line being under used even when motor vehicles were not available as an alternative.

Yes, quite a lot. A significant number never made enough to pay a reasonable return on the capital cost of construction.

 

[edwin_m]

Having said that, some branch lines that seemed like wastes of money were promoted by local industrialists and sometimes even built by them - usually the main line company would operate them and eventually take them over (sometimes reluctantly I think). This was to keep those people's wider businesses competitive with others nearby that had rail access, so they weren't too concerned about whether the railway made financial sense on its own. Also nobody anticipated mass road transport at the time, assuming the only alternative for the indefinite future would be a horse and cart, so there may have been a feeling that it would run for long enough to pay back eventually. Many of this type of route became basket cases after WW1 when trucks and buses started to be viable for the more local trips to nearby large towns and main line railheads.

 

[6Gman]

And that I think is the crux of the issue. If a bit of the cost saving from closing the railways had been used to subsidise a sensible and sustainable set of tweaks to the bus network to maintain connectivity and provide some degree of integration, then things might have been different. But the buses as well as the trains were seen as commercial businesses, and then just as now it's very hard to inject subsidy into a bus network that isn't regulated.

The bus network of the 1960s was very heavily regulated.

 

[edwin_m]

The bus network of the 1960s was very heavily regulated.

As I understand it the regulation was to give operators local monopolies and prevent competition, but the operators were largely free to determine what services to provide within their areas. Do you have better information on this?

 

[6Gman]

As I understand it the regulation was to give operators local monopolies and prevent competition, but the operators were largely free to determine what services to provide within their areas. Do you have better information on this?

No. Every service change and every fare change had to be approved by the Traffic Commissioners who were required to consider any representations made - by local authorities, other operators, the railway etc

 

[Dr Hoo]

So, back with the Beverley to Market Weighton and York line. I’ve been reading through various books, and found out that, in connection with the CTC scheme, materials, location cabinets, point motors and signal posts had been purchased and delivered to the yards at Stamford Bridge and Pocklington. Indeed, in 1961, S&T teams were having weekend possessions for fitting bonding wires for track circuiting. Track was being worked on with new sleepers and chairs etc., There was to be a profit of £7,000 per annum with the use of CTC.

Of the level crossings, of which there were those infamous 23, 17 were to have been converted to AHB’s. It was those at Haxby Road, Earswick, Barmby, West Green, Pocklington and Market Weighton which were to be continued to be manned owing to high levels of road traffic.


So the Beeching Report, making no mention of all this, as stated previously, used a double track railway and one fully manned too, set of figures. The losses and the savings gained from closure, therefore, coming as no real surprise based upon those figures.
If the CTC scheme had been in place, and in use, then it would have been a totally different ball game, and the Beverley to York line might not even have been in the report.


As it was, it was so short sighted. For with the pause to all work on the CTC scheme, and recovery of all the materials, Dr. Beeching was able to make the case for closure appear so water tight. And based upon the figures given in the report, from that week in April, 1962, it was indeed losing money each year. No argument about that. Again, if the CTC scheme had gone ahead to being put into use, earlier and later trains could have run, making commuting to York and Hull feasible from Market Weighton.


Instead, Market Weighton, in particular, started to decay away after the closure of the line. It started to recover, finally, in the later 1980’s.
The Hull to York service via Selby and Church Fenton is a long way round, and takes longer than going via Market Weighton ever did.

Indeed, my Grandparents, who lived in Market Weighton, in the 50’s to the 80’s, were advised, by BR, to go to York by bus to Beverley, then a train to Hull, and changing into a through train, via Selby, to York. Suffice it to say they never did and used one of the infrequent and uncomfortable local EYMS buses instead.


So, finally, it is now, of course, all history. Decisions were made, at the time, and there can be no going back, even if we wanted to.

Thank you for the further information here. Would it be possible to list the "various books" that described the very limited progress with the CTC scheme that had been reported as 'approved' in the summer of 1959? As already explained (in post 130), British Railways had already had to scale back its re-signalling plans by over a third by 1961 because of a shortage of signalling technical resources. One assumes that the desperately scarce skills were being applied to things like re-signalling and immunisation for the many electrification schemes under way at the time.

I am afraid that delivery of some generic kit such as point motors, signal posts and location boxes, and undertaking of some basic low-tech rail bonding hardly suggests that a high-tech scheme was well under way. Again, routine minor track component renewal would be ongoing on all similar routes.

 

[YorksDMU]

The books are, ‘Hudson’s Way, the story of the York - Beverley railway, by Stephen Chapman. 1986. The CTC details are given in the chapter, The Road To Decline, page 36.
The second book is Railways In East Yorkshire, Volume Three, by Martin Bairstow. 2007. The chapter in this one is From Hope To Despair, the demise of the Market Weighton line, by Richard D. Pulleyn, page 64.

You are sadly right about the materials delivered and the work on the tracks. The works being an indication that maybe something was started, but unfortunately paused all too quickly.
I ought to have added earlier that colour light signals had been installed near to Stamford Bridge and at Market Weighton.

 

[Dr Hoo]

Thank you, YorksDMU. I will keep an eye out for those books.