I wonder if scotch blocks, (wedges) under all the leading loco wheels would be a solution, easier and safer to apply than loads of handbrakes and probably as effective.
One used to be used on LUL 59 stock to prevent trains running away in depots as the handbrakes were not always up to the job.
Half a dozen of these must help as, despite the weight of the train there is not a lot of force to initially move the train.
Once the train is moving it is a different ball game.
You sometimes have to look beyond the detail in accident descriptions for the background to such accidents. And there do seem some similarities to the Lac Megantic accident in Quebec some years ago.
Legal crew limits of 12 hours getting scheduled right up to the limit, and railway control not keeping up with happenings and delays to crews, leading to getting to the 12 hour point out on the open line on a steep gradient, where they have to stop. Presumably the first crew were told to make for Field with minutes to spare, and didn't make it. Why had they been let go from Lake Louise if things were so close? Maybe you can work like this on the flatlands in the Prairies. But not on the gradients of the Kicking Horse.
Second crew take two hours to get there, likely coming up in a van over the snowy highway from Field, and then hiking across the landscape from the Trans Canada highway to the tracks and where the locos were. Did the first crew though expect them to take 2 hours; were they told the crew was much nearer so didn't bother to apply the handbrakes? Were the crew actually coming up all the way from Golden? Was it understood it was snowing up there? Where is the dispatcher nowadays? Was the dispatcher jumping up and down at them to get away immediately they were relieved, as there was opposing traffic held up? Did the dispatcher remind them to set handbrakes? These are train crews who spend their lifetimes on these gradients and understand all the issues.
In a UK context, it is like a driver getting to a legal limit halfway down the Lickey incline, being told to stop right there on the gradient and wait for another driver.
I wonder if scotch blocks, (wedges) under all the leading loco wheels would be a solution, easier and safer to apply than loads of handbrakes and probably as effective.
One used to be used on LUL 59 stock to prevent trains running away in depots as the handbrakes were not always up to the job.
Half a dozen of these must help as, despite the weight of the train there is not a lot of force to initially move the train.
Once the train is moving it is a different ball game.
Putting them under the loco is more or less the same as putting on the loco handbrake. If the weight of the loco combined with the rail-wheel friction can’t give you enough braking force that train will start moving no matter what.
As for “safer to apply” (and to remove!) I’m not really sure.
I was referring to putting on handbrakes along the length of the train or using scotch blocks in addition to the loco brake.
It sounds as if in this case the loco brakes bled off, or something like that, and there was no secondary system, which scotch blocks would have provided.
The loco has a parking brake that stays on without the need for air or power, so won't "bleed off" (assuming it was applied).I was referring to putting on handbrakes along the length of the train or using scotch blocks in addition to the loco brake.
It sounds as if in this case the loco brakes bled off, or something like that, and there was no secondary system, which scotch blocks would have provided.
One on each wagon....Besides which, how do you carry the several dozen chunks of wood needed to scotch enough wagons?
And what are the chances of them actually being there when needed in a hurry?One on each wagon....
And that's putting aside the safety issue with using them on a 2.2% gradient with a train weighing 15,000 tonnes to stop.And what are the chances of them actually being there when needed in a hurry?
You would put them under a stationary train, still held on the gradient by the pneumatic brake, with sufficient (if diminishing) air pressure.the safety issue with using them on a 2.2% gradient with a train weighing 15,000 tonnes to stop.
In normal service that is true. However it is achieved by having a tank of compressed air on each wagon, which is normally kept charged up by the train pipe. However when the pressure in the train pipe drops, a special valve sends the air from the tank to provide the force to push the brakes against the wheels. If the train is left without an air supply for a few hours then the air leaks out of the system and the air brakes release, so the train must rely on parking brakes.I thought brakes on trains worked the other way round - ie pressure was needed to release the brakes. This means it fails safe. Is that not the case?
I think an ECP brake would leak off in the same circumstances as a normal air brake would. It's electrically controlled but still needs an air supply to create the brake force.Well, this is one of the problems that ECP brakes would/will solve - assuming they ever enter general service........
I think an ECP brake would leak off in the same circumstances as a normal air brake would. It's electrically controlled but still needs an air supply to create the brake force.
Do you have a link to support that assertion? The only thing I can see upthread is a mention that the report isn't out yet.My understanding is this accident was caused by the single pipe being at atmospheric pressure, preventing the air in the vehicle reservoirs being topped off.
In an ECP system the train pipe would remain pressurised during the emergency brake application, as in the first instance the command would be sent electrically.
I did indeed wonder why crew relief was being undertaken there rather than Field. Where exactly is Partridge? I can't seem to find it on Google maps....You sometimes have to look beyond the detail in accident descriptions for the background to such accidents. And there do seem some similarities to the Lac Megantic accident in Quebec some years ago.
Legal crew limits of 12 hours getting scheduled right up to the limit, and railway control not keeping up with happenings and delays to crews, leading to getting to the 12 hour point out on the open line on a steep gradient, where they have to stop. Presumably the first crew were told to make for Field with minutes to spare, and didn't make it. Why had they been let go from Lake Louise if things were so close? Maybe you can work like this on the flatlands in the Prairies. But not on the gradients of the Kicking Horse.
Second crew take two hours to get there, likely coming up in a van over the snowy highway from Field, and then hiking across the landscape from the Trans Canada highway to the tracks and where the locos were. Did the first crew though expect them to take 2 hours; were they told the crew was much nearer so didn't bother to apply the handbrakes? Were the crew actually coming up all the way from Golden? Was it understood it was snowing up there? Where is the dispatcher nowadays? Was the dispatcher jumping up and down at them to get away immediately they were relieved, as there was opposing traffic held up? Did the dispatcher remind them to set handbrakes? These are train crews who spend their lifetimes on these gradients and understand all the issues.
In a UK context, it is like a driver getting to a legal limit halfway down the Lickey incline, being told to stop right there on the gradient and wait for another driver.
I did indeed wonder why crew relief was being undertaken there rather than Field. Where exactly is Partridge? I can't seem to find it on Google maps....
Of course, regulations on the way US/Canadian crews work is a lot less stringent than we're used to in the UK.
On my SPV RR atlas, Partridge is between the two spiral tunnels, and is the location of a "passing siding".
The train would have been heading pretty much eastwards at that point.
but the vegetation is such as to render it invisible except for the odd container top peeping above the tree line.