Dangerous train door incident at Bank station Feb. 2017

[Adlington]

RAIB issued a report about this incident. Here is the summary:

At around 21:30 hrs on 6 February 2017, at Bank Station on the Docklands Light Railway, part of a coat worn by a passenger on the platform became trapped in the closing door of a train. The passenger was unable to release the coat from the closed door, but managed to partially take off the coat before it was dragged from her as the train departed. The passenger was not injured, but was distressed by the incident.

The incident occurred because the part of the coat which was trapped was too small to be detected by the obstacle detection system fitted to the train door. Additionally, the design of the door nosing rubbers meant that a relatively high pull force was required by the passenger to extract her coat. The member of Docklands Light Railway (DLR) staff on the train was unaware that the coat was trapped. His position when dispatching the train meant that he was dependent on a CCTV system to observe the doors during the dispatch, but defects in this CCTV system meant that the staff member was unable to observe the door of the train at which the incident occurred.

As a result of this investigation, the RAIB has made three recommendations. One recommendation is made to Keolis Amey Docklands, in conjunction with Docklands Light Railway Limited, to review the design of door nosing rubbers with a view to reducing the forces needed to remove trapped objects. The second recommendation, made to Docklands Light Railway Limited, seeks that their specification for new trains to be procured gives adequate consideration to the safety learning from this investigation in relation to pull-out forces. The third recommendation is also made to Keolis Amey Docklands; this is to improve its processes for the management of platform observation equipment.

The RAIB has also repeated a learning point for staff responsible for the dispatching of trains; that door obstacle detection systems are not always able to detect small objects and therefore it is vital that a final, visual, safety check is made to ensure that no object is trapped in a closed door prior to a train being allowed to depart from a station.

The full text is here.

 

[Bletchleyite]

This sounds rather similar to a recent Merseyrail incident involving an inadequate CCTV system, does it not?

FWIW, at the other bit of Bank yesterday (Northern Line northbound), the usual practice of deliberately closing doors *on* boarding passengers to get the trains away on time continued, and the crowds were such that there was no way the DOO driver or dispatcher could possibly have seen if a door was obstructed. How long before someone is killed?

 

[ModernRailways]

FWIW, at the other bit of Bank yesterday (Northern Line northbound), the usual practice of deliberately closing doors *on* boarding passengers to get the trains away on time continued, and the crowds were such that there was no way the DOO driver or dispatcher could possibly have seen if a door was obstructed. How long before someone is killed?

They do this all the time, Bank is the most notable, but I've also experienced it at Green Park on the Vic. They'll usually announce they're going to do it and to stand clear but obviously people are trying to board so they don't bother listening, they just want to get on the train.

It surprises me that there hasn't been any real incidents caused by it to be honest. A lot of them are for sure very lucky.

 

[Bletchleyite]

They do this all the time, Bank is the most notable, but I've also experienced it at Green Park on the Vic. They'll usually announce they're going to do it and to stand clear but obviously people are trying to board so they don't bother listening, they just want to get on the train.

There was no such announcement audible at the door I boarded at. I've taken to holding the door as soon as I can reach to prevent it happening.

I also think Tube safety announcements get lost in the typical waffle the platform staff like to wibble out[1]. All it needs is a very clear, assertive, Received Pronunciation, loud "Stand clear, doors closing" in the manner of the German "Zurueckbleiben, bitte". The hustle alarms also aren't quite loud enough on the Northern Line stock.

[1] Thisisbankthistrainisformordenpleasemovedownthecoachesstandclearofthedoorsmindthedoorsmindthedoors. The wibble is not necessary, just a couple of very clear announcements in a very clear automated voice. For all she's boring, Atos Annie would be fine. Or for a traditional bonus, someone with the traditional "Mind the Gäp" RP accent.

 

[Bletchleyite]

FWIW, I have wondered if there is a better way of dealing with Bank, such as running a train empty from Morden to start there every other train in the evening rush (if there's nowhere further north to turn one). A completely empty train would as good as clear the platform quite quickly.

 

[ModernRailways]

I also think Tube safety announcements get lost in the typical waffle the platform staff like to wibble out[1]. All it needs is a very clear, assertive, Received Pronunciation, loud "Stand clear, doors closing" in the manner of the German "Zurueckbleiben, bitte". The hustle alarms also aren't quite loud enough on the Northern Line stock.

Completely agree. When the driver adds on to his spiel 'mind the closing doors, stand clear' most people will have tuned out because before that they were just announcing the station.

The German way is perfect. It's loud, concise and stands out from the rest of the announcements as it sounds a lot more authoritative. The loud hustle alarms, along with the flashing lights (mostly just newer stock) really do make people make their decision to either try and get into the train and hold the doors, or to just hang back and wait on the platform.

 

[jon0844]

I've never understood why we can't have bright red flashing lights in the doorway when the doors are about to close, as on many trains abroad.

On the Victoria line trains you have that rather pointless icon that appears in the doorway. I don't think even the 345s have such a system, but do have a louder hustle alarm.

Bombardier and the like must offer this if they fit them elsewhere, so train operators/DfT/TfL or whoever must be deciding NOT to go with them.

And very loud authoritative announcements, in a different voice to the normal announcements, is another obvious good idea.

May not mean 100% safety (you still need staff doing their job) in itself, but would likely help staff, and help keep trains running to time - which is likely the main reason staff are cutting corners because while told safety is key, they're still being monitored for performance and will be under pressure.

 

[Bletchleyite]

Merseyrail have put a lot of thought into the design of their new stock, and this will include an LED "frame" around the doorway in green when open and red when closing.

 

[Bletchleyite]

And very loud authoritative announcements, in a different voice to the normal announcements, is another obvious good idea.

That or a specific tone - the fast "toot-toot-toot-tooooot" you get on ex-Connex stations with the flickery yellow PIS when a train is about to run through fast is very effective.

 

[Mojo]

On the Victoria line trains you have that rather pointless icon that appears in the doorway. I don't think even the 345s have such a system, but do have a louder hustle alarm.

The Crossrail trains do have an indicator by the doors. The indicator also illuminates in red with a pictogram of the doors when the door open button is pressed but the door has not been released

 

[jon0844]

Merseyrail have put a lot of thought into the design of their new stock, and this will include an LED "frame" around the doorway in green when open and red when closing.

That sounds good.

 

[tsr]

Stadler Variobahn trams on Croydon Tramlink have green and red LED lighting strips around the doors, to do exactly as described.

That system works pretty well.

 

[otomous]

RAIB issued a report about this incident. Here is the summary:


The full text is here.

And always we come back to the same issue - what happens if something untoward is not visible when you do the final safety check even if everything's working?

 

[Taunton]

I live on the DLR and can recognise several things in a rather disappointing report.

For a start safety awareness seems to have dropped off in the couple of years since the current franchisee took over. As happened here, PSAs seemed to have developed a habit of doing the doors from the front console rather than actually at the door. As one said to me on a winter's day "it's warmer here than being in the doorway". Note this incident happened on a February evening. Even if everything works they have a worse view from there than at the door. I see in the report the management have, somewhat belatedly, banned this at Bank.

The report makes no reference to the fact that as the passenger was trying to board at the front door, they were just two seats away from the PSA. They weren't remote from one another at all. If the PSA had turned round in their seat they would have seen it happening right in front of them.

Excessive zeal for right time departures (I once read that punctuality on the DLR is measured down to 30 seconds, presumably because the ATO system can do that) means that as soon as the ATO gives the Ready To Depart tone, the PSAs just slam the doors. I've written here previously about slamming of the door once on a half-in pram, with a baby in it, at Canning Town. And that seems what happened here. Beep. Slam. Go. It's surprising they don't have more such accidents.

No procedure for drivers to report that the CCTV was misaligned and didn't cover the door in question. That sort of thing should surely be reported by the first PSA who notices it. And then there's some sort of turf war between DLR and LU, which meant the DLR technician sent to fix it could not realign it, that having to be done by a LU technician. And so it was just glossed over. For months, apparently.

I do miss such reports asking penetrating questions, such as "If you were using the CCTV to check the train, and saw it didn't cover the front door, why did you not turn round in your seat to check it?".

 

[jon0844]

If a single camera or screen fails on a train platform, there will be a platform dispatcher called until Network Rail fix it, or trains won't stop on that platform.

I would have thought such problems would be a top priority to fix, and there would be no arguments or delays. Likewise, staff would know they had to do a manual check, even if it meant a delay. The delay then being attributed to the operator of the CCTV, which would likely speed up the repair.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

That sounds good.

Merseyrail have put a lot of thought into the design of their new stock, and this will include an LED "frame" around the doorway in green when open and red when closing.

I've never understood why we can't have bright red flashing lights in the doorway when the doors are about to close, as on many trains abroad.

On the Victoria line trains you have that rather pointless icon that appears in the doorway. I don't think even the 345s have such a system, but do have a louder hustle alarm.

Bombardier and the like must offer this if they fit them elsewhere, so train operators/DfT/TfL or whoever must be deciding NOT to go with them.

And very loud authoritative announcements, in a different voice to the normal announcements, is another obvious good idea.

May not mean 100% safety (you still need staff doing their job) in itself, but would likely help staff, and help keep trains running to time - which is likely the main reason staff are cutting corners because while told safety is key, they're still being monitored for performance and will be under pressure.

Stadler Variobahn trams on Croydon Tramlink have green and red LED lighting strips around the doors, to do exactly as described.

That system works pretty well.

I'm surprised that the use of red and green lights is allowed as I would have thought that it'd fall foul of disability access regs (colour blindness)

 

[MCR247]

Surely disability regs don't prevent features additonal safety features from being used just because a minority wont benefit? Its not as if this was instead of a hustle alarm

 

[Sprinter153]

[1] Thisisbankthistrainisformordenpleasemovedownthecoachesstandclearofthedoorsmindthedoorsmindthedoors. The wibble is not necessary, just a couple of very clear announcements in a very clear automated voice. For all she's boring, Atos Annie would be fine. Or for a traditional bonus, someone with the traditional "Mind the Gäp" RP accent.

I don't understand the current craze for LU platform staff to behave like third-rate amateur DJs, waffling on about what a lovely day it is and cracking unfunny jokes. It's not twee or endearing, it's bloody annoying and patronising. (or is that just me being grumpy after a 10 hour shift?)

Anywhere else in the industry staff are taught that communications should be ABC - accurate, brief and clear. This new-fangled codswallop is none of those.

 

[Busaholic]

This sounds rather similar to a recent Merseyrail incident involving an inadequate CCTV system, does it not?

FWIW, at the other bit of Bank yesterday (Northern Line northbound), the usual practice of deliberately closing doors *on* boarding passengers to get the trains away on time continued, and the crowds were such that there was no way the DOO driver or dispatcher could possibly have seen if a door was obstructed. How long before someone is killed?

It certainly happened in the past that someone got killed, during the period I was working on the Underground, early 1970s. I know which line it was on and which station and, yes, there was a guard who had given a signal too. It led to changes in procedure and, above all, the realisation that the technology showing the doors had closed properly was fallible. The guard never faced manslaughter charges, unlike in Liverpool, but I believe he never worked on the Underground again.

 

[matt_world2004]

I live on the DLR and can recognise several things in a rather disappointing report.

For a start safety awareness seems to have dropped off in the couple of years since the current franchisee took over. As happened here, PSAs seemed to have developed a habit of doing the doors from the front console rather than actually at the door. As one said to me on a winter's day "it's warmer here than being in the doorway". Note this incident happened on a February evening. Even if everything works they have a worse view from there than at the door. I see in the report the management have, somewhat belatedly, banned this at Bank.

The report makes no reference to the fact that as the passenger was trying to board at the front door, they were just two seats away from the PSA. They weren't remote from one another at all. If the PSA had turned round in their seat they would have seen it happening right in front of them.

Excessive zeal for right time departures (I once read that punctuality on the DLR is measured down to 30 seconds, presumably because the ATO system can do that) means that as soon as the ATO gives the Ready To Depart tone, the PSAs just slam the doors. I've written here previously about slamming of the door once on a half-in pram, with a baby in it, at Canning Town. And that seems what happened here. Beep. Slam. Go. It's surprising they don't have more such accidents.

No procedure for drivers to report that the CCTV was misaligned and didn't cover the door in question. That sort of thing should surely be reported by the first PSA who notices it. And then there's some sort of turf war between DLR and LU, which meant the DLR technician sent to fix it could not realign it, that having to be done by a LU technician. And so it was just glossed over. For months, apparently.

I do miss such reports asking penetrating questions, such as "If you were using the CCTV to check the train, and saw it didn't cover the front door, why did you not turn round in your seat to check it?".

I thought unless the train was being driven manual the psa did the door check from the middle doors.

 

[Taunton]

I thought unless the train was being driven manual the psa did the door check from the middle doors.

You might have thought so, but it seems to have been optional whether to do it by opening up the front console and working from there instead, and was not infrequently done like that. Still auto driving, but the door controls, only, can also be operated from there, being duplicated from what is at each door. It does give a bit of a break from a job otherwise needing standing up throughout the shift. Obviously they cannot do ticket checks when doing the doors from there.

Unlike working from the doors, where you work on whichever side the platform is, when operated from this position the PSA is always on the left. Most DLR platforms are on the left as well, but Bank is on the right.

 

[Bromley boy]

This sounds rather similar to a recent Merseyrail incident involving an inadequate CCTV system, does it not?

FWIW, at the other bit of Bank yesterday (Northern Line northbound), the usual practice of deliberately closing doors *on* boarding passengers to get the trains away on time continued, and the crowds were such that there was no way the DOO driver or dispatcher could possibly have seen if a door was obstructed. How long before someone is killed?

Presumably what's actully happening is the door closure sequence is being initiated, starting with hustle alarm, signalling doors are about to close. People who cannot board should then step away from the train.

The fact many choose not to is why the doors end up closing on them. I imagine a final train safety check is then made prior to departure after the doors have closed and interlock has been obtained.

This doesn't seem an unreasonable practice on a busy underground railway during rush hour, surely?

 

[ModernRailways]

Presumably what's actully happening is the door closure sequence is being initiated, starting with hustle alarm, signalling doors are about to close. People who cannot board should then step away from the train.

The fact many choose not to is why the door ends up being closed on them. I imagine a final train safety check is then made prior to departure after the doors have closed and interlock has been obtained.

This doesn't seem an unreasonable practice on a busy underground railway during rush hour, surely?

No, if people are boarding the train they shouldn't be closing the doors. Here in Newcastle if a driver can't see right down the side of their train and see that it's fully clear with no-one in the PTI (passenger train interface, basically across the yellow line).
If people are boarding the train the driver should not be closing the doors. It's pretty simple, and I'm sure that's what they're taught too.

 

[Taunton]

Let us try and stick to the case in hand.

This doesn't seem an unreasonable practice on a busy underground railway during rush hour, surely?

The incident happened off peak at a quiet time.

the door closure sequence is being initiated, starting with hustle alarm, signalling doors are about to close

The report states it was different to that, the door had previously been obstructed and as the passenger approached the train it reopened - and then closed again. Nowadays it is common for doors to emit tones when they open, as well as close.

People who cannot board should then step away from the train.

The report emphasises multiple times that the passenger stood back from the doors when they began to close, and had given up trying to enter, but her coat string was still caught.

I imagine a final train safety check is then made prior to departure after the doors have closed and interlock has been obtained.

The whole nub of the report was that that didn't happen.

 

[otomous]

No, if people are boarding the train they shouldn't be closing the doors. Here in Newcastle if a driver can't see right down the side of their train and see that it's fully clear with no-one in the PTI (passenger train interface, basically across the yellow line).
If people are boarding the train the driver should not be closing the doors. It's pretty simple, and I'm sure that's what they're taught too.

Might I respectfully suggest there is no comparison between the numbers the front line personnel have to deal with all day between Newcastle and London. Frankly if DOO drivers down here waited til there's a totally clear line the network would fall apart even more than it does now. Sometimes that might happen for a split second in the peaks. It is not a case of everyone getting on. It is a case of some arriving early for the next train, some waiting for a different destination, some dawdling down the side of the train on their phone with no idea that they are causing a problem etc. You could play the air raid siren every time you close the doors and have a voice announcing that the edges of the doors now carry a lethal current and someone would still try to force their way on. I find it hard to trust any of the bodies governing this stuff now because they appear to have lost all touch with reality. In their cosy world everyone is orderly and stands clear, takes notice of alarms, never forces doors and never run for departing trains. They leave the staff to make the "fatal" decision then when things go wrong never acknowledge there might be issues with their ideal world scenario.

 

[Robertj21a]

No, if people are boarding the train they shouldn't be closing the doors. Here in Newcastle if a driver can't see right down the side of their train and see that it's fully clear with no-one in the PTI (passenger train interface, basically across the yellow line).
If people are boarding the train the driver should not be closing the doors. It's pretty simple, and I'm sure that's what they're taught too.

As much as I'm sure everybody will agree with that in theory, it simply won't work in London. For much of the day, the train would never leave the station, such is the constant stream of passengers.

 

[Bromley boy]

Let us try and stick to the case in hand.

The incident happened off peak at a quiet time.

The report states it was different to that, the door had previously been obstructed and as the passenger approached the train it reopened - and then closed again. Nowadays it is common for doors to emit tones when they open, as well as close.

The report emphasises multiple times that the passenger stood back from the doors when they began to close, and had given up trying to enter, but her coat string was still caught.

The whole nub of the report was that that didn't happen.

That may be the "nub" of the DLR incident report, but the post you've quoted is responding to a previous poster's comments about the Northern Line during the morning peak, rather than the DLR incident.

 

[Bromley boy]

As much as I'm sure everybody will agree with that in theory, it simply won't work in London. For much of the day, the train would never leave the station, such is the constant stream of passengers.

Indeed.

Looking along the train and make sure no one is obviously trapped or doing anything stupid/dangerous is closer to it (everyone walking is a good sign, people standing still close to the train are always a concern).

 

[SHD]

Merseyrail have put a lot of thought into the design of their new stock, and this will include an LED "frame" around the doorway in green when open and red when closing.

Introduced by Alstom for the latest stock of the Amsterdam metro (M5): https://youtu.be/Xima9s6FbTs?t=41s

 

[gallafent]

"Mind the Gäp"

That made me laugh … and I completely agree. Verbose announcements (and signage) are a bane. Concision and clarity should be monarchs, but have been dethroned.

“Prochain arrêt Toulouse Matabiau.”
“Attention fermeture des portes.”

Those are plenty long enough, and far more likely to be understood than some seemingly endless stream of verbiage. “Next Stop Bank.”, “Doors Closing.”, … clearer, and consequently safer.