Indeed, but as far as I know that's the extent of ther warnng about scrap rail. It also says "never leave scrap rail unattended trackside" - that may be a new instruction, but have the report's authors ever travelled around the UK's railway network and looked at the lineside (and four foot)?!
One would hope so!
Yes, there are so many ways in which this could have been a disaster - the central platform at W-o-T being one (a reminder of Potters Bar), and the junction crossings at Weybridge being another (not to mention the fairly narrow overbridge portal there too), both of which would surely have forced the bogie, and therefore coach, sideways then tipping over and bringing several others over too. Then there's the pretty high likelihood of an approaching train on the down fast, giving a closing speed of 180mph at Weybridge junction, where the derailed bogie would have hit the crossings and probably been forced to the right, turning/toppling the train into the path of a down train. Even as things were, it is amazing that only one wheelset derailed - if the second had done so, then things would also have been hugely worse, even on plain line. Whatever the outcome of the investigation for those involved, they can be very relieved that they are not facing the consequences of a probably-fatal disaster.
Not that long ago since an engineering trolley left behind after work was struck by an EMU somewhere around Shepperton or Twickenham. Away from third rail land a Class 80x hit something left behind after works in the Didcot/Reading area too. Seems like safety digests are, pardon the pun, not being properly digested!
Absolutely so. The more I mull over the chances here, the more amazed I am at the outcome. There will be a disaster soon, and no system is perfectly safe, but these incidents have been eminently preventable owing to their very obvious nature, rather than, say, a broken component in a bogie that was not spotted and causes a high-speed derailment.
Herein also lies a significant problem. The UK's railways are so littered with scrap that noticing it when it matters most becomes harder because it just becomes embedded in the subconscious as normal.
Yes, and I suspect that was shrugged off as a low-speed issue unlikely to lead to injuries, which completely misses the underlying point.
Indeed and many forum members were very dismissive of that survey!
How true…
Many of the concerns expressed on here (scrap management, possession management, etc) are legitimate and I would share them. I respect that you have couched this as suspicion rather than categorical fact but I feel I should set the record straight somewhat. There have been an unfortunate run of incidents involving signal engineering work specifically (Cardiff, Waterloo, Bristol, Sheffield, Dalwhinnie, Wingfield). In all those cases it was more by luck than judgement that nothing more serious transpired. It takes time to effect change but engineering competency management, especially for signal maintenance testing, now has a more rigorous assessment regime. Since Waterloo there has also been a push to emphasise non-technical skills across the industry. There have been considerable changes to the way works are managed, whether that's maintenance, intermediate or works testing.
With the high standards for competency and process in works testing Waterloo shouldn't have happened but the last three above were careless application of SMTH. SMTH puts much more onus on the individuals so really should be held to much higher standards given it doesn't have all the extra layers of checking that SWTH has so its taken far too long to recognise that.
Signal Maintenance Testing Handbook
SMTH Signal Maintenance Testing Handbook (small scale like for like renewals e.g. a failed component)
When did SITH come into being?
Thank you
2 or 3 years back. Reaction to the very badly managed Functionally Equivalent Design/G110 job after the Sheffield derailment
If something fails testing, is that Revenge of the Sith?
Perhaps after someone watched a Star Wars film?
Yes - at Cradlehall, south of Inverness, on Sunday 25 February 2018. The train, the 09:40 for London, did not derail. That may be the last such event (involving a passenger train at speed), and the "incident report" 05/2018 (now indexed as a safety digest, not a full investigation report) lists a number of previous examples.
Another consequence of the change in signalling areas from TC to axle counters. Whether or not its modernising the signalling system or simply making it cheaper maintain is anyone's guess.
Fair enough.
If the train "reported a large bang" then I think it absolutely WAS impacted, even though not derailed.
Yes, I saw that and did wonder. I assumed a tree and haven't heard anything further.
Indeed so, but the checking for scrap on the line is so utterly basic that it beggars belief that this was missed, even at night. Work sites are lit, and all it would take is a rail-level eyeball check to see the rails are clear.
It didn't stop till Surbiton where driver inspected but then continued forward. I suspect it hit the safeguard which did its job for that train in deflecting it clear but unfortunately onto the Up Fast.
Worksites are lit at the site of work but not necessarily at the RRAP but RRVs are pretty well equipped with lighting all round themselves. When i was in track renewals we had a track handback process which was independent of the Engineering Supervisor and managed by a nominated individual whose responsibility was to MkI eyeball the worksite and any access points for obstructions. This process was developed twenty years ago by track renewal contractors as a result of the derailment on a renewal site post renewal when it was recognised that you couldn't place all the onus on the ES on complicated jobs. As to who owned this worksite hasn't been revealed but looks like it was either renewals (contractors) or NR maintenance given the cause is scrap rail but can't rule out vandalism albeit that would have to be from unsecured scrap.