Agreed. The event started with the AP tripping off and an unreliable airspeed warning (for about 1 minute) but they didn't perform the unreliable airspeed checklist. It was the actions of the PF that caused the airplane to enter the stall (from the accident report):
"Following the autopilot disconnection, the PF very quickly applied nose-up sidestick inputs. The PFs inputs may be classified as abrupt and excessive. The excessive amplitude of these inputs made them unsuitable and incompatible with the recommended aeroplane handling practices for high altitude flight..."
"Although the PFs initial excessive nose-up reaction may thus be fairly easily understood, the same is not true for the persistence of this input, which generated a significant vertical flight path deviation."
Most tellingly: "With no PF inputs, the aircraft would have gradually rolled further to the left but the variations in pitch attitude and altitude would have been small."
It's day one stuff - if you have a stall warning at altitude, you push the nose down. The PF pulled the nose back and applied TOGA power and seemed to be targeting 12 degrees nose up - this is the recovery procedure for a low-altitude stall.
You won't get an argument there - the ECAM design was potentially confusing and I believe has been improved to make it clearer if the plane is stalling. More importantly the PNF missed opportunities to save the plane (as did the Captain when he returned to the cockpit). At no point did the crew come to a consensus as to what was happening - it seems from the CVR transcript that the PNF realised what the problem was "Wtch your speed" "According to all three you're going up, go back down" but he never gave clear direction to the PF.
It's also note-worthy that the Captain didn't say anything about the stall warning when he returned to the cockpit - you have a point when you say that the PF/PNF had other warnings displayed to them, but the Captain would have heard the stall warning before he even entered the cockpit so the stall should have been first and foremost in his mind.
There is no other way to put it - the crew flew a working aircraft into the ocean.
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The automation didn't 'give out' - the AP disconnected and the plane reverted to alternate mode by design because the pilots are there and are supposed to do a better job. However, Airbus had already developed a system call BLISS that would have continued to provide airspeed data when the pitot tubes clogged. If it had been fitted to the accident aircraft, the AP would never have disconnected and the passengers would have safely arrived in Paris. The mistake, in this case, was letting a human get involved.
And now back to your railway-related discussions...
As an ex turboprop driver with an airbus rating I could talk at length about it but as you say that isn't the point of this thread and I certainly do not wish to get into the depths of airbus alternate control laws herehock:! Moving on, sorry op!
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