Essex level crossing incident

[trebor79]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-en...on-essex-crossing-barrier-almost-hit-by-train

Lorry stuck on Essex crossing barrier almost hit by train
Footage has been released of the moment a concrete lorry came within seconds of being struck by a fast-moving passenger train.

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) said the lorry was waved over the crossing by a railway worker despite the red lights flashing.

When it tried to reverse, it got stuck on the closing barrier, forcing workers to lift it back up.

Seconds after becoming untangled and reversing to safety, a train whizzed past.

The RAIB said it happened in Mucking, near Stanford-le-Hope in Essex, on 13 March.

Simon French, chief inspector of rail accidents, said it was almost a "disaster", adding that Network Rail and Amey Inabensa had "addressed the factors" to stop it happening again.

Shocking. How on earth could rail industry workers think it was a good idea to wave a lorry over a level crossing whilst the lights are flashing?

 

[w0033944]

Might this be due to something that's been discussed on the track worker fatalities thread? It was mentioned there that some rail workers have come from a construction background and have been transferred to rail work.

 

[trebor79]

Might this be due to something that's been discussed on the track worker fatalities thread? It was mentioned there that some rail workers have come from a construction background and have been transferred to rail work.

Maybe, but surely they need to be properly trained before being let loose on the trackside. Just as you'd train anyone starting a safety critical role?

 

[Brissle Girl]

They weren't rail workers, rather construction workers working on a rail related project that happened to be adjacent to a level crossing. The RAIB report (available on their website) is quite interesting, and shockingly mentions that immediately after the train passed they carried out the same manoeuvre, with only 3 minutes before the next train was due. In a nutshell, the manoueuvre was to go half way across the crossing, and then reverse back and turn into the worksite.

 

[w0033944]

Maybe, but surely they need to be properly trained before being let loose on the trackside. Just as you'd train anyone starting a safety critical role?

Indeed. I'm an enthusiast and not employed in the industry, but I was reminded of the discussion relating to lack of rail experience on the part of some workers for large companies that have contracts in the industry due to them having transferred from other sectors within the same company. It came as news to me, I must admit.

 

[w0033944]

They weren't rail workers, rather construction workers working on a rail related project that happened to be adjacent to a level crossing. The RAIB report (available on their website) is quite interesting, and shockingly mentions that immediately after the train passed they carried out the same manoeuvre, with only 3 minutes before the next train was due. In a nutshell, the manoueuvre was to go half way across the crossing, and then reverse back and turn into the worksite.

That explains a great deal, but also suggests that they didn't receive the correct training or ignored it.

 

[eastdyke]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-en...on-essex-crossing-barrier-almost-hit-by-train
Shocking. How on earth could rail industry workers think it was a good idea to wave a lorry over a level crossing whilst the lights are flashing?

When I read the thread title I thought that there had been a new incident today! Was relieved that it was 13th March 2019.
Perhaps a title amendment to include the date would prevent others from assuming same?
RAIB report here:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5dea69ff40f0b6088d2cd1bf/R162019_191209_Mucking.pdf

Summary
Shortly before noon on Wednesday 13 March 2019, a passenger train passed over
Mucking automatic half barrier level crossing a few seconds after a partially loaded
concrete delivery lorry had reversed clear as part of a manoeuvre to enter an adjacent
Network Rail construction site. The lorry driver was following hand signals from a
railway worker and drove onto the crossing after it had been automatically activated
by the approaching train and red stop lights had begun flashing.
A lowering crossing barrier came down on the lorry and was manually lifted by site staff, before the lorry reversed off the crossing.
The incident happened because staff involved in the work planning, and staff on site,
did not recognise and manage risk associated with working near level crossings.
Following the incident, Network Rail highlighted this risk in a briefing note issued to
organisations and staff working on its infrastructure. The Amey Inabensa joint venture
working at the construction site modified procedures and briefed staff on the risk.
The RAIB has identified four learning points covering compliance with the Highway
Code, the control of construction vehicles near level crossings, taking account of
nearby level crossings when planning construction work and effective management of
small construction sites.

 

[Upton]

Why wait nearly nine months before publicising this incident?

 

[ComUtoR]

Why wait nearly nine months before publicising this incident?

RAIB reports tend to take a while to be published. 9 months is reasonable.

After an incident there is a lot of investigation. When the RAIB are involved some of that investigation takes longer. They do their investigations, the companies do theirs, report back, etc etc. They also interview staff and gather other evidence (some of which may be historical) Then they need to analyze all of that data come up with conclusions, recommendations and then report it all back to those concerned. Once everyone is happy, they will publish a report.

It all takes time.

 

[endecotp]

They weren't rail workers, rather construction workers working on a rail related project that happened to be adjacent to a level crossing.

Quoting the report:

The banksman was also provided by Resourcing Solutions and had 19 years’ experience on railway civil
engineering projects. He held PTS (personal track safety) and site warden competences. He also held a vehicle banksman competency.

 

[edwin_m]

Why wait nearly nine months before publicising this incident?

RAIB normally put up a story on their website when they decide to do a full investigation or a Safety Digest, with a brief description of the accident and sometimes the areas the investigation will focus on. This is usually within a few weeks of the incident itself.

 

[Lucan]

surely they need to be properly trained before being let loose on the trackside. Just as you'd train anyone starting a safety critical role?

How much training does someone need to to learn the fact that you should not enter a level crossing when the lights are flashing? Five seconds' worth? OK, maybe ten seconds. But someone with a driving licence should already know this anyway.

 

[endecotp]

How much training does someone need to to learn the fact that you should not enter a level crossing when the lights are flashing? Five seconds' worth? OK, maybe ten seconds. But someone with a driving licence should already know this anyway.

Well the driver’s thought process must have been more like “don’t enter a level crossing while the lights are flashing unless directed to do so by a railway worker”. Unfortunately the railway worker waving his arms couldn’t see the flashing lights.

 

[DerekC]

Well the driver’s thought process must have been more like “don’t enter a level crossing while the lights are flashing unless directed to do so by a railway worker”. Unfortunately the railway worker waving his arms couldn’t see the flashing lights.

I think that's right. Having read the RAIB report, the underlying cause was clearly the lack of any kind of analysis (by Network Rail) of the risks of having a working site immediately adjacent to the crossing. Either the banksman or the truck driver could have avoided the incident by applying common sense, but they didn't. Of the two the banksman is the one who really should have known better.

 

[Llanigraham]

It is also noticable from the report that the mixer driver ignored his own company's rules by not stopping and assessing the site access BEFORE he tried to enter.

 

[TrafficEng]

Might this be due to something that's been discussed on the track worker fatalities thread? It was mentioned there that some rail workers have come from a construction background and have been transferred to rail work.

Having read the report I feel the opposite might be the case. It appears that the whole project management chain and workers on the ground are rail experienced, but didn't recognise this as railway work.

Thus the safeguards that would apply to 'real' railway work didn't come into play. Even though it is obvious with hindsight that construction vehicles entering areas where trains are moving (albeit public space) makes it very much a railway job.

As someone with a background working in construction, in particular highways, I see the level crossing as a dangerous unknown... my first reaction would be to get on the phone and speak to someone at Network Rail to find out what I need to do. I think I would have someone from Outside Parties taking a great deal of interest in what I had planned.

Someone with a lifetime experience of railway work might not see the risks in the same way.

 

[Signal Head]

No rail staff have any legal authority to allow vehicles to pass wig-wags when illuminated, this has been included in safety briefing videos going back to BR days, though I've seen it done myself - effectively a failure as the strike-in track circuits were 'down' because of a major commissioning.

No direct risk under the circumstances as the line was under possession and there were no train movements. Presumably a failure to get the LC into local control, or the lights disconnected, before starting the work.

 

[TrafficEng]

No rail staff have any legal authority to allow vehicles to pass wig-wags when illuminated....

Likewise, banksmen have no legal authority to control traffic, but there is an expectation in the construction industry that someone wearing a fluorescent jacket waving their arms around can stop vehicles at will. Usually drivers are compliant though.

There is something of a culture - sometimes for good reason - that construction traffic is exempt from highway law (and the Highway Code) because they have a job to do.

I could see how that might extend into thinking wig-wags don't apply to them. Although in this case it seems more likely that there was a cognitive issue of seeing but not processing what was going on, or of conflicting visual cues.

 

[edwin_m]

Para 60 of the report says the banksman had identified two places beyond the crossing where a lorry could turn. Presumably it could then have come back over the crossing and reversed into the compound from the non-crossing side. So clearly that issue was in his mind at the time, making it all the more inexplicable why somebody with a competency in railway safety didn't adopt that course of action.

 

[trebor79]

Well the driver’s thought process must have been more like “don’t enter a level crossing while the lights are flashing unless directed to do so by a railway worker”. Unfortunately the railway worker waving his arms couldn’t see the flashing lights didn't bother checking with the signaller if it was safe to carry out this manoeuvre.

Fixed that for you.

 

[alxndr]

As someone with a background working in construction, in particular highways, I see the level crossing as a dangerous unknown... my first reaction would be to get on the phone and speak to someone at Network Rail to find out what I need to do. I think I would have someone from Outside Parties taking a great deal of interest in what I had planned.

Someone with a lifetime experience of railway work might not see the risks in the same way.

I've had a vehicle have to pause on an AHB crossing in order to carry out a task, the first thing we [all with railway background] did was get in touch with the signaller. It was just common sense to us to make sure that a train wasn’t going to arrive because if it did there were be absolutely nothing we could do about it.

 

[w0033944]

Having read the report I feel the opposite might be the case. It appears that the whole project management chain and workers on the ground are rail experienced, but didn't recognise this as railway work.

Thus the safeguards that would apply to 'real' railway work didn't come into play. Even though it is obvious with hindsight that construction vehicles entering areas where trains are moving (albeit public space) makes it very much a railway job.

As someone with a background working in construction, in particular highways, I see the level crossing as a dangerous unknown... my first reaction would be to get on the phone and speak to someone at Network Rail to find out what I need to do. I think I would have someone from Outside Parties taking a great deal of interest in what I had planned.

Someone with a lifetime experience of railway work might not see the risks in the same way.

I hadn't even found the report online when I typed that comment, so my thoughts were wide of the mark. It says something for our flaws as humans that rail workers could totally fail to notice the obvious rail-safety aspect to what they were doing simplu because the work they were doing wasn't directly on the line.

 

[Belperpete]

A lot is being made about some of the workers involved having railway experience. However, a lot of construction work goes on adjacent to railway lines, and fact that this was a rail-related project is really incidental to what happened.

 

[Edders23]

According to the story on the BBC news site all the issues had been addressed so presumably the contractor now issues instructions not to maneuver a lorry without proper liaison with signallers

 

[TrafficEng]

According to the story on the BBC news site all the issues had been addressed so presumably the contractor now issues instructions not to maneuver a lorry without proper liaison with signallers

That's the gist of it according to the report. Although I can't see much in the report that constitutes an effective mechanism to prevent the same thing happening again with a different contractor.

The principal action seems to be the circulation of a Safety Alert in May 2019. I've got no idea how effective these are internally within Network Rail, or whether someone joining the organisation after this date would be trained taking the information in the alert into account.

But I do note the Safety Alert doesn't fully describe the whole of the incident (no mention the lorry was driven onto the crossing a second time) and the report itself treats the second attempt as 'Events following the incident' (para 44) rather than as part of an ongoing incident. As an outsider that seems a bit of a strange approach to me. The second attempt is surely worse (even though the barriers didn't come down) because they were all fully aware at that point of what could happen.

The other thing which doesn't seem to have been picked up is that vehicles other than the lorry might have ended up on the crossing as the train approached as a result of the lorry maneuvering into the site.

For example, if the lorry had turned around on the opposite side of the crossing and reversed in from the opposite direction (as per Edwin_M's post #19) it is possible other vehicles could have followed the lorry onto the crossing unaware it was about to stop and reverse into the site. What was needed was some traffic management (with the authority to stop road traffic) on the far side of the crossing so nothing entered the crossing until the exit was clear.

 

[Re 4/4]

The lorry is described as "trapped" when the barrier came down between the cab and the mixer, and it took several seconds for staff to raise it again by hand.

Surely it would have been better to carry on reversing and snap off the barrier - once you're in that situation something has gone horribly wrong already, but getting clear of the crossing as fast as possible could save your life.

 

[GB]

The lorry is described as "trapped" when the barrier came down between the cab and the mixer, and it took several seconds for staff to raise it again by hand.

Surely it would have been better to carry on reversing and snap off the barrier - once you're in that situation something has gone horribly wrong already, but getting clear of the crossing as fast as possible could save your life.

Yes, but the crossing barrier probably acts as a psychological barrier as well as a physical one in such circumstances.

 

[TrafficEng]

Surely it would have been better to carry on reversing and snap off the barrier - once you're in that situation something has gone horribly wrong already, but getting clear of the crossing as fast as possible could save your life.

We don't know what the driver was thinking at that point - the report doesn't say anything - but as the manoeuvre was repeated shortly after it might be reasonable to think the risk to life was not appreciated or understood.

The report doesn't even mention the driver seeing the train coming. It is possible he was looking to his left in the mirrors to observe when the barrier was lifted so he could start reversing again.

GB is right with the psychological barrier point. In addition, with the workers in close proximity (see figure 12) a possible thought process might have been that by continuing to reverse it could result in the workers being hit by the broken barrier arm, with injuries caused to them.