Well the cost of the guards (over ticket collectors) is an additional £300,000 per annum plus a one off charge of over £1 million to modify controls to allow guards to operate doors. If the cost of the project and returns are budgeted over 40 years, this represents £13 million extra for one line. When you take lots of lines into account over the country, such as on SWT, this adds up to serious money.
GARL was cancelled because of transport budget cuts generally, nothing to do with this strike.
DOO was approved and looked at country wide by expert rail safety groups such as the RSSB and RAIB.
The RMT's attitude?
'We did not accept it. We told the Minister that we have no confidence whatsoever in the RSSB or the RAIB and most importantly in any Risk Assessment method whatsoever.'.
HMRI commissioned a generic quantified risk assessment into DOO in 2000. DOO is slightly safer than having a Guard on a train, it concluded.
RSSB looked at the issue in 2001 and concluded:
'That there is no case for the current DO operations to revert back to operating
with a Guard'
===
DOO is a significant industrial relations issue, and there are differing
views about whether it is as safe as operating with a Guard. This
dichotomy is reflected in the findings of the analysis undertaken during
the review. For example, passenger assault and staff assault appear
to be more prevalent in DOO than in non-DOO for one of the operators
whose incident data has been examined in detail, but the opposite is
true for another operator. It is concluded that such discrepancies
reflect significant circumstantial factors, and not DOO issues as such.
However, it is easy to see how such examples can give rise to
opposing views on DOO.
For safety issues relating to the platform/train interface, assault, arson
and train surfing, the analysis is based on an examination of the
incident record, in an attempt to establish the evidence and minimise
conjecture. This strategy has proven only partially successful, due to
significant limitations in the data available, and the need to ensure a
like for like comparison. In the main it has only been possible to
determine that there are probably not large differences in the relevant
incident rates between DOO and non-DOO.
It is thus concluded that at
present, the evidence does not suggest that either DOO or non-DOO is
generically safer than the other. There are however, numerous factors
which may affect safety in either mode of operation, and it is
considered that the thoroughness of a train operator’s on-going review
of his operating arrangements is more critical than whether the
operation is DO or non-DO. This applies equally to the interface with
the Infrastructure Controller, including such matters as the positioning
of signals at platforms, the arrangements for maintaining platform
equipment, and completeness of CSR coverage.
As regards the risks from major train accidents, the analysis concludes
that the risk from derailment is lower in DOO than in non-DOO, due to
the benefits of CSR. In the event of a collision or train fire, there is
some benefit from CSR, but the benefit of having a Guard present is
greater. Overall, the risk from major train accidents appears to be
marginally higher in DOO than in non-DOO, but the difference is not
significant bearing in mind the uncertainties. If the anticipated benefits
from the ongoing TPWS project are factored in, the situation is
reversed: the risk appears to be marginally lower in DOO than in non-
DOO.
http://www.rssb.co.uk/pdf/driver.pdf
How on earth can you negotiate with such people, what is Bob Crow's qualifications exactly, he was a track worker?