How *should* HS2 have been built?

[SynthD]

One thing I am not aware of is how the contracts are structured and where the risk sits within it and who holds the risk.

The contractors hold the risk, which is why the contracts are priced so high. This is one of few points of detail where something different could have been done, and still can in the upcoming contracts.

 

[deltic]

The key lesson from the HS2 debacle which is highlighted frequently in all academic studies of why projects fail to come in on time and budget is that once Parliamentary approval was granted it should have been full steam ahead building it. Instead government sat on it for a couple of years before making the decision to proceed meaning the project lost momentum. In the original timescale Euston should have been in the process of fitting out now. Suspension of work due to Covid didn't help.

The project was dominated by engineers at the beginning with the key ambition of speed rather than setting out what the transport or economic rationale for the project was. Hence the eastern leg ending up initially serving neither Nottingham, Derby nor Sheffield directly.

HS2 phase 1 went from drawing board concept to Parliamentary approval in probably the fastest time we have ever witnessed in the UK for a major project - its a massive shame its construction has failed to match that progress.

 

[HSTEd]

But as I mentioned in post #22, that poses potential issues with trains already full to capacity upon reaching Birmingham.

Surely, given the huge available capacity on the line, the answer to that question is to simply add more trains so that that doesn't happen?

 

[HST43257]

HS2+NPR should’ve been built fully but with care, in succumbing to political pressures the govt did alot to rush themselves into this mess

 

[Energy]

Surely, given the huge available capacity on the line, the answer to that question is to simply add more trains so that that doesn't happen?

Indeed, the trains would only be full if insufficient capacity.

 

[gazthomas]

By the Chinese. They would have ignored all environmental and health and safety issues and had it done in 3 weeks

 

[Norm_D_Ploom]

The contractors hold the risk, which is why the contracts are priced so high. This is one of few points of detail where something different could have been done, and still can in the upcoming contracts.

Thank you.
That now makes sense of some of the quoted figures for the station buildings.

 

[Bald Rick]

The key lesson from the HS2 debacle which is highlighted frequently in all academic studies of why projects fail to come in on time and budget is that once Parliamentary approval was granted it should have been full steam ahead building it.

That is certainly one of the important lessons.

 

[Technologist]

The original HS2 (including golborne link and eastern leg) would have connected 1-7, 10, 14, and 20, only missing out the ones that are not in a northern direction at all, so I don't see what problem you have with HS2?

That's a bit like saying a Lada Riva has the same number of wheels, doors and half the number of cylinders as a BMW M6 GC Competition, so it's the same thing right!

The key differences:

1: Aims and Communication - The "goal" of HS2 was to build some high speed rail in the UK with London to Birmingham being "doable", the arguments around capacity and other legs of it were tacked on later. It may well have been in the minds of the early backers that once we started building we'd keep going but that wasn't what was communicated. Creating something which is goal orientated is useful for two purposes, it's something that the public can understand in the general even if they don't understand the logic behind individual bits of it or the reasons for set backs on individual bits of it. It is also useful for keeping the organisation focused and pulling in the same direction. JFK said "we choose to go to the moon", he didn't say "We shall adapt existing ballistic missile programs to put 1 and 2 man spacecraft into orbit where they will struggle to conduct basics tasks, then we shall may be do some other missions!".

2: Benefits; HS2 has never been able to properly claim the benefits of released capacity because those items were beyond it's remit. Building a local transit system/regional rail should have been part of the projects purview even if the actual building and possibly funding of that may have been done by regional authorities.

3: Funding; setting it up as rolling programme with a very long end date makes it a lot more difficult to challenge and throw massive figures against. Also allowing the programme to capture property uplift value will over time allow treasury funding to be reduced. Again this should have been a day 1 part of the vision, from a public perception stand point this begins to sound like a "discount" and every marketer under the sun will tell you that something at priced at £12 with a 20% discount outsells something priced at £10.

4: Skills and Experience: Setting it up as a rolling programme also means that its worth building capacity in the organisation because you are going to be around for 40 years.

5: Phasing: Build an easier project first, be upfront that this first project will probably be late, over budget and that we will probably have to go back and modify. However it means that your core sections will get built for much less by the much more competent organistion that we are building. It also means that you get some tracks running and can start to show real data on how many people will ride the new lines. Those real lines will also bed in and not be shown to be horrendously noisy or ugly.

If you had set it up in the manner above HS2 would stand a fighting chance of not being the worlds most expensive railway that nearly connects the UK's first and second cities. I've not gone into the specifics of how the alignments and construction methods would be different to HS2 but if it had been undertaken in the manner advocated for above it would have been different because it would have been done by a more competent and better organised body.

So I'm okay with some of the locations, but not with the scope, goal, funding and organisation of the project.

 

[YorksLad12]

1: Aims and Communication - The "goal" of HS2 was to build some high speed rail in the UK with London to Birmingham being "doable", the arguments around capacity and other legs of it were tacked on later. It may well have been in the minds of the early backers that once we started building we'd keep going but that wasn't what was communicated. Creating something which is goal orientated is useful for two purposes, it's something that the public can understand in the general even if they don't understand the logic behind individual bits of it or the reasons for set backs on individual bits of it. It is also useful for keeping the organisation focused and pulling in the same direction. JFK said "we choose to go to the moon", he didn't say "We shall adapt existing ballistic missile programs to put 1 and 2 man spacecraft into orbit where they will struggle to conduct basics tasks, then we shall may be do some other missions!".

"High Speed Rail" sounds a lot sexier than "West Coast Main Line Bypass". The latter is what was needed - and, will be what we get. The non-stop expresses would use it, and even if they only travelled at 140mph would provide a timesaving, and the only junctions to worry about would be at either end.

But then someone says "where's the ambition?" so we get a route that costs more because of the additional infrastructure costs in coping with trains that run faster than anywhere else in Europe (cos we're British, and we invented trains mate). Boosterism. Sometimes, boring (no pun intended) is good.

 

[Energy]

But then someone says "where's the ambition?" so we get a route that costs more because of the additional infrastructure costs in coping with trains that run faster than anywhere else in Europe (cos we're British, and we invented trains mate). Boosterism. Sometimes, boring (no pun intended) is good.

A 125mph railway was only found to be 9% cheaper, barely any savings.

 

[PMN1]

A 125mph railway was only found to be 9% cheaper, barely any savings.

Considering how far out the current plan is cost wise how can it be sure that 9% figure is correct?

 

[Energy]

Considering how far out the current plan is cost wise how can it be sure that 9% figure is correct?

Thats the original design, it would be unwise to assume that a 125mph or 140mph line wouldn't go insanely overbudget in the same circumstances.

 

[HSTEd]

Considering how far out the current plan is cost wise how can it be sure that 9% figure is correct?

Because the same cost drivers that have driven the cost of HS2 into the stratosphere will have done it for a 125mph railway.

Meanwhile you get a railway that is of no use at all for relieving the MML or ECML, and thus will never be filled.

 

[Bald Rick]

Aims and Communication - The "goal" of HS2 was to build some high speed rail in the UK with London to Birmingham being "doable", the arguments around capacity and other legs of it were tacked on later.

I‘m afraid this is fundamentally incorrect.

The original objective of what became HS2 was to provide additional capacity and quicker journeys between the key economic centres, in the most efficient manner, to enable economic growth. Simple analysis showed this as being London - W Mids - Greater Manchester / Liverpool / North West and on to Scotland.

 

[YorksLad12]

A 125mph railway was only found to be 9% cheaper, barely any savings.

Firstly, who said that (as in, what were their biases)? And secondly... 9% is not an inconsequential amount. If the cost is now £91bn (Guardian story) that's £8bn-ish that could be spent elsewhere.

And thirdly (because I can't remember): do the quoted costs for HS2 include rolling stock?

 

[Trainbike46]

Firstly, who said that (as in, what were their biases)? And secondly... 9% is not an inconsequential amount. If the cost is now £91bn (Guardian story) that's £8bn-ish that could be spent elsewhere.

And thirdly (because I can't remember): do the quoted costs for HS2 include rolling stock?

The higher speed means lower rolling stock (and staffing) costs, as you need fewer trains (and therefore fewer drivers and guards) for the same service. HS2 will have longer trains to Manchester, at the same 3tph frequency, requiring fewer carriages

 

[HSTEd]

Firstly, who said that (as in, what were their biases)? And secondly... 9% is not an inconsequential amount. If the cost is now £91bn (Guardian story) that's £8bn-ish that could be spent elsewhere.

It also absolutely slashes your benefits since the line would never be any use for going anywhere away from the WCML.
So the line would never be fully utilised.

It would also have higher marginal operating costs because of increased requirements for rolling stock and traincrew.

 

[The Ham]

Surely, given the huge available capacity on the line, the answer to that question is to simply add more trains so that that doesn't happen?

Indeed, the current plan is:
- 3tph to Birmingham (3,300 seats per hour)
- 3tph to Manchester (3,300 seats per hour)

With a through station at Birmingham that could be
- 6tph to Birmingham and on to Manchester (6,600 seats per hour)

Benefits; HS2 has never been able to properly claim the benefits of released capacity because those items were beyond it's remit. Building a local transit system/regional rail should have been part of the projects purview even if the actual building and possibly funding of that may have been done by regional authorities.

Whilst that true or could have given broad brush examples:

One platform used by 2 long distance services an hour could then be used by 3 (probably 6 as they're half length) local trains an hour, cut those services are from other platforms, which can now run longer trains.

Because the same cost drivers that have driven the cost of HS2 into the stratosphere will have done it for a 125mph railway.

Meanwhile you get a railway that is of no use at all for relieving the MML or ECML, and thus will never be filled.

The near doubling of Euston isn't down to speed of the track.

The higher speed means lower rolling stock (and staffing) costs, as you need fewer trains (and therefore fewer drivers and guards) for the same service. HS2 will have longer trains to Manchester, at the same 3tph frequency, requiring fewer carriages

For example London Manchester:
Current trains (each hour 11 coaches, 11 coaches and 9 coaches) 155 coaches for the 5 hour round trip

Alternative route with a mid way speed, which cuts journey time by 30 minutes each way but with 16 coach (400m) trains 192 coaches for the 4 hour round trip.

HS2, cuts journey time by 1 hour each way, with 16 coaches 144 coaches for 3 hour round trip

On the old rule of thumb of £100k per coach per year that's an extra £1.68bn over 35 years of the trains life (plus the extra staff costs). That rule of thumb is probably old enough that least costs would be double that now, so between £3bn and £4bn extra.

Whilst not 9% of 100bn, it's made a fair debt in that difference, the extra speed would likely also make it more likely that people would use it, which would mean more income.

 

[Technologist]

I‘m afraid this is fundamentally incorrect.

The original objective of what became HS2 was to provide additional capacity and quicker journeys between the key economic centres, in the most efficient manner, to enable economic growth. Simple analysis showed this as being London - W Mids - Greater Manchester / Liverpool / North West and on to Scotland.

This is what I meant, the original motivation was primarily France has this how do we get this done, the justification of where and how then followed that.

HS2: the zombie train that refuses to die | Simon Jenkins

The Long Read: It is the most extravagant infrastructure project in British history – but nobody can say why we need it. How did HS2 ever get so far?

www.theguardian.com

 

[JamesT]

This is what I meant, the original motivation was primarily France has this how do we get this done, the justification of where and how then followed that.

HS2: the zombie train that refuses to die | Simon Jenkins

The Long Read: It is the most extravagant infrastructure project in British history – but nobody can say why we need it. How did HS2 ever get so far?

www.theguardian.com

Oh dear, Simon Jenkins. He’s a professional contrarian who is almost always wrong. He writes an article attacking HS2 every few months reheating some very tired arguments.

 

[Arkeeos]

By the Chinese and involving zero British people, I'm only partly joking.

 

[randyrippley]

You're all asking the wrong question.
What should be getting looked at is: how best we can make something useful out what's already been built but at an acceptable cost? Is there any way of using the route if the expensive parts like the OCC/Euston/Birmingham new stations were totally abandoned and instead the line fed into the existing stations? Even if the result is non-high speed.

 

[Bald Rick]

This is what I meant, the original motivation was primarily France has this how do we get this done, the justification of where and how then followed that.

But, as I said, that is fundamentally incorrect.

Don’t believe anything Simon Jenkins has to say on this subject.

 

[The Planner]

You're all asking the wrong question.
What should be getting looked at is: how best we can make something useful out what's already been built but at an acceptable cost? Is there any way of using the route if the expensive parts like the OCC/Euston/Birmingham new stations were totally abandoned and instead the line fed into the existing stations? Even if the result is non-high speed.

Not really no, as you not releasing trains from the existing stations.

 

[stuu]

This is what I meant, the original motivation was primarily France has this how do we get this done, the justification of where and how then followed that.

HS2: the zombie train that refuses to die | Simon Jenkins

The Long Read: It is the most extravagant infrastructure project in British history – but nobody can say why we need it. How did HS2 ever get so far?

www.theguardian.com

Simon Jenkins spent years writing columns in the Standard saying exactly the same thing about Crossrail - how it would be a white elephant and we were destroying London for nothing. His soothsaying record does not bear close attention

 

[RobShipway]

The key lesson from the HS2 debacle which is highlighted frequently in all academic studies of why projects fail to come in on time and budget is that once Parliamentary approval was granted it should have been full steam ahead building it. Instead government sat on it for a couple of years before making the decision to proceed meaning the project lost momentum. In the original timescale Euston should have been in the process of fitting out now. Suspension of work due to Covid didn't help.

The project was dominated by engineers at the beginning with the key ambition of speed rather than setting out what the transport or economic rationale for the project was. Hence the eastern leg ending up initially serving neither Nottingham, Derby nor Sheffield directly.

HS2 phase 1 went from drawing board concept to Parliamentary approval in probably the fastest time we have ever witnessed in the UK for a major project - its a massive shame its construction has failed to match that progress.

Problem is though, once approval had been given, it would have been better for the government to take out the loans and finance for the project at that point in time when the interest rate was about 10% lower, than waiting the two years to get the finance. But similar issues where about with both Crossrail and HS1. I will save the comment where money given to charities and individuals that faced eviction for HS2 are now worse off than they where before the building started for HS2 for another time.

You're all asking the wrong question.
What should be getting looked at is: how best we can make something useful out what's already been built but at an acceptable cost? Is there any way of using the route if the expensive parts like the OCC/Euston/Birmingham new stations were totally abandoned and instead the line fed into the existing stations? Even if the result is non-high speed.

You have to remember that both HS1 and to some extent Crossrail where built in sections at a time, so the same will be with HS2. However, unlike the first section of HS1 which did have a connection to the classical lines so that trains could run into London Waterloo International, we will not have that with HS2 with it terminating at Old Oak Common. This means for the first few years that the service will be little more than an express shuttle between the Midlands and those needing to get to Heathrow Airport, as those needing to get to city centre London I suspect will continue to use the classic lines services into Euston. However, this does depend on where in London people are having to travel too, as the Elizabeth line maybe better for such places.

But as @The Planner points out it is not really releasing any trains due to not going into London Euston. It is just giving extra capacity and meaning those needing to travel between Heathrow to the North have an easier option than travelling into London to change trains. If HS2 had gone into Euston, than there would have been fast services on the classic lines that you could have taken away, which in turn would have allowed other passenger and freight trains to be using those paths.

 

[Technologist]

Simon Jenkins spent years writing columns in the Standard saying exactly the same thing about Crossrail - how it would be a white elephant and we were destroying London for nothing. His soothsaying record does not bear close attention

I wasn't referencing his predictions but his history of the lobbying. It's hard to argue that the plan from the original backers was to build a high speed railway line first and then justify it.

It wasn't spawned from a integrated transport plan or from a study to "level up" the UK.

 

[Trainbike46]

But, as I said, that is fundamentally incorrect.

Don’t believe anything Simon Jenkins has to say on this subject.

Personally, I would broaden that; I don't believe anything Simon Jenkins has to say about any subject. Every column of him I've ever read seem to be written based on a parallel universe where all the key facts are different, rather than based on anything in reality.

 

[Magdalia]

When HS2 was conceived the world, especially the business world, was a very different place. Cutting edge hand held tech was a Blackberry; video conference involved going to a special studio, wearing plain clothes and sitting very still.

At the time my main reservation about HS2 was that the UK was already too late coming to the party and that technological advance would make HS2 redundant before it was finished. Smartphones, Zoom and Teams have knocked a hole in the business model.

My other big reservation was whether political support would last long enough to get the line built. The UK has, shall we say, a chequered history in this regard.

Other contributory factors, no one envisaged Brexit when HS2 was commissioned , nor covid, nor the special military operation in Ukraine ( because he doesn't call it a war!!!) what, if any, impact have these had on the projects costs.

These are all very important factors.

Covid put the technological advance in remote communication onto fast forward. All three have been supply side shocks with impacts on the costs of delivery. While individual supply side shocks are not predictable, a project with a timescale like HS2 needs some resilience for if and when a supply side shock results in inflation.

In my view the funding should have been done differently: long term bonds ring fenced for HS2 and with some hedge against inflation.

Finally, something else that few people could foresee in 2009 (including me) was more than a decade of near zero economic growth. If the UK economy had grown at 2% per annum in that period then we wouldn't be having this discussion.