HST cab protection

[Newtraveller58]

6. Make a commitment to ASLEF of a removal date ASAP, and replacement with ex EMR 222s, which should start to come available in 2025, and match the number of vehicles required. This should mean removal within the next eighteen months to two years is possible.

If that date slips for some reason, stop the fleet at that point regardless, and make up the slack with the existing fleet as far as possible.

While I accept that removal as soon as possible is desirable, removal without replacement would result in an overall worsenment of public safety. If the train service has to be withdrawn (or partially withdrawn), passengers will have to travel by road in replacement bus or private car. Having regularly driven on both the A90 to Aberdeen and the A9 to Inverness, I definitely feel much safer in a train of any description. If the Scottish Government has money to invest, the biggest safety bang for your bucks has to be removing the flat junctions and right turn options on these 2 roads.

I was never a train driver but regularly required to travel in cabs when I was working. I would much prefer to be in a class 43 cab than in the driver‘s seat in a Citylink bus at 70 mph.

There's a excerpt from a BBC Schools programme about plastic manufacturing methods featuring footage showing the cabs under construction at Crewe. It mentions that they were only designed to withstand collisions with birds (a 4lb bird at a speed of 125mph). It also mentions that steel and aluminium were rejected primarily due to manufacturing cost reasons.

(See also this technical paper from BR's Technical Centre in Derby)

The only steel reinforcement in the moulding was around the bottom edge, where they had to bolt to the underframe. I wonder if any thought at all was given to including vertical reinforcement up the A-pillars and around the screen (as is commonly done on GRP car bodyshells, to provide rollover protection). That would have required the steel 'cage' to be welded in a jig before being added tp the inner cab mouldings during the layup process. This would have brought a small weight penalty, but I expect would also have had led to a significant manufacturing cost increase.

A contemporary Reliant or Lotus would have a bodyshell constructed in basically the same way, but they would at least have a sacrificial crumple zone between the nose and the driver (which only had to be designed to pass a 30mph crash test).

Having been around in the 70s when these were built, it was necessary to minimise weight so that they could use existing structures and track at higher speeds. Welding on chunks of metal would have pushed the weight up reducing acceleration and potentially maximum permissible speed over certain structures.

In addition, the HSTs were designed as a stop gap until the APTs could be introduced into squadron service (at that stage to be powered by gas turbines!).

 

[43096]

If that date slips for some reason, stop the fleet at that point regardless, and make up the slack with the existing fleet as far as possible.

And make redundant the crews who are no longer required for the trains taken out of the timetable.

Is this just HSTs, or are you applying this to all BR era stock? None of it meets the current regulations.

 

[GlitterUnicorn]

Is it possible to have a small quick rough and ready study done of alternatives 'going forward', rather than often uninformed, biased or opinionated knee-jerks? maybe such has been done. Quick, because the currently expected demise of the HST is not that far off. We're now 230 postings on and, IMHO, not much further on.
IF the HST cab is unsafe, what are the alternatives now?

1. Bin them off forthwith; and replace with what, when, at what cost.etc?
2. Carry out modifications (major OR minor) with consequences meantime (Fewer trains in service for 'a while'?)
3. (Selective) vegetation removal- worst first...
4. Ameliorate ('Pay off'?) driver concerns?
5. Turn blind eye/ denial
6. Plan for replacement, by when?
7. Something else ...

Are figures available for deaths/major injuries/ consequential costs for alternative forms of transport? and for railway staff and customers?

IIRC the HST design was much lauded 'back in the day'- was resistance to tree strike a design criterion? Was it rushed to cover for tree failing APT? That was then.

I could have a tree fall on my house, or as I'm walking in the park, or a vehicle might run me down on the street...

I feel for the driver and all those with heightened anxieties

There are a few options. Will very briefly summarise my thoughts.

Do Nothing - In my view not that great considering the aforementioned risks, and also due to the general unreliability of the HSTs. Even if this particular issue is ignored there are questions on whether the HST would last until 2030.

Modifications - Prohibitively expensive and leads to even less availability of an already unreliable fleet. Bad option.

Replacement within 1-2 years (Second-hand stock) - Good option. 222s or another fleet may be available. Likely to be teething troubles as they're introduced, but given the frankly awful reliability of the HSTs the relative disruption would be lower than otherwise expected. Possible contractual issues (s.54) however nothing that can't be solved. Given the over-promising and under delivering in electrification in Scotland, something like the 222s is more likely to survive until routes are actually able to be electrified.

Replacement in the long term (New Stock) - I don't think the type of stock ordered has a huge impact but I'd imagine something Stadler or Hitachi. Expensive. Likely to pose a challenge for ScotGov to implement. Also leaves ScotRail tethered to the HSTs for 5-10 years. Worryingly close to the "Do Nothing" option. However this addresses the s.54 issue.

Replacement within 1-2 years and an order for new stock - In an ideal world this would be perfect though. Introduce a new fleet as a stand-in and then replace them with new stock that's compatible with electrification. However ScotGov is not flush with cash, and this is the most expensive option.

 

[Prime586]

But the unanswered question for me is not the 1970s vs now, but rather 2003 vs 2023. 20 years ago there was a much greater safety consciousness than in the 1970s. If there was a significant issue with HSTs wouldn't it have arisen sometime in the past 20 years?

In paragraph 4.19 of the Ladbroke Grove inquiry report, it states:
"In the leading power car of the HST, the driver’s survival space was, in the words of the experts, “severely compromised”. The cab, which was constructed of GRP, would not meet modern structural requirements. Dr Kirk expressed the view that the cab had no significant structural strength, that it could not resist loads above the underframe,and that it provided minimal protection for the driver in a collision."

Having been around in the 70s when these were built, it was necessary to minimise weight so that they could use existing structures and track at higher speeds. Welding on chunks of metal would have pushed the weight up reducing acceleration and potentially maximum permissible speed over certain structures.

I do not think that a vestigial steel cage (around the perimeter of the cab, with verticals up the front edge of the doors, the sides of the windscreen and additional horizontal members at window and cantrail height) bonded between the GRP skins and made for example to Motorsport UK regs (50 x 2.0mm Cold Drawn Steel tubing) would add sufficient weight to restrict a Class 43's route availability. It would not fully protect a driver in the event of another Ladbroke Grove incident, but it would add some level of protection for collisons with objects above buffer beam height.

It is pretty clear in the original design process that no thought was given to collision protection other than for bird strikes. However, once it was clear the HST was no longer going to be a stopgap to the APT and they were going to be around for many more years it might have been prudent to do some form of upgrade. Money was found to upgrade the engines to reduce fuel consumption and maintenance costs, but there is no cost benefit to the operators or ROSCOs from improving collision protection for the crew.

 

[43066]

Where are you going to find the money to lease those ex-EMR 222s while still paying the lease for the HSTs?

If you withdraw the fleet (say 40 passenger vehicles in use daily, plus those on exam) with no replacement how many people are you going to leave stranded because they can't get on a wedged 158 and the next train isn't for two or three hours? Are you going to put them on road coaches? I wonder what sort of driver protection road coaches have.

I’ve suggested a solution which could be made to work if the will was there. It’s not ASLEF’s problem to worry about leasing costs (if leasing costs for decrepit HSTs are high, something has gone very wrong somewhere with how we fund rolling stock), or the safety of road coaches. The correct approach to improving safety on the railway is not to say “roads are more dangerous, so let’s compromise standards on the railway”.

The 222s will be available in short order and, even if delayed, it was suggested upthread that Scotrail’s existing fleet would be able to make a decent fist of taking up the slack, so it’s by no means certain that removing the microfleet of HSTs would lead to significant numbers of strandings.

The fault for this debacle lies with whoever decided that Scotrail should take on the HSTs in the first place; they are life expired stock, and by all accounts have been a basket case in reliability terms, even ignoring the cab safety issue.

 

[GlitterUnicorn]

But the unanswered question for me is not the 1970s vs now, but rather 2003 vs 2023. 20 years ago there was a much greater safety consciousness than in the 1970s. If there was a significant issue with HSTs wouldn't it have arisen sometime in the past 20 years?

In paragraph 4.19 of the Ladbroke Grove inquiry report, it states:
"In the leading power car of the HST, the driver’s survival space was, in the words of the experts, “severely compromised”. The cab, which was constructed of GRP, would not meet modern structural requirements. Dr Kirk expressed the view that the cab had no significant structural strength, that it could not resist loads above the underframe,and that it provided minimal protection for the driver in a collision."

And also noted in the RAIB report into the Lavington tree collision in 2010. This recognised the lack of strength of HST cabs but concluded that upgrades would be cost prohibitive given that HSTs were expected to have less than 15 years of life ahead of them.

Strangely enough both of these points have appeared in the last couple of pages of this thread. It feels like some people's minds are closed to these arguments.

 

[Krokodil]

(if leasing costs for decrepit HSTs are high, something has gone very wrong somewhere with how we fund rolling stock)

Quite a bit of that leasing cost will be paying back the capital of the power door conversion.

 

[TUC]

In paragraph 4.19 of the Ladbroke Grove inquiry report, it states:
"In the leading power car of the HST, the driver’s survival space was, in the words of the experts, “severely compromised”. The cab, which was constructed of GRP, would not meet modern structural requirements. Dr Kirk expressed the view that the cab had no significant structural strength, that it could not resist loads above the underframe,and that it provided minimal protection for the driver in a collision."

Were any recommendations made in the Ladbroke Grove report in relation to this?

 

[djw]

I do not think that a vestigial steel cage (around the perimeter of the cab, with verticals up the front edge of the doors, the sides of the windscreen and additional horizontal members at window and cantrail height) bonded between the GRP skins and made for example to Motorsport UK regs (50 x 2.0mm Cold Drawn Steel tubing) would add sufficient weight to restrict a Class 43's route availability. It would not fully protect a driver in the event of another Ladbroke Grove incident, but it would add some level of protection for collisons with objects above buffer beam height.

Whilst I understand the intention, I think the justification for retrofitting impact protection to HST power cars is now very low. Before too long, ScotRail will be the only passenger operator left, as GWR is working towards full retirement of the Castle Class (though the end-of-service date has been extended at least once). The only other examples in regular use are the New Management Train and some Colas infrastructure services.

In light of the Ladbroke Grove part 1 report (published in 2001), when most of the power cars were still in use, consideration was given to impact protection upgrades. However, the ROSCOs concluded by 2004 that upgrades to driver protection were not "reasonably practicable" (quoted in footnote 15 of RAIB Report 08/2011 (Lavington)). Paragraph 74 of the Lavington report concluded that the cost-benefit justification of upgrades to driver protection was unlikely at that time. The cost-benefit situation will have deteriorated since then.

Moreover, the Lavington report noted, in paragraph 73, that the impact force of the power car with that tree was several times higher than the design standard for impact protection that was applied to new rolling stock at the time.

Even when it is possible, from an engineering perspective, to upgrade existing rolling stock to modern standards, the cost may well be unjustifiable. In most cases, all that is required is compliance with the standards current at the time the type was introduced, though some standards changes apply to existing stock (TPWS and GSM-R fitment being obvious examples).

 

[Efini92]

Because it met the required standards of the time. You are judging 1970s engineering with 2023 standards.

It’s also worth noting steam had not long since ended and in those times there were little/no trees in the vicinity of the railway.

 

[djw]

Were any recommendations made in the Ladbroke Grove report in relation to this?

The Ladbroke Grove part 1 report contained the following recommendations in relation to crashworthiness of the HST and more generally:

53. The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting (para 13.4).

54. The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53 (para 13.4).

(recommendation 55 related to crashworthiness of the Turbo)

56. The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space (para 13.5).


As I mentioned in post #248, recommendation 53 in relation to the cabs was rejected as not reasonably practicable by the ROSCOs.

 

[HSTEd]

I’ve suggested a solution which could be made to work if the will was there. It’s not ASLEF’s problem to worry about leasing costs (if leasing costs for decrepit HSTs are high, something has gone very wrong somewhere with how we fund rolling stock), or the safety of road coaches. The correct approach to improving safety on the railway is not to say “roads are more dangerous, so let’s compromise standards on the railway”.

It might not be ASLEF's problem, but it is also not ASLEF's decision to make.

ASLEF might expect that the Scottish taxpayer will just pay for this major new expense on the say so ASLEF, but it is almost certainly not going to.

ASLEF's options are to accept the status quo or undertake industrial action. I doubt either will result in early withdrawal of the rolling stock.

The view of people who are actually in a position to make the decisions is clearly that the HSTs are sufficiently safe for continued operation.

The 222s will be available in short order and, even if delayed, it was suggested upthread that Scotrail’s existing fleet would be able to make a decent fist of taking up the slack, so it’s by no means certain that removing the microfleet of HSTs would lead to significant numbers of strandings.

And where will the money come from to lease the 222s?
The railway, especially the Scottish railway only has a finite supply of money to spend on things.

The second most likely outcome of this mess, beyond the HSTs continue in service, is a reduction in Scotrail services as they are withdrawn without replacement.

 

[Wolfie]

The Ladbroke Grove part 1 report contained the following recommendations in relation to crashworthiness of the HST and more generally:

53. The enhancement of the cabs on HSTs to improve driver protection along with energy absorption and compatibility with other vehicles, and the enhancement of measures for the retention of bogies on the coaches of HSTs, should be considered, subject to an assessment of feasibility, costs and benefits, with a view to possible retro-fitting (para 13.4).

54. The current standard for crashworthiness in respect of new vehicles should be reviewed in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove with respect to the objectives referred to in Recommendation 53 (para 13.4).

(recommendation 55 related to crashworthiness of the Turbo)

56. The current standard for crashworthiness should be reviewed, in the light of the crash at Ladbroke Grove, in order to ensure that there are adequate measures for safeguarding survival space (para 13.5).


As I mentioned in post #248, recommendation 53 was rejected as not reasonably practicable by the ROSCOs.

Re your last para perhaps if the ROSCOs get sued for millions by the families of deceased drivers and their executives face corporate manslaughter charges they might just chose to change their minds!

It might not be ASLEF's problem, but it is also not ASLEF's decision to make.

ASLEF might expect that the Scottish taxpayer will just pay for this major new expense on the say so ASLEF, but it is almost certainly not going to.

ASLEF's options are to accept the status quo or undertake industrial action. I doubt either will result in early withdrawal of the rolling stock.

The view of people who are actually in a position to make the decisions is clearly that the HSTs are sufficiently safe for continued operation.


And where will the money come from to lease the 222s?
The railway, especially the Scottish railway only has a finite supply of money to spend on things.

The second most likely outcome of this mess, beyond the HSTs continue in service, is a reduction in Scotrail services as they are withdrawn without replacement.

Perhaps those people who take the view in your fourth para should be forced to sit in HST cabs every day. It's bloody easy to risk someone else's neck!

 

[HSTEd]

Re your last para perhaps if the ROSCOs get sued for millions by the families of deceased drivers and their executives face corporate manslaughter charges they might just chose to change their minds!

A corporate manslaughter prosecution would collapse, it is almost certain the ROSCOs have ALARP analyses in their back pocket that will protect them

Perhaps those people who take the view in your fourth para should be forced to sit in HST cabs every day. It's bloody easy to risk someone else's neck!

Perhaps they should, but at the end of the day, how many drivers have been killed in HST cabs in the last two decades?

How many of those drivers would have survived if they were in a more modern train, considering that no trains that I am aware of have proper crash restraints in the cab?

 

[MarkyT]

There are a few options. Will very briefly summarise my thoughts.

Do Nothing - In my view not that great considering the aforementioned risks, and also due to the general unreliability of the HSTs. Even if this particular issue is ignored there are questions on whether the HST would last until 2030.

Remaining totally silent, crouching behind the shield of the trains' route acceptance might be risky legally. I ponder if the risk assessment process was sufficiently robust for going from a handful of the class running in Scotland to operating frequent regional expresses. It might be argued that on the heavily trafficked lines of the GWML, MML, ECML these trains formerly plied, a tree fall or structural issue was far more likely to be spotted and actioned sooner. Also the wider extremes of weather, and the more rugged and isolated nature of many parts of the Scottish network can contribute to worse outcomes.

Modifications - Prohibitively expensive and leads to even less availability of an already unreliable fleet. Bad option.

The opportunity to do further safety modifications was lost when these trains were out of traffic being refurbished for this new role. It cannot have been beyond the wit of engineers to devise a bolt-on safety cage for inside the nose cone - with latest materials and techniques, maybe it needn't have been so weighty as those 1970s assumptions (and almost anything would be better than today's situation). They could have looked at non-twist couplers, bogie restraints and anticlimbing measures on car ends too. They went for a cheap limited refresh however beyond the retention toilets and power doors, and contractors still failed to deliver on schedule. Further mods might still be done today technically, but the economic case gets ever worse each day older the trains get...relentlessly.

Replacement within 1-2 years (Second-hand stock) - Good option. 222s or another fleet may be available. Likely to be teething troubles as they're introduced, but given the frankly awful reliability of the HSTs the relative disruption would be lower than otherwise expected. Possible contractual issues (s.54) however nothing that can't be solved. Given the over-promising and under delivering in electrification in Scotland, something like the 222s is more likely to survive until routes are actually able to be electrified.

Any fresh fleet being introduced needs properly bedding in with a new maintenance organisation, depot equipment, procedures, training etc. There's an advantage with a new fleet as the manufacturer is highly incentivised to help an operator set up an effective new depot and get it and the trains all running smoothly and reliably. Sometimes today, an offshoot of the manufacturer or leasing company might run a depot directly for an operator as part of the lease agreement, at least for a time, maybe with a handover clause after so long. Getting all this right is difficult and time-consuming. Rushing it, under pressure, particularly of the political sort, is probably not conducive to avoiding mistakes.

eplacement in the long term (New Stock) - I don't think the type of stock ordered has a huge impact but I'd imagine something Stadler or Hitachi. Expensive. Likely to pose a challenge for ScotGov to implement. Also leaves ScotRail tethered to the HSTs for 5-10 years. Worryingly close to the "Do Nothing" option. However this addresses the s.54 issue.

I think up to 5 years is realistic for any new order even if you were brandishing a massive suitcase of cash at the meeting.

Replacement within 1-2 years and an order for new stock - In an ideal world this would be perfect though. Introduce a new fleet as a stand-in and then replace them with new stock that's compatible with electrification. However ScotGov is not flush with cash, and this is the most expensive option.

That would be a very tall order unless Scotrail have options still open on further orders for any fleet purchase they've been involved with recently. I don't think there have been any brand new diesel units supplied for years north of the border.

Non of this is in place, ready now clearly, but if (say) Astom could rebuild Derby's production lines, they could perhaps finally ditch the ill-fated Aventra design and start constructing level-boarding UK Coradias instead which, with a standard new UK body shell, might be offered in varying trim levels for different duties and with alternative flexible and upgradable traction power systems. Coradia is Alstom's flexible FLIRT equivalent with a very similar design concept using articulated trailing bogies shared between the reduced floor-height passenger cars and the big power bogies housed only under the power cubicles and cabs at each extremity of the unit (or a small number of intermediate non-cab traction equipment areas (with power bogies if necessary) for longer formations (like the longer electric only Anglia FLIRTs on the GEML and Stansted runs). Such a train is likely what operators want today especially after having seen the Anglia experience, now being joined by TfW. If a big factory was set up on a long term rolling program of new regional trains then the orders might be more easily swapped over and reconfigured on national priorities for an emergency new fleet unexpectedly required within a year or two.

 

[43066]

Quite a bit of that leasing cost will be paying back the capital of the power door conversion.

Even when it is possible, from an engineering perspective, to upgrade existing rolling stock to modern standards, the cost may well be unjustifiable.

If money was spent upgrading power doors and installing CET tanks, it does beg the question why some thought wasn’t given to the crashworthiness of the cabs.

It might not be ASLEF's problem, but it is also not ASLEF's decision to make.

ASLEF might expect that the Scottish taxpayer will just pay for this major new expense on the say so ASLEF, but it is almost certainly not going to.

It isn’t “the taxpayers’” decision either. What *should* happen is a commitment to replacement within short order, along the lines suggested above. After all the DfT has been happy to see far larger and more modern fleets than this stopped in recent times. It remains to be seen what further steps ASLEF may take - up to now their stance has been perfectly reasonable.

Perhaps those people who take the view in your fourth para should be forced to sit in HST cabs every day. It's bloody easy to risk someone else's neck!

Indeed. Yet elsewhere on the network we’re told that new third rail installations cannot be justified on safety grounds meaning microfleets have to be (expensively) maintained to service diesel islands and, as noted above, money was found to fit power doors and CET tanks to the knackered HSTs, and heritage operators are being expected to fit central door locking to stock they operate. Yet somehow nothing can be found to provide a solution to HST cabs which are in use long, long after they should have been withdrawn.

 

[Krokodil]

If money was spent upgrading power doors and installing CET tanks, it does beg the question why some thought wasn’t given to the crashworthiness of the cabs.

Because it was not a legal requirement.

 

[djw]

Re your last para perhaps if the ROSCOs get sued for millions by the families of deceased drivers and their executives face corporate manslaughter charges they might just chose to change their minds!

The 2004 HSE report noting the rejection of HST cab enhancement read:

As earlier progress reports noted research into the feasibility and a cost benefit analysis of HST cab enhancement has been carried out. The ROSCOs report that they have comprehensively assessed HST power car energy absorption improvements and have concluded that improvements to both cab and structural integrity are not reasonably practicable. This judgement is based on the reduced risk of collision with the implementation of the TPWS fitment programme and the very high cost of completing a programme of retrofitting the underframe modifications.


This analysis makes sense: following Ladbroke Grove, TPWS substantially reduced the collision risk, whilst the underframe would likely need modifying to accept force correctly from a strengthened cab.

The barriers to corporate manslaughter prosecutions are very high - only around 40 prosecutions have been brought since 2008, resulting in 30 convictions (many of which were guilty pleas). One element of corporate manslaughter is a gross breach by the organisation of a duty of care owed to the victim. Repeated analyses that have been accepted by HSE (post-Ladbroke Grove) and RAIB that the cost-benefit justification for a structural retrofit of the HST power car did not exist seem unlikely to be a gross breach of any duty of care owed to drivers. As HSTEd says, ALARP analyses are likely to exist.

 

[dgl]

Arguably all this talk about train protection systems ignores the fact that it's incredibly rare that a train will hit another train and if it does most of that time will be as a result of something no protection system can really protect against, that is hitting a derailed train or one that has been unable to stop for some reason.
The things a train will hit will be things like trees, motor vehicles, animals and such like, and they don't necessary respond to train signals and as such a train should be designed at least somewhat to protect against collisions with them.

The question is what do we do about the 43's?, we can't just get rid of them as they are very much needed and there's nothing to replace them but can Scotrail be seen to do nothing? I would immediately be talking to the ROSCO and seeing what can be done to improve safety or see if a deal could be done regarding replacement, asking the ROSCO if they would be prepared to end the lease early if they did a deal with them for some new stock.

 

[Wolfie]

Arguably all this talk about train protection systems ignores the fact that it's incredibly rare that a train will hit another train and if it does most of that time will be as a result of something no protection system can really protect against, that is hitting a derailed train or one that has been unable to stop for some reason.
The things a train will hit will be things like trees, motor vehicles, animals and such like, and they don't necessary respond to train signals and as such a train should be designed at least somewhat to protect against collisions with them.

The question is what do we do about the 43's?, we can't just get rid of them as they are very much needed and there's nothing to replace them but can Scotrail be seen to do nothing? I would immediately be talking to the ROSCO and seeing what can be done to improve safety or see if a deal could be done regarding replacement, asking the ROSCO if they would be prepared to end the lease early if they did a deal with them for some new stock.

Re your last para, unhelpfully the HSTs aren't owned by the same ROSCO as those which own the 221 and 222s.

 

[najaB]

Yet elsewhere on the network we’re told that new third rail installations cannot be justified on safety grounds...

But not driver safety specifically.

 

[Killingworth]

It’s also worth noting steam had not long since ended and in those times there were little/no trees in the vicinity of the railway.

This is one of the most relevant points. Looking at pictures taken 50 or more years ago and comparing them with today in several locations I know the linesides have changed enormously.

Yes, there were fairly regular lineside fires set off by sparks from passing trains but embankments and cuttings were still relatively bare of large plants. Since railways were first built it has taken time for trees to get established but now they're there they're gradually taking over. You just need to walk paths along abandoned railway routes to see how well nature has been doing.

The damage caused by a tree will depend very much on how big it is, what type it is and how it falls. A local homeowner inherited a line of poplars when he bought his house. He was concerned regarding their rapid growth and potentisl damage to his own property so had them felled. They could equally well have fallen across the MML although less likely with prevailing wind.

Oaks grow much more slowly but their trunks are more solid and they have substantial branches. A fallen poplar trunk would likely lie fairly close to the ground. The bulk of a fallen oak trunk would tend to lie higher supported by the mass of branches.

Locally a leylandii has grown massively from nowhere over the last 40/50 years. It's less than 10 metres from the tracks and was very bushy. A lot of the lower branches werre removed last year and it's now top heavy. It's very healthy and it's trunk is massive. It will have to be felled sooner or later. If it fell it would block 2 if not 4 lines.

In all 3 examples the danger will be more or less according to their position and visibility. The specific leylandii above is in a very public position beside a station so would probably be reported in time to prevent an accident. (A train would be going no faster than 50mph.)

Just 3 examples of types of trees but how much damage they'd do to a train depends on how and where they may fall. Trees on an embankment generally pose less danger than beside a cutting. A tree falling at 90 degrees to two tracks creates a similar level of danger to both. It's more likely to fall at an acute or oblique angle to those tracks. Damage to the train and any derailment will depend on the angle of fall, the height and weight of the tree, and how bushy it may be to cushion impact.

Personally I'd not want to encounter any tree in any cab, especially at speed. I'd not want to pin my safety on the introduction of marginally safer Class 222s in 2026.

Identifying and removing the most dangerous trees should be the top priority, especially In Scotland where there are more trees and single tracks. Network Rail make much of their use of drone surveys. This seems to be an opportunity to prove their worth.

 

[Alanko]

Not to mention the fact those two ferries are desperately needed. The SNP may have spectacularly botched that project, but it doesn't change the fact that CalMac need new ferries.

Arguably far more than two. Like dangerous lineside trees, a rolling replacement programme for the existing ferries, starting twenty years ago, would have been a better approach than throwing everything (and the kitchen sink) at two large ferries.


Interesting that enthusiasts feel so strongly about HSTs that they foray into conspiracy theory territory. I recall seeing a similarity green-ink comment a few years ago suggesting that the HST - Azuma collision at Neville Hill was an intentional act by LNER to write off a beloved HST.

 

[Southsider]

Re your last para, unhelpfully the HSTs aren't owned by the same ROSCO as those which own the 221 and 222s.

But the 175s are ……

 

[irish_rail]

Controversial opinion possibly, but in my view the only view that counts is from those who actually CURRENTLY drive HSTs and are therefore at the perceived risk. Well, unlike many posters on this thread, I do drive HSTs, and am quite happy to say I feel far safer in a HST cab than any 15x. I'd be quite happy for HSTs to go on into the next decade. Their increased comfort compared with almost all other traction probably benefits my bodys health (unlike say an 800 where I cannot move my legs due to the new style DSD and the "desk". I'm probably at greater risk of dying of DVT whilst driving an 800 or class 15x (very tight cab) , than I am of dying in a HST cab due to tree ingress.

 

[Clarence Yard]

Whilst drivers may very well have informed views on the subject, don’t forget those of us who have had M&EE experience of railway cab structures, their construction, and what they do or don’t do when hit (at various angles) by various items, including other trains - we may well have something to add here.

Whilst an HST cab can absorb a lot of impact damage, it isn’t nearly as strong as a cl.170 era and later build cab. Being a full width cab helps with survivability, if you have time to react but a 15x cab could easily become a death trap if you are bigger in build and you see the obstruction late. A small cab 153 or 158 (because of its construction) are probably the worst although, to be fair, I haven’t had any direct experience of what a 156 does if it gets hit.

As a senior manager, I have a duty of care. I know that, with the weather conditions we are now seeing on a regular basis, tall lineside trees (situated well back on private property) are going to come down onto the railway. Now, with older stock, it isn’t going to be possible to do the kind of modifications that are going to keep drivers totally safe from serious harm if one comes at them at windscreen height.

So, what am I going to do to mitigate that risk? I’m going to have to think about phasing that stock out, not as a panic measure, but over a period of time (years), hopefully with agreement with the Unions. That is what the Scotrail managers and their Union reps should be discussing and they shouldn’t ignore the 15x stock in those HST discussions either.

 

[ainsworth74]

Just a footnote to this thread but the RAIB are going to investigate the HST that hit a tree near Broughty Ferry and that will include looking at the crashworthiness of the train:

At 13:17 hrs on 27 December 2023, a passenger train travelling between Balmossie and Broughty Ferry on the Perth to Aberdeen line struck a tree which had fallen across the track from outside of the railway. The train was travelling at 84 mph (135 km/h) when the collision occurred. The driver of the train made an emergency brake application and took shelter behind the driving seat immediately before the impact.

On the day of the accident, storm Gerrit had brought heavy rain and strong winds across Scotland and other parts of the UK.

The driver received minor injuries as a result of the accident and the driving cab of the train was heavily damaged, disabling the train and requiring its passengers to be evacuated.

Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events that led to the accident. It will also consider:

• the management of train operations during adverse weather conditions
• the arrangements in place to manage and control the risks from trees falling on to the railway
• how information received from members of the public relating to railway safety is handled
• the crashworthiness of the train
• any underlying management factors.

Collision with a tree near Broughty Ferry

Investigation into a train striking a tree near Broughty Ferry, Angus, 27 December 2023.

www.gov.uk

Once the report is out we'll look at either re-opening this thread or posting a new one to discuss the outcome.