Is this what you call a SPAD?

[najaB]

With respect, it’s very unlikely that motor points or mechanical points controlled from a signal box that have electric lever locks and track circuits would move under a train. Even without a signal route being called, track circuits and axle counters directly lock and hence prevent such points from moving under a train.

However, given that we're talking about "worst cases", points on freight lines/loops aren't necessarily fitted with facing point locks, nor are they necessarily motor driven.

 

[66701GBRF]

Also East London Line "right" next to here has third rail, not the place for the MOM to be wandering about at the back of the train

Maybe, but that doesn't preclude the MOM from being on the east bound NLL under signal protection.

 

[Annetts key]

However, given that we're talking about "worst cases", points on freight lines/loops aren't necessarily fitted with facing point locks, nor are they necessarily motor driven.

It’s got nothing to do with FPLs. The interlocking electrically “locks” the point control circuitry (or the equivalent in a computer based interlocking).

Similarly, mechanical points that are operated by a signal box as I described above, are also locked via the interlocking.

If the points are operated by a ground frame, they are not going anywhere unless the ground frame is open with an operator.

Hand points (operated by a lever next to them) generally don’t often have main line signal(s) that read across them.

 

[najaB]

Hand points (operated by a lever next to them) generally don’t often have main line signal(s) that read across them

As you say "generally". But we're talking worst case.

The worst case involves a train that has been wrong routed to the extent that to recover service they need to perform a manoeuvre across an unusual route, such as a ground frame into a siding, or an emergency cross-over.

But this is a relatively pointless side discussion, since even a manoeuvre involving locked points can lead to a derailment.

 

[TPO]

A standard electrical connection could be designed and fitted, especially if it came with other upgrades like ECP brakes, for a price of course.

Passenger units manage the door CCTV in the cab so 2 cameras shouldn't really be that big of a problem, you could even use the DMI from ETCS for one of the pictures if you wanted (Shunting would be on SR mode).

Testing and maintenance wouldn't be too problematic, but the funding is the killer.

I'm not sure, tbh. The ongoing cost of such a system would be lower than the ongoing cost of staff, even if the initial cost is higher. It depends on whether you're fitting only a handful of trains or all c.600 Class 66s. If it's only for specific trains then yes, staff are probably easier. But if it's every train then there's a lot of different operational moves that may become available and could change rolling stock strategies.

What this system wouldn't help is anywhere that locos and wagons need to be detached or shunted, which would still need staff and is where I think the business case falls down.

The proposed implementation of DACs across Europe appears to be, er, hitting the buffers..... this highlights the real logistical issues involved.

In the USA, where freight trains are very much longer than here, radio signals are routinely used to control locos at mid-train or on the rear, which may be up to three miles from the lead loco controlling them. There are also end-of-train devices which receive braking signals that operate an air valve, allowing the air to be dumped from the rear as well as front of the train. However I don't know of any which include cameras, back up moves are always done with a member of staff riding on the end wagon, talking to the engineer (driver) using a hand held radio.

Yeah but in GB our trains are rather shorter and we don't tend to use so many locos so in our case it's a solution looking for a problem. Nor would I necessarily look to the USA as an exemplar of freight train safe operations........ (see recent incidents over there)

The limitations of a radio link depend on a number of factors. Certainly it’s possible to transmit high quality, high definition pictures over ten miles or more, as that’s what happens with TV transmission.

However, given how infrequently these set-back under the control of a MOM incidents occurs, the cost of developing it, deciding a suitable standard and the cost of equipping trains, I just can’t see it happening anytime soon. At least, not until an incident occurs which results in a formal inquiry. And said inquiry makes a recommendation that forces the railway to reconsider.

This


In amuses me how some posters jump to conclusions e.g. that the railway isn't trying something obvious .

Cameras on the back of trains ain't a new idea, but it's not as simple as it sounds with current freight stock as others have said. Still, it's being looked at although other ideas to address other risks are rather higher in the priority queue at the moment- the risk level is what drives this sort of thing, along with consideration of real-life viability (logistical and engineering considerations as well as commercial).

(You might be surprised how many ideas are trialed by groups of industry specialists working under RSSB coordination and with input and support of Network Rail too, seriously, we're not as hidebound as the armchair operators often assume. There's also the perennial distraction of solutions looking for problems.....).

TPO

 

[Krokodil]

No, because the signals are not visible from the side.

Some designs of LED signal have a small LED square in the side of the head

So what's the worst case scenario in the Meerkat approach then?

Most probable is that the assisting driver SPADs because he's concentrating on another train.

How are they supposed to communicate with each other?

 

[Chris M]

How are they supposed to communicate with each other?

I think that establishing communication between reversing and assisting drivers is probably the easiest of the many problems with this idea to solve. AIUI, they couldn't use GSM-R to do it today, but the system has the capability to allow a direct voice connection between two units which could be (relatively) easily enabled if there was some need to do so.

 

[najaB]

AIUI, they couldn't use GSM-R to do it today, but the system has the capability to allow a direct voice connection between two units which could be (relatively) easily enabled if there was some need to do so.

However, as noted above, the problem there is that it's not a dedicated medium. For example, an emergency call would take priority.

 

[Chris M]

However, as noted above, the problem there is that it's not a dedicated medium. For example, an emergency call would take priority.

Assuming both parties are aware that an emergency call is happening (which if their direct call is interrupted they should be) then the simple answer is that it ends the movement authority for both trains. When the emergency call is complete the signaller can authorise movement again. Not ideal, but given the frequency of both events the chances of them happening in the same area at the same time means that the extra disruption that would result from the delay wouldn't come close to outweighing the costs of an alternative.

 

[hick]

This is from publicly available information and has some gaps as a result. The freight train was from London Gateway to Hams Hall with signalling headcode 4M47.

The usual route uses the Barking to Gospel Oak line which wasn't available due to engineering works. There were two schedules in place both using that headcode:

• An altered schedule from the usual process, RealTimeTrains link which was pathed at Canonbury to go to Finsbury Park and onwards up the ECML
• A very short term plan schedule (typically within 48 hours) RealTimeTrains link which was pathed at Canonbury onwards to Camden Road and up the WCML

The altered schedule was cancelled in TRUST probably around 9am when it was activated. The very short term plan schedule was the one in use. The train was around 5 minutes late when going through Canonbury behind a London Overground service at roughly 12:50.

From what's posted on here Automatic Route Setting (ARS) equipment may have called the route for the altered schedule. ARS is relatively simplistic, typically acting based on the headcodes and scheduled route. (If the ARS doesn't connect to either TRUST or the very short term plan schedules it could have had just the one schedule for the Finsbury Park route.)

The train went far enough past the signal to trigger the berth step in the signalling system and lock the route without it being able to reset by the signaller. It's unclear exactly how far it went past though the photo in the original post suggests not very. After the issue was resolved the train then continued with an hour delay along the very short term plan route.

NLL ARS has no link to Trust until Luminate traffic management lands later in the year so it wouldn't have known about the new routing from the VSTP

 

[Stigy]

I assume they’re thinking of the (supposed) functionality of the GSMR to allow direct train to train communication. I have no idea whether it has ever been set up, let alone had any training on it!

Would be all well and good on a passenger train with at least two cabs I guess. GSMR can be used back to back, but I’d have to look at the instructions

 

[Deepgreen]

Imagine the train’s battery powered rear wagon red light included 2 small cameras that could be radio controlled from the loco to turn on & transmit left right images to a cab unit.
It would resolve the problem as soon the signaller gives permission to draw back.

No need for MOMmy to visit from 30 miles away plus the time needed to park.
The driver could sort it in three minutes.

What’s the betting that someone will say “it can’t possibly be done like that.” I can imagine the “not possible brigade already marshalling their arguments”

It reminds me of the senior manager who said “we won’t try for DOO on the Fenchurch St Tilbury Southend line because the east west nature means the sun will shine into the cameras”. I mentioned the adjacent east west District line plodding along happily with DOO & he found some other excuse. DOO was introduced two years later on all LTS services. He went to a more important job..

The camera device would also be useful for shunting.

I have to agree. The rear of the train will be well within the signal section at rear (assuming it's plain line, not a junction), by definition, and is thus protected. A set back of the length required here can be done completely safely at a crawl, especially if the signaller confirms no train has accidentally entered the section behind (i.e. a vanishingly-unlikely coincidental SPAD). To have to foul up the route for however long it takes to get someone there is a farce - the risk of an incident in reversing for 40 metres at 2mph is so miniscule that it should be weighed against the huge potential delays.

Except it wasn't.

Who set up the wrong route then?

 

[66701GBRF]

Who set up the wrong route then?

Read the thread.

 

[Deepgreen]

Read the thread.

Thanks! So a signalling error based on AI, it seems. Doesn't alter the fact that a tiny setting back in these circumstances should not need to jam up the job awaiting extra personnel to attend site.

 

[zwk500]

Thanks! So a signalling error based on AI, it seems.

It would be very generous to ARS's capabilities to describe it as AI. It's a pre-programmed system that works to it's predetermined parameters.

Doesn't alter the fact that a tiny setting back in these circumstances should not need to jam up the job awaiting extra personnel to attend site.

The driver is 800m away from the end of their train and the signaller can't see exactly where the trains are, only which Track circuits are occupied. Pushing back means the wagons do behave different because they're being pushed up against each other not dragged. The risk isn't zero, and the consequences if there were an incident, worst case, could close the line for a lot longer than waiting for a staff member to get on site.

 

[Deepgreen]

It would be very generous to ARS's capabilities to describe it as AI. It's a pre-programmed system that works to it's predetermined parameters.

The driver is 800m away from the end of their train and the signaller can't see exactly where the trains are, only which Track circuits are occupied. Pushing back means the wagons do behave different because they're being pushed up against each other not dragged. The risk isn't zero, and the consequences if there were an incident, worst case, could close the line for a lot longer than waiting for a staff member to get on site.

Yes, but the chances are utterly tiny if done at a crawl for the tiny distance involved. I'm talking about plain track, not points, etc. (although wagon shunting over points happens with no incident 99.9999% of the time). As for track circuit occupation, in circumstances like this with the tiny distances involved at below walking pace, again utterly minimal risk. It comes down to whether the precautions are merited in the circumstances versus the delays incurred, and in this sort of event I would suggest they are not, given the infinitessimal risk.

 

[Annetts key]

Yes, but the chances are utterly tiny if done at a crawl for the tiny distance involved. I'm talking about plain track, not points, etc. (although wagon shunting over points happens with no incident 99.9999% of the time). As for track circuit occupation, in circumstances like this with the tiny distances involved at below walking pace, again utterly minimal risk. It comes down to whether the precautions are merited in the circumstances versus the delays incurred, and in this sort of event I would suggest they are not, given the infinitessimal risk.

So, tell me, how long is the train? And how long is the track circuit (or axle counter section)? And does the track circuit (or axle counter) go back to the overlap of the signal in rear? And are there any catch points along the way? Are there any level crossings where special arrangements are needed?

All of the above maybe relevant. Hence need to be considered.

 

[Trothy]

Thin end of the wedge isn't it?

At what distance travelled do you require a second member of staff for the movement? 5m? 20m? 50m?

Whose putting their name to the risk assessment? That's the big issue when you downgrade a safe method of work, if you're that confident that you put your name to it, you'll be one of the people in a courtroom defending your decision if it all goes horribly wrong.

 

[Annetts key]

Also, Network Rail is not the owner or writer of the railway rule book. Network Rail and the TOCs and FOCs have to comply with the rule book and other railway standards.

Here are some extracts. I’m sure others who are more familiar with the topic will clarify or add to this.

GERT8000-TW1 Rule Book

Preparation and movement of trains. Issue 18.1

26.2 Controlling the movement

You must not make a propelling movement unless it is controlled by a person acting as a shunter as shown in Rule Book module SS2 Shunting.

26.4 During the movement
If you are making a propelling movement, you must drive from the leading cab unless either of the following applies.
• You have to look out for signals or handsignals and you will have a better view from another cab.
• A shunter is controlling the movement by radio and you do not have to look out for signals or handsignals during the movement.

Throughout the movement you must:
• observe all signals
• not pass any block marker, signal or stop board without authority
• not exceed 20 mph (30 km/h), except for an officers’ special train
• sound the warning horn when approaching a level crossing.

GERT8000-SS2 Rule Book

Shunting Issue 5.2

4.2 Safety checks before making any movement

You must make sure that:
• the vehicles can be moved safely
• no NOT TO BE MOVED boards are placed on the vehicles
• other vehicles are not foul of the movement to be made
• any road vehicle or equipment is clear
• anyone who could be put in danger is warned to move to a safe position
• anyone who is working on the outside of vehicles on an adjacent line is warned to keep clear
• any derailer or scotch block has been removed.

Except where it is specifically authorised in local instructions that trailing hand points are suitable to be pushed through, you must check that all points the movement will go over are correctly set for the movement.

Person acting as a shunter:

5.3 Controlling movements not driven from a cab at the leading end of the movement

a) General

When a traction unit making a propelling movement or shunting movement is not being driven from a cab at the leading end of the movement, you must:

• ride in the leading cab, if this is at the leading end of the movement, or
• ride in the vehicle at the leading end of the movement, if this is suitable, from which you can control the movement and apply the automatic brake, or
• control the movement from a safe place on the ground, ahead of the movement, where you are in contact with the driver or where the driver can see you.

During the movement, you must:

• keep a good lookout
• obey all signals unless you are specifically authorised to pass a signal at danger
• not pass a block marker or shunt entry board without authority
• warn anyone on or near the line about the approaching
movement
• if anyone on or near the line appears to be in danger, stop the movement.
You must control the movement so that it is made at a safe speed which will allow you to instruct the driver to stop the movement within the distance that you can see the line is clear.

b) Riding in the leading cab or at the leading end

If you are riding in the leading cab or at the leading end of the movement, you must signal to the driver as necessary by:

• using the bell or buzzer code
• cab-to-cab telephone
• driver-guard communication equipment
• radio
• handsignal.

You must use the warning horn or a portable horn as necessary.

In an emergency you must stop the movement by using the automatic brake.

c) Movements over level crossings

You must make sure you have a clear view of the crossing and if provided, you know how to operate the plunger, if it is necessary to make a propelling movement over:

• an automatic barrier crossing locally monitored (ABCL)
• an automatic open crossing locally monitored (AOCL)
• an open crossing (OC).

8.1 Getting the signaller’s permission

Before authorising a movement over points worked from a signal box, you must:

• get the signaller’s permission either verbally or by a handsignal as described in section 8.2
• check the points are fitting correctly, where possible.