Passenger detrainment onto electrically live line, Peckham Rye

[waynemorrell]

I was shocked to read about this incident. (No pun intended).

How can this sort of thing possibly happen?

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/passenger-detrainment-onto-electrically-live-line-peckham-rye

At 18:46 hrs on Tuesday 7 November, an Arriva Rail London (London Overground) service from Dalston Junction to Battersea Park came to a stand, shortly before reaching Peckham Rye station. A faulty component on the train had caused the brakes to apply, and the driver was unable to release them. There were about 450 passengers on the train.

The train driver spoke over the train radio system with the service controller, train technicians, and the signaller. Following these conversations he began, with the assistance of staff from Peckham Rye station, to evacuate the passengers from the train via the door at the right-hand side of the driver’s cab at the front of the train. This involved passengers climbing down vertical steps to ground level, very close to the live electric conductor rail (3rd rail) and walking along the side of the line about 30 metres to Peckham Rye station.

Soon afterwards, an operations manager from GTR (which manages Peckham Rye station) contacted station staff and realised they were at the side of the electrically energised track assisting in the evacuation, and that about 80 passengers had already left the train by this route. The operations manager immediately instructed staff to stop the evacuation, and requested that the train driver contact the signaller and his company’s controller for further instructions.

The driver, with further advice from train technicians, then isolated various safety systems which enabled him to release the brakes and move the train forward into Peckham Rye station, arriving at about 19:40 hrs. It was then possible for all the passengers to leave the train normally, and it proceeded, empty, to the depot at New Cross Gate. No-one was hurt in the incident.

Our investigation will examine:

• The sequence of events and the various radio conversations leading up to the incident
• The management of the incident and reasons for the decisions that were taken
• The training, instruction, and competence management of the staff involved
• Any underlying management factors

Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

You can subscribe to automated emails notifying you when we publish our reports.

 

[Mag_seven]

they were at the side of the electrically energised track assisting in the evacuation

I can get the bit about them being at the side where the 3rd rail is but I'm not sure what the phrase "assisting in the evacuation" adds?

 

[Bletchleyite]

A safety issue caused by the presence of third rail near the cess rather than in the 6'? Seems relevant to the issues I raised in another thread

 

[Peter Mugridge]

A safety issue caused by the presence of third rail near the cess rather than in the 6'? Seems relevant to the issues I raised in another thread

The side of the rail is irrelevant as the traction current should surely have been discharged before starting an evacuation?

 

[Bletchleyite]

The side of the rail is irrelevant as the traction current should surely have been discharged before starting an evacuation?

It indeed should, but it being on the side (the cess) where it is much closer to those leaving the train is a downright dangerous and unnecessary piece of design.

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

 

[theironroad]

The side of the rail is irrelevant as the traction current should surely have been discharged before starting an evacuation?

We will have a to wait a while for the full details in the report, but I am a bit puzzled that neither the driver or signaller realised there wasn't a switch off. While the driver would have had a lot going on, current switch off in DC areas before a controlled evacuation is rules 101.

Also, not quite sure why the driver wasn't advised by techs to isolate the safety equipment beforehand unless it was an extremely complicated fault.

 

[Clip]

It indeed should, but it being on the side (the cess) where it is much closer to those leaving the train is a downright dangerous and unnecessary piece of design.

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

The trouble with that Neil is that they would still need shoes on both sides so that danger will always be there

 

[tsr]

It indeed should, but it being on the side (the cess) where it is much closer to those leaving the train is a downright dangerous and unnecessary piece of design.

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

I’m afraid you would be incorrect. The platforms which ARL & GTR use at Peckham Rye are island platforms, so if you happen to want to evacuate to a platform, the 6ft is actually a worse position for the third rail (likewise at Queens Road Peckham and South Bermondsey, though Uttley Junction and South Bermondsey Junction would complicate things at South Bermonndsey, anyway). The evacuation routes vary considerably on this bit of line, so it would be difficult to justify one position of the third rail over another, between stations.

As for the third rail switching sides, this has a number of reasons including making space for junctions and signalling equipment (also things like cables in confined areas). The third rail does also switch away from the platform side at the overwhelming majority of stations. There are also complex layouts where a safe evacuation of passengers would be extremely hard because there are 3 or more tracks in close proximity, one of which is bound to have a third rail in a difficult location. This situation can actually be seen quite near Peckham Rye itself.

I can get the bit about them being at the side where the 3rd rail is but I'm not sure what the phrase "assisting in the evacuation" adds?

RAIB reports are quite deliberately phrased. The gateline staff took it upon themselves to assist with train evacuation, but GTR gateline staff are very rarely given training or competencies to do so...

We will have a to wait a while for the full details in the report, but I am a bit puzzled that neither the driver or signaller realised there wasn't a switch off. While the driver would have had a lot going on, current switch off in DC areas before a controlled evacuation is rules 101.

It wasn't really a controlled evacuation. In fact I am not sure there is a proper technical term for this one. An uncontrolled evacuation is close, but the driver was telling people to do it...

 

[Jonny]

I'm surprised that no-one has figured out how to fit an emergency short-circuiting device onto trains (via the shoes and wheels but bypassing the fuse or equivalent) that could be used as a precaution in such circumstances, or maybe the fuse is too much of a problem.

 

[theironroad]

I’m afraid you would be incorrect. The platforms which ARL & GTR use at Peckham Rye are island platforms, so if you happen to want to evacuate to a platform, the 6ft is actually a worse position for the third rail (likewise at Queens Road Peckham and South Bermondsey, though Uttley Junction and South Bermondsey Junction would complicate things at South Bermonndsey, anyway). The evacuation routes vary considerably on this bit of line, so it would be difficult to justify one position of the third rail over another, between stations.

As for the third rail switching sides, this has a number of reasons including making space for junctions and signalling equipment (also things like cables in confined areas). The third rail does also switch away from the platform side at the overwhelming majority of stations. There are also complex layouts where a safe evacuation of passengers would be extremely hard because there are 3 or more tracks in close proximity, one of which is bound to have a third rail in a difficult location. This situation can actually be seen quite near Peckham Rye itself.



RAIB reports are quite deliberately phrased. The gateline staff took it upon themselves to assist with train evacuation, but GTR gateline staff are very rarely given training or competencies to do so...



It wasn't really a controlled evacuation. In fact I am not sure there is a proper technical term for this one. An uncontrolled evacuation is close, but the driver was telling people to do it...

Even if it was an uncontrolled evacuation, then the the emergency switch off (& scb down if needed) should have happened before 85 people had left the train. It's not as if there was a dangerous incident such as fire or derailment.

 

[TEW]

I'm surprised that no-one has figured out how to fit an emergency short-circuiting device onto trains (via the shoes and wheels but bypassing the fuse or equivalent) that could be used as a precaution in such circumstances, or maybe the fuse is too much of a problem.

Trains which run over areas with 3rd rail electrification all carry a Short Circuiting Bar that can be applied by trained staff to discharge the traction current in an emergency.

 

[WelshBluebird]

I am surprised that an evacuation was started so quickly. Considering the delay, decision to start an evacuation, the partial evacuation that happened, the decision to stop the evacuation and the eventual movement of the train into the station all too place in under one hour, that means the decision to evacuate must have been made pretty early on. Is that normal in cases where the train is fairly close to a station?

 

[Kneedown]

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

PTS instructions for anyone working on the track, caught between two oncoming trains and unable to safely reach the cess, is to lay down in the 6ft (the space between the two tracks) Having both sets of third rail in the 6ft would add another risk for anyone unfortunate enough to have to utilise this procedure.

 

[SpacePhoenix]

Do Electrical Control Room Operators (or whatever their job title actually is) ever listen in on all calls between the signallers and trains to listen out for any locations that they might need to switch off the juice to?

 

[robbeech]

A device operated on board the train to short the traction current would not be too difficult to implement. The bars I believe tend to go between the live rail and the opposite rail rather than the one next to it. This makes operation of the bar as safe and efficient as possible. An on board device wouldn’t need this it would just need to be insulated from the train. Of course, in the meantime we don’t have such a device so staff continue to use the tried and tested method, or not as the case appears to be here.

 

[tsr]

Even if it was an uncontrolled evacuation, then the the emergency switch off (& scb down if needed) should have happened before 85 people had left the train. It's not as if there was a dangerous incident such as fire or derailment.

Exactly. Although 85 people could end up self-evacuating a train very quickly (not that this happened here) - I believe a couple of incidents involving busy Southeastern Networkers have demonstrated this!

I am surprised that an evacuation was started so quickly. Considering the delay, decision to start an evacuation, the partial evacuation that happened, the decision to stop the evacuation and the eventual movement of the train into the station all too place in under one hour, that means the decision to evacuate must have been made pretty early on. Is that normal in cases where the train is fairly close to a station?

The decision appears to have been made by the driver and station staff without the proper procedures being followed. I doubt a competent controlled evacuation would have been required in this case, or carried out - and would in any case have taken longer, as there would need to be sufficient staff to assess passenger requirements and to escort them. For a heavily loaded train with 450 passengers in 5 coaches, that would take some organising.

Do Electrical Control Room Operators (or whatever their job title actually is) ever listen in on all calls between the signallers and trains to listen out for any locations that they might need to switch off the juice to?

If it’s a Railway Emergency Call (“red button”) on the GSM-R then their equipment will pick up on it, where installed. Some areas have had installation problems so it’s not always clear-cut.

Other incidents will be communicated manually by separate phone calls, which tends to take time.

 

[sefton]

It wasn't really a controlled evacuation. In fact I am not sure there is a proper technical term for this one. An uncontrolled evacuation is close, but the driver was telling people to do it...

It was neither a controlled or uncontrolled evacuation, as an evacuation involves moving people from a place of danger to safety, which was not the case here.

 

[Antman]

I am surprised that an evacuation was started so quickly. Considering the delay, decision to start an evacuation, the partial evacuation that happened, the decision to stop the evacuation and the eventual movement of the train into the station all too place in under one hour, that means the decision to evacuate must have been made pretty early on. Is that normal in cases where the train is fairly close to a station?

I would imagine passengers were getting somewhat irritated and may well have made their own evacuation arrangements had it continued?

 

[Mojo]

There’s a photo in the RAIB report taken from the forward facing CCTV on the train. It shows the third rail as being on the secondman’s side underneath the train (in the 6ft) and extending to about a metre or two past the front of the train. The current rail then switches to the driver’s side (adjacent to the cess), as the train stopped just outside the station. I’m a bit confused by the comments above relating to the presence of the current rail by the cess, and it somehow being dangerous?

 

[Bletchleyite]

I would imagine passengers were getting somewhat irritated and may well have made their own evacuation arrangements had it continued?

If the train has no toilets, as LO ones do not, action will need to be taken much sooner than if it does. Keeping passengers on a train without toilets for three hours (as seems to be the typical time before an evacuation) is unacceptable.

 

[WelshBluebird]

I would imagine passengers were getting somewhat irritated and may well have made their own evacuation arrangements had it continued?

I think that would be true for a longer period. But what I was trying to get at is the decision must have been made pretty quickly for all of that to happen in less than 60 minutes, so quickly that I seriously doubt the amount of time that had passed would have been anywhere near enough for a passenger self evacuation to be a serious concern at that point.

If the train has no toilets, as LO ones do not, action will need to be taken much sooner than if it does. Keeping passengers on a train without toilets for three hours (as seems to be the typical time before an evacuation) is unacceptable.

I'd agree, but we are not talking about 3 hours here. We are talking about less than 60 minutes from train coming to a halt to passengers being safely allowed off the train at the platform. That is a short amount of time for such a delay in the grand scheme of things, and as I mentioned the decision to evacuate must have been made even earlier. Are people in London really in that much of a rush that they would self evacuate after less than say 30 minutes?

 

[sefton]

I'd agree, but we are not talking about 3 hours here. We are talking about less than 60 minutes from train coming to a halt to passengers being safely allowed off the train at the platform. That is a short amount of time for such a delay in the grand scheme of things, and as I mentioned the decision to evacuate must have been made even earlier. Are people in London really in that much of a rush that they would self evacuate after less than say 30 minutes?

Most of the stops on that service are only a couple of minutes apart, so being held for an hour would have delayed someone's journey by an hour would have extended their journey by 30 times the length expected.

 

[TEW]

I have worked a train not too far away from where this incident took place, a train with no toilets and we became stranded between stations for around 90 minutes. At no time did passengers self evacuating feel like a risk.

 

[Lrd]

I’m a bit confused by the comments above relating to the presence of the current rail by the cess, and it somehow being dangerous?

See the thread here...

https://www.railforums.co.uk/threads/third-rail-on-the-outside-on-the-southern.157699/#post-3228602

 

[matt_world2004]

Can passengers detrain through the drivers carriage front door on the london overground stock?

 

[Lrd]

Can passengers detrain through the drivers carriage front door on the london overground stock?

Yep, steps fold down.

http://districtdavesforum.co.uk/thread/27878/class-378-emergency-egress-doors

 

[Bromley boy]

Undoubtedly a serious incident and I will be very interested to read the RAIB's report.

I'm speculating of course but perhaps there was a break down in communications between the signaller and the driver? It's difficult to imagine a driver attempting an evacuation without lines blocked, an electrical switch off and the SCB down as a fail safe.

Easy for it to happen in the heat of the moment, of course, but it does underline the need to come to a "clear understanding" as is hammered home during the training.

 

[Filton Bank]

It was neither a controlled or uncontrolled evacuation, as an evacuation involves moving people from a place of danger to safety, which was not the case here.

This was a controlled evacuation, but the procedure was not followed.An emergency evacuation moves people from danger to a place of safety. An uncontrolled evacuation does the opposite. Either way, an emergency switch off should have been requested.

 

[Filton Bank]

It indeed should, but it being on the side (the cess) where it is much closer to those leaving the train is a downright dangerous and unnecessary piece of design.

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

What if the cess is not a safe place to walk?

 

[Bromley boy]

It indeed should, but it being on the side (the cess) where it is much closer to those leaving the train is a downright dangerous and unnecessary piece of design.

Thus far on that thread the only justification that has come up for having on that side is to even out wear (which it doesn't do, as running the train back in the other direction on the other line does that just as well), and "because it is". Well, maybe it shouldn't be.

You're off the mark here.

The whole point is that an evacuation may be necessary at any point on the network where a train fails. The risk of a passenger coming into contact with the live rail is mitigated by requesting a switch off, which evidently didn't happen in this case (hence the investigation).

There are many good reasons why the juice rail changes sides as have been pointed out by other posters.