Quintinshill rail disaster (1915)

[MP33]

In one of the books describing a number of the classic rail accidents. There is a photograph of the commanding officer taking the names of the around 20 men who were uninjured.

 

[wildcard]

Neil Oliver's "The Quintinshill Rail Disaster" made for the BBC is worth searching out. Going from my memory - a contributor to the program suggested the Caledonian Railway knew that it's rule book was being flouted but turned a blind eye - hence had some responsibility. The railwaymen concerned were imprisoned with hard labour but with relatively short sentences and re-employed by the railway on their release. This gave the appearance in some eyes that a deal had been struck - the railwaymen would take the full rap to avoid too many searching questions of the company ( and of the war-time government ) - in return they would be looked after on release.

 

[bspahh]

The Signals to Danger podcast by tpfx89 had this episode on Quintinshill

 

[Carron]

Neil Oliver's "The Quintinshill Rail Disaster" made for the BBC is worth searching out. Going from my memory - a contributor to the program suggested the Caledonian Railway knew that it's rule book was being flouted but turned a blind eye - hence had some responsibility. The railwaymen concerned were imprisoned with hard labour but with relatively short sentences and re-employed by the railway on their release. This gave the appearance in some eyes that a deal had been struck - the railwaymen would take the full rap to avoid too many searching questions of the company ( and of the war-time government ) - in return they would be looked after on release.

Does anyone have any detailed information on the life of James Tinsley, after he returned to the railways, following his time at Peterhead. I'd be fascinated to know...

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Does anyone have any detailed information on the life of James Tinsley, after he returned to the railways, following his time at Peterhead. I'd be fascinated to know...

A few sources have him as having been given a job as lampman at Carlisle station, this after he'd been released from prison in late 1916. Tinsley eventually died sometime in the 1960's. Not much detail there, though.

 

[Gloster]

Does anyone have any detailed information on the life of James Tinsley, after he returned to the railways, following his time at Peterhead. I'd be fascinated to know...

A few sources have him as having been given a job as lampman at Carlisle station, this after he'd been released from prison in late 1916. Tinsley eventually died sometime in the 1960's. Not much detail there, though.

Thomas’ book says he became a lampman at Carlisle and died in 1967. Richards and Searle (a far from reliable book, but I will make an exception here) say he became a lampman and later a porter, dying in 1961 aged 77, which would fit with him being 32 at the time of the accident (according to Thomas).

 

[Eyersey468]

I am not for one minute suggesting Meakin and Tinsley were completely blameless, I do wonder though why the railway re employed them after their release from prison. I also find it hard to believe at the very least the station master didn't know about the unofficial shift change arrangement.

 

[Taunton]

I am not for one minute suggesting Meakin and Tinsley were completely blameless, I do wonder though why the railway re employed them after their release from prison. I also find it hard to believe at the very least the station master didn't know about the unofficial shift change arrangement.

It was actually common then not to 'fire' your staff. In one of David L Smith's books he writes of encountering in LMS days, at Carlisle, Driver Caudle, from the Ais Gill accident on the Midland. He was still driving, in the shunting yard, but was not allowed out onto the main line.

I did understand that the reason why the first mainstream LMS express loco after grouping was named "Royal Scot", rather than anything else, was a commemoration of the regiment involved in the accident 12 years beforehand.

 

[Eyersey468]

It was actually common then not to 'fire' your staff. In one of David L Smith's books he writes of encountering in LMS days, at Carlisle, Driver Caudle, from the Ais Gill accident on the Midland. He was still driving, in the shunting yard, but was not allowed out onto the main line.

Thanks, that's interesting, is there any reason why it was more common then?

 

[Lucan]

It was actually common then not to 'fire' your staff.

Thanks, that's interesting, is there any reason why it was more common then?

A cultural thing I believe. In those days it was considered that your company was for life, especially if it was a railway company of which the larger ones were economic ecosystems in themselves. In most industries back then, changing jobs was rather the exception and loyalty was valued - both ways. Shifting staff, shifting company ownerships and shifting customers, hire and fire, zero hour contracts, zero mutual loyalty, and even mutual hotility, are modern business characteristics.

 

[Gloster]

Thanks, that's interesting, is there any reason why it was more common then?

I would say that there was a far greater belief then that you became better at your job by doing it over a long period. It was a lot more than just passing tests: the drivers of the most important expresses tended to be those with the longest service. If you sacked somebody for one mistake, even one as serious as a
major crash, you would be losing that accumulated experience.

There was also the way that the railway was, after reaching a certain level, a secure job. Men who might be able to get a better job elsewhere would stay on the railway because they knew that, even if there was an economic downturn, they would keep their steady, if ill-paid and inconvenient, employment. Continuing to employ someone who had caused a crash was an element of this.

 

[Taunton]

You see this all round. Political party leaders who aren't the election winner have to go the next day. Used not to happen - Wilson, PM 1965-70, lost in 1970, still leader, won again and back as PM in 1974. Same for Churchill, in opposition from 1945-50, came back.

 

[341o2]

Perhaps the worst aspect of Quintinshill was escaping gas from the lighting system in the carriages of the troop train caught fire, and all five trains involved were burnt.
Establishing an accurate record of who perished was not helped by some bodies being totally consumed in the fire

 

[Eyersey468]

Perhaps the worst aspect of Quintinshill was escaping gas from the lighting system in the carriages of the troop train caught fire, and all five trains involved were burnt.
Establishing an accurate record of who perished was not helped by some bodies being totally consumed in the fire

Agreed, if those carriages were genuinely all that could be found for that train on that day why did the Caledonian let it travel at express train speeds which it wasn't suited to, that was an accident waiting to happen in itself

 

[Dr Hoo]

Agreed, if those carriages were genuinely all that could be found for that train on that day why did the Caledonian let it travel at express train speeds which it wasn't suited to, that was an accident waiting to happen in itself

A significant number of carriages used on fast services were still gas lit in 1915. It was nothing particularly ‘unusual’ at the time.

 

[Taunton]

Agreed, if those carriages were genuinely all that could be found for that train on that day why did the Caledonian let it travel at express train speeds which it wasn't suited to, that was an accident waiting to happen in itself

That's how it was done in those days. The majority of rolling stock was indeed still from Victorian times. Electric lighting was little past the experimental stage. The low-powered 4-4-0 would have been slow on the uphill, but would put in high speeds coming down from Beattock.

 

[Falcon1200]

I also find it hard to believe at the very least the station master didn't know about the unofficial shift change arrangement.

Something that has always intrigued is why the Caledonian Railway was seemingly so against staff agreeing changeover times to make their journey to work easier, so much so that the early shift Signalman had to copy entries from 0600 into the TR book so that it appeared he had been on duty since then, obviously a cause of distraction. Of course, things were different in the 1980s from 1915 but on BR, and after, we had agreed and officially recognised mutual changeover times, for example in my office the early shift started at 0745 instead of 0600 with the night shift working on until then.

 

[Gloster]

Something that has always intrigued is why the Caledonian Railway was seemingly so against staff agreeing changeover times to make their journey to work easier, so much so that the early shift Signalman had to copy entries from 0600 into the TR book so that it appeared he had been on duty since then, obviously a cause of distraction. Of course, things were different in the 1980s from 1915 but on BR, and after, we had agreed and officially recognised mutual changeover times, for example in my office the early shift started at 0745 instead of 0600 with the night shift working on until then.

That was quite normal at the time: you were a company servant and if it demanded you work specific hours, you worked specific hours. The life and convenience of employees was of absolutely no interest to the company. Furthermore, if it made things simpler or cheaper, that was what they wanted.

I think that the Railway Inspectorate had made it clear over the years that they did not like unofficial, or even semi-official, alterations to the official hours. What actually happened locally was not always according to the rules, but the higher levels of management could, and I think often did, deny any knowledge of such local fiddles. (I don’t think the Inspectors tended to believe the denials, but they knew that proving such attitudes would rarely be possible.)

We used to do the 07.00, vice 06.00, and 13.00 Saturday changeovers, but I would never do over 12 or have than less than 8 rest. If something happened in the thirteenth hour or after too short a rest, you had no defence.

 

[341o2]

I am not for one minute suggesting Meakin and Tinsley were completely blameless, I do wonder though why the railway re employed them after their release from prison. I also find it hard to believe at the very least the station master didn't know about the unofficial shift change arrangement.

The fireman of the stopping train was also culpable, in that he failed to implement Rule 55 correctly, which states in the event of a train being held at a signal for more than three minutes, a member of the crew should go to the box, sign the register, and see that a locking collar is placed over the appropriate lever. He signed the register and then left without seeing the collar in place.

There are also unconfirmed accounts of soldiers trapped in the burning train shooting themselves or begging their comrades to put them out of their misery

 

[wildcard]

The fireman of the stopping train was also culpable, in that he failed to implement Rule 55 correctly, which states in the event of a train being held at a signal for more than three minutes, a member of the crew should go to the box, sign the register, and see that a locking collar is placed over the appropriate lever. He signed the register and then left without seeing the collar in place.

The lack of persistent use of the collar was one of those areas a contributor to the BBC program highlighted. I believe they stated it was in the rule book but the Caledonian knew it wasn't being rigorously observed at that signal box (and elsewhere) but did little about it . I think the issue was it was considered time consuming so potentially introducing delays to the timetable so the CR turned a blind eye.

 

[Taunton]

It actually wasn't possible when the local train had been crossed over to either apply the collar to the Home signal or send the blocking back bell, as the Up goods train was still standing at the Home signal awaiting telephoned instructions, so the Home would need to be cleared for it to come forward, and it was still in section and had not been belled out of section, so a blocking back bell would be incorrect. The goods was only admitted to the loop after the local had been standing on the Up Main for some time.

The regulations appeared not to envisage this combination of movements.

 

[Gloster]

It actually wasn't possible when the local train had been crossed over to either apply the collar to the Home signal or send the blocking back bell, as the Up goods train was still standing at the Home signal awaiting telephoned instructions, so the Home would need to be cleared for it to come forward, and it was still in section and had not been belled out of section, so a blocking back bell would be incorrect. The goods was only admitted to the loop after the local had been standing on the Up Main for some time.

The regulations appeared not to envisage this combination of movements.

I don’t know exactly how the Caledonian’s rules were phrased, but I think it could reasonably be interpreted that the fireman should have remained in the box until either the collar had been placed on the Home or Blocking Back had been sent. Thomas says that both the coal train and the local were in place by 06.34, but the fireman signed the book at 06.46.

 

[midland1]

It actually wasn't possible when the local train had been crossed over to either apply the collar to the Home signal or send the blocking back bell, as the Up goods train was still standing at the Home signal awaiting telephoned instructions, so the Home would need to be cleared for it to come forward, and it was still in section and had not been belled out of section, so a blocking back bell would be incorrect. The goods was only admitted to the loop after the local had been standing on the Up Main for some time.

The regulations appeared not to envisage this combination of movements.

There would be no telephone at the Up Home signal at that time, phones at signals almost unknow in 1915.

 

[Taunton]

Indeed. The telephone call awaited was from Carlisle to the signalbox.

 

[Falcon1200]

That was quite normal at the time: you were a company servant and if it demanded you work specific hours, you worked specific hours.

I think that the Railway Inspectorate had made it clear over the years that they did not like unofficial, or even semi-official, alterations to the official hours.

Fair points, but all I can say is that there were mutually agreed handover times throughout my railway career (1978-2016), and as long as these didn't impinge on working time directives, eg no 13 hour shifts, there was never an issue, with management or anyone else (except when my office altered the early shift handover time meaning I could no longer get in by train.....)

 

[341o2]

I don’t know exactly how the Caledonian’s rules were phrased, but I think it could reasonably be interpreted that the fireman should have remained in the box until either the collar had been placed on the Home or Blocking Back had been sent. Thomas says that both the coal train and the local were in place by 06.34, but the fireman signed the book at 06.46.

Indeed, Rule 55 states that the purpose of the visit is to remind the signalman of the train's position, and see that measures have been taken to protect it eg the lever collar. He simply signed the register and immediately returned to his train without carrying out these checks

 

[Eyersey468]

Indeed, Rule 55 states that the purpose of the visit is to remind the signalman of the train's position, and see that measures have been taken to protect it eg the lever collar. He simply signed the register and immediately returned to his train without carrying out these checks

Did he immediately return to the train though? Some sources state he stayed in the signal box for a while. Obviously I wasn't there so can't say for certain either way

 

[Gloster]

Did he immediately return to the train though? Some sources state he stayed in the signal box for a while. Obviously I wasn't there so can't say for certain either way

Thomas says that the fireman entered the box the box just after Tinsley, who had arrived on his train, which seems to make his entry in the box no more than a minute or two after 06.30. He remained in the box for a while chatting before saying he wanted to return to his loco and signing the book at 06.46: ‘then left the box’.

 

[Taunton]

Whatever the 'sources' in print say, there can be only one primary account, and that is the official accident report, with interviews with the staff involved. All subsequent publications must surely be an interpretation of this. There is no alternative authoritative record. And even there, as their interview accounts are given verbatim, one can see a range of inevitable inconsistencies between them.

 

[341o2]

The important issue is that the fireman returned to his train without seeing a protective collar in place, therefore not carrying out Rule 55 correctly

Quote from his statement

But Mr. Lighifoot :-Tinsley knew that I had come from my train, and I assumed that he was aware that it was standing on the up line, as he had left it while 1t was passing through the road to the up line, and that is the reason I did not see that the collar was put on the lever.
source https://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/documents/BoT_Quin1915.pdf