Redcar Level Crossing Accident (01/05/2024)

[ainsworth74]

So potentially there was a failure on something else, such as a set of points or a track circuit, that was holding the signal at danger, and the signaller while concentrating on that forgot about the crossing.

That is how I've interpreted the information that's available.

 

[Darandio]

The gates have broken down again with trains sat either side and the ticket office lady orchestrating traffic.

Less chance of a similar incident but boy are these gates a pain in the backside.

 

[Towers]

The gates have broken down again with trains sat either side and the ticket office lady orchestrating traffic.

Less chance of a similar incident but boy are these gates a pain in the backside.

Doing what?!

I really hope she isn’t attempting to direct traffic over the crossing in contravention of the wigwags?!

 

[800001]

The gates have broken down again with trains sat either side and the ticket office lady orchestrating traffic.

Less chance of a similar incident but boy are these gates a pain in the backside.

Pretty sure that she should not be out there doing anything with the traffic!

 

[Darandio]

Doing what?!

I really hope she isn’t attempting to direct traffic over the crossing in contravention of the wigwags?!

No!

However she is frantically trying to get traffic to turn around on both sides, lots of shouting and waving.

In this case the gates are half open.

 

[Towers]

No!

However she is frantically trying to get traffic to turn around on both sides, lots of shouting and waving.

In this case the gates are half open.

Ah okay! That’s less concerning then!

 

[ainsworth74]

Looks like trains are back on the move with just some fairly mild residual delays? Is the crossing fixed or is now just shut completely so trains can traverse but road users are out of luck?

 

[800001]

Looks like trains are back on the move with just some fairly mild residual delays? Is the crossing fixed or is now just shut completely so trains can traverse but road users are out of luck?

Normal working 09:51, after a barrier reset by S+T.

 

[LAX54]

That is how I've interpreted the information that's available.

Human error, so very easily done

 

[Darandio]

Looks like trains are back on the move with just some fairly mild residual delays? Is the crossing fixed or is now just shut completely so trains can traverse but road users are out of luck?

Yeah, all sorted quite efficiently this time around with a team still there presumably to make sure it behaves.

It does feel like it's becoming more regular although I suppose it does depend on how much you use it as to how much you notice. Problem is I use it a hell of a lot so I seem to get caught up in even the shortest of barrier events.

 

[MarkyT]

Different regulations and safety standards admittedly, but in the US it's mandatory for drivers of yellow school buses to stop short of the tracks at level (grade) crossings, open the passenger side doors, and check the tracks in both directions before driving across.

That applies regardless of the provision of barriers, wigwag lights, etc. The only exception is where local authorities provide a crossing guard who watches the tracks and signals to each driver to confirm that no trains are approaching. I assume that this requirement came about as a result of there having been accidents caused by wrong side equipment failures.

That said, the US has a poor record of grade crossing accidents, probably partly because drivers are tempted to zig zag the barriers if an approaching train is going to take up to about ten minutes to pass over the crossing.

The number of grade crossings in the USA is also huge and they're on all sorts of railroads from shortlines with a switching job once a week to fast frequent passenger routes in urban areas. On the quietest lines, I suspect people encounter trains so infrequently they can get complacent. There's a danger when a crossing fails safe to road closed with barriers down and lights flashing or stays closed after passage of a train. Eventually, road users may get sick of waiting and attempt to weave around barriers. If the situation persists for a time people may lose trust in the warning equipment - e.g. it's always failed, take no notice of it.

 

[Belperpete]

I suspect it could also take a considerable time to get a technician out to some of those rural grade crossings in the US.

 

[Taunton]

Different regulations and safety standards admittedly, but in the US it's mandatory for drivers of yellow school buses to stop short of the tracks at level (grade) crossings, open the passenger side doors, and check the tracks in both directions before driving across.

That applies regardless of the provision of barriers, wigwag lights, etc. The only exception is where local authorities provide a crossing guard who watches the tracks and signals to each driver to confirm that no trains are approaching. I assume that this requirement came about as a result of there having been accidents caused by wrong side equipment failures.

The regulation is actually for all buses, and large trucks, and is a Federal regulation (as the Federal government regulates railroads), so applies to all States. It also was taken up by Canada. This is why many North American buses have written on the back "This vehicle stops at all railway crossings". Required is to turn off radios etc, and open the door, to hear better the classic North American Long-Long-Short-Long train whistle approaching the crossing.

Wrong side failures are by no means unknown there, but the majority of rural crossings there on minor lines, still, have no automation at all and it's up to you to look up down before crossing. At least they always cut the vegetation right back.

Some car drivers do as well, and having got the habit when living there I still turn off the radio, open the window, and glance when going over any level crossing here. But I don't stop!

 

[ainsworth74]

The RAIB have now released their report into this accident:

Summary​

At around 09:25 on 1 May 2024, a passenger train traveling between Saltburn and Nunthorpe struck a car on Redcar level crossing, which is situated in the unitary authority of Redcar and Cleveland. The collision took place with the train travelling at 23 mph (37 km/h). The car driver was injured in the collision and significant damage was caused to the car. There were no reported injuries to the passengers and staff on the train.

The investigation found that the signaller had opened Redcar level crossing to road traffic following the passage of a previous train to allow road traffic to clear. The signaller then forgot that the crossing was open and tried to set the route for the passenger train into Redcar Central station but was unable to clear the protecting signal to allow the train to proceed. This was because the interlocking in the signalling system had detected that the crossing was open. Unable to get the signal to clear, the signaller authorised the train to pass the signal at danger. In the absence of the crossing gates being closed or the road traffic signals being activated, the car driver drove onto the crossing where the collision occurred.

RAIB found that the normal sequence of actions used by the signaller to set the route for the train to enter Redcar Central station was disrupted, probably causing them to forget that Redcar level crossing was open to road traffic. This disruption included a telephone call and a perceived fault with the signalling panel. RAIB also found that the visual and procedural cues available to the signaller of the status of Redcar level crossing, which may have alerted them that it remained open, were either not used or were not effective.

The investigation also found that the train driver did not approach the level crossing at a speed that would have allowed them to stop the train before it collided with the car. The train driver was also unable to see that the crossing gates were open to road traffic due to their unusual design. RAIB additionally identified that there were no engineered controls fitted to the level crossing that would have automatically activated the wig-wag lights when the train approached.

An underlying factor to the accident was that Network Rail’s processes for managing signaller competence had not effectively addressed the signaller’s previous operational incidents. RAIB also found that no ergonomic assessment of the layout of controls at Redcar signal box had been carried out, and that this was a possible underlying factor.

Recommendations​

RAIB has made one recommendation to Network Rail. This deals with reviewing the ergonomic risks associated with the operation of the signals and level crossings at Redcar signal box.

Three learning points have also been identified, relating to the need to comply with the rules associated with trains being authorised to pass signals at danger. These relate to signallers checking that the route is clear, to train drivers driving at caution at controlled level crossings, and to signallers specifying the locations of controlled level crossings to train drivers.

Report 05/2025: Passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing

RAIB has today released its report into a passenger train collision with a road vehicle at Redcar level crossing, Redcar and Cleveland, 1 May 2024.

www.gov.uk

 

[Y Ddraig Coch]

A bad day all round, lessons to be learnt, and lessons to be learnt again for the signaler who seemingly has previous incidents.

 

[1955LR]

Not exactly the same but sounds very similar in the respect of the signaler loosing situational awareness and box ergonomics, to the circumstances to the Moreton on Lugg crossing incident which unfortunatey resulted in fatalities

Report 04/2011​

 

[MarkyT]

Not exactly the same but sounds very similar in the respect of the signaler loosing situational awareness and box ergonomics, to the circumstances to the Moreton on Lugg crossing incident which unfortunatey resulted in fatalities

Report 04/2011​

There was a lack of interlocking at Moreton on Lugg. The barriers became unlocked immediately a signal was replaced, allowing the signaller to open the crossing to road traffic immediately after they had put a protecting signal back to danger right in front of a closely approaching train. The train didn't have a chance of stopping in time, but the interlocking should have protected the road users. In a more modern system, the barriers should have remained locked down for a time sufficient for the train to have come to a stop or have passed completely into the route, likely via an electric lock circuit for the gate lock lever. Circuits had only been partly modernised when the site had been converted from gates to barriers. Old mechanical boxes typically didn't have such approach locking controls and there was no explicit requirement to fit that at the time this crossing was converted. From recommendations of the accident report, a programme to retrofit more sophisticated controls to prevent this happening again was implemented at this and other similar crossings.

 

[styles]

Buy why do you look both ways on a clear crossing. You need to have faith in the equipment. You don't see is train drivers slow from 110mph to 15 just to check on the off chance that whilst on green signals the crossing has failed, just daft. As a car driver I trust the system works and don't check.

If your time is up it's up full stop.

Same reason I look both ways when proceeding past a green signal at traffic lights on the road - not only equipment can fail, but people run red lights on purpose or by accident, or people configuring light sequences make mistakes, etc.

 

[edwin_m]

There was a lack of interlocking at Moreton on Lugg. The barriers became unlocked immediately a signal was replaced, allowing the signaller to open the crossing to road traffic immediately after they had put a protecting signal back to danger right in front of a closely approaching train. The train didn't have a chance of stopping in time, but the interlocking should have protected the road users. In a more modern system, the barriers should have remained locked down for a time sufficient for the train to have come to a stop or have passed completely into the route, likely via an electric lock circuit for the gate lock lever. Circuits had only been partly modernised when the site had been converted from gates to barriers. Old mechanical boxes typically didn't have such approach locking controls and there was no explicit requirement to fit that at the time this crossing was converted. From recommendations of the accident report, a programme to retrofit more sophisticated controls to prevent this happening again was implemented at this and other similar crossings.

Redcar also had a deficiency in the interlocking relative to current standards. More recent crossing designs will activate the wig-wags in the event of a SPAD of the protecting signal (although this incident wasn't a SPAD, talking past the signal has the same effect). There is some discussion about why this wasn't retrofitted at Redcar.

 

[Darandio]

Same reason I look both ways when proceeding past a green signal at traffic lights on the road - not only equipment can fail, but people run red lights on purpose or by accident, or people configuring light sequences make mistakes, etc.

You would struggle with that at Redcar especially if you hadn't thought to look down Birdsall Row as you approached. With the way the signalbox blocks the view you'd more or less have the front of your vehicle fouling the track before you could get a view of anything approaching.

 

[edwin_m]

You would struggle with that at Redcar especially if you hadn't thought to look down Birdsall Row as you approached. With the way the signalbox blocks the view you'd more or less have the front of your vehicle fouling the track before you could get a view of anything approaching.

The report mentions this and also that the position of the signal box is the reason for the unique sliding gates instead of lifting barriers.

There's actually an argument that when driving a road vehicle across an automatic crossing, it's better to keep going than to stop and look, potentially re-start in the wrong gear and stall half way across. However at this crossing the signaller has to confirm visually that it is clear after the barriers go down and before the signal can be cleared.

 

[Meerkat]

A bad day all round, lessons to be learnt, and lessons to be learnt again for the signaler who seemingly has previous incidents.

The report mentions the signaller has been subject to judicial proceedings.
It worries me as a passenger that someone with so many previous issues has a safety critical job. Seems crazy that it’s down to the LOM to escalate. Surely with safety involved there should be a senior manager reviewing repeat offenders who can take a ‘this person is done here’ decision without personal or work considerations at the back of their mind?
seems particularly unlucky that nothing went over that crossing in sight of the driver to trigger a stop.

 

[Y Ddraig Coch]

The report mentions the signaller has been subject to judicial proceedings.
It worries me as a passenger that someone with so many previous issues has a safety critical job. Seems crazy that it’s down to the LOM to escalate. Surely with safety involved there should be a senior manager reviewing repeat offenders who can take a ‘this person is done here’ decision without personal or work considerations at the back of their mind?
seems particularly unlucky that nothing went over that crossing in sight of the driver to trigger a stop.

Hence my comment about a bad day all round and lessons to be learnt. There seems to be multiple failings from multiple people. Luckily nobody actually died in this incident, but very easily could have.

 

[MarkyT]

The report mentions this and also that the position of the signal box is the reason for the unique sliding gates instead of lifting barriers.

ISTR they also thought it might be more reliable than lifting barriers in that location, and could be a prototype for other difficult sites. It's possible NR could have been able to design a single long conventional boom installation with the machine on the opposite side of the road from the box, but a long boom would be more susceptible to wind damage. The sliding design has not proved very reliable in service I understand.

There's actually an argument that when driving a road vehicle across an automatic crossing, it's better to keep going than to stop and look, potentially re-start in the wrong gear and stall half way across.

Especially AHBCs. If you're stuck on the crossing and the warning lights illuminate, you have about 27 seconds before the train arrives, and there's a very low probability it will be able to stop in time even if the driver sees the obstruction. Always leave the vehicle and stand well clear. Never waste valuable seconds trying to rescue it or any belongings inside.

 

[MadMac]

The report mentions the signaller has been subject to judicial proceedings.
It worries me as a passenger that someone with so many previous issues has a safety critical job. Seems crazy that it’s down to the LOM to escalate. Surely with safety involved there should be a senior manager reviewing repeat offenders who can take a ‘this person is done here’ decision without personal or work considerations at the back of their mind?
seems particularly unlucky that nothing went over that crossing in sight of the driver to trigger a stop.

Was this box “difficult to cover” with a long-standing vacancy? Maybe past issues were overlooked in the interests of solving a staffing problem?

 

[BrummieBobby]

When considering post incident analysis, the "Swiss Cheese" method usually gets mentioned, namely that it isn't one single failure that leads to an incident, but several (Hence the holes lining up)

Here we have:
1. Notoriously unreliable level crossing equipment
2. A signaller with two fairly serious safety of line incidents on record in tbe past 2 years (Pulling off for a train before getting line clear and granting a line blockage with a train in section) as well as other incidents
3. A failure to implement the rules of S5 correctly (From driver and signaller)

Several have stated that the barriers in question fail on a fairly regular basis; this is not acceptable and NWR should be compelled to come up with a better solution, ASAP.

The two incidents on the signallers recent record, particularly regarding the line blockage, are definitely at the more serious end of the spectrum; was the signaller being managed effectively?

The lack of proper implementation of the rules of module S5 (Passing signals at danger with authority) is obviously the greatest concern. Taking the position of the LX barriers out of the discussion for a moment, there is no evidence that the crossing has been considered for the purposes of S5. When I authorise a train past a signal at danger that is protecting a level crossing, my instructions are something along tbe lines of

"Driver I require you to pass signal AB123 at danger, approach Anytown Level Crossing at caution, being prepared to stop short of the crossing, only cross if you deem it safe to do so. When you are clear of the crossing proceed through the remainder of the section at caution and obey the next signal" When the driver repeats back, I give them authority to pass the signal at ddanger. Looking through the report there is no evidence that any such instructions were given. Whilst it is the signallers responsibility to pass these instructions on, I would not class 23MPH as an appropriate speed for a driver to cross a level crossing when the driver has just been talked past the signal.

 

[Meerkat]

The two incidents on the signallers recent record, particularly regarding the line blockage, are definitely at the more serious end of the spectrum; was the signaller being managed effectively?

Did you read the full report, specifically p33? The signaller had had 6 issues requiring support plans in 2 years!

 

[BrummieBobby]

Did you read the full report, specifically p33? The signaller had had 6 issues requiring support plans in 2 years!

Sorry, was emphasising the line block and not getting line clear, have now edited the post to reflect the other incidents

 

[Tomnick]

The handling of the indication fault on the home signal also struck me as a concern. Why did the signaller accept the train normally from Longbeck, and then stop the train at the potentially defective signal to ascertain whether it was correctly at danger? Before that, supposedly making a conscious decision to leave the barriers down at Church Lane because a second train (the train involved in the collision) was ten minutes or so away seems odd, too. It certainly doesn't sound like someone who's keeping on top of the job at a relatively simple location.

 

[jkkne]

Another failure of public sector management. That signaller would have been managed out of their job in a private sector or arguably a well run public sector organisation, they clearly aren’t competent and if I was a driver on that stretch of line, I’d have zero confidence in that person.