The Green Book was revised based on those findings. Hence my comments on the importance of BOTH meeting strategic policy objectives and having benefits in excess of costs. Again, unless I have missed it, no credible evidence has been provided of transformational impacts from HS2 on the relevant strategic policy objectives.
Capacity, capacity, capacity.
Capacity of the long distance trains - at the time of proposal over double that of the trains in service on those routes, even if the refurbished 390's were lengthened to 12 coaches still 60% uplift (or more) in capacity.
Capacity of the existing local services along the WCML, even if there's a need for long distance services to rejoin North of Birmingham and for there to be services along the WCML to Birmingham, you can still run (for example) more services in the paths which are removed from the existing network.
Capacity at stations like Manchester, as with new platforms, that frees up capacity at existing platforms for other services. Even if you replace the existing services with local services of the same length, 2tph being in a platform for 15 minutes rather than 30 minutes (as you can turn local trains around much faster) means that you've got space to run 4 trains of 6 coaches into that platform which you couldn't do before.
If those trains were 3 coaches long before, then you've lengthened them. However you've also freed up the platform capacity if where they were running to before, this means that the services which were using those platforms with them can also be lengthened by 3 coaches. That's 8tph which could be quiet a bit longer.
Neither of the latter points were considered in the business case for HS2 (as it was always said that would be a matter for future decisions - which I can understand as why say that place a is getting a better service when it maybe better that place b gets a better service as things had changed in the 20 years since the business case was first written), however, with little to no infrastructure costs the business case for those extra services is likely to be fairly good.
As we're now close enough to set future services, it would be interesting to do a full business case for every benefit from building a new pair of lines into central Manchester and all the improvements to services it facilitates.
With it possible for residents of Manchester and places served by those trains to see what it could actually look like in terms of wider rail improvements, not only would the business case be significantly better, there would be significantly more political support for the scheme - even if was just a copy paste of what HS2 was going to do.
As I've of the difficulties with the selling of the dream of HS2 was that all the secondary stuff it facilitated takes a lot to explain.
If you could say, if we build 6 platforms in Manchester we could lengthen every existing train service by an average of 2 coaches, add a further 50% capacity to the Avanti services on top of that and add 4 extra trains an hour, is it worth building that?
I would imagine that the response to that would be better than if your saying you were going to build 6 platforms in Manchester to double the capacity of Avanti services.
The reality is that the proposal in Manchester by HS2 is the same, it's just without being able to detail the improvements to anything other than the long distance services they could only say the second description, when the reality was that it's likely that it could have also delivered the first description (and probably more).