ROC Locations, confused? you will be.

[LAX54]

Same applies at any big signalling centre today, and has done for over 50 years.

But even with a PSB etc, the overall effect of a closure will be, or is far, far less than a ROC would be, The Romford one for example, IF it shut, even for an hour, there would be NO trains at all from London to the whole of East Anglia, right up to Peterborough, then the staff also have to get there first too ! Romford must be one of the hardest places to get to in the who of the Anglia Region, I imagine driving there would be almost a non starter.. M25 / A12 / A13 or M11 !

 

[LAX54]

One of the issues is that no matter how good the kit is, if a ROC goes down due to external influences (weather etc.) you can transfer the control to another one technically with no probleem, but it will be very hard to get the extra staff to it to do the controlling.

Cannot see that ever happening, too complex, and rules state that if you have not worked a location in 6 months you need to 'refresh' before you are allowed to work it, and after a couple of years your 'certifiate' expires

 

[Carlisle]

HNJ

I forgot Ashford IECC does control HS1, so that would have the TVM430 signalling stuff in it.

But I just do NOT trust NR to get it right, because previous experiences have proven otherwise. Look at the shambolic PARs project at Havant, it's a farcical thing. There they have to use interface modules to get the computers to work the points, points that the computer thinks is in Germany!

Again there's barely a week going by where that new fangled signalbox at Havant doesn't throw a wobbler and screw up SWT, SN & FGWs service. One evening it took me over an hour to go from Havant to Portsmouth & Southsea with a 1Pxx, an ~12' journey, because that junk heap threw it's electronic toys out of its pram.

What's more worrying is that NR intend to keep it running until well into 2040 or beyond, not that I care I've only got about 10 years to do. I dread to think what will happen when they try to bring in ERTMS.

I can remember the BR Havant -Chichester resignalling scheme around the early 90s where the line was closed and replacement busses operated every day seemingly for months on end which make this more recent Portsmouth resignalling project seem relatively painless in comparison

 

[Olaf]

I dont think thats right, Saltley isnt becoming a ROC. I cant find a date on that document but it must be old?

That document dates from late May 2014, and so there is the chance it does not reflect current status.
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Only needs a major weather incident such as flooding, severe electrical storms to shut the ROC down and you've lost the lot. One terrorist threat or even fire alarm going off..

And as the saying goes never say never, they say that they'll be able to do a transfer of all control functions to another ROC should such event occur, YEAH RIGHT!

Obviously no one at NR has heard of the adage: Never put all of your eggs in one basket.

These ROCs are fairly old hat, the UK is playing catchup. The approach has been proven, and BT did a similar thing back in the 90s.
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It is, you've already seen what happens when NATS (which controls almost all of the UK air space) at Swanwick went haywire a while back. Major delays.

And to answer your second point, I think you'll find that a considerable number would take redundancy or retire than work in one of those holes. What really makes me chuckle is NR's somewhat bizarre belief that this new "TMS" aka Traffic Management System will solve all ill's on the railway & sort out all of the conflicting moves & problems.

Sounds more like you have an axe to grind than anything else.

Other industries have gone through similar changes and have both survived & prospered. With the current plans, it will be sometime before the old skills become fully redundant, and if anything, I suspect that new people will have to be trained up in the heritage technology for sometime.

By the time the current migration plan nears completion, most of the current staff will have retired, while the ROCs will have evolved through a few generations.
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Yes, but you missed the point completely.

They have invested heavily and bought the best, most reliable, tried & tested technology which works, as have the French & Germans when it comes to the "High Speed" networks.

Here they're tight fisted a hell when it comes to investment in technology, they always want everything at a bargain basement price & all you're going to get for a bargain basement price is cheap, nasty & unreliable cr4p, which will ultimately prove to not be such a bargain, because it breaks down so often and causes mayhem or is obsolete so quickly that it needs replacing & updating within a matter of a few years.

The re-control projects have proven that, time & time again.

I think not.
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I found this from 2011:
http://www.networkrailmediacentre.c...nloadmedia.ashx?MediaDetailsID=5469&SizeId=-1

It states that the original plan was for 14 ROCs, but that "this number may change.", so at the time they had some idea that the plans had not yet been finalised. I'm guessing that it is Gillingham and Saltey that are most likely to drop off of the list if the number is to be reduced.

This article (from 12th September 2014) states that there are "12 centres being built" - I am guessing that means that the number has changed, even it implies that they are all being built from new.
http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/...lly-opens-biggest-railway-control-centre.html

Also, the details of the migration are not planned in detail beyond the end of CP5, and will be driven by the work packages to be delivered in future CPs.

 

[Joseph_Locke]

Do you really think NR would build a ROC on a flood plain. with one power supply and no security safeguards?

Until you've been in one (or tried to get into one, it isn't easy even if you've been invited) then you'll have to take it from the industry that with three independent power supplies plus a UPS, multiple FTN connections, RPG - resistant doors, anti-vehicle barriers and an internal layout that minimises the possiblity of a blast reaching the operating floor in any case, plus the fact that the signalling system can continue to route trains safely without human intervention if the need arises, it would have to be quite a set of circumstances to prompt a ROC to stop operating completely.

 

[Olaf]

This article about TMS contracts from 2nd June 2014 gives a different list - this one with Ashford and Saltley not appearing in the list:
http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/network-rail-traffic-management-contracts-146573

I do not know the local considerations regarding Ashford and Gillingham, but I would have thought that it would be the former of the two that would become a full ROC (they wont both go forward), but IBM will be closer to the top-level discussions.

 

[user15681]

Hmm, I'd have thought Ashford wouldn't be the ROC, but Gillingham would. An August update on the East Kent resignalling project said it was progressing in line with CP5 strategic business plan - which was for Ashford to stay as an IECC (not an ROC) and Gillingham be the ROC.

 

[Llanigraham]

The GN/GE Joint and Ely to Norwich are both rubbish with constant level crossing, axle counter and points failures. Bring back the Victorian sheds and bits of cast iron and wire please.

As a lever puller to be made redundant within the next couple of years, I agree with you, but who is going to pay for us to remain?

 

[LowLevel]

It's something I haven't quite got my head around, things have remained as they were for decades, but there's now a sudden rush to reduce manning and so forth. If it was really a step change improvement for everyone I could understand but it generally seems not to be - especially for the passengers who have no price cuts to show for it and just get stuck in the middle of nowhere when the new kit fails to live up to expectations. And as I keep seeing and hearing of people missing or nearly missing trains because of the way the new OD crossings operate I can't help but think they're not fit for purpose in many areas. The barriers drop far too early and there's no discretion there from the signaller to do anything about it if a stopping train is running early for example.

 

[Bald Rick]

But even with a PSB etc, the overall effect of a closure will be, or is far, far less than a ROC would be, The Romford one for example, IF it shut, even for an hour, there would be NO trains at all from London to the whole of East Anglia, right up to Peterborough, then the staff also have to get there first too ! Romford must be one of the hardest places to get to in the who of the Anglia Region, I imagine driving there would be almost a non starter.. M25 / A12 / A13 or M11 !

That depends which PSB. Three Bridges ASC (formerly PSB) shut down for an hour in the early morning not long ago, and the whole of Sussex suffered for the whole day. Similarly, the fire alarm went off at Liv st IECC about 5 years ago, and 80% of the services in Anglia were affected.

I worked in Romford for a while, and it was surprisingly easy to get to, 40 min drive from St. Albans at peak time.

 

[carriageline]

Rick,

A little while ago we had the discussion about ROCs taking over another's area of control, during say a failure or evac. You said this wouldn't happen, and won't happen. But I recently read that they are still planning to do this (some topbod in NR ops in the IRO mag). What are your thoughts?

Spare workstations and signallers of course being the biggest obstacle.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[HarleyDavidson]

Plus the lack of local knowledge and understanding of what goes on, what goes where and when.

 

[snowball]

On 21 July there was a press release about the opening of the Manchester centre. After mentioning that Manchester and Rugby would control the "LNW route", it listed the other ROCs as Cardiff, Derby, Didcot, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Gillingham, Basingstoke, Romford, Three Bridges and York.

That list looks as if it started out in alphabetical order but then had Gillingham and Basingstoke inserted!

[Edit: same list as at Olaf's link.]

There's been a more recent opening, at York, but the press release for that didn't include a list,

 

[Bald Rick]

Rick,

A little while ago we had the discussion about ROCs taking over another's area of control, during say a failure or evac. You said this wouldn't happen, and won't happen. But I recently read that they are still planning to do this (some topbod in NR ops in the IRO mag). What are your thoughts?

Spare workstations and signallers of course being the biggest obstacle.

It's not happening at present to my knowledge, and certainly not on those I have involvement with. That's not to say it won't happen in future, but then 'the future' is an indeterminate time.

I don't see the IRO journal, so don't know who said it or in what context.

 

[fgwrich]

Do you really think NR would build a ROC on a flood plain. with one power supply and no security safeguards?

Until you've been in one (or tried to get into one, it isn't easy even if you've been invited) then you'll have to take it from the industry that with three independent power supplies plus a UPS, multiple FTN connections, RPG - resistant doors, anti-vehicle barriers and an internal layout that minimises the possiblity of a blast reaching the operating floor in any case, plus the fact that the signalling system can continue to route trains safely without human intervention if the need arises, it would have to be quite a set of circumstances to prompt a ROC to stop operating completely.

They certainly aren't building the Basingstoke one on any form of flood plain etc - It's being constructed on the triangular patch of land between the Southern & GW Lines, above Barton's Mill sidings and is shaping up to be quite a large item on the local landscape already! It will also house a training centre for the Southern Region too, and has had a bridge linking that area to the business park / SWT Driver Training School area.

The present Basingstoke New Box was however converted from the old NSE/SWT former training school buildings on the northern side of the station.

 

[LAX54]

That depends which PSB. Three Bridges ASC (formerly PSB) shut down for an hour in the early morning not long ago, and the whole of Sussex suffered for the whole day. Similarly, the fire alarm went off at Liv st IECC about 5 years ago, and 80% of the services in Anglia were affected.

I worked in Romford for a while, and it was surprisingly easy to get to, 40 min drive from St. Albans at peak time.

Indeed the 'Bridges' did cripple Sussex, but then it covers quite a wide area of the Central Division, and most trains are signalled by it at some point.#
Liv St IEEC was shut, and again it covers a wide area! Trains terminated at Colchester / Ipswich, but at least beyond Colchester it was a fairly decent service, of course there was some disruption due to crews etc, but overall for the most of Anglia. life went on as normal !
someone on here said travelling to Romford seemed OK, obviously not been on the A12 in the past year or two, there is not one day goes by now when the traffic news is not giving notice of mile after mile of delays ! The odd thing is in this location, the ASC at Colchester was enlarged a few years back, and could quite easlily have some two thirds or more of Anglia there! Cambridge could do the rest if needed, and raod / rail access to Both Colchester and Cambridge is excellent ! The ROC's will ahve the Controllers in there, how will the Signalmen talk to them? on the phone !
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Plus the lack of local knowledge and understanding of what goes on, what goes where and when.

Which is why, now, if you have not done a loaction in the previous 6 months, you have to have a refresher, and longer than 1 year (could be 2 ?) the 'other' locations if not worked will drop of your certificate of compentency

 

[Olaf]

Hmm, I'd have thought Ashford wouldn't be the ROC, but Gillingham would. An August update on the East Kent resignalling project said it was progressing in line with CP5 strategic business plan - which was for Ashford to stay as an IECC (not an ROC) and Gillingham be the ROC.

Yes, sorry, I went back and checked, and I think you are right. I was thinking that the Gillingham site was less favoured.
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Rick,

A little while ago we had the discussion about ROCs taking over another's area of control, during say a failure or evac. You said this wouldn't happen, and won't happen. But I recently read that they are still planning to do this (some topbod in NR ops in the IRO mag). What are your thoughts?

Spare workstations and signallers of course being the biggest obstacle.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Yes, this is the normal practice for operations centres across all industries; there will likely be a fail-over of supervision to adjacent centres with the workload split between two or three other centres. As the program progresses I expect that the ROC cluster will be able to cope with up to 4 or 5 of the centres being out of service at anyone time, but it is still early days and they have to get them up and running first.

 

[carriageline]

Yes, sorry, I went back and checked, and I think you are right. I was thinking that the Gillingham site was less favoured.
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Yes, this is the normal practice for operations centres across all industries; there will likely be a fail-over of supervision to adjacent centres with the workload split between two or three other centres. As the program progresses I expect that the ROC cluster will be able to cope with up to 4 or 5 of the centres being out of service at anyone time, but it is still early days and they have to get them up and running first.

Haha. I would to love to see them get the amount of signallers and workstations for them to that! And then there is having signallers that are passed out on the workstations


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[LAX54]

Yes, sorry, I went back and checked, and I think you are right. I was thinking that the Gillingham site was less favoured.
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Yes, this is the normal practice for operations centres across all industries; there will likely be a fail-over of supervision to adjacent centres with the workload split between two or three other centres. As the program progresses I expect that the ROC cluster will be able to cope with up to 4 or 5 of the centres being out of service at anyone time, but it is still early days and they have to get them up and running first.

Cannot see it ever taking off, costs alone would be immense, not only staffing, training, keeping knowlege up to date, and the actual cost of duplicating another ROC elsewhere and all the interlocking, wiring, software that would have to go with it. do wonder iof some 'designers' think its just like simsig !

 

[Class 170101]

Only needs a major weather incident such as flooding, severe electrical storms to shut the ROC down and you've lost the lot. One terrorist threat or even fire alarm going off..

Will toast be banned then?
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The GN/GE Joint and Ely to Norwich are both rubbish with constant level crossing, axle counter and points failures. Bring back the Victorian sheds and bits of cast iron and wire please.

In the case of Ely - Norwich it has more to do with the MCB ODs not working properly. Apparently NR turned of the LIDAR (which ias the scanner scanning for things on the floor) and the relaibility went up markedly. Of course NR got an ORR enforcement notice for it but apparently our European friends use this system without LIDAR without problems.

 

[HarleyDavidson]

Didn't a forgetful signaller at Three Bridges do exactly that thing, forgot the toast & set off the fire alarms.

 

[Darren R]

I believe the Official Opening of York ROC took place a couple of weeks ago but that it won't be operational until January 2015. This leads me to wonder a few things I've never considered before, about exactly how this will happen. Will all the current Workstations in York IECC move across to the ROC at the same time, or will they migrate across in 'dribs and drabs'? From a signaller's point of view, is there much difference between an IECC and a ROC? (Apart from having more colleagues with which to share the Mess Room, that is!) And just how much work is there involved trackside in switching from the IECC to the adjacent building? (I'm sort of assuming the short to answer to the latter question is "alot!")

 

[The Planner]

Cannot see it ever taking off, costs alone would be immense, not only staffing, training, keeping knowlege up to date, and the actual cost of duplicating another ROC elsewhere and all the interlocking, wiring, software that would have to go with it. do wonder iof some 'designers' think its just like simsig !

I suspect that is the idea though. What is actually stopping a workstation becoming entirely scalable by adding chunks on and off at will? I would expect during the overnight periods that two workstations could well get scaled into one and back out again. If it all goes digital it is technically just data down a cable.

 

[LAX54]

I suspect that is the idea though. What is actually stopping a workstation becoming entirely scalable by adding chunks on and off at will? I would expect during the overnight periods that two workstations could well get scaled into one and back out again. If it all goes digital it is technically just data down a cable.

Flippin' lonmg cable ! LOL
as for overnight periods, they can be as busy, if not busier than daytimes at some locations, Ipswich & Felixstowe as an example, mind you I think TMS may just keel over and wave a white flag if it was trying to work Ipswich !

 

[moggie]

What puzzles me in regards to multi site operation should a ROC go offline is one assumes , each ROC will have a number of areas it will be designated to 'stand in' for? Each area to be controlled will require a link from the each ROC to each interlocking within the wider designated network.

Besides the obvious multitude of extra datalinks required there's also the individual geographic 'identity' of each area to be controlled at the ROC (office) end. That in theory is a copy of the same identity of the master office (assuming each designated ROC is equipped with identical system manufacturer which in NR's 'best value' procurement world is far from a given). If so, fine, but in truth how long is it going to take the staff on duty designated as the alternative controllers to achieve a changeover of the area identity onto the designated workstations and how long is going to take to perform even a rudimentary check that the changeover of route setting and comms equipment is successful and fully operation for each interlocking area? That's a fair workload in anyones estimation and that's before named staff are assigned in the heat of the moment. Once that is achieved they've then got to establish contact with all trains which will have continued on their route until a red signal is encountered, when the driver will then be unable to establish contact with control (signaller and potentially co-located controller).

Based on current performance when things go awry and the simple fact that there's no precedent on such a scale at present it's hard to imagine the practicalities, especially in the context of the ORR breathing down the necks of the NR/TOC's to keep the public better informed as to what the situation is and when it's going to improve. This in the context of switching the network control personnel at the 'flick of a switch'. It's not hard to imagine the chaos of competing requirements of information technicalities and safety. All being undertaken by staff who presumably will be relatively unfamiliar with the process based on the infrequency of such an event.

If only it was so simple. But then again it usually is in the eyes of the ignorant.

 

[LAX54]

What puzzles me in regards to multi site operation should a ROC go offline is one assumes , each ROC will have a number of areas it will be designated to 'stand in' for? Each area to be controlled will require a link from the each ROC to each interlocking within the wider designated network.

Besides the obvious multitude of extra datalinks required there's also the individual geographic 'identity' of each area to be controlled at the ROC (office) end. That in theory is a copy of the same identity of the master office (assuming each designated ROC is equipped with identical system manufacturer which in NR's 'best value' procurement world is far from a given). If so, fine, but in truth how long is it going to take the staff on duty designated as the alternative controllers to achieve a changeover of the area identity onto the designated workstations and how long is going to take to perform even a rudimentary check that the changeover of route setting and comms equipment is successful and fully operation for each interlocking area? That's a fair workload in anyones estimation and that's before named staff are assigned in the heat of the moment. Once that is achieved they've then got to establish contact with all trains which will have continued on their route until a red signal is encountered, when the driver will then be unable to establish contact with control (signaller and potentially co-located controller).

Based on current performance when things go awry and the simple fact that there's no precedent on such a scale at present it's hard to imagine the practicalities, especially in the context of the ORR breathing down the necks of the NR/TOC's to keep the public better informed as to what the situation is and when it's going to improve. This in the context of switching the network control personnel at the 'flick of a switch'. It's not hard to imagine the chaos of competing requirements of information technicalities and safety. All being undertaken by staff who presumably will be relatively unfamiliar with the process based on the infrequency of such an event.

If only it was so simple. But then again it usually is in the eyes of the ignorant.

The the GSM-R has to be switched too !

It's a bit like LAX taken over Swanick ATC !

 

[Olaf]

Cannot see it ever taking off, costs alone would be immense, not only staffing, training, keeping knowlege up to date, and the actual cost of duplicating another ROC elsewhere and all the interlocking, wiring, software that would have to go with it. do wonder iof some 'designers' think its just like simsig !

No, it does not work that way. You replicate the data and the model in the fail-over scenario, and the system design takes into account the necessary capacity provision in the systems. This is common practice in other industries and it is usually built-in from the outset. It would not be as difficult to implement as you think. In terms of personel, they would be 'bused' to the fail-over site. This all adds to operational costs during a fail-over, but allows NR to provide a service during such events. Local knowledge will become less of an issue as the systems are evolved.
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What puzzles me in regards to multi site operation should a ROC go offline is one assumes , each ROC will have a number of areas it will be designated to 'stand in' for? Each area to be controlled will require a link from the each ROC to each interlocking within the wider designated network.

Besides the obvious multitude of extra datalinks required there's also the individual geographic 'identity' of each area to be controlled at the ROC (office) end. That in theory is a copy of the same identity of the master office (assuming each designated ROC is equipped with identical system manufacturer which in NR's 'best value' procurement world is far from a given). If so, fine, but in truth how long is it going to take the staff on duty designated as the alternative controllers to achieve a changeover of the area identity onto the designated workstations and how long is going to take to perform even a rudimentary check that the changeover of route setting and comms equipment is successful and fully operation for each interlocking area? That's a fair workload in anyones estimation and that's before named staff are assigned in the heat of the moment. Once that is achieved they've then got to establish contact with all trains which will have continued on their route until a red signal is encountered, when the driver will then be unable to establish contact with control (signaller and potentially co-located controller).

Based on current performance when things go awry and the simple fact that there's no precedent on such a scale at present it's hard to imagine the practicalities, especially in the context of the ORR breathing down the necks of the NR/TOC's to keep the public better informed as to what the situation is and when it's going to improve. This in the context of switching the network control personnel at the 'flick of a switch'. It's not hard to imagine the chaos of competing requirements of information technicalities and safety. All being undertaken by staff who presumably will be relatively unfamiliar with the process based on the infrequency of such an event.

If only it was so simple. But then again it usually is in the eyes of the ignorant.

The data networking is generally a given; this should be relatively easy to design into the system.

I do not know how the back-ends are engineered, but it sounds like they are currently co-hosted at the ROC, so that would be a deciding factor in any future design. However, the system would be designed and tested from the outset to handle the fail over and typically it can be performed from within milli-seconds for basic connectivity/switch of systems, to a few hours for the transfer staff. A large proportion of the process would be automatic and within minutes at most, but there would also be portions that would involve human intervention and decision making which extends the time-scales.
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The the GSM-R has to be switched too !

It's a bit like LAX taken over Swanick ATC !

The data and comms would be switched at the provider switch centre, and again the system can be, if not already, designed to handle this.

 

[carriageline]

From plans I have seen for rugby roc, there is no plans for additional workstations for failover. Just the bare necessity. And yes, workstations can be scaled up and down as needed. That helps when dealing with a major incident, the signaller can deal with the incident while another takes over signalling everything else. How that works with extra workstations and signallers I do not know!

This all works in theory, providing the signalling doesn't need commissioning on every workstation (as it does at present)

Also, a question for people more clever than I. How does it work with ROC and the interlockings? Is the ROC directly connected to them, or does it use, for example, the internet to dial in to them?

The way I have heard people speak about it, make it sound like the interlockings are all connected to the internet (or at least a network), and the ROC just dials in to the interlockings (like one big LAN I suppose), which would make sense (even more so with the 'moving of ROCs'), but at the same time
I would be surprised if they are.


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[Joseph_Locke]

From plans I have seen for rugby roc, there is no plans for additional workstations for failover. Just the bare necessity. And yes, workstations can be scaled up and down as needed. That helps when dealing with a major incident, the signaller can deal with the incident while another takes over signalling everything else. How that works with extra workstations and signallers I do not know!

This all works in theory, providing the signalling doesn't need commissioning on every workstation (as it does at present)

Also, a question for people more clever than I. How does it work with ROC and the interlockings? Is the ROC directly connected to them, or does it use, for example, the internet to dial in to them?

The way I have heard people speak about it, make it sound like the interlockings are all connected to the internet (or at least a network), and the ROC just dials in to the interlockings (like one big LAN I suppose), which would make sense (even more so with the 'moving of ROCs'), but at the same time
I would be surprised if they are.

They are (or can be) all interconnected via FTN, some remotely and some in the basement for the ROC itself. This is no different from many other more modern systems suchas SSI - the signaller sees a moderated version of events, the interlocking itself is on the end of a wire somewhere else in the building (or another building altogether in some current installations). FTN (a very big very fast fibre-based LAN) makes it possible to plug an interlocking in somewhere in Cumbria and the workstation in in Manchester and for one to control the other. In theory, you could control all the non-mechanical interlockings in the UK from orbit.

 

[moggie]

They are (or can be) all interconnected via FTN, some remotely and some in the basement for the ROC itself. This is no different from many other more modern systems suchas SSI - the signaller sees a moderated version of events, the interlocking itself is on the end of a wire somewhere else in the building (or another building altogether in some current installations). FTN (a very big very fast fibre-based LAN) makes it possible to plug an interlocking in somewhere in Cumbria and the workstation in in Manchester and for one to control the other. In theory, you could control all the non-mechanical interlockings in the UK from orbit.

Indeed, and it's nothing particularly complex where all the field end links to/from individual interlockings are routed to a single control centre as is for current system architectures. Multiply that by the number of 'standby' ROC locations which are to be connected and it gets a lot more interesting.

Designation of workstations which theoretically are able to cover a multitude of areas in a standby capacity with all associated Track / Train comms networks as well as a more complex technical changeover process (so an interlocking can only communicate with one control centre at any given time) is not simple. 'Not simple' usually equates to expense. a fair bit of expense, and that for something which in theory may never be used either from a practical standpoint or because the 'doomsday' event may never happen.

NR are fond of spending taxpayers money on many projects, many which see little use after implementation but it would (if it's going to happen) will take some persuasive talking to get someone to sign off on the dotted line for something that in theory shouldn't be required if all the other areas of expense to protect the centre of the rail operation do their job.