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Suspended jail for FCC driver after covering up of SPAD

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In my experience the ORR and indeed the RAIB will only measure staff compliance when investigating an incident against either the rule book or similar RSSB guidance. The CSR instructions from memory differs from GSMR in as much as partial registration for CSR has to be corrected at the first opportunity whereas GSMR can complete a journey on partial registration. I am certainly no expert but would thought that the reason for this is that the CSR partially registered will not automatically transfer to the next CSR cell, whereas the GSMR system will. Of course my opinions expressed are only mine and you would need to reference your company procedures to be certain that you are acting within the current rules.
 
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acepepper

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Do you really think that you will be convicted in a court of law for running the radio unregistered? Not a hope in hell's chance. The driver was convicted of an unsafe practice regarding TPWS and SPADing yet ASLEF issued no statement (that I am aware of) about this. What measures have they put in place to protect their members from a driver who has SPADed and reset his TPWS?




Delays will increase because of this interpretation by ASLEF
I assume ASLEF have made no comment about it because they are not disputing it. The cab radio issue is something completely separate that has arisen as a result of this case. He was not convicted because of it but it made his case look far worse by making him look irresponsible from the minute he left Cambridge, when in fact he'd actually followed correct radio procedure.
 

68000

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In my experience the ORR and indeed the RAIB will only measure staff compliance when investigating an incident against either the rule book or similar RSSB guidance. The CSR instructions from memory differs from GSMR in as much as partial registration for CSR has to be corrected at the first opportunity whereas GSMR can complete a journey on partial registration. I am certainly no expert but would thought that the reason for this is that the CSR partially registered will not automatically transfer to the next CSR cell, whereas the GSMR system will. Of course my opinions expressed are only mine and you would need to reference your company procedures to be certain that you are acting within the current rules.


Quite possible although there are CSR area code boards to inform the driver when the train goes out of one signaller area to another so presumably the driver is also required to change the area code each time
 

455driver

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Quite possible although there are CSR area code boards to inform the driver when the train goes out of one signaller area to another so presumably the driver is also required to change the area code each time

Yes I have done it several times, maybe I need to hand myself into the ORR so they can prosecute me for such a dangerous work practice? :lol:
 

68000

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I assume ASLEF have made no comment about it because they are not disputing it. The cab radio issue is something completely separate that has arisen as a result of this case. He was not convicted because of it but it made his case look far worse by making him look irresponsible from the minute he left Cambridge, when in fact he'd actually followed correct radio procedure.


They cannot dispute it as the driver admitted it. I would have expected ASLEF to protect their members by reminding their members that they should always speak to the signaller if they SPAD and they should not just reset TPWS and go. That is the big issue here, not the fact that the driver left without entering the headcode or TRN

Yes I have done it several times, maybe I need to hand myself into the ORR so they can prosecute me for such a dangerous work practice? :lol:

Yep, we're all guilty.

Ignoring the channel changing enroute is actually more serious that not inputting the headcode initially as CSR was generally implemented for DOO(P) where it is a requirement to have secure radio comms with the signaller
 
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acepepper

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The other thing to remember about this is that this driver would have been represented by ASLEF solicitors at this trial and it would be them who are now asking the union to get clarification on this.
 

455driver

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They cannot dispute it as the driver admitted it. I would have expected ASLEF to protect their members by reminding their members that they should always speak to the signaller if they SPAD and they should not just reset TPWS and go. That is the big issue here, not the fact that the driver left without entering the headcode or TRN

The driver didnt know he had SPADded because he read across! :roll:
 

acepepper

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They cannot dispute it as the driver admitted it. I would have expected ASLEF to protect their members by reminding their members that they should always speak to the signaller if they SPAD and they should not just reset TPWS and go. That is the big issue here, not the fact that the driver left without entering the headcode or TRN
And ASLEF have done this on numerous occasions and will continue to do so in the future.

This may not be a big issue for you but I'm assuming that you won't be getting into a cab tomorrow wondering where you stand if the radio doesn't set up to ORR requirements, (whatever they are) and something goes wrong.
 

455driver

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Lets wait ans see what happens when a driver cant set up the CSR and is told to put the area code in and get on with it, what happens when the driver refuses to move?
There is no reason (except for the ORR interpretation) why the train cant go!
 

acepepper

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Lets wait ans see what happens when a driver cant set up the CSR and is told to put the area code in and get on with it, what happens when the driver refuses to move?
There is no reason (except for the ORR interpretation) why the train cant go!
If it's me, the train won't be going anywhere until the radio is FULLY set up.
 

68000

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Lets wait ans see what happens when a driver cant set up the CSR and is told to put the area code in and get on with it, what happens when the driver refuses to move?
There is no reason (except for the ORR interpretation) why the train cant go!

Well hopefully in a few months time, those couple of operators who are still operating CSR will have moved on from it
 

acepepper

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Well hopefully in a few months time, those couple of operators who are still operating CSR will have moved on from it
We have CSR and GSM-R and I will be using the same criteria for both; no set up, no go. Hopefully we'll get some sensible answers from the ORR very soon.
 

ComUtoR

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This may not be a big issue for you but I'm assuming that you won't be getting into a cab tomorrow wondering where you stand if the radio doesn't set up to ORR requirements, (whatever they are) and something goes wrong.

The instruction applies from 1st December so Drivers will all be sweating prosecution tomorrow.

455Driver said:
Let's wait and see what happens when a driver can't set up the CSR and is told to put the area code in and get on with it, what happens when the driver refuses to move?

Any instruction that you believe to be unsafe you can refuse. Be prepared to justify it.

455Driver said:
There is no reason (except for the ORR interpretation) why the train cant go!

Not sure if I'm repeating myself but how have they interpreted it ? Where have they said by failing to set the radio up was unsafe ? Inference is coming from the posters not the ORR.
 

acepepper

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Why when the ORR case referred to CSR?
Because it now throws GSM-R set up into doubt. We're told that we can take a train into service without the train reporting number showing on the GSM-R. We were told exactly the same about CSR but now the ORR says that that was wrong.

Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train.
That's a direct quote from the ORR. I'm not going to put myself in a position where I'm in charge of an "out of control" train.
 

68000

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So the serious risk of a collision was because of the radio issue and not the SPAD & TPWS reset issue?
 

acepepper

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The instruction applies from 1st December so Drivers will all be sweating prosecution tomorrow.



Any instruction that you believe to be unsafe you can refuse. Be prepared to justify it.



Not sure if I'm repeating myself but how have they interpreted it ? Where have they said by failing to set the radio up was unsafe ? Inference is coming from the posters not the ORR.

Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train.


There you go, straight from the ORR's mouth. Nonsense, I know, but that's their view.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
So the serious risk of a collision was because of the radio issue and not the SPAD & TPWS reset issue?
That seems to be what the ORR are suggesting. Do you see the need for clarification now?
 

68000

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That seems to be what the ORR are suggesting. Do you see the need for clarification now?

Seeking clarification? yes
Delaying the public in the process? no

What is wrong with ASLEF asking their lawyer to get that clarification from the ORR?

What is wrong with ASLEF asking RSSB for the clarification?
 

SpacePhoenix

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Could CSR and GSM-R be interlocked with the traction so that a driver couldn't take power if the radio was not set up?
 

acepepper

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Seeking clarification? yes
Delaying the public in the process? no

What is wrong with ASLEF asking their lawyer to get that clarification from the ORR?

What is wrong with ASLEF asking RSSB for the clarification?
That's what they've done. They've given the ORR, Network Rail and the TOC's until 1st Dec to come up with a solution to this. That's when their advice to drivers comes into effect.
 

68000

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Could CSR and GSM-R be interlocked with the traction so that a driver couldn't take power if the radio was not set up?


CSR is dead, it will be removed within the year

There is no need to interlock the GSM-R to the train's traction supply unless, of course, you see a need to interlock all the other required systems on the train. Taxpayers to pay for it of course
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
That's what they've done. They've given the ORR, Network Rail and the TOC's until 1st Dec to come up with a solution to this. That's when their advice to drivers comes into effect.

They have not, they have promised increased delay on the travelling public if they do not get the clarification

Do you have access to the previous ASLEF correspondence with the ORR and possibly RSSB seeking this clarification? Care to share it?
 
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AndyPJG

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Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also{*1} failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions{*2} Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train.


There you go, straight from the ORR's mouth. Nonsense, I know, but that's their view.

*1 - implies this was additional to the resetting of TPWS;
*2 - could refer to both actions (ie reset of TPWS and failure to set up CSR).

The TPWS act was the prime failing, by his actions he has put railway staff and members of the public at risk, so is an offence under H&S act.
 
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ComUtoR

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Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train.

You are missing the important sentence and then making an inference.


On 8 October 2013, the 20:40 Cambridge to London Kings Cross, driven by Mr Walford, passed a red signal at Hitchin station – a signal which instructs a driver to stop their train. The train's warning safety system applied automatic brakes but Mr Walford deliberately reset the system and continued on without seeking the required authorisation. Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train

Let's break it down.

The sentence about Scott resetting the safety system is his action that put the train "out of control"

The sentence about leaving Cambridge and the CSR is merely a statement of a fact. NOWHERE have they said that not having it fully setup is unsafe. Just an action Scott took.

Now lets look at what that implies and what hasn't been said.

As a Driver. You key on your cab and make an attempt to set up the radio. If that fails then you call the Signaller and ask why your headcode/TRN has been rejected or if there is any problems. It is the radio that has failed to setup and your actions are fully compliant. The Signaller knows your only running with the area code and makes whatever he/she does to insure you are contactable. I proposed they would use the stock number and anecdotally will confirm that they can contact you directly. If this was the case, the report would read...

Prior to leaving Cambridge, The Cab Secure Radio failed to setup correctly.

Considering "Mr Walford failed to set up the CSR" can easily mean that he simply keyed on the cab. NOWHERE does it say that the CSR had the area code entered. We have inferred that. It doesn't even say anything about the state of the CSR just that Mr Walford failed to set it up. Everything about the whole CSR is hearsay because there is no evidence to say precisely what state it was in.

The report is so badly written and lacking in any real concrete facts its impossible to make a valid judgement to what actually happened. Its so bad its a wonder why everyone is so apprehensive about what will happen next and where you stand when the brown stuff hits the spinny thing. PERSONALLY its pushing me further towards a work to rule attitude. Keeping fully within all procedure will prevent the TOC's making a scapegoat out of the Driver.

As to "Out of Control" its in quotation marks and I'm desperately searching the grey matter but isn't there a technical definition for a Train Out of Control ? The train was no longer under the protection of the signalling system and I think that is what "out of control" is defined as (I've been checking but can't find it) Remember this is the railway we are talking about. Technicalities and Jargon is prolific.
 

68000

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If we remove reference to CSR, the statement would look like

'On 8 October 2013, the 20:40 Cambridge to London Kings Cross, driven by Mr Walford, passed a red signal at Hitchin station – a signal which instructs a driver to stop their train. The train's warning safety system applied automatic brakes but Mr Walford deliberately reset the system and continued on without seeking the required authorisation. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train'

which is the real issue here and something ASLEF has ignored
 

O L Leigh

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I think we might be in danger of losing sight of the point. Scott Walford was not prosecuted for a SPAD or a TPWS reset and go. He was prosecuted for a breach of the Health & Safety at Work Act.

Whatever we might think or feel about the severity of the component parts of this incident, whatever we know from experience to make operational sense, it was clearly felt that the state of the cab radio had a bearing on this incident. Dissecting the words and trying to play semantics is all very interesting, but it diverts attention away from the facts.

I believe it is right and proper of Aslef to seek clarification of the matter. As someone else has said further up the thread, there is a chance that Mr Walford did indeed follow correct procedure but that it has formed part of the case against him all the same. We need clarity on this matter.

O L Leigh
 
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68000

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O L Leigh said:
I believe it is right and proper of Aslef to seek clarification of the matter

and so do I but not in the manner they have gone about it. Reading the ASLEF statement, you would almost be led to think that the driver was prosecuted because he did not do something with the radio and the rest is an afterthought
 

muz379

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I believe it is right and proper of Aslef to seek clarification of the matter. As someone else has said further up the thread, there is a chance that Mr Walford did indeed follow correct procedure but that it has formed part of the case against him all the same. We need clarity on this matter.

O L Leigh

Just out of interest if this was the case , given the danger posed by his train being out of control coupled with the fact that he was following an accepted procedure laid down by his TOC would the RAIB not report on the incident as well as there are then lessons that can be learnt about safety from this incident .
 

Llama

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As I understand it, the fact the CSR wasn't set up [to receive immediate point to point calls] compounded the effect of the driver resetting-&-continuing after a spad & TPWS intervention, only in so far as it took several seconds longer to communicate a stop message to him than it would otherwise have taken if he had set up the CSR to its full capability. If he hadn't attempted to set up the radio when setting up the cab at Cambridge this could be used by prosecutors as some evidence of an attitude indifferent to compliance in general terms, perhaps weakening the driver's argument that the incident was a lapse and honest mistake in believing that the brake activation wasn't made by the TPWS, rather than a deliberate (whether conniving or through panic) attempt to evade the consequences of passing a signal.

The ORR words in their statement are however ill-judged and misleading (the phrase "out of control" especially so) and whoever wrote the press release needs bringing to task, as the statement is not befitting an organisation of the stature of the ORR (as Aslef said in their response).
 

acepepper

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CSR is dead, it will be removed within the year

There is no need to interlock the GSM-R to the train's traction supply unless, of course, you see a need to interlock all the other required systems on the train. Taxpayers to pay for it of course
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---


They have not, they have promised increased delay on the travelling public if they do not get the clarification

Do you have access to the previous ASLEF correspondence with the ORR and possibly RSSB seeking this clarification? Care to share it?
Yes, it was in the ASLEF link posted earlier.

Why the 1st December and not now?

We want to give the train operators, Network Rail and ORR time to put measures in
place or to respond appropriately to the impact of the court’s decision.

--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
You are missing the important sentence and then making an inference.




Let's break it down.

The sentence about Scott resetting the safety system is his action that put the train "out of control"

The sentence about leaving Cambridge and the CSR is merely a statement of a fact. NOWHERE have they said that not having it fully setup is unsafe. Just an action Scott took.

Now lets look at what that implies and what hasn't been said.

As a Driver. You key on your cab and make an attempt to set up the radio. If that fails then you call the Signaller and ask why your headcode/TRN has been rejected or if there is any problems. It is the radio that has failed to setup and your actions are fully compliant. The Signaller knows your only running with the area code and makes whatever he/she does to insure you are contactable. I proposed they would use the stock number and anecdotally will confirm that they can contact you directly. If this was the case, the report would read...

Prior to leaving Cambridge, The Cab Secure Radio failed to setup correctly.

Considering "Mr Walford failed to set up the CSR" can easily mean that he simply keyed on the cab. NOWHERE does it say that the CSR had the area code entered. We have inferred that. It doesn't even say anything about the state of the CSR just that Mr Walford failed to set it up. Everything about the whole CSR is hearsay because there is no evidence to say precisely what state it was in.

The report is so badly written and lacking in any real concrete facts its impossible to make a valid judgement to what actually happened. Its so bad its a wonder why everyone is so apprehensive about what will happen next and where you stand when the brown stuff hits the spinny thing. PERSONALLY its pushing me further towards a work to rule attitude. Keeping fully within all procedure will prevent the TOC's making a scapegoat out of the Driver.

As to "Out of Control" its in quotation marks and I'm desperately searching the grey matter but isn't there a technical definition for a Train Out of Control ? The train was no longer under the protection of the signalling system and I think that is what "out of control" is defined as (I've been checking but can't find it) Remember this is the railway we are talking about. Technicalities and Jargon is prolific.
Again, this was in the ASLEF link posted earlier. Remember ASLEF solicitors represented him in court so had all the details. He had clearly entered the area code rendering the ORR statement that he hadn't set it up, nonsense.

Setting up the CSR has two stages: First, logging on by entering the
appropriate area code. This puts the radio on the network. It means that the
driver is contactable by the signaller. The second stage is putting in a signal
number that identifies the train and produces a unique Train Reporting
Number (displayed on the radio). The signaller can then communicate with
the driver on a one-to-one basis.
Scott Walford had completed the first stage. His radio was therefore live on
the network. He was contactable through a General Call or Train Stop
message. A General Call or Train Stop goes directly to all the drivers on a
specified area within the network. When he received the General Call on his
radio, Scott Walford stopped his train.
 
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