I haven't heard of it by name, I assumed it existed.
As I said, I think would be difficult and computationally expensive to run anti-fraud checks in the "authorisation loop" when you're scanning your ticket at the gate, working out whether it's possible for you to be at that gateline, based on your previous journey history. Plus, prone to error (clock skew, anyone?), particularly within London where tolerances would be very tight as things are very close together.
You could do it in the background, sure, but that would be reactive.
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Essentially, it's a very different threat model. At the moment, the thread model is we trust the validity of paper tickets and smartcards intrinsically (the latter because the 'unique' magstripe is hard to forge, the latter because we can cryptographically prove it is genuine).
You cannot trust an e-ticket in the same way.