Train derails on highway bridge in Washington state

[MarkyT]

In the US, the railroad companies are the owners of the infrastructure, with the notable exception of the Northeast Corridor high-speed line (and Metra in Chicago I believe owns some of their lines). The railroad companies are investing in their infrastructure, but as their business is freight, do not and do not have the motivation to maintain the lines for high speed passenger use.

In a number of places, rail rights of way in urban areas where modern commuter rail operates have been purchased by local authorities, usually with running rights retained for freight railroads to access yards and customer sidings. The big freight RRs have also spun off a lot of their marginal trackage to smaller 'shortline' freight operators who often have much lower costs because they don't have to conform to the same staffing and wage levels. These continue to act as feeder services for the larger companies while being free to develop other local traffic that the larger companies might not be able to compete for.

 

[Taunton]

With it being the inaugural run, surely questions have to be asked whether the driver was under pressure to run as fast as possible to demonstrate the time saving of the new line, and/or the cab wasn't sterile and the driver distracted by others?

I would say the opposite. If there were others in the cab surely they would also be there knowing the route and prompting about braking. US locos long after Britain still ran with a fireman also in the cab, and there was an established procedure that for each signal, speed restriction, etc, they would call them back and forth between one another. If an inspector ("road foreman" in US terminology) was there, the same.

Unfortunately it seems that two of the three fatalities are enthusiasts

Two of the dead were identified as train enthusiasts who belonged to the rail advocacy group All Aboard Washington and were excited to be aboard for the inaugural run: Jim Hamre, a retired civil engineer with the state Transportation Department, and Zack Willhoite, a customer service employee at a local transit agency.

http://komonews.com/news/local/official-amtrak-engineer-may-have-been-distracted-before-derailment

http://allaboardwashington.org/

 

[MarkyT]

I would say the opposite. If there were others in the cab surely they would also be there knowing the route and prompting about braking. US locos long after Britain still ran with a fireman also in the cab, and there was an established procedure that for each signal, speed restriction, etc, they would call them back and forth between one another. If an inspector ("road foreman" in US terminology) was there, the same.

This is why I wonder if there actually was even an advanced warning board of some sort for the oncoming restriction to give a clue as to where to start slowing, never mind any technical warning and supervision system. The route is fairly straight and featureless for a few miles on approach to the curve it appears, so there could have been some location awareness blindness going on here, especially in the early morning dark or in other limited visibility conditions. Not unlike the Croydon Tramlink derailment in this respect.

 

[Busaholic]

A miracle only 3 people killed

Agreed, possibly because the leading carriage's descent to the road surface was arrested by a passing truck?

 

[Groningen]

Arrested

Taken in to custody?!

 

[Billy A]

Taken in to custody?!

Arrest literally means....stop!

 

[Groningen]

OK! Google Translate gave me this: a stoppage or sudden cessation of motion. That is what i understand much clearly!

 

[theageofthetra]

With it being the inaugural run, surely questions have to be asked whether the driver was under pressure to run as fast as possible to demonstrate the time saving of the new line, and/or the cab wasn't sterile and the driver distracted by others?

Exactly what I thought. Have seen on a US site that there were two persons in the leading cab & the train was running 25 mins late prior to the accident.

 

[Groningen]

The front locomotive was a new Charger locomotive.

It is amazing how with 130 kilometers an hour 1 can stop in say 100 meters. Must have been a shock stop.

 

[Chris M]

This is why I wonder if there actually was even an advanced warning board of some sort for the oncoming restriction to give a clue as to where to start slowing, never mind any technical warning and supervision system.

This BBC News article quotes State transport spokesperson Barbara LaBoe as saying:

"warning signs were in place two miles before the lowered limit."

 

[Groningen]

The train departed indeed 30 minutes late from Tacoma.

https://asm.transitdocs.com/trainDetail.html?train=501&year=2017&month=12&day=18

It is my believe, that when the accident happened it was still dark. Those speedmarkers are really small!

 

[MarkyT]

This BBC News article quotes State transport spokesperson Barbara LaBoe as saying: "warning signs were in place two miles before the lowered limit."

In UK 80>30mph speed reduction would require a minimum warning distance of 1534m on a 1:100 falling gradient (it is actually about 1:140F average measured on Google Earth over the 2 miles). Assuming US braking performance is similar, a two mile advanced warning would be over double that. I think that's probably too much as it doesn't really give a good indication of where to start braking; you could really keep going at linespeed for a further mile or so before starting to slow, and thus without a further reminder there's much more chance of misjudgement. Perhaps 2 miles is a default standard warning distance, maybe most suitable for their very heavy freights with a big margin of error, but not for better braking passenger stock. BBC news just said that there was no manual brake application until the accident caused it automatically, presumably by the separation of the brake pipe. There was also a trainee in the cab along with the driver.

 

[WatcherZero]

Some more details from Investigators;
Driver was trained and knew the route, he was training a new conductor on the route who was with him in the cab when the accident occurred, the assigned conductor was in the passenger compartments.
Inward and outward facing cab cameras were damaged but have been salvaged for examination.
The Driver never activated the brakes, the two data recorders report they were activated automatically after the train detected a derailment.
All 5 staff members survived and are in hospital, police are waiting to interview them.
Investigators expect to remain on site for 7-10 days before removing the train and the damaged road lorries to storage, investigation report will take around a year.

 

[Groningen]

A quote from the Seattle Times.

State transportation leaders had long ago envisioned the corridor would be refurbished by 2019, according to state records, but to collect federal stimulus money, construction had to be completed by mid-2017. The state then vowed to open the line this fall. Officials kept that promise, launching the new Point Defiance Bypass route on Monday. But had they waited just a few more months, the service would have included a critical safety feature that automatically slows trains if they exceed speed limits.

With other words: time pressure to open the line or getting no federal money, but the speed security system was not yet ready.

 

[Taunton]

Driver was trained and knew the route

I'm sure they had done the training. Training runs generally take place 0900-1700 Monday to Friday. There had never been a scheduled passenger train over the line before this one, only freights (different operator) and these training runs, so I wonder whether the engineer had ever been over the route in the dark before.

It does indeed look like the Croydon Tram accident, long fast run followed by a tight bend you have to know, with minimal signage. Even being in the dark is a common factor.

But had they waited just a few more months, the service would have included a critical safety feature that automatically slows trains if they exceed speed limits.

Alternatively, they could have got the PTC installation up and working with the rest of the project. It's not rocket science technology, it's readily available off the shelf from the major US signalling suppliers.

 

[WatcherZero]

Actually the original statutory deadline for PTC was 2015 when it was signed in to law in 2008, the Federal government had put the deadline back till Dec 31 2018 with a further two year grace period possible because they had withdrawn the funding for implementation.

 

[Dixie]

The driver should get themselves a good lawyer.

 

[Groningen]

The driver should get themselves a good lawyer.

25.577 lawyers in Washington state
35 lawyers for every 10.000 residents in WA

That will so not be a problem!

Source: http://www.denniswpottslaw.com/united-states-attorneys-map/

 

[philabos]

All this confusion over who is responsible for the track, coupled with the repeated slashing of public transportation budgets in the US, and with the suggestion that the rules on route knowledge over there might be less stringent than here in the UK, shows the logical conclusion of decades of under-investment and an ideologically driven drive* to cut regulations and oversight that borders on the pathological. We may complain about the amount of red tape involved in making any changes to operations or infrastructure here, but if the only options for running a railway were the US approach or the UK approach... well, I know which I'd choose.


.

While some of what you say may be true, it has little relationship to this incident.

This line just had $181 million in investment at the end of an $800 million total spend on the Cascade service. This may yet turn out to be a lot of things, but lack of investment will not be on the list.
Except of course for the 30mph curve in order to cross I5.

The train 188 derailment several years ago in Philadelphia caused by excessive speed on a curve, was also not an investment issue. The Pennsylvania Railroad system installed in the 1950's that would have prevented the over speed was turned off for eastbound trains. It was activated again before trains could operate after the derailment . Took all of about 48 hours as I remember.

While systematic issues cannot be ignored, they also should not be used as cover for dumb decisions.

PTC was mandated when it was a high level description, not an off the shelf functioning system. It required FCC channels which did not exist. The railroads were told to figure it out and pay the bill. It still has issues and is not plug and play.

In this particular case, someone made the decision to initiate service prior to activation of the PTC system which supposedly would be ready in Spring 2018.

Speaking of dumb decisions, it has taken almost three decades to develop PTC. We could have bought a system off the shelf 20 years ago, one I can think of in use in the UK. Not made here though.

 

[HSTEd]

Given that US Talgo trainset construction has shut down, will it be possible to obtain a replacement tilting trainset for the service?
It seems likely that the crashed set will be a near total writeoff.

 

[ac6000cw]

There are two Talgo owned series 8 trainsets currently stored (originally built for the state of Wisconsin before it reneged on the order), so they are potentially available for sale or lease.

Also the Talgo facility in Milwaukee is still in use for maintenance and repairs.

In the meantime services from the north are being turned around at Portland instead of Eugene to at least partly cover for the loss of the trainset, with an Amfleet-equipped shuttle train between Portland and Eugene.

(Info from Trains magazine newswire)

 

[philabos]

Given that US Talgo trainset construction has shut down, will it be possible to obtain a replacement tilting trainset for the service?
It seems likely that the crashed set will be a near total writeoff.

In addition to the set out of service as a result of a derailment several months ago.
It will be interesting to see what NTSB has to say about Talgo. We will probably have to wait some time before a report.

 

[philabos]

The Washington State DOT has now announced no passenger service will be permitted on the rebuilt line until PTC is in place.
The passenger trains will be moved back to the main line freight route that is PTC equipped. All BNSF and UP freight locomotives are also PTC equipped. Amtrak locomotives are not equipped at this point.

 

[petergb]

NTSB News Release : NTSB Conducts Initial Review of Amtrak Train Recorders 22 Dec 2017
<<
The lead locomotive’s event data and video recorders were successfully downloaded with the manufacturer’s assistance and processed in the NTSB’s lab in Washington, D.C. An initial review of the final portion of the accident sequence revealed the following information, which is preliminary and subject to change as the investigation continues:

• Inward-facing video with audio captured the crew’s actions and their conversations. A forward-facing video with audio captured conditions in front of the locomotive as well as external sounds.
• The crew was not observed to use any personal electronic devices during the timeframe reviewed.
• About six seconds prior to the derailment, the engineer made a comment regarding an over speed condition.
• The engineer’s actions were consistent with the application of the locomotive’s brakes just before the recording ended. It did not appear the engineer placed the brake handle in emergency-braking mode.
• The recording ended as the locomotive was tilting and the crew was bracing for impact.
• The final recorded speed of the locomotive was 78 mph.

A preliminary report detailing the facts and circumstances of the crash developed in this early stage of the investigation will be available on the NTSB website in the coming days.
>>
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/PR20171222.aspx

 

[SemaphoreSam]

Originally the line was owned by a private freight operator (BNSF?). When local government took it over for commuter operations, part of the investment was to provide for straightening out the subject curve; later this was determined to be too expensive, and was dropped. Soooo, a trap was set: 1, First day of operations, crew not very familiar with the route (AMTRAK, as opposed, say, to the LIRR, seems to be "loose" on route training 2, PTC was provided for, but delayed (kind of stupid, after the Philly accident), and 3, Planned straightening of curve deleted. As in aviation, the holes in the swiss cheese were aligned, and the result was an accident. Look to managers and politicians, not crew, for blame. Sam

 

[Taunton]

When local government took it over for commuter operations,

I believe that the accident site is not part of the local government-supported commuter operation. This, Sounder Train, managed by BNSF, operates south from Seattle, to Lakewood terminus. The accident has happened several miles beyond Lakewood, on a former minor (in fact hardly used) freight-only extension which connects back, shortly after the scene, with the main Seattle-Portland trunk route. This latter, also the former Amtrak route, has taken a somewhat indirect and curving route, but is at least level, right along the shoreline. The new route is more direct, and straighter, except at its western end where it has a double-S curve, firstly to cross the main Interstate 5 from one side to the other, and almost immediately again to connect back onto the main line where it also passes under this road. The rail formation had been altered, including the bridge, when the road was built in the early 1960s.

The recent works had improved the infrastructure, with relaying and reballasting, but not addressed the final twisting alignment; the rest of the new route is pretty much straight. In fact, it's a miles-long straight, doubtless high speed now, with what must be few if any identifiable braking points, through the forest approaching the twists. I wonder how many training trips over it the engineer had made, and whether this had ever been done in the hours of darkness. The fact that this inaugural train was apparently running 30 minutes late doubtless was an additional incentive to run to the maximum.

 

[SemaphoreSam]

Oops, I was confused. The following article in the Seattle Times of June 2016, last paragraph, implies Sounder, not BNSF, ownership of that trackage. Sam
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattl...so-popular-sound-transits-trying-to-add-more/

 

[Dixie]

SemaphoreSam and Taunton I must agree with you both. The cards were well stacked against the driver (engineer). He should have been on top of it, but I would liken it to a 50/50 traffic collision, or perhaps more to when a road hasn't been well engineered and a collision occurs. The various railroad bodies must share at least 50% of any responsibility.

Even a flashing amber signal at the point at which you need to slow would have provided a good visual warning for such a dramatic reduction in speed.

 

[MarkyT]

SemaphoreSam and Taunton I must agree with you both. The cards were well stacked against the driver (engineer). He should have been on top of it, but I would liken it to a 50/50 traffic collision, or perhaps more to when a road hasn't been well engineered and a collision occurs. The various railroad bodies must share at least 50% of any responsibility.

Even a flashing amber signal at the point at which you need to slow would have provided a good visual warning for such a dramatic reduction in speed.

There was an advanced warning board apparently but I was surprised it was reported to be a whole two miles from the restriction. Based on UK figures that's nearly double braking distance for the reduction, so the train could have continued on for nearly a mile at line speed after passing it before commencing to slow down. Without any further warning or technical safeguards, that overbraking could have been a risk in its own right with no landmark to indicate the ideal place to start braking.

 

[Dixie]

There was an advanced warning board apparently but I was surprised it was reported to be a whole two miles from the restriction.

As others have said, though, a board is not very visible in darkness or low light if not accompanied by something, such as a flashing light, which shows where it is and can be easily seen by the driver (engineer).