Trap and drag? Is this a more common problem with the 1995 tube stock. If so, why?

[Silent]

I haven’t witnessed a trap and drag incident. I’ve heard of it happening though on the Piccadilly line, Central Line and Northern Line.

I suppose it probably happens on all lines though.

 

[edwin_m]

This report just appeared into two recent ones on the Northern Line, and contains some details of other incidents: https://assets.publishing.service.g...c6e/R062024_240627_Archway_and_Chalk_Farm.pdf

RAIB has previously investigated two similar accidents on the London Underground network. One of these accidents occurred on the Northern line, while the other took place on the Central line.
...
On 14 May 2023 at Green Park station on LUL’s Jubilee line, a passenger’s clothing became trapped in the closing door of a train
...
On 21 February 2024, an accident occurred at Bank station on the Central line when a passenger’s coat became trapped in the closing door of a train.

 

[bramling]

I haven’t witnessed a trap and drag incident. I’ve heard of it happening though on the Piccadilly line, Central Line and Northern Line.

I suppose it probably happens on all lines though.

One can certainly see that the Northern Line seems to be slightly disproportionally affected by doors incidents, and if anything the trend seems to be increasing. Also the Notthern Line is probably one of the lines used more by regular users than infrequent ones, so if anything you’d expect *less* incidents on here rather than more.

However if you look at the quality of LU management and training nowadays it’s not hard to see a link. These sorts of things are the manifestation of a slide which has been going on for quite a few years.

I’d put it more down to this than the trains, and the RAIB report makes quite shambolic reading at times - for example both drivers had been given a previous Action Plan for platform/train interface incidents yet no record of what this was or even whether it was carried out. Likewise no D& A test carried out due to an “oversight”. At times the RAIB are a bit too diplomatic.

And possibly even worse, RAIB making the point that many staff on the line still don’t seem to appreciate that the pilot light can - by design - illuminate with a small object still in the doors. Quite simply nothing seems to have been learned or implemented from past incidents. The feeling one gets is that the management here simply have no understanding at all of how to actually run a railway.

 

[waterboo]

One can certainly see that the Northern Line seems to be slightly disproportionally affected by doors incidents, and if anything the trend seems to be increasing. Also the Notthern Line is probably one of the lines used more by regular users than infrequent ones, so if anything you’d expect *less* incidents on here rather than more.

However if you look at the quality of LU management and training nowadays it’s not hard to see a link. These sorts of things are the manifestation of a slide which has been going on for quite a few years.

I’d put it more down to this than the trains, and the RAIB report makes quite shambolic reading at times - for example both drivers had been given a previous Action Plan for platform/train interface incidents yet no record of what this was or even whether it was carried out. Likewise no D& A test carried out due to an “oversight”. At times the RAIB are a bit too diplomatic.

And possibly even worse, RAIB making the point that many staff on the line still don’t seem to appreciate that the pilot light can - by design - illuminate with a small object still in the doors. Quite simply nothing seems to have been learned or implemented from past incidents. The feeling one gets is that the management here simply have no understanding at all of how to actually run a railway.

Wow, having read the report I have to agree wholeheartedly with your sobering remarks regarding this report.

On the surface, it would not be unduly harsh to suggest that LUL has failed jointly in the prevention and mitigation against previously outlined factors and recommendations for Trap and Drag incidents.

I was also seriously concerned around paragraph 97 which states that:

"In addition, it is not uncommon for passengers to get momentarily caught in closing doors as trains prepare to start. This most often results in the
passenger pulling themselves free of the doors. Such events seldom lead to an
incident or accident"

I feel like the RAIB have brushed aside the underpinning context that PTI checks are frequently not sufficient to prevent entrapment - and this probably most suggesting for the 'non reporting' culture.

Say this was the Piccadilly or Bakerloo lines where the driver relies on platform mounted OPO monitors and mirrors, the lack of continuous PTI monitoring as the train leaves the platform could have significantly more tragic implications.

Thank for for making us aware of this.

 

[edwin_m]

Interestingly no reports from the sub-surface lines or the Victoria, which I believe are the only ones to have sensitive door edges. Presumably the Piccadilly will get these with the new fleet.

 

[Mawkie]

I feel like the RAIB have brushed aside the underpinning context that PTI checks are frequently not sufficient to prevent entrapment - and this probably most suggesting for the 'non reporting' culture.

Trap and drag is a serious issue, and one that operational staff take seriously - my ultimate aim every day is that every single person I interact with gets home safely at the end of their journey, and that includes staff and passengers. There is actually a mnemonic for the departure process at each station: SODOSO.

S = SIGNAL (CHECK)

O = OPO MONITORS (CHECK)

D = DOORS CLOSED VISUAL (CHECK)

O = OPO MONITORS (AGAIN)

S = SIGNAL (AGAIN)

O = OPO MONITORS (CHECKING AS YOU LEAVE THE PLATFORM)

Saying that, and in response to your quote above, there are stations on the Underground where it simply isn't possible to close the doors without trapping someone in them!

1. There is no dwell time 'limit' on LU, but realistically, a train does have to depart in a timely manner - this is especially true if there is another train (or trains) directly behind, where passengers may be more comfortable just waiting 1 more minute. I understand passengers don't want to wait longer when they've already waited for extended periods.

2. Without victim blaming, by far the people who are getting trapped in doors the most are those who wear headphones, or earpods. They don't hear the chimes and literally just walk/run into closing doors. I see this on nearly every platform I serve, on every shift I do. What can I do about this? Not much.

3. The pilot light misunderstanding is widespread and I don't understand why. It is called a "Doors Closed Visual", so perhaps that doesn't help. I certainly know that it means "the doors are closed" and not "there's nothing trapped in the doors".

4. The station monitors are sometimes woeful! See Osterley (E) on a sunny day, or Knightsbridge (W) where the positioning is not good. Of course there are procedures in place for this, but there is a reluctance for management to address those issues when reported.

5. LU have decided to cut station staff numbers and specifically, reduce the number of staff who do the SATS announcements (the classic person with a baton saying "mind the closing doors"). I have to think management have done the Maths on this - how much impact does it have on PTI incidents over the cost of the extra staff....

6. LU serve a lot of stations with a very frequent service. The sheer numbers of people travelling make it hard to ensure 100% safety.

I plan for zero incidents each day, but is it inevitable that some incidents happen? I want to say no, but in reality I'm surprised it isn't more.

 

[bramling]

Trap and drag is a serious issue, and one that operational staff take seriously - my ultimate aim every day is that every single person I interact with gets home safely at the end of their journey, and that includes staff and passengers. There is actually a mnemonic for the departure process at each station: SODOSO.

S = SIGNAL (CHECK)

O = OPO MONITORS (CHECK)

D = DOORS CLOSED VISUAL (CHECK)

O = OPO MONITORS (AGAIN)

S = SIGNAL (AGAIN)

O = OPO MONITORS (CHECKING AS YOU LEAVE THE PLATFORM)

Saying that, and in response to your quote above, there are stations on the Underground where it simply isn't possible to close the doors without trapping someone in them!

1. There is no dwell time 'limit' on LU, but realistically, a train does have to depart in a timely manner - this is especially true if there is another train (or trains) directly behind, where passengers may be more comfortable just waiting 1 more minute. I understand passengers don't want to wait longer when they've already waited for extended periods.

2. Without victim blaming, by far the people who are getting trapped in doors the most are those who wear headphones, or earpods. They don't hear the chimes and literally just walk/run into closing doors. I see this on nearly every platform I serve, on every shift I do. What can I do about this? Not much.

3. The pilot light misunderstanding is widespread and I don't understand why. It is called a "Doors Closed Visual", so perhaps that doesn't help. I certainly know that it means "the doors are closed" and not "there's nothing trapped in the doors".

4. The station monitors are sometimes woeful! See Osterley (E) on a sunny day, or Knightsbridge (W) where the positioning is not good. Of course there are procedures in place for this, but there is a reluctance for management to address those issues when reported.

5. LU have decided to cut station staff numbers and specifically, reduce the number of staff who do the SATS announcements (the classic person with a baton saying "mind the closing doors"). I have to think management have done the Maths on this - how much impact does it have on PTI incidents over the cost of the extra staff....

6. LU serve a lot of stations with a very frequent service. The sheer numbers of people travelling make it hard to ensure 100% safety.

I plan for zero incidents each day, but is it inevitable that some incidents happen? I want to say no, but in reality I'm surprised it isn't more.

Completely agree with the above. I think the issue is more about why the Northern Line seems to be cropping up more with these sorts of issues, when really one would expect less. The Picc Line for example has a less good OPO system, is generally a bit busier, and it’s fair to say has a much greater proportion of non-regular users, yet doesn’t seem to be having these incidents. One can’t escape the conclusion that there’s more of a local issue going on here.

If I had to make a guess, I’d say the competence assurance isn’t performing properly, and seemingly hasn’t been for some while. This in turn probably means the training is deficient as well. Essentially no one in leadership roles has an eye for and an understanding of what’s happening - or perhaps more to the point not happening - on the ground.

Clearly for whatever reason a mainline-style “train safety check” isn’t being consistently performed, despite this probably being by far the most important element of dispatching a train. There seem to have been enough red flags, so this can only be put down to a management failing.

 

[edwin_m]

2. Without victim blaming, by far the people who are getting trapped in doors the most are those who wear headphones, or earpods. They don't hear the chimes and literally just walk/run into closing doors. I see this on nearly every platform I serve, on every shift I do. What can I do about this? Not much.

The Stadler trams in Croydon have lights around the door edge that turn from green to red when the closure sequence starts, and I believe the new Piccadilly stock will have these too. Along with edge sensitive doors I hope these will go a long way with new fleets, but it doesn't solve the problem for the existing fleets that will be around for decades yet.

 

[skyhigh]

I’d put it more down to this than the trains, and the RAIB report makes quite shambolic reading at times - for example both drivers had been given a previous Action Plan for platform/train interface incidents yet no record of what this was or even whether it was carried out. Likewise no D& A test carried out due to an “oversight”. At times the RAIB are a bit too diplomatic.

And possibly even worse, RAIB making the point that many staff on the line still don’t seem to appreciate that the pilot light can - by design - illuminate with a small object still in the doors.

Plus failing to report the incidents to RAIB. It's really quite an alarming read and gives the impression management doesn't have a clue and training is woefully deficient.

 

[Mawkie]

Essentially no one in leadership roles has an eye for and an understanding of what’s happening - or perhaps more to the point not happening - on the ground.

If I remember correctly, you have written here previously about the loss of skilled people within TfL throughout all grades (for various reasons) and being replaced with people who lack the skills or experience of managing a large transport organisation. Like you, I suspect that has something to do with it. However, ultimately, it's the train op who has eyes on the monitors and fingers on the buttons.

 

[bramling]

If I remember correctly, you have written here previously about the loss of skilled people within TfL throughout all grades (for various reasons) and being replaced with people who lack the skills or experience of managing a large transport organisation. Like you, I suspect that has something to do with it. However, ultimately, it's the train op who has eyes on the monitors and fingers on the buttons.

I think what’s happening is two-fold. Firstly clearly there’s misunderstandings about what the pilot does and doesn’t mean. Secondly it’s abundantly clear that there isn’t a “train safety check” being specifically and/or consistently carried out as mainline drivers do (I also note and realise LU’s rule book doesn’t specifically require it, or at least not in the clear terms that the mainline does).

That being the case, one would expect management to have identified and addressed this, certainly after previous incidents, and certainly after the briefings (referred to by the RAIB) were brought in. So briefings were implemented - presumably in response to an issue being identified - yet apparently they weren’t documented, and no one seems to have thought to see whether they had proven effective, or even whether every driver had received one…

I’d suggest we can also make the reasonable assumption, given the slapdash reporting, that there’s also been other incidents which haven’t come to RAIB’s notice.

 

[bahnause]

After reading the report about the two incidents, it occurs to me that there may be a certain discrepancy between expectations and reality as far as the recognisability of dangerous situations on the screens is concerned.

The report itself states that the situation may not have been recognisable to the operator with the available resources. No amount of training could fix this, at least not without compromises in other parts like longer standing times in stations or improved technology.

This raises the fundamental question of whether DOO in this form, i.e. with this mixture of technical and human monitoring, makes sense. This question was also in focus during the introduction of DOO on our network. Due to the train lengths, the existing infrastructure, other tasks such as monitoring the route and signals and the planned dwell times, it quickly became clear that the human component had no place in the DOO environment and that the driver could not take on this responsibility. The driver can therefore rely 100% on the feedback from the door control system.

 

[edwin_m]

After reading the report about the two incidents, it occurs to me that there may be a certain discrepancy between expectations and reality as far as the recognisability of dangerous situations on the screens is concerned.

The report itself states that the situation may not have been recognisable to the operator with the available resources. No amount of training could fix this, at least not without compromises in other parts like longer standing times in stations or improved technology.

This raises the fundamental question of whether DOO in this form, i.e. with this mixture of technical and human monitoring, makes sense. This question was also in focus during the introduction of DOO on our network. Due to the train lengths, the existing infrastructure, other tasks such as monitoring the route and signals and the planned dwell times, it quickly became clear that the human component had no place in the DOO environment and that the driver could not take on this responsibility. The driver can therefore rely 100% on the feedback from the door control system.

So that's saying that DOO is only workable if the door systems are effective at detecting obstructions such as coats and bag straps.

 

[whoosh]

I think what’s happening is two-fold. Firstly clearly there’s misunderstandings about what the pilot does and doesn’t mean. Secondly it’s abundantly clear that there isn’t a “train safety check” being specifically and/or consistently carried out as mainline drivers do (I also note and realise LU’s rule book doesn’t specifically require it, or at least not in the clear terms that the mainline does).

Driving on the main line, I have a camera on each coach, so I can see in line with the Platform Train Interface. Also, with the exception of Farringdon, the yellow line for passengers to stand behind is much further back than on the tube.
Whilst I drive trains that are ATO capable, I am not yet trained to do so. However, I do know that class 700s can be driven manually at any time, and can be placed into ATO at anytime in the Core, (i.e. The mode can be changed on the move) which would allow a cautious departure in manual mode if necessary, but still keep as much ATO performance as possible.
This is something that isn't available as far as I know to Tube drivers, where ATO needs to be selected at a stand only.



Cameras on each coach are impossible with a tube train because of the curvature of the roof, and the yellow line has been deliberately placed closer to the platform edge as passengers were using it as a 'walkway' when it was further back. It's placed closer to the edge to discourage walking near to the edge.
Underground Train Operators are having to use judgement as there are often people in the way (between the camera and the train) - a clear view is often impossible. You can see this in the report with the Chalk Farm incident.
You can also see that even with no-one else on the platform, the person couldn't have been seen.

The awful incident at Waterloo during COVID, where a person slipped between platform and train whilst the train had a few minutes standing time, also highlights inadequacies with the cameras.

Only one of the doors in a double doorway having ability to be pushed back to free clothing, is another common factor amongst one of the incidents here and previous ones - the pullback movement happening to be the wrong way to work in the direction of travel in each incident.

I'm honestly surprised there aren't a lot more incidents.
 

 

[bahnause]

So that's saying that DOO is only workable if the door systems are effective at detecting obstructions such as coats and bag straps.

No, a certain residual risk is accepted. The design of the doors can minimise the risk. For example, by improving detection or enabling thinner objects to be pulled out with little effort.