Unattended bags

[EM2]

I have no idea, I’m no expert, and very few have been found in the UK. I’m basing that on what ex military people who’ve done tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have to say about IEDs.

I’ll be taking their word over what some half-wit from a TOC training team has to say about what is safe or unsafe.

The person who took all my security training, who explained in great detail about how to approach unattended items and how to properly use the HOT protocol, was from exactly this background, as well as having done tours in Kosovo and Northern Ireland.

 

[Bromley boy]

The person who took all my security training, who explained in great detail about how to approach unattended items and how to properly use the HOT protocol, was from exactly this background, as well as having done tours in Kosovo and Northern Ireland.

Was he being paid by a TOC to do so? If so, take it with a pinch of salt, he’d have said whatever they asked him to say.

It’s a personal decision and I mean no criticism of those who take a different approach - that’s up to them.

I became a train driver because I like trains and enjoy driving them. Not because I want to approach and examine suspect packages. It’s just not something I’m willing to do and I’d resign before doing so!

The best way for people to prevent inconvenience and delay is to avoid leaving unattended packages in the first place.

 

[EM2]

Was he being paid by a TOC to do so? If so, take it with a pinch of salt, he’d have said whatever they asked him to say.

No, he wasn't.

 

[AlterEgo]

I'm really surprised staff are being trained to actually approach items which might be explosive devices.

I would not go near any package I suspected might be a bomb.

 

[EM2]

I'm really surprised staff are being trained to actually approach items which might be explosive devices.

I would not go near any package I suspected might be a bomb.

How would you suspect it might be a bomb, if you don't go near it?

 

[Bromley boy]

Indeed, AlterEgo.

And from the below article I have just had my suspicions confirmed - the HOT protocol is based on the threat from the IRA in the early 90s.

This is very out of date in light of recent attacks. The IRA were generally out to cause disruption and damage property - recent attacks are about maximising civilian casualties.

http://www.professionalsecurity.co.uk/news/transport/h-o-t-protocol/

Unattended items and the perception of risk

In a little under 36 months between 1991 and 1994, Britain’s railway network was targeted on more than 36 occasions by the Provisional IRA. The weapon of choice was the hand-placed, timer-controlled improvised explosive device (IED). In the minds of rail users, any unattended item could contain a bomb, and this represented a significant problem because, each day, hundreds of items were lost or abandoned on trains and in stations. For a brief period in 1992, for example, this meant one incident in every seven closed a station. Similar reactions were noted in other public spaces. It was recognised that something had to be done – and treating every item of lost property, or carelessly discarded rubbish, as if it were a confirmed IED was neither tenable nor proportionate.

 

[Bromley boy]

No, he wasn't.

I’d formed the impression you are or were TOC platform staff? Apologies, if not.

 

[EM2]

Indeed, AlterEgo.

And from the below article I have just had my suspicions confirmed - the HOT protocol is based on the threat from the IRA in the early 90s.

This is very out of date in light of recent attacks. The IRA were generally out to cause disruption and damage property - recent attacks are about maximising civilian casualties.

I see that you omitted to quote the final sentence:

However, what it continues to demonstrate is that by considering the three questions in context, it represents a rational and proportionate response to risk under conditions of uncertainty.

 

[johnkingeu]

Also note from the article there are an estimated 250,000 items of unattended luggage per year. If they were all treated as bombs then it would basically be the end of the rail system in the U.K.
I guess what actually happens in about 249,500 of those instances is someone trundles over, takes a peek, and goes ‘Oh, it’s someone’s sports kit’ and in 499 of them someone’s sports kit gets blown up. The remaining 1 is a viable but faulty bomb that either fails to explode or singes someone’s eyebrows.

 

[Bromley boy]

I see that you omitted to quote the final sentence:

I didn’t omit that sentence intentionally. That article is written in a 1994 context, hence irrelevant to the radically different threat we face in 2017.

You omitted to quote the penultimate sentence:

This is not to suggest that the H-O-T protocol will, in isolation, address all situations and will always result in the outcome attained at Oxford Circus – it is not a panacea.

It’s certainly being billed as a panacea these days!

 

[EM2]

I didn’t omit that sentence intentionally. That article is written in a 1994 context.

Yet it is dated 2016?

You omitted to quote the penultimate sentence:

This is not to suggest that the H-O-T protocol will, in isolation, address all situations and will always result in the outcome attained at Oxford Circus – it is not a panacea.

It’s certainly being billed as a panacea these days!

Not in any environment that I've worked in.

 

[Bromley boy]

Yet it is dated 2016?

Not in any environment that I've worked in.

Well, if you read it, you’ll note it’s dated 2016, but is discussing the genesis of the HOT protocol, which was designed with reference to data obtained between 1991 and 1994.

Are you or are you not TOC platform staff? What was the context of the training you received?

 

[EM2]

I am not.
I do work in stations.
My training was provided on that basis.

 

[AlterEgo]

How would you suspect it might be a bomb, if you don't go near it?

You don't have to actually approach the package and inspect it to apply the HOT protocol. Eg: if I can see, from 20 yards, a duffel bag lying hidden behind an door left ajar, the door in question being an old cupboard nobody's been in since BR days. I'm not going near that. I'm going to evacuate and ring it in to the police.

In the article quoted, the Oxford Circus incident involves a policeman seemingly weighing a suspect package. That's sheer idiocy - the IRA used to use magnesium tilt switches and other types of booby traps - unless he's specifically trained in bomb disposal.

 

[jon0844]

This is not to suggest that the H-O-T protocol will, in isolation, address all situations and will always result in the outcome attained at Oxford Circus – it is not a panacea.

It’s certainly being billed as a panacea these days!

It's just one method of many. As has been said, you can't make everything 100% safe as even installing x-ray machines and metal detectors and making checks for explosives doesn't eliminate the risk of an attack at the checkpoint.

For the most part, it does work though as it shouldn't mean an 'all stop' for a bag on a platform, but would if a bag was found in a cabinet that had been broken into.

What do you suggest as a better form of security, or are you suggesting that most of it is over the top and unnecessary?

 

[Llanigraham]

Was he being paid by a TOC to do so? If so, take it with a pinch of salt, he’d have said whatever they asked him to say.

It’s a personal decision and I mean no criticism of those who take a different approach - that’s up to them.

I became a train driver because I like trains and enjoy driving them. Not because I want to approach and examine suspect packages. It’s just not something I’m willing to do and I’d resign before doing so!

The best way for people to prevent inconvenience and delay is to avoid leaving unattended packages in the first place.

I've just been involved, in a senior position, with Wales Rally GB and we had to sit through a 90 minute talk and scenario lecture concerning concerning any possible terrorist action, and the HOT procedure was one that was "pushed" to us. That lecture was given by the head of West Midlands Police Anti-Terrorism Squad and I will follow his advice over that given by some of the people on this forum, who from some of the comments made , frankly, don't have a clue.

Your last comment is the most correct one.

 

[EM2]

You don't have to actually approach the package and inspect it to apply the HOT protocol. Eg: if I can see, from 20 yards, a duffel bag lying hidden behind an door left ajar, the door in question being an old cupboard nobody's been in since BR days. I'm not going near that. I'm going to evacuate and ring it in to the police.

There you go, you've just used the HOT protocol!
It is hidden and it is not typical of something in that location.
So the action that you would take is exactly right.

 

[Bromley boy]

I am not.
I do work in stations.
My training was provided on that basis.

Right, so presumably by a TOC (I reckon I know which one!) or network rail, depending on where you work?

Potatoe potata.

Some advice - don’t believe the guff the hired training mouth pieces tell you about what’s safe... Their concern is minimising delay minutes.

You feel free to approach suspect packages and apply HOT to your heart’s content...

I’ve explained why I will never do so!

 

[Llanigraham]

Right, so presumably by a TOC (I reckon I know which one!) or network rail, depending on where you work?

Potatoe potata.

Some advice - don’t believe the guff the hired training mouth pieces tell you about what’s safe... Their concern is minimising delay minutes.

You feel free to approach suspect packages and apply HOT to your heart’s content...

I’ve explained why I will never do so!

And as has been explained you do NOT have to approach a "package" in the HOT procedure!

 

[Bromley boy]

And as has been explained you do NOT have to approach a "package" in the HOT procedure!

That’s not the way the protocol has been explained to me. I was told that you do approach and open packages which are deemed to meet the protocol: not hidden; not obviously suspicious; typical of their environment. Which the Parsons Green device evidently was.

A recent, viable terrorist device would have been deemed worthy of opening and inspecting by the protocol.

That renders it unfit for purpose in my view.

 

[EM2]

Some advice - don’t believe the guff the hired training mouth pieces tell you about what’s safe... Their concern is minimising delay minutes.

Who said it was a hired trainer?
Suffice to say the person concerned had been an Army officer for almost twenty years.

 

[Bromley boy]

Who said it was a hired trainer?
Suffice to say the person concerned had been an Army officer for almost twenty years.

Well, i doubt they were training you for free!

I imagine it would have been training from SE, or network rail (who I believe look after HS1), given where you live...?

 

[EM2]

I imagine it would have been training from SE, or network rail (who I believe look after HS1), given where you live...?

Now what you're doing here is assuming that the training was done by a trainer, rather than by someone that actually has the overall responsibility for things like security planning, crisis management, operational risk and emergency/continuity planning within the organisation.

 

[johnkingeu]

That’s not the way the protocol has been explained to me. I was told that you do approach and open packages which are deemed to meet the protocol: not hidden; not obviously suspicious; typical of their environment. Which the Parsons Green device evidently was.

A recent, viable terrorist device would have been deemed worthy of opening and inspecting by the protocol.

That renders it unfit for purpose in my view.

Wires were seen hanging out of the Parsons Green device. So it would have failed HOT.

Not that this stopped members of the public wondering up to it and filming it :-/

 

[Bromley boy]

Keep it coming.

As a DOO driver, I’m yet to hear a reply to this thread that sheds any light on why on earth I should follow the HOT protocol.

I’m all ears!

Now what you're doing here is assuming that the training was done by a trainer, rather than by someone that actually has the overall responsibility for things like security planning, crisis management, operational risk and emergency/continuity planning within the organisation.

2 questions, yes or no answers please:

Do you or do you not work for a TOC?

Was the training provided by someone employed, or in some way affiliated with, a TOC or network rail?

 

[AlterEgo]

There you go, you've just used the HOT protocol!
It is hidden and it is not typical of something in that location.
So the action that you would take is exactly right.

I understand that - what I don’t understand is (and correct me if I’m wrong) why you’d actually *approach* something which could or could not be a bomb to determine this. I wouldn’t be taking my chances with something triggering me in the slightest on the HOT protocol.

 

[EM2]

Do you or do you not work for a TOC?

Was the training provided by someone employed, or in some way affiliated with, a TOC or network rail?

No.

Yes.

 

[EM2]

I understand that - what I don’t understand is (and correct me if I’m wrong) why you’d actually *approach* something which could or could not be a bomb to determine this. I wouldn’t be taking my chances with something triggering me in the slightest on the HOT protocol.

The only way to determine whether it is or it isn't, is to look at it.
If it's a bag sat next to a TVM, then it's not hidden, and it's typical of its location. So far, so good. Is it obviously suspicious? You don't know, so what are you going to do now?

 

[Bromley boy]

No.
Yes.

As I suspected!

They will tell you what they are told, and paid, to tell you. Their aim isn't your safety, it’s keeping the trains moving.

Rightly or wrongly, my aim is my personal safety.

 

[Bromley boy]

The only way to determine whether it is or it isn't, is to look at it.
If it's a bag sat next to a TVM, then it's not hidden, and it's typical of its location. So far, so good. Is it obviously suspicious? You don't know, so what are you going to do now?

So would you have walked up to the Parsons Green device and opened it?

You be an obedient little TOC employee and get your head blown off then.

I’ll resign over the GSMR, chuck my key into the cess and sprint up the 4 foot before I do similar...

(No offence intended by this - but you see what I mean!)