Railperf
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- 30 Oct 2017
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Where was the problem in the end?WM113 (and WM116) were reconnected on the 23rd.
Where was the problem in the end?WM113 (and WM116) were reconnected on the 23rd.
Where was the problem in the end?
Still not fully resolved but approach control removed.Where was the problem in the end?
But when they were first installed they weren't a problem so whats changed since their installation?AIUI it was interference somewhere on the datalink affecting specific modules.
I don’t know in this specific case, but components can degrade overtime and become less effective at filtering out interference or cables can be damaged. The level of interference can also increase beyond what can be filtered out, this has happened in a few different places where there has been issues with the overhead line switching equipment.But when they were first installed they weren't a problem so whats changed since their installation?
The interference may have come from a faulty item of signalling equipment. Or other nearby equipment.But when they were first installed they weren't a problem so whats changed since their installation?
But when they were first installed they weren't a problem so whats changed since their installation?
In addition to interference from railway sources such as traction, it's plausible third party activity near the railway can cause problems, say a really noisy electrical process under the line in a commercially leased arch, or a powerful new radio transmitter nearby. Unfortunately BR chose a copper datalink standard while Belgium specified fibre optics for the same job when they also adopted SSI technology through Alst(h)om (a little later than BR I think to be fair). While Belgium used the same central interlocking hardware, they had different custom TFMs, datalink modules and customised main programme and data config language that better matched their national standards. I think the field address space was larger, i.e. more modules per system, and the fibre datalink protocol was much faster and suitable for axle counter evaluation over the same link. Alstom developed a special TFM that, in addition to standard inputs and outputs, could directly connect the inductive sensors.The interference may have come from a faulty item of signalling equipment. Or other nearby equipment.
Or part of the datalink (cable or equipment module connected to it) have have degraded resulting in a worse signal to noise ratio. Like listening to an AM radio, then a car passes with an unsuppressed ignition system and the audio signal becomes hard to hear due to the interference.
The trouble is, with up to 63 Trackside Functional Modules (TFM) per data link, tracking down the source of the trouble is time consuming.
This fault caused considerable disruption over many weeks.The reason for the failure here is still under investigation.
The only change is approach control on Fast Lines has been removed.
I'm not in he industry so this is purely speculation, but my guess would be that they initially defaulted to the safest mode of operation per the rule book (approach control) until they were able to make the safety case for resuming normal operating procedures.If the approach control, which caused many down fast drivers to slow to 10mph from 55 mph, can be removed now with the ‘failure’ still under investigation why was approach control ordered in the first place.
I'm not in he industry so this is purely speculation, but my guess would be that they initially defaulted to the safest mode of operation per the rule book (approach control) until they were able to make the safety case for resuming normal operating procedures.
In other words, assume that it will kill you until you can prove that it won't. Don't forget that the rules are literally written in blood.
To prevent a SPAD at line speed. It will not have been applied for the fun of it - and the delay will have caused significant financial penalty to NR.This fault caused considerable disruption over many weeks.
If the approach control, which caused many down fast drivers to slow to 10mph from 55 mph, can be removed now with the ‘failure’ still under investigation why was approach control ordered in the first place.
For the signallers’ & the public’s benefit I hope this fault can be eliminated & publicly explained so lessons can be learnt.
It will not have been applied for the fun of it
and the delay will have caused significant financial penalty to NR.
Or to put it another way, permission given for a return to normal working, but the fault is still open (also known as "left on test").Still in under investigation means the exact cause may not be known but there is enough data and enough has been done to stabilise the link enough to remove the approach control.
Delay was around 3 mins per train with the delay totalling around 14k mins since the incident started late March.Correct
Not correct, as the delays will largely be ‘sub threshold’ and not accounted for financially.
It has, however, completely screwed On Time and Time to 3 punctuality, which has caused much consternation.
Delay was around 3 mins per train with the delay totalling around 14k mins since the incident started late March.