Western Rail Access to Heathrow delayed

[coppercapped]

You're a factor of 10 out there for a start.

Fair enough!

But it still means that the price increase alone would have bought enough oil to run all the trains for 15 years.

The whole thing was a response to JamesRowden's question in post no. 47

How many years worth of diesel could you buy?

to my point about the cost increase in the GW's electrification. It was clearly intended to an 'order of magnitude' calculation and should be treated as such.

But the point is valid - the cost increase has been beyond all imagination. And I do not really accept Philip Phlopp's argument that if we knew then what we know now it would have been better planned and the Government interfered causing cost increases. It's always too easy to blame outside influences "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves,..." I accept that interference will have caused some increases, but a billion pounds worth?

On the same patch Reading station and its approaches were rebuilt on schedule, in fact quicker than the very original schedule that was published, and at a price which was very close to the original estimate allowing for some additional works. The area was re-signalled, embankments widened, new drains dug, a 2km long viaduct built, a new station structure erected, a maintenance depot and yard built and electrification masts put up with very little effect on the train services. It was managed by Bechtel on behalf of Network Rail and run by a project manager, Bill Henry, who ate 6 inch nails for breakfast.

In my judgement, based on published information, such a project management organisation was not set up for the electrification works. In fact it was even more complex, east of Maidenhead the works belong to Crossrail, west of Reading to Network Rail and as far as I can see it's a mish-mash between Reading and Maidenhead. I attended a talk in Swindon last year on the GW modernisation programme presented by a Network Rail manager who had the word 'Change' somewhere in his job title. He was, frankly, less than impressive. He confused 'objectives' with 'constraints', showed some PowerPoint slides showing all the things going on and essentially said that it was all very difficult. Much of Network Rail's difficulty is clearly home grown. If it had identified a project manager - a real live breathing person - for route modernisation at the start and not just assembled a nebulous collection of 'stakeholders', I very much doubt whether it would be in such a state at the moment. Electrification would then have been a work package in the whole programme.

BR learnt from the initial London - Manchester - Liverpool project which was very similar to today's GW work - the track and structures were being rebuilt at the same time as re-signalling and electrification work was going on. In later electrifications, Weaver Junction to Glasgow and the East Coast, much (but not all) of the preparatory work had been done before the wires went up and these works were done comparatively quickly.

Network Rail can now do its day to day maintenance well (although there is always room for improvement - there always is!) - it has relearnt the basic skills. The tragedy is that, at least as seen from the outside, it didn't know it couldn't do complex interdisciplinary construction projects. Except at Reading where it engaged specialist project managers. The exception tests the rule...!

 

[DerekC]

Fair enough!

But the point is valid - the cost increase has been beyond all imagination. And I do not really accept Philip Phlopp's argument that if we knew then what we know now it would have been better planned and the Government interfered causing cost increases. It's always too easy to blame outside influences "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves,..." I accept that interference will have caused some increases, but a billion pounds worth?
....

In my judgement, based on published information, such a project management organisation was not set up for the electrification works. In fact it was even more complex, east of Maidenhead the works belong to Crossrail, west of Reading to Network Rail and as far as I can see it's a mish-mash between Reading and Maidenhead. I attended a talk in Swindon last year on the GW modernisation programme presented by a Network Rail manager who had the word 'Change' somewhere in his job title. He was, frankly, less than impressive. He confused 'objectives' with 'constraints', showed some PowerPoint slides showing all the things going on and essentially said that it was all very difficult. Much of Network Rail's difficulty is clearly home grown. If it had identified a project manager - a real live breathing person - for route modernisation at the start and not just assembled a nebulous collection of 'stakeholders', I very much doubt whether it would be in such a state at the moment. Electrification would then have been a work package in the whole programme.

BR learnt from the initial London - Manchester - Liverpool project which was very similar to today's GW work - the track and structures were being rebuilt at the same time as re-signalling and electrification work was going on. In later electrifications, Weaver Junction to Glasgow and the East Coast, much (but not all) of the preparatory work had been done before the wires went up and these works were done comparatively quickly.

Part of the (historic) problem - which we can learn from - is that these upgrades were conceived in the post-West Coast Route Modernisation atmosphere of blame and recrimination over the cost overruns. There was a very great reluctance on the part of DfT and NR to recognise GW as needing an integrated approach. In fact I heard a very senior DfT project director in about 2008 telling off somebody for daring to talk about "Great Western Route Modernisation". The different elements (Reading, Crossrail, electrification, ERTMS, IEP) were to be managed separately. So - no coordination, some projects (Reading) have gone well and others (Electrification, ERTMS) haven't - and the whole mess (including IEP) ends up costing all of us an arm and a leg. Like WCRM, only worse.

 

[coppercapped]

Part of the (historic) problem - which we can learn from - is that these upgrades were conceived in the post-West Coast Route Modernisation atmosphere of blame and recrimination over the cost overruns. There was a very great reluctance on the part of DfT and NR to recognise GW as needing an integrated approach. In fact I heard a very senior DfT project director in about 2008 telling off somebody for daring to talk about "Great Western Route Modernisation". The different elements (Reading, Crossrail, electrification, ERTMS, IEP) were to be managed separately. So - no coordination, some projects (Reading) have gone well and others (Electrification, ERTMS) haven't - and the whole mess (including IEP) ends up costing all of us an arm and a leg. Like WCRM, only worse.

Thank you! It's nice to learn that one's analysis is correct!

But, at the same time, it's very depressing...:cry:

 

[Tio Terry]

Part of the (historic) problem - which we can learn from - is that these upgrades were conceived in the post-West Coast Route Modernisation atmosphere of blame and recrimination over the cost overruns. There was a very great reluctance on the part of DfT and NR to recognise GW as needing an integrated approach. In fact I heard a very senior DfT project director in about 2008 telling off somebody for daring to talk about "Great Western Route Modernisation". The different elements (Reading, Crossrail, electrification, ERTMS, IEP) were to be managed separately. So - no coordination, some projects (Reading) have gone well and others (Electrification, ERTMS) haven't - and the whole mess (including IEP) ends up costing all of us an arm and a leg. Like WCRM, only worse.

There's currently no budget cover for ERTMS/ETCS. Some work is progressing on the Stockley-Heathrow bit but the rest is currently unfunded.

 

[nidave]

I guess for now you could go to Reading and then get RailAir from there.

Which always amused me as its not by Rail or by Air - its a bus.

 

[Old Yard Dog]

Then chose another transit Airport , fly from your local Airport to Amsterdam, Frankfurt or Paris , doing yourself a big favour and avoiding LHR.....

Sadly operators of niche tours to interesting places seldom give their customers a choice of airports. They book blocks of seats on scheduled flights from London at affordable prices.

On some occasions, you do have the option of making your own way to the country you are visiting, but this is often much more expensive, you lose out on transfers, there may be complications with insurance and you are in a fix if the flight you choose is cancelled.

When you are a couple of old codgers, like me and the missus, with heavy cases, taking the National Express coach to London the day before is the most stress free way to get to LHR although it is very time consuming. National Express look after your cases unlike Virgin trains who hate luggage. And changing at Digbeth is actually quite pleasant (unlike New St!).

I now only use Manchester - London flights if I can get a "through" ticket so my luggage is checked to my final destination and the airline takes responsibility for missed connections. Otherwise I make sure my travel insurance has a missed UK departure clause - most policies don't.

 

[DerekC]

There's currently no budget cover for ERTMS/ETCS. Some work is progressing on the Stockley-Heathrow bit but the rest is currently unfunded.

Don't think that's exactly true - Hendy has ETCS Infrastructure as a "Project with significant delivery in CP5 and completion in CP6". Having said that, NR has been examining ETCS implementation strategies for GWML for the last 10 years or so, so don't expect anything soon.

 

[MarkyT]

Which always amused me as its not by Rail or by Air - its a bus.

But it is a link BETWEEN rail and air. When I used it from home in Reading to catch early morning flights (a little before the peak traffic build-up on the M4) I found it fast and reliable, and it used to do the rounds of all the older terminals so it was only a fairly short walk through terminal 1 to my domestic gate back in the 90s.

 

[The Planner]

Don't think that's exactly true - Hendy has ETCS Infrastructure as a "Project with significant delivery in CP5 and completion in CP6". Having said that, NR has been examining ETCS implementation strategies for GWML for the last 10 years or so, so don't expect anything soon.

Terry is correct though, we are only funded at the minute for CP5 and ETCS may not have money or any left for the remainder of CP5. We have to be sure the funding for completing by the end of CP6 (2024 , so still 8 years) is secured. NR regions are currently building their initial industry plan (IIP) for CP6 so I expect it will be top of the list.

 

[coppercapped]

So, trying to get a little bit back on topic, although it is very hard...!

...in view of the inner workings of the pig's ear that has been made of the Great Western Route Modernisation which have been laid bare by some well-informed posters here, it should now be clear why I view the plan for an OOC 'interchange' with a degree of scepticism.

Essentially it has been brought to you by the same organisations that couldn't plan their way out of a paper bag — and the impression remains that no speed improvements will be made on any North-South routes which could possibly compete with HS2. The Western Rail Approach to Heathrow will probably slide through because, being essentially a local/regional initiative, it poses no direct threat to HS2. HS2 needs another traffic source and sink, and the OOC schemes fill the bill - they are not, and probably never have been, thought of as an interchange as the stations are all too far apart. No 'pods' will ever connect them.

In addition, no other significant competing North-South route (Basingstoke - Reading - Oxford - Birmingham or Bristol - Birmingham) speed improvements will happen for years to come because:

• both HS2 and Network Rail are now funded out of the same pot of money, the size of which is limited by the level of acceptable tax rates and other Government spending priorities. The money available will be spent on HS2.
  
• By being included in the national statistics as a public body, Network Rail no longer has the option of raising additional money through the markets.
  
• HS2 will be so eye-wateringly expensive that it will need all the passengers it can get to have a chance of making any sort of financial case.

Somebody, please prove me wrong!

 

[DerekC]

In addition, no other significant competing North-South route (Basingstoke - Reading - Oxford - Birmingham or Bristol - Birmingham) speed improvements will happen for years to come because:

• both HS2 and Network Rail are now funded out of the same pot of money, the size of which is limited by the level of acceptable tax rates and other Government spending priorities. The money available will be spent on HS2.
  
• By being included in the national statistics as a public body, Network Rail no longer has the option of raising additional money through the markets.
  
• HS2 will be so eye-wateringly expensive that it will need all the passengers it can get to have a chance of making any sort of financial case.

Somebody, please prove me wrong!

Sorry, but I agree with you. My objection to HS2 has always been that it would suck all the money (and resource - just look at the salaries paid) from the main line network. There's no stopping it now, however. Politicians have sensed a big, big series of media-ops!

 

[NotATrainspott]

So, trying to get a little bit back on topic, although it is very hard...!

...in view of the inner workings of the pig's ear that has been made of the Great Western Route Modernisation which have been laid bare by some well-informed posters here, it should now be clear why I view the plan for an OOC 'interchange' with a degree of scepticism.

Essentially it has been brought to you by the same organisations that couldn't plan their way out of a paper bag — and the impression remains that no speed improvements will be made on any North-South routes which could possibly compete with HS2. The Western Rail Approach to Heathrow will probably slide through because, being essentially a local/regional initiative, it poses no direct threat to HS2. HS2 needs another traffic source and sink, and the OOC schemes fill the bill - they are not, and probably never have been, thought of as an interchange as the stations are all too far apart. No 'pods' will ever connect them.

In addition, no other significant competing North-South route (Basingstoke - Reading - Oxford - Birmingham or Bristol - Birmingham) speed improvements will happen for years to come because:

• both HS2 and Network Rail are now funded out of the same pot of money, the size of which is limited by the level of acceptable tax rates and other Government spending priorities. The money available will be spent on HS2.
  
• By being included in the national statistics as a public body, Network Rail no longer has the option of raising additional money through the markets.
  
• HS2 will be so eye-wateringly expensive that it will need all the passengers it can get to have a chance of making any sort of financial case.

Somebody, please prove me wrong!

Sorry, but I agree with you. My objection to HS2 has always been that it would suck all the money (and resource - just look at the salaries paid) from the main line network. There's no stopping it now, however. Politicians have sensed a big, big series of media-ops!

Oh for goodness' sake.

NR are HS2 Ltd's biggest supporters, since they themselves have made very clear that a new line will be needed. Without that new line, NR's job becomes extraordinarily difficult, as they have to manage ever-rising passenger numbers against less and less time to actually implement the schemes that will provide the capacity for them.

HS2 is being funded directly from the Treasury as an infrastructure investment separate to the rest of the NR funding. Its borrowing costs are justified on the basis of the benefits it will bring. HM Treasury has effectively unlimited ability to borrow money so long as the schemes presented for funding are useful ones, as the act of building those schemes provides confidence for investors to know that the government is capable of paying back their loans on them. Increased borrowing to pay for current or useless capital expenditure (Bridges to Nowhere, for instance) is what may cause problems for the government's ability to borrow. And in any case, an investment like HS2 is exactly what long term institutional investors (e.g. pension funds) will fight tooth and nail for, as returns are guaranteed over an extremely long length of time.

Why is competition between other north-south routes essential? The HS2 operator will end up being in a natural monopoly position unlike any other long distance travel service. Doing anything but would make a mockery of the whole point of HS2, which is to create the most efficient way of carrying large numbers of people between the major cities of Britain. Allowing the other operators to even attempt to compete would mean denying capacity and connectivity benefits for the places not served directly by HS2. On the rail network, that means providing more long distance capacity for people on the WCML, MML and ECML, and after HS2 competes with air for Scotland journeys it means allowing capacity at Heathrow for flights to places which need them more, like Aberdeen or Inverness.

Also, the vast majority of people interchanging at OOC will still be interchanging between the GWML/Crossrail and HS2. These two stations are as close as it is practical to be when one of them is on the surface and the other is three storeys underground. It's only the Overground network which has a less than suitable connection and the total passenger carrying capacity of this line would be significantly less. On the GWML there will be 20tph on the Main lines and probably more than 40tph on the Slow and Crossrail lines (since the Crossrail dedicated tracks will without question end up being extended to the station) combined. All 60tph will be full-length trains more than 200m long, so we're talking here about 12 kilometres of train passing through on the surface platform alone each hour, and that's just in one direction. Unless something radical changes, the number of paths available for Overground services will remain pretty much the same as it is at the moment, and without massive amounts of work the train lengths will remain similarly limited. At most there would be 20tph on all Overground routes running through the site, while each train would be 100m long at most, so that's only 2 kilometres of train passing through, probably in both directions. Most of the Overground passengers will be people going to work, play or live in the OOC area, so for them it may not be essential to have a minimal-difficulty interchange with HS2. For those who are travelling on HS2, the benefits of HS2 will be more than enough to outweigh the minor complexity of a change there.

 

[The Planner]

Oh for goodness' sake.

NR are HS2 Ltd's biggest supporters, since they themselves have made very clear that a new line will be needed. Without that new line, NR's job becomes extraordinarily difficult, as they have to manage ever-rising passenger numbers against less and less time to actually implement the schemes that will provide the capacity for them.

I wouldn't say it is as clear cut as that, NR couldn't really be seen to petition against the Hybrid Bill even though I suspect there are several elements of it that it isn't happy with. The protective provisions agreement offset a lot of it.

 

[coppercapped]

I wouldn't say it is as clear cut as that, NR couldn't really be seen to petition against the Hybrid Bill even though I suspect there are several elements of it that it isn't happy with. The protective provisions agreement offset a lot of it.

Also

Mark Carne's boss is the Secretary of State for Transport

and

Simon Kirby's boss is the Secretary of State for Transport.

Having public disagreements between two branches of Government is never going to happen. Of course Network Rail supports HS2...:roll:

 

[HowardGWR]

As each section of HS2 is built, I had assumed it would be handed over to NR, or whatever it will be called by then.

 

[MidlandMainlie]

Also

Mark Carne's boss is the Secretary of State for Transport

and

Simon Kirby's boss is the Secretary of State for Transport.

Having public disagreements between two branches of Government is never going to happen. Of course Network Rail supports HS2...:roll:

Not to mention the Chairman of HS2 Sir David Higgins is the former chief executive of Network Rail so I imagine the two have close contact and a good working relationship.

 

[coppercapped]

As each section of HS2 is built, I had assumed it would be handed over to NR, or whatever it will be called by then.

That is not obvious. The Government would like, if possible, to get its money back - and a likely model already exists in HS1. The Government sells a long (30 year or more) concession to a third party to operate the railway but retains ultimate ownership. The third party then sub-contracts Network Rail and/or its successor(s) to maintain the infrastructure.

The train service operator may have no connection with the rest of the franchised railway. As most of the end-points are termini, don't be surprised if it will be run more like an airline...

 

[MarkRedon]

Back on thread - although I have very much appreciated the surrounding discussion! - Network Rail has now announced formal consultation on the Western access starting 23/02/2016. See: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/heathrow/?cd=1

 

[infobleep]

Because the track from Stockley Flyover to T4/T5 is owned by Heathrow Airport Holdings and are non-franchised operators which do not have to follow National Rail pricing and until it ends up under NR infrastructure it will continue to be that way so it's LUL services for you still!

HAH want's to charge the DfT 40m a year for Crossrail to use the tracks, and even if HEx don't get granted more track access after 2023, they will be making money from access charges...

Alternatively they could not allow access to National Rail and not run trains on their tracks, making the Heathrow tracks perhaps worthless.

 

[Philip Phlopp]

Alternatively they could not allow access to National Rail and not run trains on their tracks, making the Heathrow tracks perhaps worthless.

It's not a real threat, it's both parties getting their ducks in a row for the third runway, await the press announcement that has Heathrow Airport Holdings dropping a planned levy on trains operating to Heathrow as part of a public transport and environmental mitigation deal to enable the third runway without increasing passenger travel emissions.

It's of course illegal for Network Rail and ORR to refuse Heathrow Airport Holdings paths on the GWML in any case, and if Heathrow get properly arsey about the third runway, DfT will compulsory purchase order the Heathrow rail link, as it would be a significant public and economic benefit to maintain heavy rail access to Heathrow.

Heathrow Airport Holdings position, in black and white, is moronic, idiotic and farcical, but when you add in the 1000 shades of grey involved with the third runway, it's suddenly looks like a really clever game both are playing.

 

[coppercapped]

DfT will compulsory purchase order the Heathrow rail link, as it would be a significant public and economic benefit to maintain heavy rail access to Heathrow.

Hmm! Sends all the wrong signals about GB being a good place to do business if the rights of private property are not respected and stuff can be confiscated by the Government on a whim.

Thank you, Mr Secretary of State - I think I will spend my billion quid on a new <name product of choice> factory in Germany/Denmark/Singapore/France/...

It would at least go the the European Court of Justice.

 

[NotATrainspott]

Hmm! Sends all the wrong signals about GB being a good place to do business if the rights of private property are not respected and stuff can be confiscated by the Government on a whim.

Thank you, Mr Secretary of State - I think I will spend my billion quid on a new <name product of choice> factory in Germany/Denmark/Singapore/France/...

It would at least go the the European Court of Justice.

Compulsory purchase order.

The DfT would have to recompense Heathrow properly. CPO is necessary for countries to function as otherwise, individual actors would be able to block schemes which would benefit the entire country. So long as you're given a reasonable amount of money in return, and all the legal proceedings are followed properly, then there's nothing wrong with the idea of CPO. This isn't like the seizure of farms in Zimbabwe.

 

[coppercapped]

Compulsory purchase order.

The DfT would have to recompense Heathrow properly. CPO is necessary for countries to function as otherwise, individual actors would be able to block schemes which would benefit the entire country. So long as you're given a reasonable amount of money in return, and all the legal proceedings are followed properly, then there's nothing wrong with the idea of CPO. This isn't like the seizure of farms in Zimbabwe.

And that will keep people arguing for years...

...and if it's so important and strategic then why not purchase Heathrow as well?

 

[The Ham]

And that will keep people arguing for years...

...and if it's so important and strategic then why not purchase Heathrow as well?

CPO's can run for a number of years, especially if the landowner puts in a planning application to increase the value of the property being purchased.

However, they happen semi regularly (else otherwise no road or railway schemes which needed more land would ever go ahead), so it shouldn't be too long winded or costly.

If the operators of Heathrow were to try and close it as an airport then the country could CPO it, however while it is doing what the country wants it to do (i.e. being a hub airport) there is no need to CPO it.

 

[civ-eng-jim]

Western Rail Link to Heathrow Public Consultation:

https://consultations.networkrail.co.uk/communications/westernraillinktoheathrow

There are some drawings of the route at the end of the "Initial Environmental Information Report" from Page 55 onward. Detailed enough to see which properties might be affected by the alignment.

"Threading the Needle" through the M25/T5 spur junction must have been tricky.

 

[Mikey C]

Western Rail Link to Heathrow Public Consultation:

https://consultations.networkrail.co.uk/communications/westernraillinktoheathrow

There are some drawings of the route at the end of the "Initial Environmental Information Report" from Page 55 onward. Detailed enough to see which properties might be affected by the alignment.

"Threading the Needle" through the M25/T5 spur junction must have been tricky.

Well it is in a tunnel under the junction, and then most of the way towards the GWML, much like the existing route to London

Indeed, if runway 3 ever gets built won't the M25 be relocated?

 

[Class 170101]

Well it is in a tunnel under the junction, and then most of the way towards the GWML, much like the existing route to London

Indeed, if runway 3 ever gets built won't the M25 be relocated?

M25 also to be tunneled through this area.

 

[Lurpi]

Jacobs has been awarded a contract to carry out engineering and other technical support services for the planning process for the rail link.

Their press release from 27 July (link above) says the work will take place over 'the next 27 months', so up to the end of October 2018. That tallies with Network Rail's timeline of a development consent order submission in 'late 2017'.

Under the terms of the contract, Jacobs is supporting Network Rail’s development consent order (DCO) submission. The initial project work is focused on defining a preferred option to take through consultation.

Once a recommendation is agreed upon, Jacobs’ role is to lead the multi-disciplinary engineering and environmental design component to an approval-in-principle level of design for the new 3.1 mile [5 km] tunneled route.

This includes completing the environmental impact assessment to produce the scheme’s environmental statement, which critically informs the engineering design, construction strategy and environmental mitigation program to minimize impact on local residents and the environment during both construction and operation phases.