Would The Big Four have survived if No BR?

[Senex]

Yes, that last paragraph is true. Even if it did lead to a lot of dmus being inflicted on services for which they were not really suitable. Units with 3+2 seating layout, designed mainly for shortish distance suburban services and branch lines, were put on various longish-distance services, such as Birmingham - Norwich, and Manchester - North Wales Coast. And. in some cases, that probably contributed to loss of lots of passengers. One afternoon peak service from Manchester to North Wales went from being a fairly-well loaded loco hauled set to a half-filled 2 car dmu within a couple of years.

Not just on longish-distance services, but also on inter-city services like Manchester to Leeds. As we know, Regional Railways did do something about by bringing in the decent-quality 158s, but was never allowed by the governments of the day to acquire enough coaches, and so the sort of over-crowding that characterises rail travel to this day set in and has never been overcome. Unfortunately the trend towards discomfort has continued unabated since privatisation with ever more units that just stuff passengers in, offer no or poor views out of the windows, and (when diesel) can be noisy internally and extremely noisy when standing in stations. Is there one single modern train that matches the comfort of BR's MkIII coaches in their original configuration?

 

[Willr2094]

1) The LNER would have almost certainly gone into liquidation. Remember it was the one which was dealt a massive blow to its business by the Depression and it never really recovered from that. Its operations might have been forced to merge with the LMS.
2) The LMS would have continued, but probably in a scaled back form - they might have been forced to handover their Welsh operations to the GWR and their operations in West Yorkshire to the LNER for instance.
3) The GWR would have continued in much the same form as before - as even as late as 1947, the company was still making handsome profits.
4) The Southern would have continued, because its operational model was very close to that adopted by the rest of the British rail network in the later half of the 20th century (i.e. a preference for electric traction and the fact that most of the Southern's revenue came from passenger services).

 

[Searchlight]

1) The LNER would have almost certainly gone into liquidation. Remember it was the one which was dealt a massive blow to its business by the Depression and it never really recovered from that. Its operations might have been forced to merge with the LMS.
2) The LMS would have continued, but probably in a scaled back form - they might have been forced to handover their Welsh operations to the GWR and their operations in West Yorkshire to the LNER for instance.
3) The GWR would have continued in much the same form as before - as even as late as 1947, the company was still making handsome profits.
4) The Southern would have continued, because its operational model was very close to that adopted by the rest of the British rail network in the later half of the 20th century (i.e. a preference for electric traction and the fact that most of the Southern's revenue came from passenger services).

Statements 1 and 2 are contardictory.......If the LMS had merged with LNER, the huge LNER losses would have crippled the LMS, which was already weak itself! When the LNER was formed in 1923, it inherited a large dept from the GCR London Extension Project, which i don t believe they really recovered from? Drastic cut-backs would have been necessary to cut costs (something like Serpell?). Even then, no guarrantee of profitability for the New LMS Combine.

Possibly this albatross railway would have had to be nationalised?

 

[coppercapped]

1) The LNER would have almost certainly gone into liquidation. Remember it was the one which was dealt a massive blow to its business by the Depression and it never really recovered from that. Its operations might have been forced to merge with the LMS.
2) The LMS would have continued, but probably in a scaled back form - they might have been forced to handover their Welsh operations to the GWR and their operations in West Yorkshire to the LNER for instance.
3) The GWR would have continued in much the same form as before - as even as late as 1947, the company was still making handsome profits.
4) The Southern would have continued, because its operational model was very close to that adopted by the rest of the British rail network in the later half of the 20th century (i.e. a preference for electric traction and the fact that most of the Southern's revenue came from passenger services).

Nice to go back to the original topic of this thread!

My take is that I would suggest that one can predict a likely alternative history for the Big 4 for a maximum of possibly 10 years after the end of the war. After that other social and economic changes in Britain would have changed the rules of the game sufficiently that any prediction of what the ‘Big 4’ would have done after about 1955 would be no more than guesswork.

Some assumptions for the first ten years:

• the ‘Common Carrier’ obligation for freight traffic would have been abandoned by the end of 1945
• at the same time the influence of the Traffic Commissioners on fares and rates would have stopped
• the growth of car ownership would have been the same as real history
• employment levels would have remained as they really were
• the country’s economic condition would not have been significantly different from that which really happened.

Dropping the Common Carrier obligation would have meant that it became useful and necessary to have a proper management accounting system which could allocate costs and revenues to particular activities. This would then have helped the businesses to have concentrated their resources where they would make the best return. The costs of running lightly used lines and of operating the heavy daily traffic around the large cities for 4 hours a day would have become clear. The railways would have had a proper understanding of their revenues and costs by 1948 or 1949 at the latest - 15 years before Beeching.

What certainly would also have had to have happened for the Big 4 to survive was that the return on capital would have had to have been greater than that pertaining at the end of the 30s (around 2% to 2.5%) in order to attract investment capital. The effects of the Common Carrier obligations, the rate-setting by the Transport Commissioners and the after-effects of the Depression meant the railways were starved of investment funds.

The financially weakest of the ‘Big 4’, the LNER, had proposed a ‘Landlord and Tenant’ structure - it would sell its network to the Government and pay rent to run its services over it. (This sounds very much like the structure adopted 50 years later…!) If the LNER could have got rid of much of its excessive infrastructure where heavy industry had suffered badly in the 1920s and 30s, it might have been able to survive as a company. Alternatively it could have regrouped as two companies - one with the profitable parts and either closed the other or sought other sources of funds from local or central Government.
I suspect that the other three would have continued much as before - transport conglomerates operating trains, road coaches and buses, lorries, hotels, ferries and airlines and developing those fields which gave the best return. I could well see the GWR, using its experience in selling holidays in Devon and Cornwall, being an early player in the package holiday boom to Majorca with GWR-branded DC3s!

I don’t know what would have happened to loss-making suburban services - either the railways would have put up their prices and priced themselves out of the business or, with increasing car ownership and congestion, the city authorities might have come up with something like the Public Services Obligation subsidy 20 years earlier.

Certainly many short, dead end, branch lines would still have closed, but as railwaymen liked running trains I suspect that more efficient ways of operation would have been found for many secondary lines. Whether this would have saved any or all of them in view of the doubling of the number of private cars between 1950 and 1960, I can’t guess.

All the railways were already investigating alternative forms of traction, the LNER had planned the Woodhead and Shenfield electrifications and was proposing a build of mainline diesel locomotives; the GWR had built branch and mainline diesel railcars, had studied the electrification of the lines in Devon and Cornwall and the use of the power of the future, the gas turbine; the LMS had built diesel shunters, mainline diesel traction, diesel railcars and operated electrified lines; the Southern had invested widely in electrification and adopted more efficient ways of using its rolling stock. I would have expected these trends to have continued and the construction of steam locomotives to have ceased by 1952 or 1953.

For the next attempt at alternative history - what if William had lost in 1066?

 

[Skutter]

I wonder what would have happened to the road freight industry in this alternate reality - if the government didn't nationalise the trains they certainly wouldn't have done the lorries. The short period of British Road Services doesn't get a lot of attention now, but seems to have increased safety standards and staff conditions.

Would a private railway have taken the opportunity to transfer goods traffic to an expanded road division run on the cheap with the advantage of good planning and customer contacts - or would new road transport companies have taken most of their traffic before they could react?

 

[Senex]

Some assumptions for the first ten years:

• the ‘Common Carrier’ obligation for freight traffic would have been abandoned by the end of 1945
• at the same time the influence of the Traffic Commissioners on fares and rates would have stopped
• the growth of car ownership would have been the same as real history
• employment levels would have remained as they really were
• the country’s economic condition would not have been significantly different from that which really happened.

What about adding one more? That government did indeed properly compensate the railway companies for their war-time efforts. This would have provided a very substantial sum to help the railways invest for the future -- a job that the four companies would very likely have done much better than did the British Transport Commission. We know that all the companies had got detailed plans for what they wanted to do after the war -- they were not lacking in ideas.

But what actually happened was the dead hand of nationalisation. (Is it Michael Bonavia who tells us that Sir Brian Robertson's board meetings were not seminar-fashion with everyone around a table but rather briefing-fashion with everyone lined up in rows facing him?)

 

[Searchlight]

[/LIST]
What about adding one more? That government did indeed properly compensate the railway companies for their war-time efforts. This would have provided a very substantial sum to help the railways invest for the future -- a job that the four companies would very likely have done much better than did the British Transport Commission. We know that all the companies had got detailed plans for what they wanted to do after the war -- they were not lacking in ideas.

But what actually happened was the dead hand of nationalisation. (Is it Michael Bonavia who tells us that Sir Brian Robertson's board meetings were not seminar-fashion with everyone around a table but rather briefing-fashion with everyone lined up in rows facing him?)

Perhaps Sir Brian Robertson still thought he was in the Forces? Giving out Orders, instead of Collective Responsibility and consultation at meetings?

 

[coppercapped]

[/LIST]
What about adding one more? That government did indeed properly compensate the railway companies for their war-time efforts. This would have provided a very substantial sum to help the railways invest for the future -- a job that the four companies would very likely have done much better than did the British Transport Commission. We know that all the companies had got detailed plans for what they wanted to do after the war -- they were not lacking in ideas.

Absolutely. The money could have come from funds saved by not having to pay dividends to the dispossessed shareholders of the old companies or by using the American money from the 1946 Anglo-American loan agreement or, a couple of years later, by using some of the Marshall Aid cash.

But what actually happened was the dead hand of nationalisation. (Is it Michael Bonavia who tells us that Sir Brian Robertson's board meetings were not seminar-fashion with everyone around a table but rather briefing-fashion with everyone lined up in rows facing him?)

Bonavia doesn't quite say that! What he does say, following the 1953 re-organisation and internal restructuring, is:

An increasing formality became to attach itself to meetings of the Commission, which had started in 1947 as a small informal policy-making body of five Members. At a plenary meeting of the Commission under the new organisation there might be twelve Commission Members seated on one side and no less than thirty Chairmen, General Managers and Headquarters chief officers on the other side.

Nuff said!

 

[Bevan Price]

One point not mentioned so far is that the "Big 4" were set up by Act of Parliament which specified the compulsory amalgamations of the pre-1922/1923 railway companies.

I have not read the original Act, but it may have contained specifications about what the "Big 4" were able to do without the further approval of Parliament. So, selling bits of LNER to LMSR, etc., may not have been a straightforward process.

 

[Senex]

Bonavia doesn't quite say that! What he does say, following the 1953 re-organisation and internal restructuring, is:

That's not the comment I was (mis-)remembering but adds very nicely. I dug out the book to check back, and the bit I was thinking of (though my recollection made it more brutal than it is) was this:

"A symbol of the new form of headquarters management was the new board room which Robertson ordered for the meetings ol the Commission. The Executive Members had sat round tables grouped to form a rectangle in a moderate-sized meeting-room. The new board room was laid out like the council chamber of a major local authority, with the Chairman in the centre of a row of desks facing several tiers of seats opposite in a half-moon. Over the Chairman’s head a large plaque displayed the BTC armorial bearings.

"The psychological effect was considerable. Proceedings became much more formal and the large number ot officials attending, as well as Area Board Chairmen and General Managers, meant that debate had to be closely controlled. Robertson’s formidable presence in the chair rather discouraged the cut-and-thrust of discussion and people normally spoke only when invited to do so, and then were encouraged to be brief. The Chairman’s summing-up was always impressive but sometimes one felt that the root of the matter had not been penetrated." Michael R Bonavia, British Rail : The first 25 years (1981), pp.89-90.

 

[coppercapped]

That's not the comment I was (mis-)remembering but adds very nicely. I dug out the book to check back, and the bit I was thinking of (though my recollection made it more brutal than it is) was this:

"A symbol of the new form of headquarters management was the new board room which Robertson ordered for the meetings ol the Commission. The Executive Members had sat round tables grouped to form a rectangle in a moderate-sized meeting-room. The new board room was laid out like the council chamber of a major local authority, with the Chairman in the centre of a row of desks facing several tiers of seats opposite in a half-moon. Over the Chairman’s head a large plaque displayed the BTC armorial bearings.

"The psychological effect was considerable. Proceedings became much more formal and the large number ot officials attending, as well as Area Board Chairmen and General Managers, meant that debate had to be closely controlled. Robertson’s formidable presence in the chair rather discouraged the cut-and-thrust of discussion and people normally spoke only when invited to do so, and then were encouraged to be brief. The Chairman’s summing-up was always impressive but sometimes one felt that the root of the matter had not been penetrated." Michael R Bonavia, British Rail : The first 25 years (1981), pp.89-90.

I was using Bonavia's book The Organisation of British Railways, Ian Allan, 1971.

The conclusion about this period has to be that BR was administered, not managed as a business.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---

I wonder what would have happened to the road freight industry in this alternate reality - if the government didn't nationalise the trains they certainly wouldn't have done the lorries. The short period of British Road Services doesn't get a lot of attention now, but seems to have increased safety standards and staff conditions.

Would a private railway have taken the opportunity to transfer goods traffic to an expanded road division run on the cheap with the advantage of good planning and customer contacts - or would new road transport companies have taken most of their traffic before they could react?

Interesting point. What could have happened would, I suggest, have depended on the type of goods, the volume of goods and the origin and destination points.

Bulk freight, the siding to siding, siding to dock or pit to power station traffic would have most likely remained on the railways. The railways might have found it difficult to continue with 'sundries' and parcels traffic because of the labour intensive sorting operations - unless they themselves started 'courier'-type services. Wagonload (in those days about 10 to 12 tons of stuff) and less-than-wagonload might well have been lost to the roads as the origin and destination points were scattered and building a train load for a haul of a suitably long distance would have been difficult. They might have kept the traffic between larg(ish) population centres using a Speedlink-type service.

Of course, in those days there were no supermarkets so the distribution of foodstuffs was very diffuse and each individual delivery was quite small.

Nevertheless, if the railways' road delivery people were quick and flexible they might have competed successfully...

 

[Bevan Price]

[/LIST]
What about adding one more? That government did indeed properly compensate the railway companies for their war-time efforts. This would have provided a very substantial sum to help the railways invest for the future -- a job that the four companies would very likely have done much better than did the British Transport Commission. We know that all the companies had got detailed plans for what they wanted to do after the war -- they were not lacking in ideas.

But what actually happened was the dead hand of nationalisation. (Is it Michael Bonavia who tells us that Sir Brian Robertson's board meetings were not seminar-fashion with everyone around a table but rather briefing-fashion with everyone lined up in rows facing him?)

Public ownership, as such, is not a bad idea. The problem is that the Civil Service was involved in suggesting / selecting the leaders. So, the boss would be "one of us" - a "good fellow" type - even if he knew **** all about the business.

A civil service / pseudo-military hierarchy would be established, with lots of "litlle empire building" and far too many layers of management. Moreover, it was considered "not good form" to criticise the established order, and you risked your career / promotion prospects by not toeing the line. And people now wonder why innovation took so long.

If, instead, the government had chosen a strong manager who knew something about the needs of railway systems & operation, BR might have been much more effective in its early years, and wasted a lot less money.

 

[edwin_m]

Some of this is very reminiscent of an article on the BBC website a couple of weeks back about how the VW board all had similar background and viewpoints and that perhaps a bit more challenge and debate might have avoided their current problems.

So it's not necessarily only in the past and not necessarily only in the public sector.

 

[Zerachiel76]

The strange thing is that, 20 or more years after nationalisation, it was also a common belief that the LNER had the best management training programme and their onetime personnel had most influenced the top BR financial decisions. Quite how they can have recruited and trained the best management skills but been the worst financial basket case is difficult to understand.

To be fair to LNER, they were stuck with GC's debts from the London extension which were crippling and I've read somewhere that as a result of GC's debts LNER never made an operating profit in it's entire history.

It would be interesting to know whether the LNER would have run a profit once GC's debts were removed from the equation.

Therefore it's possible that LNER did have the best management training program since they could have inherited it from one of the other constituent parts.

 

[Taunton]

Therefore it's possible that LNER did have the best management training program since they could have inherited it from one of the other constituent parts.

Gerry Fiennes wrote that the LNER management trainee scheme (Fiennes was one such alumni) was run "pretty much single handed" by Robert Bell, Deputy General Manager of the company. Bell was ex-North British.

 

[coppercapped]

To be fair to LNER, they were stuck with GC's debts from the London extension which were crippling and I've read somewhere that as a result of GC's debts LNER never made an operating profit in it's entire history.

It would be interesting to know whether the LNER would have run a profit once GC's debts were removed from the equation.

Therefore it's possible that LNER did have the best management training program since they could have inherited it from one of the other constituent parts.

The LNER also suffered very badly from the post First World War collapse in the heavy industries in the north-east. The immediate post-war boom had given way by 1920 to a slump; unemployment in the north-east reached nearly 20% by 1924.

In many ways the LNER was more sinned against than sinning.

 

[Zerachiel76]

Gerry Fiennes wrote that the LNER management trainee scheme (Fiennes was one such alumni) was run "pretty much single handed" by Robert Bell, Deputy General Manager of the company. Bell was ex-North British.

Ahh, that solves that question. Thanks for the info

The LNER also suffered very badly from the post First World War collapse in the heavy industries in the north-east. The immediate post-war boom had given way by 1920 to a slump; unemployment in the north-east reached nearly 20% by 1924.

In many ways the LNER was more sinned against than sinning.

That's interesting, thanks for that info. Not that I'm querying your sources but as I'm interested in finding some good books to read on Great Central and LNER history, if you could confirm the source of the info just so I could find a book to read that would be great.

 

[coppercapped]

Ahh, that solves that question. Thanks for the info



That's interesting, thanks for that info. Not that I'm querying your sources but as I'm interested in finding some good books to read on Great Central and LNER history, if you could confirm the source of the info just so I could find a book to read that would be great.

The info comes from general economic and social history books and articles. Look up references to the Jarrow March, or Jarrow Crusade, of 1936 and the events leading up to it. It was reported that Edward VIII said at the time of the Crusade 'Something must be done' which seriously impressed my father. It was taken to be an involvement in politics and possibly dangerously left wing and the conspiracy theorists see this as the start of the movement which led to his Abdication.

The Crusade probably had an effect on William Beveridge and influenced his 1942 report which led to the creation of the Welfare State.

For Great Central history look for the three volume set by George Dow called, unsurprisingly, 'Great Central', first published in 1959. Magisterial!

 

[EbbwJunction1]

It was reported that Edward VIII said at the time of the Crusade 'Something must be done' which seriously impressed my father. It was taken to be an involvement in politics and possibly dangerously left wing and the conspiracy theorists see this as the start of the movement which led to his Abdication.

The actual quote, made during a visit to an abandoned colliery on 19th November 1936 was "These works brought all these people here. Something should be done to get them at work again."

Although it was seen as directly critical of the Government, it has never been clear whether Edward had anything in particular in mind.

 

[coppercapped]

The actual quote, made during a visit to an abandoned colliery on 19th November 1936 was "These works brought all these people here. Something should be done to get them at work again."

Although it was seen as directly critical of the Government, it has never been clear whether Edward had anything in particular in mind.

Thank's for the correction. I was writing from memory!

 

[Zerachiel76]

The info comes from general economic and social history books and articles. Look up references to the Jarrow March, or Jarrow Crusade, of 1936 and the events leading up to it. It was reported that Edward VIII said at the time of the Crusade 'Something must be done' which seriously impressed my father. It was taken to be an involvement in politics and possibly dangerously left wing and the conspiracy theorists see this as the start of the movement which led to his Abdication.

The Crusade probably had an effect on William Beveridge and influenced his 1942 report which led to the creation of the Welfare State.

For Great Central history look for the three volume set by George Dow called, unsurprisingly, 'Great Central', first published in 1959. Magisterial!

Thanks for the info but I meant info on how the economic slump affected LNER specifically. I'm assuming the recession caused a slump in the amount of coal, steel etc, the transport of which was one of LNER's staple sources of income.

Is there any information about the reduction in LNER's profits as a result of the recession?

I know a little about the Jarrow March as I play Hearts of Iron 3 which in one of the mods, has this as an event - who says PC games don't teach anything.

You get the choice to give them nothing, a pound to get home or to meet their demands and each response has a considerable effect on your economy.

 

[krus_aragon]

I know a little about the Jarrow March as I play Hearts of Iron 3 which in one of the mods, has this as an event - who says PC games don't teach anything.

Hear, hear! I learned an awful lot about world politics of the late 1930s (especially the Sino-Japanese conflict) from Hearts of Iron 2.

 

[coppercapped]

Thanks for the info but I meant info on how the economic slump affected LNER specifically. I'm assuming the recession caused a slump in the amount of coal, steel etc, the transport of which was one of LNER's staple sources of income.

Is there any information about the reduction in LNER's profits as a result of the recession?

A possible source of the information you are looking for might be Michael R Bonavia's 3 volume 'A History of the LNER', published by Allen and Unwin. I have read it - but many years ago and I can't remember the details. I don't have a copy of it, but I do have some others by him - they are all detailed and well written. The last volume was published in 1983.

Bonavia joined the LNER in 1945 so he writes with insider knowledge and some love of the company. He died in 1999 at the age of 90.

 

[zn1]

I believe teh GWR were in profit and directors until the very last day of operating, their ethos of closing lines were only if loss makers as long as line broke even yearly it survived...The LMS would have increased 3rd rail to rugby over the branch to bedford and back down to St P...the new station would have been built and looked better than the current nuclear bunker euston is now...southern would have stayed in profit andc continued...LNER as said needed the money from gov to keep operating wouldnt have lasted long...

 

[ChiefPlanner]

Of course - the Big 4 had plans for the post 1945 - the GWR were going to rebuild Paddington in grand style with a heliport on top , more express diesel units etc. .

In the 1930's the LMS half heartedly started the Euston project (by detonating stone in Caldon Low QUarry for the new build - which would have been very impressive) - as wel as overhead electrification to Harpenden and St Albans.

The LNER likewise had plans for most of the ECML route - as well as continuing the pre-war Shenfield line wiring.

They were stymied by (a) Nationalisation (b) the poor economic conditions brought about by the need to replace worn out base assets from the war years (c) Austerity and a dire shortage of resource and human power.

Any survival of the companies would have been on a tight financial basis - and any plans would have been tempered accordingly. The post war political ethos was of course for state owned almost everything .....the means of supply , production and social benefit.

 

[thewiltog]

A possible source of the information you are looking for might be Michael R Bonavia's 3 volume 'A History of the LNER', published by Allen and Unwin. I have read it - but many years ago and I can't remember the details. I don't have a copy of it, but I do have some others by him - they are all detailed and well written. The last volume was published in 1983.

Bonavia joined the LNER in 1945 so he writes with insider knowledge and some love of the company. He died in 1999 at the age of 90.

From Vol 1 of Bonavia's history...

"Passenger receipts in 1929 were down to 81% of the 1923 level, and by 1933 had fallen to 65%. Coal traffic in 1933 was 77% of the 1923 figure - minerals, iron and steel down to 78%, and general merchandise down to 70%. The railway's net receipts from freight and passenger traffic fell from £58.8 million to £42.7 million."

 

[Taunton]

Both the Shenfield and Woodhead electrification schemes were LNER investments of the late 1930s, despite this apparent shortage of funds. This, and other schemes (the GWR widening through Taunton being a fine example!) came about because there was a longstanding tax on rail passenger tickets, of 5%. This tax had not been shown explicitly on tickets, so if the government ended the tax this was just to the financial benefit of the companies. It was ended, provided that the total amount was spent instead on capital expenditure for infrastructure improvements that otherwise would not have taken place. It was a good source of funds for the railway; the Woodhead was very expensive to operate, with large numbers of steam banking locomotives, continuous maintenance on the old tunnels, etc, so there was going to be a substantial reduction in working expenses as well.

The government saw an additional benefit as the funds were spent wholly with UK civil engineering contractors, UK electrical engineering companies, etc, so the spending of what was otherwise tax receipts contributed to economic development and reduction in unemployment. It was good old Keynesian Economics in practice.