Another thought, if the technology makes an error, or there is wheelslip or leaf mulch on the line in ATO which couldn't be visually seen, and the brakes are either applied too late or don't stop the train in time of an obstruction such as a bay, and contact is made, who is liable? The driver? The train manufacturers? The software systems? The signallers?
If a train gets dangerously close to the one in front and the driver realises the brake hasn't applied, two seconds pass while his brain processes and presses the brake but the train is already too close and it's like a spad in the traditional sense, who gets the blame? The train?
This has been partially answered by others but the following may be of interest. The use of Automatc Train Protection (ATP) of which ETCS is one example, and Automatic Train Operation (ATO) has been well understood since the 1960’s, ATP in the form of cab signalling since the 1930’s. The alagorithms required for the design of such systems is therefore well understood including allowances for poor rail conditions. For example a lot of effort was expended by my colleagues at Chippenham in the early 1990’s to overcome issues with wet rails on the above ground areas of the Central Line.
Speed and location are measured in three ways, 1. an axle end mounted speed tachogenerator, usually two off, 2. Doppler radar and 3. recalibration of distance travelled at each ETCS track mounted Ballise. On Thameslink these will tend to be close together whereas on the Cambrian these are much further apart. All this data is integrated to ensure the train knows where it is and actual speed adjusted for wheel slip or slide.
It is worth pointing out that ATP is a safety critical system with ATO safety related, SIL4 and SIL2 respectively in accordance with the CENELEC Standards EN50126, 50128 and 50129.
The ATO interstation run can be varied subject to required service performance at the time. Often in order to save energy the run profile will include an element of coasting which can be adjusted or removed if required to catch up a bit of time. I don’t know the specifics of the Siemens ATO or control centre intervention protocols for Thameslink but this sort of facility is core to the regulation of the Victoria Line and many other mass transit railways worldwide.
The application of Temporary Speed Restrictions is part of the ETCS as this is a safety critical function.
The driver is still responsible for looking ahead for incursions on the railway that might require emergency brakes to be applied, with the ETCS looking after safe spacing between trains and at junctions etc. in conjunction with the signalling interlocking. The ATO is subservient to the ETCS and cannot create an unsafe situation, the ETCS being subservient to the interlocking.
In principle the Thameslink and Crossrail cores are being treated as mass transit railways with uniform train sets and calling patterns. ATO ensures uniform interstation run profiles, thus maximising throughput.