Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[Rockhopperr]

It’s staggering that the coaches aren’t retained to the bogies in the vertical direction. This is a big factor in the post impact dynamics. Are the coaches just resting on some form of lug or locating pin then?

 

[jfollows]

The Guardian has its report today (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news...er-heavy-rain-restrictions-speeds-close-lines):
Pretty much as reported above, Network Rail didn't inspect the work performed wrongly by Carillion and the unchecked errors led to the crash. It also reports the relatively poor "crashworthiness" of the HST.

Network Rail

Wrongly built drainage system led to Stonehaven train crash, investigators find

Network Rail failed to notice that works by Carillion on Aberdeen to Glasgow line did not match the design

Three people were killed at Stonehaven in Aberdeenshire on 12 August 2020 when a drain washed debris on to the track.

Gwyn Topham Transport correspondent

@GwynTopham

Thu 10 Mar 2022 00.01 GMT

A drainage system wrongly built by Carillion and unchecked by Network Rail led to the Stonehaven train crash, investigators have found, when a Scotrail train hit debris washed by rain on to the railway track.

Three people died on 12 August 2020 in the worst fatal event on the UK railways in 18 years, when the passenger train from Aberdeen to Glasgow derailed at Carmont, near Stonehaven, after heavy rainfall.

Inspectors said the drainage system and earthworks, installed in 2011-12 by the contractor Carillion to stabilise the slope above the track, “had not been constructed in accordance with the original design and so were not able to safely accommodate the water flows” when almost a month’s rainfall, 51.5mm, fell in three hours.

The changes made by Carillion, which went bust in 2018, were not noted by Network Rail, which did not inspect the upper parts of the drainage system after a handover in 2013.

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch’s final report on the disaster also found that route controllers had “not been given the information, procedures or training needed” to effectively manage the situation, and that Network Rail had not fully implemented risk measures developed after previous events involving extreme weather.

Despite a nearby landslip the same morning, and floods from the extreme rainfall, no speed restrictions were imposed and the train was travelling at 73mph when it hit the gravel washed from the drainage trench and came off the tracks, striking a bridge parapet. One of the four carriages overturned and another fell down a steep embankment and caught fire.

The RAIB said the outcome would probably have been less severe for a more modern train with better “crashworthiness” than the 1970s-built HST model involved.

The train drivers’ union Aslef called for moves to start immediately to take the HST train type out of service.

The three people who died included two train staff: the driver, Brett McCullough, and the conductor, Donald Dinnie. One passenger, Christopher Stuchbury, died, and the other six people on the train were injured. The report said many more casualties could have arisen but for the low numbers travelling during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The RAIB’s chief inspector, Simon French, said the tragedy highlighted “the risk of uncontrolled changes to railway infrastructure during construction” and was “a reminder how potentially dangerous Britain’s volatile weather can be”.

French said the railway should “get even smarter about the way it counters this threat” and “urgent[ly] provide real-time decision-makers with the information, procedures and training they need”.

He said shutting down the railway during bad weather would force potential passengers on to roads, which were “undoubtedly much more dangerous”. But the accident should not be dismissed as a one-off event, he added, and the industry “needs to think through the implications of severe weather on its infrastructure”.

Andrew Haines, Network Rail’s chief executive, said the report showed there were “fundamental lessons to be learned by Network Rail and the wider industry”.

“As well as expressing our deep sorrow and regret … we acknowledge it should not have taken this tragic accident to highlight those lessons,” Haines said. “We must do better.”

He said they had invested tens of millions of pounds in improving rail’s resilience to weather, including inspecting similar locations and drainage systems across the country.

Mick Whelan, the general secretary of Aslef, the train drivers’ union, said: “The failures identified in this report are so bad that we believe this must be a watershed moment in the way we ensure the safety of passengers and staff on our railway network.”

ScotRail’s chief operating officer, Ian McConnell, said the report made for “very sober reading”, adding that while most of the RAIB’s recommendations related to other parties, “ScotRail will play its part fully in ensuring that safety lessons are learned … to do everything possible to reduce the risk of something like this ever happening again.”

Solicitors acting for relatives of a victim and for injured passengers said the report showed “a catalogue of failures within Network Rail”. Neil Davidson, a partner at law firm Digby Brown, said: “The RAIB investigation clearly shows rail management had prior knowledge of several known risks – they were told to improve, yet still failed to act. This is the very definition of negligence.”

The rail regulator, ORR, is conducting a separate investigation into the crash, with Police Scotland and the British Transport Police. It expects to hand over a final report to Scotland’s public prosecutor, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, in the coming months.

 

[92002]

I think this report has substantial implications for the HST fleets. The Unions will be all over this which makes action inevitable. Have a look at the video on YouTube from the RAIB to see the animated version of what happened to the Driver‘s cab. It’s very sobering to watch!

The structural integrity of HST's has been trialled many times. Think Southall and others where they have been in high speed collidion, so maybe the RMT are just looking for a sound bite. Many more competent people have already given their Professional opinion.

 

[Deltic1961]

I actually drove down the A90 just before the derailment happened on the way to the Edzell supply base. I had never seen rain like that in my life and I'm 55. It was worse than torrential.

Had to stop the car in a lay by as it was impossible to see out the windscreen.

 

[O L Leigh]

What a shock.

They should instead by challenging the proposed cuts to network rail maintenance and contractors having more power to self assure as they have proven to be much more pertinent to this incident. And the fact that control didn't have the experience or training to manage the incident as well as it could have been which may have led to the HST going back at a reduced speed.

This was an incredibly violent crash, with a very unlucky set of circumstances, a 170 may have faired slightly better but it is likely it too would have ended up down the embankment so let's not pretend this is the HSTs fault. There should be a plan for phased withdrawal yes, because they are approaching half a century old and are fuel hungry and slightly less crashworthy. Not because in this one incident they were torn to shreds.

Reducing risk is about making it as low as reasonably practical. Therefore, I would say other parts of this incident are much MUCH more important to improve as they don't just apply to limited trains they apply to the entire network. Removing HSTs as a knee jerk is just being seen to do 'something' simple that actually will make it worse for passengers.

I don’t believe that anyone has blamed the rolling stock. However, the crash performance of the train was pertinent to the outcome and, therefore, cannot be ignored.

Yes there were bigger lessons highlighted in the report, but all lessons ought to be taken away and considered, and that includes the ongoing role of HSTs in the provision of rail services and whether there ought to be modifications made. Given the similarities between this and Ufton Nervet, I can’t help but wonder why I’m reading very similar observations about the train and it’s performance.

The structural integrity of HST's has been trialled many times. Think Southall and others where they have been in high speed collidion, so maybe the RMT are just looking for a sound bite. Many more competent people have already given their Professional opinion.

It’s not just about structural integrity of the coaches, though.

 

[John Bishop]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.

The structural integrity of HST's has been trialled many times. Think Southall and others where they have been in high speed collidion, so maybe the RMT are just looking for a sound bite. Many more competent people have already given their Professional opinion.

Have a look at the crash reconstruction video of the leading power car and then tell me if you still agree with your statement.

 

[Jordan Adam]

The one thing i still can't get my head around is why the train was returning to Stonehaven at such speed when there had already been flooding/land slips elsewhere on the line.

I actually drove down the A90 just before the derailment happened on the way to the Edzell supply base. I had never seen rain like that in my life and I'm 55. It was worse than torrential.

Had to stop the car in a lay by as it was impossible to see out the windscreen.

I can also attest to this, torrential is very much an understatement of the rain that morning. In Stonehaven there was over 90mm of rain in the space of three hours, for context 60mm is the average rainfall for the entire month of August. And in Aberdeen itself there was widespread flooding, even in higher elevated areas which are not known to flood.

 

[WelshBluebird]

However, the crash performance of the train was pertinent to the outcome and, therefore, cannot be ignored.

It can't be ignored but I do think there's a risk that the rolling stock becomes a scapegoat rather than the blame being firmly put on Carillion and the drainage system (thankfully it looks like at the moment the media aren't doing that, I've not had a chance to read the actual report yet to see how that balances the blame).

 

[williamn]

Travelling in an HST is still massively safer than travelling by car. If mass withdrawals of HST’s occurred leading to perhaps a reduction in services or overcrowded trains we’d be driving people to their cars. It’s clear they should be replaced in the next few years but in a planned manner and not just to show that ‘something is being done’.

 

[norbitonflyer]

The structural integrity of HST's has been trialled many times. Think Southall and others where they have been in high speed collidion, so maybe the RMT are just looking for a sound bite. Many more competent people have already given their Professional opinion.

The Mark 3s seem to have stood up reasonably well in the circumstances, as they have in other accidents. The RMT's issue is with the design of the power car, and in particular the driving cab.

If the accident had happened to a more "modern" train like a 170 there would have been more people in the leading vehicle that went off the bridge.

 

[O L Leigh]

It can't be ignored but I do think there's a risk that the rolling stock becomes a scapegoat rather than the blame being firmly put on Carillion and the drainage system (thankfully it looks like at the moment the media aren't doing that, I've not had a chance to read the actual report yet to see how that balances the blame).

Indeed. It certainly seems like a bit of an odd response when there are still other (almost) equally venerable classes still operating. However, there are detail differences between an HST or other Mk3 stock and MU stock based on the same design, such as the type and characteristics of the couplers, that may have an effect on a train’s performance during a derailment/collision that makes a difference.

My reason for focussing on the rolling stock is because a lot of the issues highlighted by the RAIB in response to this accident are the same as those mentioned in accident investigation reports going at least as far back as Ladbroke Grove. I am dismayed that aspects common to these reports, such as bogie retention, appear never to have been addressed.

Travelling in an HST is still massively safer than travelling by car. If mass withdrawals of HST’s occurred leading to perhaps a reduction in services or overcrowded trains we’d be driving people to their cars. It’s clear they should be replaced in the next few years but in a planned manner and not just to show that ‘something is being done’.

I have never particularly liked this line of reasoning because it can just as easily be seen as an reason to do nothing. Ultimately it is up to individuals to make their own travel choices based on their own assessment of risk, which holds true every day. I do agree that a knee-jerk reaction is perhaps not warranted, but I do think that maybe it’s coming towards the time when we wave the HST goodbye.

 

[HamworthyGoods]

I do agree that a knee-jerk reaction is perhaps not warranted, but I do think that maybe it’s coming towards the time when we wave the HST goodbye.

we do however need to ensure the cab does provide a safe workspace.

 

[Falcon1200]

Some of the control aspects are obviously telling too in terms of workload, procedures for normal running and the use of gold commands. The growing use of blanket speed restrictions and "do not travel" has been a major reaction to Stonehaven. That being said, most control centres will always been overloaded in severe service disruption and it remains a challenge to step up that additional knowledge resource in a relatively short time-frame and keep those people competent for the 99% of the time they are not required.

Having been, until retiring in 2016, in one of the roles mentioned in the RAIB report, I must be careful in what I say, however the recognition of the pressure on Control during extreme weather is welcome; The fact that there were just 7 staff on duty in Network Rail Control on the nightshift, and that there were 30 (thirty) incidents ongoing. One of those incidents, the canal breach and washaway near Polmont which shut the railway for over a month, was a major event on its own requiring much Control effort and time, regardless of what else was happening. There would have been no time on shift when staff could take a moment to step back and consider the overall picture rather than simply respond to the multiple incidents occurring.

 

[Deltic1961]

Travelling in an HST is still massively safer than travelling by car. If mass withdrawals of HST’s occurred leading to perhaps a reduction in services or overcrowded trains we’d be driving people to their cars. It’s clear they should be replaced in the next few years but in a planned manner and not just to show that ‘something is being done’.

Read S78 in the report though.

Quote: "Would the consequences have been worse if more people were on the train?

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were only nine people on train 1T08 on the morning of 12 August 2020. ScotRail estimated the number of passengers that would have been on train 1T08 in normal times to be between 25 and 50 (three and six times greater than on the day of the accident). The circumstances of the accident and the resulting movements of the vehicles was such that, with normal passenger numbers, the casualty toll would almost certainly have been significantly higher"

Link to full report: https://assets.publishing.service.g...e/1059410/R022022_220310_Carmont_Synopsis.pdf

 

[bengley]

The one thing i still can't get my head around is why the train was returning to Stonehaven at such speed when there had already been flooding/land slips elsewhere on the line.


I can also attest to this, torrential is very much an understatement of the rain that morning. In Stonehaven there was over 90mm of rain in the space of three hours, for context 60mm is the average rainfall for the entire month of August. And in Aberdeen itself there was widespread flooding, even in higher elevated areas which are not known to flood.

Because there was no known reason to instruct the driver to run at caution. There was no evidence or report of any landslips between Carmont and Stonehaven. Landslips can happen at any time, so really nothing will be completely safe unless trains always run at a reduced speed.

 

[Towers]

The specific issue with the HST is that the cab offers very little protection to its occupants. As per those pictures we've all seen of them sitting in various works over the years during refurb etc with no cab on them, the whole thing just unbolts and lifts off. Unfortunately, in the event of a major impact it isn't really somewhere that you want to be. A FGW HST suffered a collision with a tree at Lavington some years ago, the tree went straight through the entire width of the cab horizontally at windscreen height and sliced the whole structure in two. Plenty of pics on Google, and they're rather sobering.

The MK3s are, and always have been, very well regarded for their crashworthyness, and aren't an issue.

 

[swt_passenger]

Read S78 in the report though.

Quote: "Would the consequences have been worse if more people were on the train?

Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were only nine people on train 1T08 on the morning of 12 August 2020. ScotRail estimated the number of passengers that would have been on train 1T08 in normal times to be between 25 and 50 (three and six times greater than on the day of the accident). The circumstances of the accident and the resulting movements of the vehicles was such that, with normal passenger numbers, the casualty toll would almost certainly have been significantly higher"

Link to full report: https://assets.publishing.service.g...e/1059410/R022022_220310_Carmont_Synopsis.pdf

To be accurate that’s a short synopsis of the full report, which was linked to in post #1056

 

[northernbelle]

Travelling in an HST is still massively safer than travelling by car. If mass withdrawals of HST’s occurred leading to perhaps a reduction in services or overcrowded trains we’d be driving people to their cars. It’s clear they should be replaced in the next few years but in a planned manner and not just to show that ‘something is being done’.

Totally agree. Any move needs to be proportional and not result in people choosing road over rail.

The Mark 3s seem to have stood up reasonably well in the circumstances, as they have in other accidents. The RMT's issue is with the design of the power car, and in particular the driving cab.

If the accident had happened to a more "modern" train like a 170 there would have been more people in the leading vehicle that went off the bridge.

Notwithstanding what happened to the cab, if people had been travelling in the leading vehicle I'd imagine they'd have been relatively ok in this crash - the front power car, while having come off the bridge, did not roll over or have significant incursion into the survival space with the exception of the right hand rear corner (see below).

For me, the main takeaway regarding the crash performance of the HST is that the lack of anti-override measures probably made the outcome of the accident worse. The fact that Coach D was able to override the power car was an influence on the whole train being scattered - had the train remained in line (even if it had followed the power car down the embankment), the actual intrusion (and therefore injury) in the passenger areas would have been managed down, much like the Grayrigg Pendolino.

 

[Taunton]

Surely the upside of it being an HST was that the first car, being a power car, and which took the bulk of the smash, didn't have any passengers in it, whereas in a modern train it would. Isn't that actually an advantage?

I thought the Carmont carriages looked to have held up remarkably well. If you look at Ladbroke Grove, the modern 165 Turbo was far more heavily destroyed than any of the HST carriages; had the passenger loads of each been reversed it would have been a very different matter.

 

[najaB]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.

To be replaced with...?

 

[Ex-controller]

ASLEF demanding withdrawal of HST fleet by next year.


Have a look at the crash reconstruction video of the leading power car and then tell me if you still agree with your statement.

Exactly. I think asking for it by next year is quite reasonable on their part. I hope they pursue it.

To be replaced with...?

That’s for the Scottish Government to address. We see diesel units being transferred between TOCs all round England and Wales.

For example, class 197s in Wales displacing class 158s? Maybe we can have those. Point is this is a safety issue, the 158s etc might not be ideal but they’ll do the job until there’s a long term replacement

 

[GB]

Given the injuries to the driver were due to hitting the windscreen and other bits in the cab, what stock would have faired better in this accident?

 

[Ex-controller]

Having been, until retiring in 2016, in one of the roles mentioned in the RAIB report, I must be careful in what I say, however the recognition of the pressure on Control during extreme weather is welcome; The fact that there were just 7 staff on duty in Network Rail Control on the nightshift, and that there were 30 (thirty) incidents ongoing. One of those incidents, the canal breach and washaway near Polmont which shut the railway for over a month, was a major event on its own requiring much Control effort and time, regardless of what else was happening. There would have been no time on shift when staff could take a moment to step back and consider the overall picture rather than simply respond to the multiple incidents occurring.

Completely agree.

 

[John Bishop]

To be replaced with...?

No idea, but something safer for the Drivers to work in than the HST does at present.

 

[gimmea50anyday]

You have to bear in mind the overall impact speed of Ladbroke Grove was well beyond any forseen design capability of collision protection, the 165 splitting open along the extrusion welds by forces far beyond what they were designed or expected to hold. The other two cars of 165115 and the HST stood up to the impact forces very well under the circumstances as did the mk4s that collided with the 66 at Heck, the DVT sadly was destroyed again by forces that were well beyond any perceived speed and impact force expected or designed. in both cases the collisions were head on at speeds in excess of 120mph. There will always be improvements to be made in crashworthiness and survivability but not every accident scenario or outcome will ever be predicted or mitigated against

 

[najaB]

That’s for the Scottish Government to address. We see diesel units being transferred between TOCs all round England and Wales.

Are there any DMUs unspoken for? It's not that long ago that there was a shortage.

Don't get me wrong - it's clear that they need to go, but simply withdrawing them with no replacement trades a low risk to the driver to a higher risk for everyone else.

 

[TheEdge]

Notwithstanding what happened to the cab, if people had been travelling in the leading vehicle I'd imagine they'd have been relatively ok in this crash - the front power car, while having come off the bridge, did not roll over or have significant incursion into the survival space with the exception of the right hand rear corner (see below).

Have you not seen the images later on of the inside of the leading vehicle? No one would have been ok if the train had been loaded.

Given the injuries to the driver were due to hitting the windscreen and other bits in the cab, what stock would have faired better in this accident?

Its hard to say really. If I hit something with my 745 at 100 and was thrown forward I'd still die going flying over the desk and thrown into the windscreen a good distance away.

Are there any DMUs unspoken for? It's not that long ago that there was a shortage.

There is a long line of 153s at Ely...

 

[HamworthyGoods]

Are there any DMUs unspoken for? It's not that long ago that there was a shortage.

Don't get me wrong - it's clear that they need to go, but simply withdrawing them with no replacement trades a low risk to the driver to a higher risk for everyone else.

Scotrail is soon to start cascading out it’s class 156s (some point next year?) by new electrification. That could allow a start in the replacement of HSTs

 

[John Bishop]

Given the injuries to the driver were due to hitting the windscreen and other bits in the cab, what stock would have faired better in this accident?

Stock that doesn’t involve the whole cab shearing off and being catapulted through the air to its landing spot.

 

[yorkie]

Scotrail is soon to start cascading out it’s class 156s (some point next year?) by new electrification. That could allow a start in the replacement of HSTs

If anyone wishes to speculate on any potential cascade or withdrawal please feel free to contunue any such discussion in the Speculative Discussion forum. Thanks.