MatthewHutton
Member
Surely the peak train demand in the north crush loaded (i.e 4-5 people per square metre) isn’t significantly lower than after Mondays parade?Whilst that certainly hasn't helped the main culprit here is managing things in the most financially efficient way possible. This is the ultimate outcome of management by spreadsheet and in particular HM Treasury spreadsheet.
Keeping reserves of rolling stock and crew on hand to cater to the odd major event is not seen as a good use of financial resources. So each TOC now operates as close to the minimum as it's can possibly get. Even BR in it's later days didn't have carriage sidings full of mouldy Mk1s waiting for a freight loco to haul around to help with events in the way it did in say 70s (though it certainly had far more flexibility and resilience than today's efficiency optimised railway).
You can find the same issue all over different part of the state. Look at NHS hospitals, even before Covid poleaxed it, they were resourced to operate at very close to maximum capacity with very limited ability to absorb surges in demand.
Privatisation absolutely made the situation worse in terms of the ability to redeploy resources in an ad-hoc basis. But the rot set in decades ago with the drive to maximum efficiency day to day and has only worsened since.
== Doublepost prevention - post automatically merged: ==
10 platforms of local/regional trains is still ~20tph or something.Realistically though that can’t happen.
There are legalities surrounding hours crew can work continuously and also when breaks must be taken before working trains.
On the other side of the coin logistically you only have 10 platforms at Liverpool of various maximum train lengths that are usually quite full and occupied on a normal day without the additional carriages and services running by all TOC’s. You can only delay a train so long before the platform is required for something else to replace it, and it also causes the butterfly effect where even a 1 minute delay at Liverpool can completely destroy the national network timetable.
An attempt was made to delay what was feasible but the collapse in the organisation of the queuing system is what caused the main problem to occur