Breckland Line

[CockneySparrow]

Seems to me that there are issues down there on a weekly basis

Since the new style barriers have been installed its been a known problem that a couple of crossings north of Thetford are not working properly causing trains to reduce speed

But today the GA website said that two of them are damaged, one being Brandon of all places, this crossing isn't one of the normal failures, the only thing I can think of as its a busy crossing is that a car was involved

On another note does anyone know when the boxes will go, NR normally demolish them pretty quickly but as far as I know they are all still standing

 

[Sleepy]

:roll: Line has been an absolute shambles since re-signalling - used to be one of GA most reliable !! Network Rail should hang their heads in shame.:roll::roll::roll::roll::roll:

 

[CockneySparrow]

Just been digging around online, looks like Brandon is the worst of all

Strange as I look at GA site everyday and it always says problems at Harling Road and the first crossing from Thetford Norwich side

Different sites are now saying Brandon is going to be manned again, whether or not the box will be used or whether the NR gate or barrier keeper will sit in a car all day only time will tell

 

[YorkshireBear]

Apparently the new technology with level crossings does not play ball! (read modern railways for info)

It was a trial system i imagine that it won't be rolled out any time soon!

 

[dk1]

Most of the Obstacle detector crossings are now permanently manned. Days like today when numpty motorists collide with barriers never helps.

 

[jopsuk]

Most of the Obstacle detector crossings are now permanently manned.

I guess in hindsight going with CCTV (as they wanted to avoid having all crossing manned) would have been the better option- and presumably will become the default if they can't solve these issues. Sure I saw mention that there's an OD crossing elsewhere in the country that is semi-CCTV- that is, if the OD detects something it sounds an alert at the signalling centre, allowing a signaller to check the CCTV and clear the signal if it is a false alarm?

Days like today when numpty motorists collide with barriers never helps.

There's no crossing type solves that one.

 

[306024]

Apart from ones without barriers

 

[jopsuk]

I their own way, yes! I suppose there's also "bridges", but they're not infallible (Selby, that cement lorry that landed on the 455 in Surrey!) either.

 

[w0033944]

According to "The Signal Box" forum, the low-level detection system, which I understand is LIDAR-based, has been triggered frequently when no obstruction is present. This seems to be a separate problem from the fogging/weather-related obstruction of the radar heads, which has apparently been addressed by the fitting of shutters. My question is this, however; it seems that crossings with low pedestrian use will have LIDAR removed or not fitted if they are yet to be converted. However, it surely only takes one dog walker to fall on black ice while crossing, resulting in being incapacitated by injury in the prone position and the resultant horrific incident where the equipment fails to detect their presence and allows a train to proceed to cause an uproar?

Obviously, I'd love for this scenario to remain purely theoretical, but it surely isn't a completely outlandish or ridiculous eventuality.

 

[Bald Rick]

According to "The Signal Box" forum, the low-level detection system, which I understand is LIDAR-based, has been triggered frequently when no obstruction is present. This seems to be a separate problem from the fogging/weather-related obstruction of the radar heads, which has apparently been addressed by the fitting of shutters. My question is this, however; it seems that crossings with low pedestrian use will have LIDAR removed or not fitted if they are yet to be converted. However, it surely only takes one dog walker to fall on black ice while crossing, resulting in being incapacitated by injury in the prone position and the resultant horrific incident where the equipment fails to detect their presence and allows a train to proceed to cause an uproar?

Obviously, I'd love for this scenario to remain purely theoretical, but it surely isn't a completely outlandish or ridiculous eventuality.

In 20 years on the railway, and 7 being closely involved in LX management, I have never heard of such an incident. That's not to say it couldn't happen, along with someone being incapacitated due to a meteorite strike.

 

[w0033944]

In 20 years on the railway, and 7 being closely involved in LX management, I have never heard of such an incident. That's not to say it couldn't happen, along with someone being incapacitated due to a meteorite strike.

Fair dos, I'm not in the industry and don't know what sort of risk assessments would be used or how risk would be quantified and assessed. My thoughts were that:

1. While I suspect the public would regard your meteorite strike example as being so unlikely as to not be worth bothering with, they would, I suspect, view slipping on ice as being rather more foreseeable.

2. With usual caveats surrounding the media's portrayal of railways, indeed anything newsworthy, there are reports every winter of hospitals being inundated with injuries from falls when bad weather hits. I'm not aware of a similarly constant flow of meteorite strike victims.

3. Given point 2, isn't it reasonable to suggest that, should this scenario occur, and it emerged that NR either didn't consider the risk or dismissed it, the populist, generally anti-rail sections of the media would have a field day? Being from East Anglia, I know that the amount of coverage the deaths of the girls at Elsenham still gets 8 years after the event on the local TV news is incredible.

4. There is, if I'm not mistaken, a precedent for ice on an LC surface causing an accident (South Drove in Lincolnshire?), albeit in this case it was a vehicle which became stranded.

5. If no risk of fallen pedestrians blocking the line was noted during the MCB-OD design process, why was LIDAR even added to the specification? I'm sure you, or someone else, will correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't the lowest the radar can detect an obstacle 25 cm above rail height? Obviously, there is the much more likely situation where an inanimate object less than 25cm in height would pose a serious threat to the train, but I'd be interested to know whether the "fallen pedestrian" scenario was part of the reason for LIDAR being part of the original specification.

I'm genuinely not having a go at you or anyone else, just observing from personal experience in my own studies that those on the inside sometimes find it hard to maintain perspective. I'm aware that I'm no expert, which is why I'm bombarding those of you who are with questions rather than arrogantly stating that you're wrong!

 

[Bald Rick]

LIDAR was used to pick up the 95th %ile smallest 5* year old female child lying on the crossing. (*it may have been 9, can't remember).

But that's not the issue.

Broadly speaking the issue is whether a crossing is routinely used by pedestrians. For some of the MCB-ODs, e.g. Brandon, pedestrian use is high. For some, eg Lakenheath or Shippea Hill, it clearly isn't.

So in an holistic risk assessment, you would look to assess:

i) the event of a pedestrian being incapacitated on an LX due to falling on ice / meteorite strike / hit and run by a vehicle / anything else factored by the number of pedestrians on the crossing

against

ii) the wider risk of incidents at the level crossing caused by a false activation of the LIDAR e.g. trains having to be talked past signals at danger, possibly through the LX with the barriers still up; risk of barriers being down longer than necessary causing abuse, serious delays to train services causing unplanned detrainment of passengers etc etc (all of which is a factor of the number of services on the line), multiplied by the likelihood of failure.


For some crossings (e.g. Shippea Hill), i) will be a very small number multiplied by a very very small number, coming out with a fatality risk of 1 x 10 to the power minus a lot; some other crossings (eg Brandon, Thetford) will be a large number multiplied by a very very small number, coming out with a fatality risk of 1 x 10 to the power minus quite a lot.

ii) will have a fatality risk for this issue of broadly the same magnitude for most crossings on a given line of route.

So if (i) can be reasonably demonstrated to be lower than (ii) for any given crossing, take out the LIDAR, and it is ALARP.

Simples

 

[w0033944]

LIDAR was used to pick up the 95th %ile smallest 5* year old female child lying on the crossing. (*it may have been 9, can't remember).

But that's not the issue.

Broadly speaking the issue is whether a crossing is routinely used by pedestrians. For some of the MCB-ODs, e.g. Brandon, pedestrian use is high. For some, eg Lakenheath or Shippea Hill, it clearly isn't.

So in an holistic risk assessment, you would look to assess:

i) the event of a pedestrian being incapacitated on an LX due to falling on ice / meteorite strike / hit and run by a vehicle / anything else factored by the number of pedestrians on the crossing

against

ii) the wider risk of incidents at the level crossing caused by a false activation of the LIDAR e.g. trains having to be talked past signals at danger, possibly through the LX with the barriers still up; risk of barriers being down longer than necessary causing abuse, serious delays to train services causing unplanned detrainment of passengers etc etc (all of which is a factor of the number of services on the line), multiplied by the likelihood of failure.


For some crossings (e.g. Shippea Hill), i) will be a very small number multiplied by a very very small number, coming out with a fatality risk of 1 x 10 to the power minus a lot; some other crossings (eg Brandon, Thetford) will be a large number multiplied by a very very small number, coming out with a fatality risk of 1 x 10 to the power minus quite a lot.

ii) will have a fatality risk for this issue of broadly the same magnitude for most crossings on a given line of route.

So if (i) can be reasonably demonstrated to be lower than (ii) for any given crossing, take out the LIDAR, and it is ALARP.

Simples

Cheers. I presume that PR departments would just have to fend-off the media should the 1X10 to the umpteenth negative power event actually occur? Plus, if LIDAR is causing greater problems than it solves, why bother retaining it at certain locations if the risk is still "1 x 10 to the power minus quite a lot"? I hasten to add that my opinion is that, despite the fact that I appreciate that employing sufficient staff to monitor a greater number of installations, whether on-site or remotely, MCB-OD seems to me to be a very good idea that's ahead of the available technology. Would conversion of gated crossings with AHBs pending the development of LIDAR that isn't triggered by random events have been feasible?

 

[jopsuk]

I thought all the weather issues were with the LIDAR. not the RADAR. At that range RADAR should penetrate anything short of a waterfall.

 

[Chris125]

Sure I saw mention that there's an OD crossing elsewhere in the country that is semi-CCTV- that is, if the OD detects something it sounds an alert at the signalling centre, allowing a signaller to check the CCTV and clear the signal if it is a false alarm?

It's mentioned in Roger Ford's latest monthly e-preview, sign up here

Basically Wem crossing, which has just been upgraded as part of the Crewe-Shrewsbury resignalling, has been fitted with the CCTV the technology was meant to remove - "CCTV will allow the signaller to make a visual inspection before over-riding the automatic operation and clearing the signals manually if OD has failed safe"

Chris

 

[moggie]

It's mentioned in Roger Ford's latest monthly e-preview, sign up here

Basically Wem crossing, which has just been upgraded as part of the Crewe-Shrewsbury resignalling, has been fitted with the CCTV the technology was meant to remove - "CCTV will allow the signaller to make a visual inspection before over-riding the automatic operation and clearing the signals manually if OD has failed safe"

Chris

Meant to remove CCTV - yes, but the principal gain of reduced signallers workload on each OD is in theory preserved thereby still allowing NR to have more crossings monitored by a single signaller / desk in one of the big control centres / ROCs - as in principle they remain automatic. This is what this is really about. Of course if OD's continue to fail - consistently that's a problem which CCTV can solve, but at what expense to time management on the signaller? How will NR get around that when they are flouting their own workload assessments?

 

[w0033944]

Meant to remove CCTV - yes, but the principal gain of reduced signallers workload on each OD is in theory preserved thereby still allowing NR to have more crossings monitored by a single signaller / desk in one of the big control centres / ROCs - as in principle they remain automatic. This is what this is really about. Of course if OD's continue to fail - consistently that's a problem which CCTV can solve, but at what expense to time management on the signaller? How will NR get around that when they are flouting their own workload assessments?

This leads back to my view that the idea is good but the technology is as yet unable to provide what is needed. If remote monitoring needs to be retained so that a worker can operate the system themselves, then it proves that the technology is insufficiently reliable.

 

[Baxenden Bank]

Got trapped inside one once, as a pedestrian.

Set off across the crossing on the offside of the road. Wigwag lights / sirens started. Better to carry on than turn back. Barrier behind me came down first (as it should being off-side). Barrier in front of me came down before I got to it. Trapped inside. I wasn't the only person trapped either.

 

[Mechy]

Got trapped inside one once, as a pedestrian.

Set off across the crossing on the offside of the road. Wigwag lights / sirens started. Better to carry on than turn back. Barrier behind me came down first (as it should being off-side). Barrier in front of me came down before I got to it. Trapped inside. I wasn't the only person trapped either.

Were the barriers raised again whilst you were trapped or did a train pass whilst you were still inside them?

Also was this an OD crossing you were trapped in, or a CCTV/Manned one?

 

[CockneySparrow]

This leads back to my view that the idea is good but the technology is as yet unable to provide what is needed. If remote monitoring needs to be retained so that a worker can operate the system themselves, then it proves that the technology is insufficiently reliable.

Yes but in terms of the breckland line where there are only 2 trains each way per hour and two freight trains in either direction a day it will still only require one signaller to cover the whole line per shift that's including watching CCTV at every crossing of note, put that against how many boxes have gone NR will although not be 100% happy but accept it as a win win

 

[Mechy]

Yes but in terms of the breckland line where there are only 2 trains each way per hour and two freight trains in either direction a day it will still only require one signaller to cover the whole line per shift that's including watching CCTV at every crossing of note, put that against how many boxes have gone NR will although not be 100% happy but accept it as a win win

Yes, but one of the reasons the budget was approved for the modular signalling on the Ely-Norwich was because the crossings were entirely self sufficient. The second you have to add a full CCTV system to each crossing (even as a fallback) with data links back to Cambridge etc, you are then eating away at the cost benefit.

I think NR will just push to remove the LIDAR on all future MCB-OD installations, and where pedestrian traffic is high, use an MCB-CCTV.

 

[Tomnick]

Yes but in terms of the breckland line where there are only 2 trains each way per hour and two freight trains in either direction a day it will still only require one signaller to cover the whole line per shift that's including watching CCTV at every crossing of note, put that against how many boxes have gone NR will although not be 100% happy but accept it as a win win

I make it eight full barrier crossings - not sure what the maximum permitted number (if proper CCTV, rather than just as a fallback for OD) is to be supervised by one signalman, but I thought it was somewhere around six. Once you include all the other bits and pieces (line blockages for engineering access, user worked LCs and so on), it adds up to quite a hefty workload.

 

[Baxenden Bank]

Were the barriers raised again whilst you were trapped or did a train pass whilst you were still inside them?

Also was this an OD crossing you were trapped in, or a CCTV/Manned one?

First, I need to point out that this incident was a few years ago and not on the Breckland line, but the principle remains that technology is not perfect (and certainly not as perfect as any salesman will have you believe) - just like people. At least people can intervene if they see something - machines just carry on as programmed.

Anyway, the crossing in question (Blythe Bridge, Staffordshire) is remotely monitored by CCTV - whether this is the next crossing box up the line (Caverswall Lane) or at a more remote signalling centre I do not know. The barriers were raised and everyone went on their way safely.

To be honest I think the problem may have been that the line was not operating in its normal manner. This was the time of the big WCML blockade at Stoke-on-Trent (2004?), trains from Derby were terminating at Blythe Bridge and then continuing a short distance past the level crossing to reverse, so perhaps the barriers were actually being operated by the signalman rather than the usual rail treadles. That being the case, shame on the remote signaller for not giving people enough time to cross.

Regardless, I really would prefer to know that someone, somewhere, can see what is going on and intervene if necessary.

I might have misunderstood but is one of the posts here actually suggesting that the new kit on the Breckland line is self-contained / fully automated with no link back to a signaller, anywhere?

 

[Bald Rick]

I might have misunderstood but is one of the posts here actually suggesting that the new kit on the Breckland line is self-contained / fully automated with no link back to a signaller, anywhere?

There is a link to the signaller - basically a failed indication as with an AHB. Otherwise it is completely automatic.

 

[Tomnick]

Anyway, the crossing in question (Blythe Bridge, Staffordshire) is remotely monitored by CCTV - whether this is the next crossing box up the line (Caverswall Lane) or at a more remote signalling centre I do not know. The barriers were raised and everyone went on their way safely.

For what it's worth, it's operated by Caverswell box.

To be honest I think the problem may have been that the line was not operating in its normal manner. This was the time of the big WCML blockade at Stoke-on-Trent (2004?), trains from Derby were terminating at Blythe Bridge and then continuing a short distance past the level crossing to reverse, so perhaps the barriers were actually being operated by the signalman rather than the usual rail treadles.

Unless auto-lower is provided to ease the workload (which I doubt it is at Caverswall), the lowering sequence is started by the signalman anyway...

That being the case, shame on the remote signaller for not giving people enough time to cross.

Regardless, I really would prefer to know that someone, somewhere, can see what is going on and intervene if necessary.

...but, once started, the sequence then runs its course automatically, unless interrupted by the signalman if he sees something amiss. There's no requirement to observe the crossing throughout the process though (there's often something else to attend to!): safety is ensured by checking the crossing once the barriers are down, so it sounds like everything operated correctly and safely here (although it can't be nice to find yourself trapped, even if only for a few moments!).

 

[GB]

First, I need to point out that this incident was a few years ago and not on the Breckland line, but the principle remains that technology is not perfect (and certainly not as perfect as any salesman will have you believe) - just like people. At least people can intervene if they see something - machines just carry on as programmed.

But the technology of the breckland line is different to the technology you experienced. The crossing you got stuck on was working as intended.

 

[w0033944]

I think NR will just push to remove the LIDAR on all future MCB-OD installations, and where pedestrian traffic is high, use an MCB-CCTV.

Sounds quite a decent solution to the current difficulties.

 

[Baxenden Bank]

For what it's worth, it's operated by Caverswell box.


Unless auto-lower is provided to ease the workload (which I doubt it is at Caverswall), the lowering sequence is started by the signalman anyway...

...but, once started, the sequence then runs its course automatically, unless interrupted by the signalman if he sees something amiss. There's no requirement to observe the crossing throughout the process though (there's often something else to attend to!): safety is ensured by checking the crossing once the barriers are down, so it sounds like everything operated correctly and safely here (although it can't be nice to find yourself trapped, even if only for a few moments!).

It may have operated correctly but it cannot possibly have operated safely, unless it is safe practise to trap people inside the barriers. Clearly the timing was insufficient as I can assure you I do not dawdle and I did not stop to admire the view or tie my sholelaces!

Regardless of Blythe Bridge being old technology and the Breckland Line being new technology, the issue is the same.

A previous post on this thread mentioned someone potentially slipping on black ice, dismissed rather summarily if I may say. Many times in my life I have slipped on black ice. I’m sure all readers of this thread have also done so. Why is it regarded as a rare possibility that it may happen on a level crossing, and by extension at a time when the barriers are being lowered? Sirens come on, rush to get across, increased likelihood of a fall?

The difference is that the old technology has someone whose job is, once the barriers have lowered / gates closed, to specifically look and confirm everything is OK before clearing the signals. Failure to do so would be a disciplinary (criminal?) offence. The new technology only has a machine to perform the same task – if it fails what is the recourse – hit the radar box with the big spanner to make one feel better?

These Breckland Line crossings utilising radar / object detectors – are they open, half barrier or full barrier? What does the OD ‘scan’; the loading gauge or the entire crossing between the barriers / white lines? If, having been inadvertently trapped inside the barriers (a possibility I have proven personally) and I stand close to the barrier, rather than in the middle of the track, do I get detected? Does the OD have a ‘mental picture’ of the crossing to compare against each time it operates itself – a bit like the suicide detectors on the underground?

Unfortunately, the track record on level crossing safety is not as good as it could be – particularly in conducting and acting upon the results of risk assessments. You will (perhaps) forgive those not directly involved in the process for being somewhat sceptical when they are told of some wonderful new technological solution, especially when the introduction of said technology appears driven by cost savings rather than enhanced performance.

If the crossing is capable of reporting ‘failure’ back to a signalling centre, clearly cabling (or radio communication) exists between the automated crossing and the signalling centre - why not send back CCTV pictures as well and do a double check?

Finally, returning to the subject of this thread, regardless of the technology / processes involved, they should blinking well work rather than regularly fail.

 

[Tomnick]

Don't get me wrong, I'm no fan of the new OD technology either! The reason there's no CCTV for routine use (although some installations do now have CCTV, for use as a fallback when the radar kit throws a wobbly) is that the CCTV then needs monitoring, which in turn increases the signalman's workload and ultimately increases (or prevents a decrease in) staffing levels.

At a CCTV crossing (for that's what we're talking about), it might not be desirable to trap a pedestrian within the barriers, but it's certainly not unsafe. Anyone in such a position should be spotted, and the barriers raised to free them before the protecting signal is cleared to allow a train to approach. As you say, anyone failing to notice such an obstruction would find themselves being invited for a substantial chat (and yes, I'm sure that'd potentially extend as far as criminal proceedings if the person was subsequently struck by a train). The OD technology does, as I understand it, scan the whole crossing area for obstructions (and removes the potential for human error in doing so) - it's only of use on full barrier crossings.

 

[Bald Rick]

Unfortunately the MkI human eyeball is fallible, particularly when linked to the MkI human brain. In my time looking after a large number of signal boxes I would have a signaller trapping a pedestrian inside closed barriers and crossing clear given about once a month. Never intentionally, and there were usually mitigating circumstances, but it happened nevertheless. I'm not aware of an MCB-OD ever doing this.

Similarly (and just on the Breckland line) there were two examples in two recent years of signallers having gates open in front of approaching trains, in both cases causing the unplanned removal of said gates (shortly followed by a tea no biscuits conversation).

There is no doubt that MCB-OD are at least as safe as MCB / CCTV, otherwise they would have not got through the exhaustive approval process.