Carmont (near Stonehaven) derailment - 12 August 2020

[BRX]

Without wishing to defend Carillion in any way, it is perhaps worth remembering that the incorrectly-installed drain at Carmont had been in place since 2012, and had therefore coped with the worst of the weather over several years, before it was overwhelmed by very heavy and intense rainfall. There would therefore have to be an acceptance that such conditions, which could occur anywhere and at any time (even in the height of summer, as at Carmont), have to be mitigated against, even where as in almost all cases the railway infrastructure is built and maintained to specification.

I don't really get the point here - the fact that an incorrectly installed drain functioned without apparent problems for several years doesn't tell us much about the risks associated with correctly installed ones. During all the time that the Carmont drain seemed to be working ok, various things would have been happening unseen, that eventually caused the failure.

 

[Falcon1200]

I don't really get the point here - the fact that an incorrectly installed drain functioned without apparent problems for several years doesn't tell us much about the risks associated with correctly installed ones. During all the time that the Carmont drain seemed to be working ok, various things would have been happening unseen, that eventually caused the failure.

My point was in response to an earlier post;

Or is there now an assumption that no works on the railways can be relied on as having been done to the right specification, and hence this (slowing down when bad weather is forecast) is going to be an indefinite process?

 

[matchmaker]

From the BBC today:

Network Rail has been accused of failing to warn a train driver that the track was unsafe before a fatal derailment near Stonehaven in 2020.
Three men died in the crash, which took place following a landslide.
Network Rail is due to face charges under the Health and Safety at Work Act at the High Court on Thursday.
It is accused of not warning the driver that it was unsafe to drive on that section of track and of not telling him to reduce his speed.

Carmont crash

 

[CAF397]

Network Rail admits failings caused deaths in Stonehaven crash​

Network Rail admits failings caused deaths in Stonehaven crash

The driver was not warned that part of the track near Stonehaven was unsafe before the fatal crash in 2020.

www.bbc.co.uk

Network Rail admitted failing to impose a speed restriction, warn the driver that part of the track was unsafe, or ask him to reduce his speed.

It also admitted a number of failures over the maintenance and inspection of drainage in the area, and in adverse and extreme weather planning.

 

[jfowkes]

Network Rail admitted failing to impose a speed restriction, warn the driver that part of the track was unsafe, or ask him to reduce his speed.

Is this an admission that they should have done those things, or merely an admission of the fact that they did not? Those are very different things to admit.

 

[snowball]

Is this an admission that they should have done those things, or merely an admission of the fact that they did not? Those are very different things to admit.

As I understand it, it's an admission of breaking the law.

 

[Falcon1200]

Network Rail admitted failing to ..... warn the driver that part of the track was unsafe....

Which seems a strange statement, given that until the accident no-one actually knew that that particular part of the track was unsafe.

Presumably (and hopefully) this is a corporate action against NR rather than individuals.

 

[68000]

I think this has major implications for the railway if I read that admission of guilt correctly. NR did not know the railway was unsafe but should have cautioned trains through it in any case... that is my reading of it

 

[12LDA28C]

Network Rail admitted failing to ..... warn the driver that part of the track was unsafe....

Which seems a strange statement, given that until the accident no-one actually knew that that particular part of the track was unsafe.

Presumably (and hopefully) this is a corporate action against NR rather than individuals.

Indeed. I'm very surprised that NR has admitted guilt when it was not known at that stage there was a problem. Were they supposed to use their crystal ball to predict the future?

 

[tomuk]

Indeed. I'm very surprised that NR has admitted guilt when it was not known at that stage there was a problem. Were they supposed to use their crystal ball to predict the future?

No but maybe the unprecedented amount of rain that morning and all the other landslips that occurred maybe should have given them an inkling?

 

[EC54]

Network Rail admitted failing to ..... warn the driver that part of the track was unsafe....

Which seems a strange statement, given that until the accident no-one actually knew that that particular part of the track was unsafe.

Presumably (and hopefully) this is a corporate action against NR rather than individuals.

Also bearing in mind at least 2 trains in each direction (including the one involved) had passed that area previously that morning with no reports of anything untoward.
In hindsight it does seem crazy that a blanket speed restriction was not put in place that morning due to the amount of rainfall until all the track had been inspected, all the way from Aberdeen to Dundee.

 

[chuff chuff]

Nothing had gone through the section for sometime IIRC so there would have little knowledge of the condition of the track.

 

[ainsworth74]

In hindsight it does seem crazy that a blanket speed restriction was not put in place that morning due to the amount of rainfall until all the track had been inspected, all the way from Aberdeen to Dundee.

Which is presumably why Network Rail, as a corporation, as has pled guilty. I wouldn't fault the, doubtless, overwhelmed control staff for missing that a blanket restriction was required but Network Rail, the corporation, made a mistake and people died. Indeed I suspect this paragraph from the report would have be the key one:

231. The apparent lack of awareness about weather-related risk to train 1T08 contrasts with action taken when train 1A43 was reversed at Laurencekirk station because flooding at Newtonhill meant it could not continue its scheduled northward journey. Train 1A43 had arrived at Laurencekirk station at about 07:16 hrs and remained there until, at 08:28 hrs, route control staff instructed the Laurencekirk signaller to return the train to Dundee as train 1Z43 (paragraph 52). When giving this instruction, an informal exchange between route control and the Laurencekirk signaller identified that the train had been at Laurencekirk for over an hour, and led control to instruct the signaller that he should advise the driver of 1Z43 to run at a reduced speed. The instruction was given, but there was no opportunity for the driver to implement it as he stopped the train shortly after leaving the station because he encountered a landslip (paragraph 53).

1A43 was, rightly it turns out, instructed to proceed at a reduced speed. But 1T08 was not. Again, to be absolutely clear, I attach no blame to the controllers who were overwhelmed by the huge amount of disruption that morning. But Network Rail, as a corporation, clearly failed by not giving an instruction to reduce at a reduced speed to 1T08 even though it was clearly alive to the risks as it had given such an instruction to 1A43.

 

[Dai Corner]

Apologies for snipping this sentence out of the conversation but the general principle is that if it's not known whether something is safe it should be assumed to be unsafe, shouldn't it?

. NR did not know the railway was unsafe

 

[Killingworth]

Nothing had gone through the section for sometime IIRC so there would have little knowledge of the condition of the track.

Short of sending drones along all tracks that wouldn't be possible. Centrally it was known that there had been many landslides already reported. It would have been reasonable to consider there may have been others as yet unknown. Caution was called for.

At Carmont the sun had come out and it was now a lovely day. All was right with the world?

Hindght is wonderful but it can't turn the clock back.

 

[LAX54]

I think this has major implications for the railway if I read that admission of guilt correctly. NR did not know the railway was unsafe but should have cautioned trains through it in any case... that is my reading of it

Which will result in far more blanket ESR's being imposed if there is the slightest chance of bad weather

 

[68000]

Apologies for snipping this sentence out of the conversation but the general principle is that if it's not known whether something is safe it should be assumed to be unsafe, shouldn't it?

Where do you draw the line? How can any driver of any vehicle know the way ahead is safe to proceed? Nobody would travel anywhere

 

[chuff chuff]

Which will result in far more blanket ESR's being imposed if there is the slightest chance of bad weather

There thrown around like confetti anyway now,lessons may have been learned.

Where do draw the line? How can any driver of any vehicle know the way ahead is safe to proceed? Nobody would travel anywhere

You have to have trust in the system,sadly that day it didn't work our to well.

 

[jfowkes]

Which will result in far more blanket ESR's being imposed if there is the slightest chance of bad weather

This would be a overcorrection, surely? It just means that if there is very bad weather, there may be ESRs imposed for longer than necessary, and/or over a wider area than necessary. If it avoids another Carmont (or, here's hoping, results in more spending on infrastructure resilience and maintenance), then that's a good thing.

 

[12LDA28C]

Apologies for snipping this sentence out of the conversation but the general principle is that if it's not known whether something is safe it should be assumed to be unsafe, shouldn't it?

Had the train not passed over the affected area recently before the incident and seen nothing untoward?

 

[Morayshire]

Had the train not passed over the affected area recently before the incident and seen nothing untoward?

Not that recently sadly. Haven't got the RAIB report to hand but I think there was over an hour between the last train going through the area and the train being turned back at Carmont.

 

[chuff chuff]

It sat quite a while awaiting instructions before finally going through the crossover and back to Aberdeen.

 

[EC54]

Had the train not passed over the affected area recently before the incident and seen nothing untoward?

Yes but what can be described as recent, 30 mins, 1 hour, 2 hours, 3 hours? and the rain had stopped.

 

[LAX54]

This would be a overcorrection, surely? It just means that if there is very bad weather, there may be ESRs imposed for longer than necessary, and/or over a wider area than necessary. If it avoids another Carmont (or, here's hoping, results in more spending on infrastructure resilience and maintenance), then that's a good thing.

It would be a good thing. but we also know that the public will have a totally different view, and if they are 'late' by a few mins, then it will be the end of the world ! NR already get complaints when a blanker ESR is brought in for the OHL in high heat, or ESR's for some sections of track

 

[SamYeager]

If the train had been cautioned then at what speed would it have been running? Presumably this slower speed would have enabled it to stop before the landslide or would it have just meant the impact of the collision was less?

 

[Dieseldriver]

If the train had been cautioned then at what speed would it have been running? Presumably this slower speed would have enabled it to stop before the landslide or would it have just meant the impact of the collision was less?

Would depend on the speed laid down.
If a Driver is specifically instructed to proceed at caution, they should drive their train at a speed which enables them to stop short of any obstruction.
However, if say there is a blanket speed of 50mph, that would not necessarily mean they’re able to stop short of an obstruction however at least they would be travelling at a lower speed and it would lessen the consequences.

 

[najaB]

However, if say there is a blanket speed of 50mph, that would not necessarily mean they’re able to stop short of an obstruction however at least they would be travelling at a lower speed and it would lessen the consequences

Kinetic energy goes up with the square of velocity, so a small decrease in speed takes a lot of energy out of a collision.

 

[Falcon1200]

I wouldn't fault the, doubtless, overwhelmed control staff for missing that a blanket restriction was required but Network Rail, the corporation, made a mistake and people died.

I very much have a vested interest here, because as a Controller I was in that (utterly overwhelmed on extreme weather days) situation more times than I care to remember; And, had I not retired in 2016, and declined NR's offer to return to work during Covid, I might well have been on duty for Carmont and therefore held responsible.

Before Carmont occurred there were already multiple disruptive events across the network, including the canal washaway near Polmont which was by far the most serious aftermath of the extreme weather. Other than agreeing with Scotrail and the Signaller that 1T08 should return to Aberdeen once the crossover at Carmont had been secured NR Control would not have had one moment to stop and consider further implications. After all, no-one knew that the drainage at the crash site had been incorrectly installed and would therefore cause a tragic derailment.

 

[35B]

I very much have a vested interest here, because as a Controller I was in that (utterly overwhelmed on extreme weather days) situation more times than I care to remember; And, had I not retired in 2016, and declined NR's offer to return to work during Covid, I might well have been on duty for Carmont and therefore held responsible.

Before Carmont occurred there were already multiple disruptive events across the network, including the canal washaway near Polmont which was by far the most serious aftermath of the extreme weather. Other than agreeing with Scotrail and the Signaller that 1T08 should return to Aberdeen once the crossover at Carmont had been secured NR Control would not have had one moment to stop and consider further implications. After all, no-one knew that the drainage at the crash site had been incorrectly installed and would therefore cause a tragic derailment.

Which is why it seems that NR have both changed the rules on blanket restrictions and taken it on the chin that, as an organisation, they ought already to have done so at Carmont.

Regardless of my views on blanket restrictions or who owns what decisions, I'm personally a little uncomfortable at the implication of accepting criminal liability for this when established practice did not require it at the time. That feels like a pandora's box being opened. IANAL and, especially, not aware of how Scottish law may differ, however.

 

[trebor79]

Regardless of my views on blanket restrictions or who owns what decisions, I'm personally a little uncomfortable at the implication of accepting criminal liability for this when established practice did not require it at the time. That feels like a pandora's box being opened. IANAL and, especially, not aware of how Scottish law may differ, however.

I guess there's a legal view as infrastructure owner and operator, NR are liable for the failure of that infrastructure, regardless of how it came to pass.