CarterUSM
Established Member
A stop command can be sent via NRN though if need be. A voice command I mean.
-
Our booking engine at tickets.railforums.co.uk (powered by TrainSplit) helps support the running of the forum with every ticket purchase! Find out more and ask any questions/give us feedback in this thread!
Guard 'ignored red light and refused to let passengers off'
- Thread starter yorkie
- Start date
- Status
Sponsor Post - registered members do not see these adverts; click here to register, or click here to log in
R
RailUK Forums
CarterUSM
Established Member
I know. But it can be sent regardless if the situation arose.
Yep, but you cannot run passenger trains DOO on NRN, it has to be CSR because it has a lot of extra features and technical superiority.
I suspect we'll get another post from Ferret soon, saying that guards running down the train track placing TC clips is superior to CSR. The delusion is painful.
I suspect we'll get another post from Ferret soon, saying that guards running down the train track placing TC clips is superior to CSR. The delusion is painful.
CarterUSM
Established Member
I'm well aware metroland, I was just stating that a stop command can be sent with the system. Not whether it is inferior or not, nor that it isn't used with passenger DOO.
O L Leigh
Established Member
Bored now.
If we don't put this one to bed soon it will become the longest running thread in RailUK history, most tangential and just possibly it's most circular too. I think everyone is going to have to accept that viewpoints are not going to be changed and so the arguing is futile.
So do we think we could draw this one to a close, preferrably before the end of time...?
O L Leigh
If we don't put this one to bed soon it will become the longest running thread in RailUK history, most tangential and just possibly it's most circular too. I think everyone is going to have to accept that viewpoints are not going to be changed and so the arguing is futile.
So do we think we could draw this one to a close, preferrably before the end of time...?
O L Leigh
CarterUSM
Established Member
Absolutely, i'm getting bored myself. I proposed this last night, and I believe metroland did also the night before. Let's call it a day chaps.
The only delusion that is painful is your view that the Guard has no role in making a situation safe in the event of an incident. CSR and GSM-R have their strengths but also their weaknesses too. Much like TC clips really!
Never said that, once nor can you find any quotes that infer that.
I have argued the guards role (as opposed from ticket collectors) is relatively insignificant with modern signalling and communications.
Virtually all the advantages and more can be had with CSR/DOO/customer focussed ticket staff (as will be operating on the Bathgate route) especially when compared to Absolute block and trains with guards. Even the doors issue can be solved with GPS.
There are demonstrably better ways to spend the money saved on safety. Therefore it is not a safety of the line issue as argued by the RMT, it is a jobs/salary issue. This is fair enough, but the RMT should be upfront about that, instead of playing the safety card to justify spending - especially as, per pound, there are better ways to spend money.
Despite pages of this thread, we have not seen once instance where the actions of a guard has saved the day - there has been some mild inferences to 'what ifs' and cases where it *might* have been advantages, but nothing substantial that makes a case. Frankly, just a lot of bully boy scaremongering. It's not to say something could *never* happen, but then you could apply this to level crossings and the money is better spent there.
Clearly, we could turn the clock back to steam days, and I'm sure there would be many examples. We are no longer in that era. If the case had been made, I would have changed my mind, but with such insignificant evidence its an instance of 'case dismissed'.
I have argued the guards role (as opposed from ticket collectors) is relatively insignificant with modern signalling and communications.
Virtually all the advantages and more can be had with CSR/DOO/customer focussed ticket staff (as will be operating on the Bathgate route) especially when compared to Absolute block and trains with guards. Even the doors issue can be solved with GPS.
There are demonstrably better ways to spend the money saved on safety. Therefore it is not a safety of the line issue as argued by the RMT, it is a jobs/salary issue. This is fair enough, but the RMT should be upfront about that, instead of playing the safety card to justify spending - especially as, per pound, there are better ways to spend money.
Despite pages of this thread, we have not seen once instance where the actions of a guard has saved the day - there has been some mild inferences to 'what ifs' and cases where it *might* have been advantages, but nothing substantial that makes a case. Frankly, just a lot of bully boy scaremongering. It's not to say something could *never* happen, but then you could apply this to level crossings and the money is better spent there.
Clearly, we could turn the clock back to steam days, and I'm sure there would be many examples. We are no longer in that era. If the case had been made, I would have changed my mind, but with such insignificant evidence its an instance of 'case dismissed'.
No it is not Metroland. What happens after the accident. Who organises the evacuation? Who makes the emergency call? We agree that the box may well know something has happened - but what? A derailment? A collision? A fire? All three? What response is required? How many casualties are there? So many unanswered questions! But how does the signalbox find the answer to them all? Ah yes, when an emergency call is made. And who makes that? That insignificant Guard in many cases - I'm not 100% sure on this but as you went to the Inquiry, you'll know - was it not the FGW Guard that made the emergency call and took care of the evacuation?
Far from being insignificant, the Guard has a vital role to play and you ignore that fact at your peril.
Far from being insignificant, the Guard has a vital role to play and you ignore that fact at your peril.
Most of these points have been addressed above. I've copied and pasted the inquiry document which is available online.
08:08 Noted by Slough IECC that Turbo train had passed SN109 at Danger, signaller replaces SN120 to danger in face of HST. This took effect at SN120 at about 08:08:50. At that point the front of the HST was 222-251m from SN120. CSR emergency stop sent to Turbo.
08:08 Attempts to move points to divert Turbo (logged on data, request to interlocking unsuccessful)
08:09 Combined speed of impact is likely to have been in the region of 130 mph. The point of impact between the trains was about 58 sleepers east of the tip of blade 8063A.
08:09 OHL trip failure, ECR Slough.
08:10 Calls were made to the London Fire service by members of the public and Slough IECC, via 999.
08:10 Guard dials 999, followed by call to his TOC control
08:15 Fire service arrives on site
08:15 Emergency calls made by public to Police
08:16 Ambulances arrive on site
08:22 BTP Police ariive on site
08:30 Guard telephones IECC to say he couldn't find the driver and asked if power was cut off
Notes from the inquiry Document
"While he was walking forward two members of Virgin Trains railway
staff, who fortuitously had been travelling in his compartment, assessed the situation
in coach A. One of them, Mr M Thomas, put down track circuit clips behind the train
to ensure that the signals in rear of it were at red, and in due course assisted passengers
to dismount from the train through the senior conductor’s compartment with the use of
a ladder which he had obtained from there. The other members of the train crew of
the HST were the two persons who were serving in the buffet car. The only means by
which the senior conductor could communicate with them was by way of the public
address system or by using his mobile telephone. On his way forwards the conductor
realised a disaster had happened. He was delayed by requests for assistance to deal
with the injured. He became progressively overwhelmed by the magnitude of what
was happening about him, and realised that the protection of the passengers was an
impossible task for him to discharge. His predicament was aggravated by the fact that
he had apparently sustained some concussion as a result of the impact."
"Following the conductor’s initial announcement to the passengers, no further advice
was given to them over the address system."
"The Inquiry heard evidence of the difficulties experienced by passengers from these
coaches in making their escape. Apart from the efforts of the Virgin Trains staff and his
colleague, who fortuitously had been able to assist passengers at the rear of the train,
passengers had not received any further advice or instruction.
"Many of those travelling on the trains showed acts of great courage and humanity in
the aftermath of the crash. Under appalling conditions and, in many cases, with
injuries of their own, they helped their fellow travellers to safety and looked after
them until the emergency services were able to take over. Their outstanding efforts,
and those of the many members of the public who responded so readily and effectively
to the crisis"
"At a ceremony on 7 February 2001, HRH The Prince of Wales presented Certificates
of Commendation from the British Transport Police to 47 passengers, members of the
public, organisations and BTP police officers for the outstanding courage and skill
which they displayed in response to the crash."
08:08 Noted by Slough IECC that Turbo train had passed SN109 at Danger, signaller replaces SN120 to danger in face of HST. This took effect at SN120 at about 08:08:50. At that point the front of the HST was 222-251m from SN120. CSR emergency stop sent to Turbo.
08:08 Attempts to move points to divert Turbo (logged on data, request to interlocking unsuccessful)
08:09 Combined speed of impact is likely to have been in the region of 130 mph. The point of impact between the trains was about 58 sleepers east of the tip of blade 8063A.
08:09 OHL trip failure, ECR Slough.
08:10 Calls were made to the London Fire service by members of the public and Slough IECC, via 999.
08:10 Guard dials 999, followed by call to his TOC control
08:15 Fire service arrives on site
08:15 Emergency calls made by public to Police
08:16 Ambulances arrive on site
08:22 BTP Police ariive on site
08:30 Guard telephones IECC to say he couldn't find the driver and asked if power was cut off
Notes from the inquiry Document
"While he was walking forward two members of Virgin Trains railway
staff, who fortuitously had been travelling in his compartment, assessed the situation
in coach A. One of them, Mr M Thomas, put down track circuit clips behind the train
to ensure that the signals in rear of it were at red, and in due course assisted passengers
to dismount from the train through the senior conductor’s compartment with the use of
a ladder which he had obtained from there. The other members of the train crew of
the HST were the two persons who were serving in the buffet car. The only means by
which the senior conductor could communicate with them was by way of the public
address system or by using his mobile telephone. On his way forwards the conductor
realised a disaster had happened. He was delayed by requests for assistance to deal
with the injured. He became progressively overwhelmed by the magnitude of what
was happening about him, and realised that the protection of the passengers was an
impossible task for him to discharge. His predicament was aggravated by the fact that
he had apparently sustained some concussion as a result of the impact."
"Following the conductor’s initial announcement to the passengers, no further advice
was given to them over the address system."
"The Inquiry heard evidence of the difficulties experienced by passengers from these
coaches in making their escape. Apart from the efforts of the Virgin Trains staff and his
colleague, who fortuitously had been able to assist passengers at the rear of the train,
passengers had not received any further advice or instruction.
"Many of those travelling on the trains showed acts of great courage and humanity in
the aftermath of the crash. Under appalling conditions and, in many cases, with
injuries of their own, they helped their fellow travellers to safety and looked after
them until the emergency services were able to take over. Their outstanding efforts,
and those of the many members of the public who responded so readily and effectively
to the crisis"
"At a ceremony on 7 February 2001, HRH The Prince of Wales presented Certificates
of Commendation from the British Transport Police to 47 passengers, members of the
public, organisations and BTP police officers for the outstanding courage and skill
which they displayed in response to the crash."
Last edited:
One can only imagine the horrible scenes described. Unfortunately, it seems the FGW guard became overwhelmed as could have happened to anyone in that situation. They are human after all. But the VXC guard clearly retained his composure and did as he was trained and assisted with an evacuation. But yet still you'd rather have DOO and modern technology which having talked to drivers who use it is far from infallible.
Sorry Metroland but your opinion that Guards are insignificant is frankly complete bollards.
I'll tell you another story about why I'm against all these modern methods. WCML not so long back, high winds blew a container off a wagon. The only reason the box had any idea was because the OHLE was tripped. No signals at red, even though the container was foul of at least one running line. Could've been nasty on the GWML for example... This just proves technology is never perfect! I'd rather have a human there as back up thanks.
Sorry Metroland but your opinion that Guards are insignificant is frankly complete bollards.
I'll tell you another story about why I'm against all these modern methods. WCML not so long back, high winds blew a container off a wagon. The only reason the box had any idea was because the OHLE was tripped. No signals at red, even though the container was foul of at least one running line. Could've been nasty on the GWML for example... This just proves technology is never perfect! I'd rather have a human there as back up thanks.
Now this is drawing to a close, it seems a good time to add the comments I would have added had I joined this sooner. That is, that these things are very rare, that 99.9% (at least) of all railway staff, especially safety critical staff such as Guards and drivers, are very professional, and these problems can occur with all members of staff, including guards, secondmen (it's a very old problem) and drivers.
Many members of railway staff, going back a very long time, have shown a great deal of courage and dedication following accidents, often at risk to themselves.
Two questions which hopefully won't reignite any disagreements. Someone said one of the guards careers pretty much ended after the Ladbroke Grove crash. Which one and why? Did they do something wrong or could they just not handle their job after what they saw and heard?
Many members of railway staff, going back a very long time, have shown a great deal of courage and dedication following accidents, often at risk to themselves.
Two questions which hopefully won't reignite any disagreements. Someone said one of the guards careers pretty much ended after the Ladbroke Grove crash. Which one and why? Did they do something wrong or could they just not handle their job after what they saw and heard?
Aictos
Established Member
- Joined
- 28 Apr 2009
- Messages
- 10,403
Are you sure about the door issue being solved with GPS, I've had past experience of doors using GPS and they've never been good experiences.
Indeed while they might look good on paper, you need to ensure the GPS signals are good at all points along the route - take the recent problems with the doors at St Pancras International that FCC had with the 377s to understand the problems that relying solely on a GPS system presents, it's bad enough trying to get a mobile signal in some parts of the UK so thinking of solving the door problem with GPS is daft unless the investment is put into place and it won't as there are more vital areas needing investment so you could class your idea as a "nice to have but on hold idea".
SWT Driver
Member
Southern's 377s have to be stopped in exactly the right place otherwise the...
Computer says NO.
Computer says NO.
royaloak
Established Member
as I have found out at Havant a couple of times :roll:
Old Timer
Established Member
The case was reported by at least two different newspapers from very diffferent stables. The two I have seen used the same words.
I have little doubt that the Prosecution were playing to the Court, as they tend to do at times, and that a little checking of the Court records will actually show that these were phrases used by the Prosecution to build up the case.
However please do not let me disturb your obvious paranoia about the Daily Mail.
In many ways it is quite amusing to see people getting into a lather about the Daily Mail, especially when a little research into the usually preferred Guardian and Mirror reveal some very nasty and unpleasant truths about the veracity and altruism of these two "liberal" and "socialist" papers.
- Status