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Judge overturns Will.
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DarloRich
Veteran Member
if you read the judgement the facts of the case are quite clear. Have you read it?
DarloRich
Veteran Member
but on what basis - that you don't like it or some other reason.
As I have said i can understand how the decision was made and why. It does not mean the end of the world (wills wise) that some posters seem to think, has not generated a new concept or principle and does not mean that the entire system is faulty.
Whilst I understand the decision I am not entirety in agreement or comfortable with it as I think it has the potential to expand the principle of support for non dependent adult children beyond a sensible level.
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The link to the judgement in post #17 pointed to the forum I have fixed the link so that it now points at the judgement in question.
On the basis that the judge might, and this will go against the grain, have subjectively disagreed with it, in the same manner we're all disagreeing with it now.
What is written within the rules stipulating to wills is always going to, at some point, come across instances of multiple interpretation. The judge has obviously perverted the rules according to personal taste. To you that's impossible but to the rest of us, it's not beyond the realms of possibility.
Unless you can cite examples where judges have made similar decisions unchallenged, then no matter how much you cry 'read the facts' it isn't going to change people's minds on this (certainly my mind and a few others at least).
DarloRich
Veteran Member
Subjective disagreement is the problem and I would suggest that it is you and others who are displaying "personal taste" rather than objectively assessing the situation.
You don't like the fact that someone on benefits has been awarded a sum of money when they were not provided for in the will coupled with the fact that they are not "dependent" upon the deceased and that the terms of the Will have been changed by the Court.
In fairness neither do I ,at least to the first part, as i have said several times! I do at least understand how and why that decision was made.
There are numerous examples of judges making provision for people with dependency. There are also many cases of judges refusing provision for healthy adult children. I would suggest re Coventry or re Hancock. You could then look at Robinson v Bird or Espinosa v Bourke. However in those cases the appellants were "financially secure". The only case I can find at present which went against the above principle is Gold v Carter.
The key difference here is the lack of financial security. Clearly the appellant is of limited means although (and this is the part i don't like) she IS able to work and provide for herself.
Were she unable to work or had a dependency on the deceased through illness (for instance) I would agree with the decision. As she has little stopping her from working i am concerned that the court found in her favour.
(BTW Here is the relevant act http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/63 )
Where have I said that, and why are you being evasive? I still haven't had answers to the questions I posed. Let me re-iterate them, contextualising the link above:
a) which of the facts in the legislation quoted are pertinent here?
b) are they in the public interest or only so because the person is on benefits?
And the biggest question:
c) how do you know the reason the judge overturned the will was because the person was 'on benefits'? This is key here, as dependency issues are not considered reasonable mitigation in the link above, thus it is more likely the judge was being favorable on personal grounds.
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DarloRich
Veteran Member
which question was that? Unsure about being evasive. I have offered you thoughts based on the judgement and legislation.
I offered you some case law on the issue ( which i think you asked for) and the facts of the case
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
a) Reasonable financial provision is defined in s1 (2) (b). s2 sets out the powers and types of orders available. s3 sets out the matters to be considered in making any award.
The key parts to my mind are s3 (1) (a) - (g) , 3(4), 3(5) & 3(6).
I have set s.3 out below to assist:
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 said:
b) the legislation is in the public interest in my view. Consider the situation if a dependent ,perhaps disabled, adult child was "cut out" of a Will. is it not reasonable to expect them to be looked after and provided for and for there to be some mechanism that allows the Will to be changed? However, the decision here may not be in the public interest in the long term for the reasons i have set out above.
c) I think the judge changed the terms of the will because of the financial circumstances of the appellant and the conduct of the parties. However judges are at liberty to find in whatever manner they feel fit and are free to reject existing case law if they feel it is appropriate. You assume the decision was taken on the basis of personal taste. I am assuming it was taken on an objective assessment of the facts of the case. As neither of us are the judge neither of us can answer that point.
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DaveNewcastle
Established Member
I said I'd give my comments on the judgement later, so here we go. I think there's 3 points which might be of particular interest to those who've already commented on here.
Firstly, the territory. This could only have happened in England or Wales. I could say that the UK is the only part of the EU where a parent could leave a child out of their Will, but even Scotland, following the research and recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission in 2009 and wide public opinion, as in all other European countries, it is simply not possible to leave a child out of a Will in this way. A Will in Scotland which seeks to disinherit a child is automatically voided and the default arrangements as if the person died intestate will be applied (i.e. without having left any Will at all), the children will automatically receive at least a third of the inheritable estate.
In France, there is a strict tariff of the proportions which must be left to each child, (see 'la reserve'), an arrangement which has contributed to the large number of small parcels of land all over France which have no obvious means of access. In Germany, the children are entitled to claim their proportion of 25% of the estate; in Spain, a child may only be disinherited if they had caused physical injury to their parents. In Ireland, a child may be disinherited, but if they have been left without adequate means then they will be expected to make a claim which will result in both a moral and a financial re-assessment of the arrangements.
But 40 years ago in England, the Parliament decided to introduce the 1975 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act which wasn't going to make disinheriting a child in a Will invalid, though it was going to allow a child (or other dependant) to make a claim which would be only be tested in the Courts and would have no regard for the moral background or impact of the disinheritance.
Secondly, reasonableness. The 1975 Inheritance Act does not expect the Court to make a decision on whether the provisions in the Will are reasonable or whether the intentions of the deceased were reasonable. But the Act does require the Court to decide if the arrangements in the Will for the maintenance of the child or dependant are either a 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' allowance. This is a binary test, and is set out in the judgement of Oliver J in re Coventry back in 1980. The test takes the form of a value judgement, based on the facts when tested against each of the factors in Section 3 of the Act. This is what Heather Ilott asked the Family Court to decide in 2007, where District Judge Million 'having meticulously gone through the section 3 factors and cited the very passage from re Coventry which emphasised that it was the result which must be unreasonable, concluded by saying that in his judgment the factors had produced an unreasonable result' and so determined that her mother, having sought to disinherit her daughter, had not made the 'reasonable' provision for her maintenance.
The Appeal Court, as we've read this week, hasn't changed that decision, and as the test is a simple binary choice based on the facts of the Will, that was never going to be a likely outcome. It is a matter of fact that the will did not make 'reasonable financial provision' for the child under the Act, so the Court would have had no alternative but to repeat that Mrs Mitson's Will was 'unreasonable'.
Thirdly, the settlement. The Act requires that a Court which finds that a Will is unreasonable in its provision for a child must then consider a long list of factors including the future financial needs of the child. The Act makes no distinction between a young child and an adult child. It must calculate an amount to be awarded to the child from the estate. The Court then makes an order to provide for those present and future needs. None of this is optional. Only the child which is disinherited in England or Wales and who doesn't apply under the Act will remain disinherited. The interesting and novel consideration in this case was the impact of an allowance on the claimant's tax credits, and the reasoning which resulted in the decision to provide the capital for the child to pay for the freehold of their home thereby reducing the monthly outgoings and preserving her tax credits. The Judges were obliged by the 1975 Act to make a settlement, but the assessment of the actual amounts will have been the subject of much examination and discussion. But we can't accuse the Judges of having been creative in reaching this decision, as it was Heather Ilott's pro bono QC who proposed the arrangement and the rationale for it, and the QC for the three charities only opposed it on the grounds that "the money saved would be small".
My own views?
I am sympathetic with all those who object to a Will being redefined by a Court, but am surprised that no one else noticed that to disinherit a child is an exceptionally English liberty with a mixed history of patriarchial bequeathments, destitute widows and abandoned daughters.
Disinheriting a child is an action which I think must always leave open the opportunity for scrutiny, considering the basis for the reason to disinherit and the actual circumstances (and there are a range of factors which can disrupt expectations of a Will, including a child adopted at birth, a spouse who dies and the other parent remarries - mentioned again below - as well as intentional disinheritance, or where the cause for the disinheritance has been reversed, to the approval of the deceased before they died).
The amount awarded to Heather Ilott by the Court of Appeal compares well with the amount that would be awarded by default in Scotland, and comparable with the statutory minimum in other larger European nations.
I read the judgement as reaffirming the decision of the previous two hearings of Heather Ilott's claim, the decision that when the test of reasonableness in the Act is applied, then the Will was 'unreasonable'. I wish that those who object to the decision would direct their objection at the 1975 Inheritance Act, it is an Act which leaves negligible room for discretion and no scope to consider the intentions of the parent, no scope to consider any moral issues, and certainly not to look at the circumstances which might have changed since the disinheriting Will was written.
I do understand that Yorkie's objection is directed at 'the system' as a whole and holds the courts and their Judges complicit in the laws which Parliament chooses to enact. I disagree - I find the separation between politicians and those enforcing their laws reassuring (and the prospect of MPs sitting in Judgement, or Judges debating and making laws would be very imbalanced). I don't agree that this judgement is symptomatic of 'a broken system', but of an unpopular and inappropriate law. The 1975 Act seems to undermine both the traditional liberty of an English parent to disinherit their offspring, and also fails to meet the transparent and non-negotiable minimum proportions which all children inherit in the rest of Europe and in Scotland. It doesn't adequately meet the needs of our present culture of life choices and the nation's multi-cultural composition. Even the disinherited widows which the Act sought to protect are only protected if they have the knowledge and the means to bring their claim to a Court.
Badger89 seems persuaded that the Appeal Court Judges made the award on the basis of personal preferences and/or factors other than the rationale set out in the Act. As I commented above, I see the finding of 'unreasonablness' as flowing naturally from the facts as applied to the Act, as have the two lower Courts who considered the same question. The decision on quantum (the financial amount of the award) is less predictable, and all three Courts reached different amounts. I can follow the interesting reasoning based on the need to remedy the deficiency while avoiding the loss of tax credits. The solution to award a third of the mother's estate to enable the daughter to buy her home might not have been expected, but with hindsight, I can't see that it is inconsisent with the Act (and perhaps by coincidence, it is consistent with the provision which is clearly specified in Scotland and elsewhere in Europe); as mentioned above, the outcome was the proposal of Heather Ilott's QC and not something devised by the Court. I have good reason to believe that there were no 'other factors' beyond that which was produced to the Courts - and actually I see no need for there to have been any, to have reached the settlement that was awarded (notwithstanding the unusual form of the settlement).
One benefit of leaving the option for a court to intervene in interpreting a Will is in those slightly complex cases where there are unintended consequences of a Will and which can be corrected by a careful consideration of the facts. These can and do arise when a child adopted at birth is unintentionally left out of an inheritance because they don't meet the definition of 'child', or when a parent dies (leaving their estate to their children but not while their surviving spouse remains alive) and then the survivor remarries, leaving the children of the first marriage suddenly losing their intended inheritance.
How to reconcile the English system with the rest of Europe?
When the European Commission was debating cross-border inheritance rights, the English system was seen as bizarre, unfair, and a throwback from days of the privileged place of elder sons; the UK delegation (Scotland apart) see the right to disinherit as an essential liberty. In fact, the historic reasoning comes from a number of concerns, ranging from the impoverishment of widows to the fragmentation of farmland, but a review of the different historic routes to where the nations of Europe now find themselves doesn't seem to help very much in deciding what is best for citizens, families and dependants in the future. The drivers of change are less likely to be destitute widows, but current lifestyle factors, such as owning property in 2 nations, informal partnerships (cohabiting or separate), international cultural traditions and values, children of multiple step-parents, new forms of charitable giving and new forms of charitable bodies, etc. I expect that England will move towards conformity with the rest of Europe and Scotland, introducing a minimum level of inheritance to all children, whatever their age - but that such a change is not a priority - in the meantime, the English will continue to be able to disinherit their offspring at the risk of a challenge in Court under the 1975 Inheritance Act to claim for their maintenance. Whether we like it or not!
Firstly, the territory. This could only have happened in England or Wales. I could say that the UK is the only part of the EU where a parent could leave a child out of their Will, but even Scotland, following the research and recommendations of the Scottish Law Commission in 2009 and wide public opinion, as in all other European countries, it is simply not possible to leave a child out of a Will in this way. A Will in Scotland which seeks to disinherit a child is automatically voided and the default arrangements as if the person died intestate will be applied (i.e. without having left any Will at all), the children will automatically receive at least a third of the inheritable estate.
In France, there is a strict tariff of the proportions which must be left to each child, (see 'la reserve'), an arrangement which has contributed to the large number of small parcels of land all over France which have no obvious means of access. In Germany, the children are entitled to claim their proportion of 25% of the estate; in Spain, a child may only be disinherited if they had caused physical injury to their parents. In Ireland, a child may be disinherited, but if they have been left without adequate means then they will be expected to make a claim which will result in both a moral and a financial re-assessment of the arrangements.
But 40 years ago in England, the Parliament decided to introduce the 1975 Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act which wasn't going to make disinheriting a child in a Will invalid, though it was going to allow a child (or other dependant) to make a claim which would be only be tested in the Courts and would have no regard for the moral background or impact of the disinheritance.
Secondly, reasonableness. The 1975 Inheritance Act does not expect the Court to make a decision on whether the provisions in the Will are reasonable or whether the intentions of the deceased were reasonable. But the Act does require the Court to decide if the arrangements in the Will for the maintenance of the child or dependant are either a 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' allowance. This is a binary test, and is set out in the judgement of Oliver J in re Coventry back in 1980. The test takes the form of a value judgement, based on the facts when tested against each of the factors in Section 3 of the Act. This is what Heather Ilott asked the Family Court to decide in 2007, where District Judge Million 'having meticulously gone through the section 3 factors and cited the very passage from re Coventry which emphasised that it was the result which must be unreasonable, concluded by saying that in his judgment the factors had produced an unreasonable result' and so determined that her mother, having sought to disinherit her daughter, had not made the 'reasonable' provision for her maintenance.
The Appeal Court, as we've read this week, hasn't changed that decision, and as the test is a simple binary choice based on the facts of the Will, that was never going to be a likely outcome. It is a matter of fact that the will did not make 'reasonable financial provision' for the child under the Act, so the Court would have had no alternative but to repeat that Mrs Mitson's Will was 'unreasonable'.
Thirdly, the settlement. The Act requires that a Court which finds that a Will is unreasonable in its provision for a child must then consider a long list of factors including the future financial needs of the child. The Act makes no distinction between a young child and an adult child. It must calculate an amount to be awarded to the child from the estate. The Court then makes an order to provide for those present and future needs. None of this is optional. Only the child which is disinherited in England or Wales and who doesn't apply under the Act will remain disinherited. The interesting and novel consideration in this case was the impact of an allowance on the claimant's tax credits, and the reasoning which resulted in the decision to provide the capital for the child to pay for the freehold of their home thereby reducing the monthly outgoings and preserving her tax credits. The Judges were obliged by the 1975 Act to make a settlement, but the assessment of the actual amounts will have been the subject of much examination and discussion. But we can't accuse the Judges of having been creative in reaching this decision, as it was Heather Ilott's pro bono QC who proposed the arrangement and the rationale for it, and the QC for the three charities only opposed it on the grounds that "the money saved would be small".
My own views?
I am sympathetic with all those who object to a Will being redefined by a Court, but am surprised that no one else noticed that to disinherit a child is an exceptionally English liberty with a mixed history of patriarchial bequeathments, destitute widows and abandoned daughters.
Disinheriting a child is an action which I think must always leave open the opportunity for scrutiny, considering the basis for the reason to disinherit and the actual circumstances (and there are a range of factors which can disrupt expectations of a Will, including a child adopted at birth, a spouse who dies and the other parent remarries - mentioned again below - as well as intentional disinheritance, or where the cause for the disinheritance has been reversed, to the approval of the deceased before they died).
The amount awarded to Heather Ilott by the Court of Appeal compares well with the amount that would be awarded by default in Scotland, and comparable with the statutory minimum in other larger European nations.
I read the judgement as reaffirming the decision of the previous two hearings of Heather Ilott's claim, the decision that when the test of reasonableness in the Act is applied, then the Will was 'unreasonable'. I wish that those who object to the decision would direct their objection at the 1975 Inheritance Act, it is an Act which leaves negligible room for discretion and no scope to consider the intentions of the parent, no scope to consider any moral issues, and certainly not to look at the circumstances which might have changed since the disinheriting Will was written.
I do understand that Yorkie's objection is directed at 'the system' as a whole and holds the courts and their Judges complicit in the laws which Parliament chooses to enact. I disagree - I find the separation between politicians and those enforcing their laws reassuring (and the prospect of MPs sitting in Judgement, or Judges debating and making laws would be very imbalanced). I don't agree that this judgement is symptomatic of 'a broken system', but of an unpopular and inappropriate law. The 1975 Act seems to undermine both the traditional liberty of an English parent to disinherit their offspring, and also fails to meet the transparent and non-negotiable minimum proportions which all children inherit in the rest of Europe and in Scotland. It doesn't adequately meet the needs of our present culture of life choices and the nation's multi-cultural composition. Even the disinherited widows which the Act sought to protect are only protected if they have the knowledge and the means to bring their claim to a Court.
Badger89 seems persuaded that the Appeal Court Judges made the award on the basis of personal preferences and/or factors other than the rationale set out in the Act. As I commented above, I see the finding of 'unreasonablness' as flowing naturally from the facts as applied to the Act, as have the two lower Courts who considered the same question. The decision on quantum (the financial amount of the award) is less predictable, and all three Courts reached different amounts. I can follow the interesting reasoning based on the need to remedy the deficiency while avoiding the loss of tax credits. The solution to award a third of the mother's estate to enable the daughter to buy her home might not have been expected, but with hindsight, I can't see that it is inconsisent with the Act (and perhaps by coincidence, it is consistent with the provision which is clearly specified in Scotland and elsewhere in Europe); as mentioned above, the outcome was the proposal of Heather Ilott's QC and not something devised by the Court. I have good reason to believe that there were no 'other factors' beyond that which was produced to the Courts - and actually I see no need for there to have been any, to have reached the settlement that was awarded (notwithstanding the unusual form of the settlement).
One benefit of leaving the option for a court to intervene in interpreting a Will is in those slightly complex cases where there are unintended consequences of a Will and which can be corrected by a careful consideration of the facts. These can and do arise when a child adopted at birth is unintentionally left out of an inheritance because they don't meet the definition of 'child', or when a parent dies (leaving their estate to their children but not while their surviving spouse remains alive) and then the survivor remarries, leaving the children of the first marriage suddenly losing their intended inheritance.
How to reconcile the English system with the rest of Europe?
When the European Commission was debating cross-border inheritance rights, the English system was seen as bizarre, unfair, and a throwback from days of the privileged place of elder sons; the UK delegation (Scotland apart) see the right to disinherit as an essential liberty. In fact, the historic reasoning comes from a number of concerns, ranging from the impoverishment of widows to the fragmentation of farmland, but a review of the different historic routes to where the nations of Europe now find themselves doesn't seem to help very much in deciding what is best for citizens, families and dependants in the future. The drivers of change are less likely to be destitute widows, but current lifestyle factors, such as owning property in 2 nations, informal partnerships (cohabiting or separate), international cultural traditions and values, children of multiple step-parents, new forms of charitable giving and new forms of charitable bodies, etc. I expect that England will move towards conformity with the rest of Europe and Scotland, introducing a minimum level of inheritance to all children, whatever their age - but that such a change is not a priority - in the meantime, the English will continue to be able to disinherit their offspring at the risk of a challenge in Court under the 1975 Inheritance Act to claim for their maintenance. Whether we like it or not!
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DaveNewcastle
Established Member
Oh, the Will certainly wasn't completely overturned - the 3 charities between them still received approx. a third of a million (65% of Mrs Jackson's estate), so we should say that the provisions of the Will were amended. (Though in Scotland, the Will would have been completely overturned).
The exact reason for District Judge Million to find that the provisions in the Will for the daughter's maintenance were 'unreasonable' ten years ago were precisely following the procedural tests of the Act, tests which had to be carried out when Heather Ilott brought her claim to the Family Court. The Court of Appeal in July re-considered and re-affirmed that analysis. I'm sorry if I hadn't made that clear.
This much is no different from many other Wills which have faced similar claims in the Courts under the 1975 Inheritance Act, and amendments have been made to maintain the deceased's dependant(s).
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Indeed. I certainly remain very unclear. Presumably the meaning of "child" in the Act is simply "offspring" and not "offspring note of the age of majority". But what is the meaning of "dependant"? Surely this would normally be someone who is routinely supported by someone else to a greater or lesser extent. Yet here we are hearing about someone in middle age who has not been supported by her mother for many years. We have not been told why she is on state hand-outs ("benefits") or what steps she has taken to qualify herself for any or better employment -- and it was presumably her own conscious decision to have no fewer than five children. Then the decision to provide her with the money to buy her house means in fact that she is enabled to buy an asset that will in this country's housing market rise sharply in value and provide her with capital to leave to those children that she would not otherwise have had. There are still too many things about this case we have apparently not heard about. Maybe all will become clear if an appeal is taken to the Supreme Court.
ExRes
Established Member
I also wonder what exactly the term child is supposed to mean, I would have thought that anyone reaching the age of majority would cease to be regarded as a child
The fact that one can be forced to leave an inheritance to offspring is also rather worrying in a context that I have first hand knowledge of, a divorced father dies and leaves his son and daughter, willingly, 50% each of his assets, his son then spends his entire inheritance on cocaine and dies in his early 40's because of his addiction. If his father had taken the time to make himself aware of the addiction and disinherited him would the court then take it upon themselves to override the fathers sensible decision and, ultimately, be responsible for supplying the son with the method with which he killed himself
The fact that one can be forced to leave an inheritance to offspring is also rather worrying in a context that I have first hand knowledge of, a divorced father dies and leaves his son and daughter, willingly, 50% each of his assets, his son then spends his entire inheritance on cocaine and dies in his early 40's because of his addiction. If his father had taken the time to make himself aware of the addiction and disinherited him would the court then take it upon themselves to override the fathers sensible decision and, ultimately, be responsible for supplying the son with the method with which he killed himself
crispy1978
Member
I've not read the whole story, but what's the point of a will (assuming sound of mind isn't in question) - it's the wish of that person how their money is spent - what right does anyone have to a) challenge it, and b) overturn it?
I don't know if this is one of those DIY wills, or one done through a solicitor - but providing it is properly witnessed, etc - it really should hold up in a court of Law.
Setting a very dangerous precedent is this.....
I don't know if this is one of those DIY wills, or one done through a solicitor - but providing it is properly witnessed, etc - it really should hold up in a court of Law.
Setting a very dangerous precedent is this.....
DaleCooper
Established Member
I think this was a very wise judgment, the daughter is happy, the charities get a lot of money and the only person who might object is way past caring.
Johnuk123
Established Member
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Bizzare statement.
ExRes
Established Member
Overturning the wishes of someone as left in their will is a very wise judgement ?
DaleCooper
Established Member
Which bit do you find bizzare and why?
Johnuk123
Established Member
- Joined
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Why do you think the state should redistribute a dead persons money to make someone happy ?
DaleCooper
Established Member
I didn't say the state should redistribute a dead persons money to make someone happy. What I said was that I think the judgment was wise in this instance.
Now perhaps you'll answer my question.
--- old post above --- --- new post below ---
Yes in this case.
crispy1978
Member
So what happens in the case of charitable PETs (potentially exempt transfers) made up to 7 years before the deceased's passing? Are we suggesting recall on these too?
What about if the daughter was a convicted murderer? Can she still get the money? When do we stop?
What about if the daughter was a convicted murderer? Can she still get the money? When do we stop?
DaleCooper
Established Member
I wasn't aware that either of these applied in this case (neither did I suggest anything of the sort) and I am sure the judge can only rule on the facts not on "what ifs".
As I said in my previous post I think it was a wise decision in this case.
Furthermore I'm no legal expert but I wasn't aware that convicted murderers are disqualified from inheriting.
Who is this 'only person' please?
DaleCooper
Established Member
The dead one of course.
DaleCooper
Established Member
I don't understand the question but I will say that it is unusual that a legal dispute should be concluded with both sides getting a good result and the only objections coming from people who have no involvement.
So basically because the deceased had money leftover the daughter (who couldn't even be bothered to visit her mum) decided she wanted some of it and the law (as stupid as it is in my opinion) backed her up!
Maybe the mother should have spent it (o gambled it) all before passing away, problem solved!
This case and the law does smack of 'we know best'!
Maybe the mother should have spent it (o gambled it) all before passing away, problem solved!
This case and the law does smack of 'we know best'!
DaleCooper
Established Member
As a parent I can't imagine the circumstances in which I would disinherit my children, no matter what they did I would forgive them. The only possible exception would be if I thought the money would be used for an illegal purpose.
From this quote from the BBC, Mrs Jackson appears to be a very vindictive person and I'm glad her daughter got some money.
Who would disherit their own daughter for that?
From this quote from the BBC, Mrs Jackson appears to be a very vindictive person and I'm glad her daughter got some money.
Who would disherit their own daughter for that?
I don't see how the animal charities got a good result as they were deprived of £164,000-odd they ought to have had. The animals lose out. And for what? Because some lawyers think that a woman in her mid-fifties who whilst still under age had chosen to walk out of the parental home to live with a boy-friend and who doesn't seem to have achieved that much for herself if she's now reliant on state hand-outs (and who chose of her own free will to produce five children) still has a claim on a parent even if there has been no contact for over thirty years. Certainly there's no evidence at all that she was dependent upon her mother in any way, so the court appears to be basing everything on a blood-link that hasn't counted for much for a very long time. (Incidentally, I wonder if the judgment would have been the same had it been an estranged male child in his fifties living on state hand-outs and with five children.)
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