Manchester-Clitheroe services...why never beyond?

[adrock1976]

As there was a Leeds/London facing bay at Hellifield that has missing track, a simple solution would be to replace the missing track and have quality connections with the Leeds - Carlisle/Lancaster trains at Hellifield.

An alternative could be (if the timings work out right) for the Manchester - Clitheroe - Hellifield to couple/uncouple from the Leeds - Carlisle train at Hellifield.

 

[Bletchleyite]

So reversing trains there during the day is a no-no then. Unless its a very quick turn round.

Have you seen the frequency of the train service on the S&C? It's hardly Merseyrail.

 

[Esker-pades]

Have you seen the frequency of the train service on the S&C? It's hardly Merseyrail.

It's also absolute block signalling, so far less flexible than Merseyrail. Not saying it can't be done; just saying the freight + passenger frequency at certain times of day could preclude the shunt.

 

[Ken H]

It's also absolute block signalling, so far less flexible than Merseyrail. Not saying it can't be done; just saying the freight + passenger frequency at certain times of day could preclude the shunt.

quite. there is a bit of freight. Including trains from Helwith Bridge reversing at Blea Moor currently. Pity the poor shunter doing the coupling/uncoupling in typical Blea Moor winter weather!

 

[30907]

They reverse on the Down Main. There's not a signalled move into the Up Goods Loop from Settle, if I'm not mistaken.

I think there must be: see the SA diagram upthread. Like Ken H I have seen a freight (from Horton) run round and reverse there; RTT has them (but not the passengers) in the UGL, and there's no longer a trailing crossover at the tunnel end.

As there was a Leeds/London facing bay at Hellifield that has missing track, a simple solution would be to replace the missing track and have quality connections with the Leeds - Carlisle/Lancaster trains at Hellifield.

An alternative could be (if the timings work out right) for the Manchester - Clitheroe - Hellifield to couple/uncouple from the Leeds - Carlisle train at Hellifield.

Both of which would require significant resignalling, unfortunately.

 

[6Gman]

Well the reality of it is that the whole line from Blackburn to Hellifield was closed to passengers by Beeching in the 1960s and only reopened south of Clitheroe in 1994, leaving the line from Clitheroe to Hellifield to remain closed to passengers.

I suspect the reasons include a shortage of DMUs and crews to run additional services north of Clitheroe, a need for services from Appleby to run to Skipton and Leeds as opposed to Clitheroe and Manchester and nowhere suitable short of Appleby to turn back these non-existent DMUs, which in my mind makes the Hawes branch the ideal solution given additional rolling stock for Northern as well as providing local connectivity to a relatively large town in the Yorkshire Dales.

Is that the "reality"?

My recollection was that the regular passenger service was withdrawn pre-Beeching.

But how many people would then visit Hawes? The service would also equally be supported by Ribblehead (population 0), Settle, Hellifield, Clitheroe, Blackburn and Bolton, which combined are certainly large enough to support a regular rail service and in fact support 2.

Don't know. Do you?

I would make the observation that there are several honeypot tourist hotspots served by rail where the contribution made by visitors arriving by train is minimal.

 

[johnnychips]

^I think 507020 was being sarcastic.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Well the reality of it is that the whole line from Blackburn to Hellifield was closed to passengers by Beeching in the 1960s ...

September 1962, I believe, so roughly half a year before the publication of "The Reshaping of British Railways" in March 1963.

 

[507020]

It's also absolute block signalling, so far less flexible than Merseyrail. Not saying it can't be done; just saying the freight + passenger frequency at certain times of day could preclude the shunt.

Merseyrail was absolute block with semaphores until 1994 and it managed with a 7 minute frequency in the peaks and a centre turnback at Hall Road, which it hasn’t had since, so this method of signalling was able to sustain a more intensive service.

Both of which would require significant resignalling, unfortunately.

If a piece of track has simply been removed without resignalling and levers e.t.c. still exist it should be able to be reinstated relatively easily.

Is that the "reality"?

My recollection was that the regular passenger service was withdrawn pre-Beeching.

September 1962, I believe, so roughly half a year before the publication of "The Reshaping of British Railways" in March 1963.

Blackburn - Clitheroe - Hellifield passenger services on 10 September 1962, yes a few months before the publication of the Reshaping of British Railways “Beeching” report, but after Beeching became the chairman of the British Railways Board, having been appointed by Ernest Marples 18 months earlier in March 1961, so I think it is the reality yes.

It may not have been part of the “Beeching” round of closures that immediately followed the report but it was certainly closed during the Beeching era.

Don't know. Do you?

I would make the observation that there are several honeypot tourist hotspots served by rail where the contribution made by visitors arriving by train is minimal.

Neither do I but it would certainly not be 0. The question is rhetorical to some extent.

Effort should be made to encourage more rail journeys to honeypot sites, many of which will be damaged by excessive road traffic and are underserved by rail, including by providing better connections from stations serving urban housing and in other parts of the country.

^I think 507020 was being sarcastic.

I may or may not have been.

before you start coming up with through trains from Southport to Hawes

Of course there are no connections from Southport or Ormskirk to the northbound DalesRaik service, so a Sunday morning Southport to Hawes service running via the reinstated Burscough North Curve and Preston avoiding line at Farington would rectify this. Both the Ormskirk - Preston and Preston - Blackburn lines are operated below capacity largely due to capacity constraints on the WCML, so allowing through trains to run from Liverpool and Southport directly to Blackburn and beyond is a very good idea for connectivity to and within East Lancashire.

I noticed a thread on here recently where someone described difficulty in travelling from Blackburn to Liverpool, a journey for which there is no direct route, when historically there was a choice of Ormskirk-Farington, Boars Head-Chorley, Wigan-Dicconson Lane or Bolton avoiding curve-Entwistle routes. Neither of 2 routes to Bolton are even still open.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Blackburn - Clitheroe - Hellifield passenger services on 10 September 1962, yes a few months before the publication of the Reshaping of British Railways “Beeching” report, but after Beeching became the chairman of the British Railways Board, having been appointed by Ernest Marples 18 months earlier in March 1961, so I think it is the reality yes.

It may not have been part of the “Beeching” round of closures that immediately followed the report but it was certainly closed during the Beeching era.

Technically the British Railways Board didn't come into existence until January 1963, but Beeching was already in the higher echelons of what existed immediately beforehand, so, yes, would concur that he would have probably had oversight of the closure plans. Makes you wonder how poor the passenger traffic had been beforehand if the station closures had already been planned/implemented before what was proposed when the March 1963 report was subsequently published.

 

[Ken H]

Technically the British Railways Board didn't come into existence until January 1963, but Beeching was already in the higher echelons of what existed immediately beforehand, so, yes, would concur that he would have probably had oversight of the closure plans. Makes you wonder how poor the passenger traffic had been beforehand if the station closures had already been planned/implemented before what was proposed when the March 1963 report was subsequently published.

The S&c had very few passenger trains pre 1985. It was mostly full of unfitted freights.

 

[quantinghome]

Technically the British Railways Board didn't come into existence until January 1963, but Beeching was already in the higher echelons of what existed immediately beforehand, so, yes, would concur that he would have probably had oversight of the closure plans. Makes you wonder how poor the passenger traffic had been beforehand if the station closures had already been planned/implemented before what was proposed when the March 1963 report was subsequently published.

Hard to tell. Beeching was certainly in post by that point, but line closures had been going on for decades by that point. According to this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beeching_cuts, 1300 miles were shut in the 1920s and 1930s, then a further 3300 miles closed or made freight only from 1948 to 1962.

The effect of Beeching was to extend and accelerate the closure programme that was already well underway.

 

[507020]

Technically the British Railways Board didn't come into existence until January 1963, but Beeching was already in the higher echelons of what existed immediately beforehand, so, yes, would concur that he would have probably had oversight of the closure plans. Makes you wonder how poor the passenger traffic had been beforehand if the station closures had already been planned/implemented before what was proposed when the March 1963 report was subsequently published.

The S&c had very few passenger trains pre 1985. It was mostly full of unfitted freights.

Prior to 1985 (quite a lot prior) there were were the main Midland Railway expresses to Scotland from Liverpool Exchange and Manchester Victoria via L&Y lines which must have generated significant passenger traffic. With the WCML basically full, surely the Clitheroe - Hellifield route gains strategic importance as effectively a secondary albeit unupgraded WCML, especially with the potential to reach the main WCML north of Windermere via Ingleton. Subsequently in 1986, the BBC News reported that the Settle - Carlisle line which they proposed to close generated annual profits in the £millions for BR.

Hard to tell. Beeching was certainly in post by that point, but line closures had been going on for decades by that point. According to this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beeching_cuts, 1300 miles were shut in the 1920s and 1930s, then a further 3300 miles closed or made freight only from 1948 to 1962.

The effect of Beeching was to extend and accelerate the closure programme that was already well underway.

Many railways were closed before Beeching but I wouldn’t describe these as being part of a programme, more of sporadic closures. Beeching provided direction to a programme, however his direction was incorrect and he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network. The fact that a network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates where he went wrong.

 

[Mcr Warrior]

Of course the occasional WCML passenger diverts and various freight trains running between Hellifield and Blackburn in the 1960s/1970s/1980s didn't directly result in the re-opening of Clitheroe station in the 1990s, but it did of course at least mean that the Ribble Valley line was still there and operational.

 

[quantinghome]

Many railways were closed before Beeching but I wouldn’t describe these as being part of a programme, more of sporadic closures.

It was a programme. The branch lines committee was established in 1949 with the express purpose of closing the least used and most uneconomic lines. They were shutting hundreds of miles of line per year. Beeching came in and doubled the rate of closure.

Beeching provided direction to a programme, however his direction was incorrect and he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network.

Certainly the closures went too far, with key strategic lines like Oxford-Cambridge being closed (although again, that had been proposed for closure before Beeching, then wasn't included in the Beeching report, and then was closed shortly after. It's complicated.)

Closures of lines in large conurbations that could now work as busy commuter networks were another massive oversight.

That said, I'm not convinced that 'he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network'. The most important and profitable lines were major freight routes, the long distance network and South east commuter networks. They pretty much all remained intact.

The fact that a network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates where he went wrong.

I doubt that very much. What main lines would you have left? The GCR excluding the section into London. What commuter network would you have in the south east or any of our major cities?

 

[RT4038]

Prior to 1985 (quite a lot prior) there were were the main Midland Railway expresses to Scotland from Liverpool Exchange and Manchester Victoria via L&Y lines which must have generated significant passenger traffic. With the WCML basically full, surely the Clitheroe - Hellifield route gains strategic importance as effectively a secondary albeit unupgraded WCML, especially with the potential to reach the main WCML north of Windermere via Ingleton. Subsequently in 1986, the BBC News reported that the Settle - Carlisle line which they proposed to close generated annual profits in the £millions for BR.

Many railways were closed before Beeching but I wouldn’t describe these as being part of a programme, more of sporadic closures. Beeching provided direction to a programme, however his direction was incorrect and he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network. The fact that a network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates where he went wrong.

Just because the BBC news reported it, does not make the statement either factual or correct.

The lines closed before Beeching were part of a programme ('direction to reduce losses by closing down unprofitable lines'), however you are correct in saying that Beeching brought more specific direction and order to the process.

I do not think that any or very little (because the traffic could be diverted at an overall advantage) of the 'most important' (by whose measure - yours?) lines (i.e. Heavily used and profitable passenger and/or freight lines) were closed, and relatively few 'potentially profitable' were closed [and even then those potential profits may only have materialised due to external decisions taken after his direction].

A network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates no such thing - it merely illustrates the quantity of duplication that existed in the 50s and 60s.

Certainly the closures went too far, with key strategic lines like Oxford-Cambridge being closed (although again, that had been proposed for closure before Beeching, then wasn't included in the Beeching report, and then was closed shortly after. It's complicated.)

However, I am not sure that this line, even now, is either 'most important' or 'potentially profitable'. It is being [partially] rebuilt now, but I'm not holding my breath for any profits any time soon - it is still going to be an extra drain on the taxpayer. The section which did not close, by the skin of its teeth, is virtually moribund and a bottomless capital and operating money pit.

Closures of lines in large conurbations that could now work as busy commuter networks were another massive oversight.

Beeching recognised the use of such lines to work as commuter networks, but also recognised that they would require continuing ongoing subsidy, which should be a social responsibility and not for the railway to pay for (in accordance with his brief). This was brought out in his report. The Government largely ignored this, although later set up the PTEs to deal with the losses of those lines that could not be closed due to political considerations.

As for Clitheroe-Hellifield trains - they are never going to be profitable (except perhaps as the current weekend DalesRail type solution.

 

[507020]

Certainly the closures went too far, with key strategic lines like Oxford-Cambridge being closed (although again, that had been proposed for closure before Beeching, then wasn't included in the Beeching report, and then was closed shortly after. It's complicated.)

Closures of lines in large conurbations that could now work as busy commuter networks were another massive oversight.

That said, I'm not convinced that 'he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network'. The most important and profitable lines were major freight routes, the long distance network and South east commuter networks. They pretty much all remained intact.

And vice versa. Some lines that hadn’t been proposed for closure before Beeching were in his report and then survived.

What is important is strategic importance in that the lines could carry existing traffic flows taking pressure off congested main lines and roads. If this happened it would have made them inherently profitable. It is inconsequential whether they carried huge amounts of traffic or were profitable at a single point in the 1960s, which was the basis for closure.

I doubt that very much. What main lines would you have left? The GCR excluding the section into London. What commuter network would you have in the south east or any of our major cities?

Of course much of the south east commuter network utilises long distance main lines out of London which also carry freight. The commuter section of the GCML survives, as does the GW&GCJR. As for lines I would have kept, not necessarily the London Extension of the GCR, but certainly Woodhead, the MML Buxton - Bakewell - Matlock and Swinton - Royston - Normanton, Colne - Skipton - Ilkley - Otley - Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton as one long main line, Clapham - Ingleton - Lowgill, Tebay - Barnard Castle - Darlington (and a route north to Durham), Carlisle - Tweedbank - Edinburgh, Menai Bridge - Caernarfon - Afon Wen, the SWML Exeter - Okehampton - Plymouth and connections to Minehead, Ilfracombe, Bude and Padstow, Bristol - Portishead, Obviously Oxford - Cambridge but also Huntingdon - Cambridge if not Kettering - Cambridge and much more of the GN&GEJR to provide a secondary ECML all the way to Doncaster, Garsdale - Hawes if not Northallerton, Coastal routes including Saltburn - Whitby - Scarborough, Bradford avoiding line and Pudsey Greenside loop line (perhaps instead of the present line), many L&Y lines Bolton - Bury - Rochdale, Bury - Rawtenstall - Bacup and Bury - Ramsbottom - Accrington, Rochdale - Bacup, Blackburn - Padiham - Burnley, Wigan - Chorley - Blackburn, Poulton-le-Fylde - Fleetwood, the North Mersey Branch Bootle - Aintree, Burscough Curves for Southport - Ormskirk and most importantly the West Lancashire Railway Southport - Preston with much commuter traffic to Liverpool, Southport and Preston. I’m sure there are many others which I personally am not aware of.

Just because the BBC news reported it, does not make the statement either factual or correct.

The lines closed before Beeching were part of a programme ('direction to reduce losses by closing down unprofitable lines'), however you are correct in saying that Beeching brought more specific direction and order to the process.

I do not think that any or very little (because the traffic could be diverted at an overall advantage) of the 'most important' (by whose measure - yours?) lines (i.e. Heavily used and profitable passenger and/or freight lines) were closed, and relatively few 'potentially profitable' were closed [and even then those potential profits may only have materialised due to external decisions taken after his direction].

A network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates no such thing - it merely illustrates the quantity of duplication that existed in the 50s and 60s.

Splitting non-stop traffic between multiple lines instead of an otherwise congested one would greatly improve overall reliability in the event of delays and especially in the event of a line being blocked.

The most important lines where a need exists can be assessed scientifically where road traffic is now at unsustainable levels due to the lack of an alternative, traffic is suppressed due to a desire to avoid this road congestion or hardship is created by a lack of local connectivity without having to pass through such road congestion.

Lines that were closed before potential profits materialised were the most egregious and the direction provided by Beeching to the closure programme was to actively prevent these profits materialising for the taxpayer so they could proceed with closure.

This duplication was what had won us the war in the 1940s. When one line was bombed, people were simply able to use another immediately without having to wait for it to be rebuilt.

 

[The Planner]

Merseyrail was absolute block with semaphores until 1994 and it managed with a 7 minute frequency in the peaks and a centre turnback at Hall Road, which it hasn’t had since, so this method of signalling was able to sustain a more intensive service.

Not surprised considering the amount of signal and gate boxes there were on the Southport line. There must have been thirteen of them.

 

[6Gman]

And vice versa. Some lines that hadn’t been proposed for closure before Beeching were in his report and then survived.

What is important is strategic importance in that the lines could carry existing traffic flows taking pressure off congested main lines and roads. If this happened it would have made them inherently profitable. It is inconsequential whether they carried huge amounts of traffic or were profitable at a single point in the 1960s, which was the basis for closure.

How does splitting "existing traffic flows" between different routes, with duplicated costs of maintenance, signalling etc make anything "inherently profitable"?

Surely spreading the same income across increased costs reduces profitability?

We understand that you are convinced Beeching "got it wrong" and that you believe many of the closed lines should have been retained but given the level of subsidy much of the existing network requires it's hard to believe any significant proportion of those routes would now break even, never mind be "profitable".

 

[quantinghome]

What is important is strategic importance in that the lines could carry existing traffic flows taking pressure off congested main lines and roads. If this happened it would have made them inherently profitable. It is inconsequential whether they carried huge amounts of traffic or were profitable at a single point in the 1960s, which was the basis for closure.

That wasn't the basis for closure. As we've already noted, many lines were closed before the 60s, some after, and some were slated for closure, then reprieved, then closed. Point is, closures happened over a long time, over several decades in fact, from right back in the 1920s up to the early 1980s. Beeching was obviously the peak of that trend, but it wasn't like Beeching suddenly came in and started ordering closures out of the blue. He may have put his foot on the accelerator, but he didn't change the course the railways were already taking.

Splitting non-stop traffic between multiple lines instead of an otherwise congested one would greatly improve overall reliability in the event of delays and especially in the event of a line being blocked.

Being a duplicate route doesn't make a line inherently profitable. Look at the current lines that fit your description. Is the Reading-Taunton line inherently profitable? The West of England line?

The WCML and Settle-Carlisle are a classic case in point. The northern WCML from Lancashire to Carlisle is heavily congested, with all sorts of timetabling compromises having to be made to allow freight to run. According to your theory, it should be 'inherently profitable' to move the freight trains onto the Settle-Carlisle (via Blackburn and Clitheroe) and reduce congestion, improve reliability etc. But it hasn't happened. Because it's actually cheaper and more economical to upgrade the WCML instead.

Not that I'm advocating we close these lines. Far from it. I recognise the important social and potential strategic role these lines can play. But let's not pretend they are actually earning money for the railway.

As for lines I would have kept, not necessarily the London Extension of the GCR, but certainly Woodhead, the MML Buxton - Bakewell - Matlock and Swinton - Royston - Normanton, Colne - Skipton - Ilkley - Otley - Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton as one long main line, Clapham - Ingleton - Lowgill, Tebay - Barnard Castle - Darlington (and a route north to Durham), Carlisle - Tweedbank - Edinburgh, Menai Bridge - Caernarfon - Afon Wen, the SWML Exeter - Okehampton - Plymouth and connections to Minehead, Ilfracombe, Bude and Padstow, Bristol - Portishead, Obviously Oxford - Cambridge but also Huntingdon - Cambridge if not Kettering - Cambridge and much more of the GN&GEJR to provide a secondary ECML all the way to Doncaster, Garsdale - Hawes if not Northallerton, Coastal routes including Saltburn - Whitby - Scarborough, Bradford avoiding line and Pudsey Greenside loop line (perhaps instead of the present line), many L&Y lines Bolton - Bury - Rochdale, Bury - Rawtenstall - Bacup and Bury - Ramsbottom - Accrington, Rochdale - Bacup, Blackburn - Padiham - Burnley, Wigan - Chorley - Blackburn, Poulton-le-Fylde - Fleetwood, the North Mersey Branch Bootle - Aintree, Burscough Curves for Southport - Ormskirk and most importantly the West Lancashire Railway Southport - Preston with much commuter traffic to Liverpool, Southport and Preston. I’m sure there are many others which I personally am not aware of.

That's a veritable smorgasbord of lines. I agree with some but others, no. Why Clapham-Lowgill? Because S&C and Bentham lines are already so busy? And what sort of level of service would you put on Garsdale-Northallerton?

The most important lines where a need exists can be assessed scientifically where road traffic is now at unsustainable levels due to the lack of an alternative, traffic is suppressed due to a desire to avoid this road congestion or hardship is created by a lack of local connectivity without having to pass through such road congestion.

Possibly. Rule of thumb - if there's a busy dual carriageway there's probably a case for a railway on the same corridor. And that's what we have, more or less.

Lines that were closed before potential profits materialised were the most egregious and the direction provided by Beeching to the closure programme was to actively prevent these profits materialising for the taxpayer so they could proceed with closure.

Evidence-free assertion.

This duplication was what had won us the war in the 1940s. When one line was bombed, people were simply able to use another immediately without having to wait for it to be rebuilt.

Churchill commented in his WW2 history that at one stage every line into London was out of action due to bombing, so again, not convinced. And we won world war 2 thanks to the Red Army who inflicted 90% of total German casualties.

 

[507020]

Not surprised considering the amount of signal and gate boxes there were on the Southport line. There must have been thirteen of them.

Given enough boxes, absolute block can sustain a very intensive service. The resignalling included a small amount of rationalisation but the present arrangement is relatively well designed and can more than cope with the level of service. Power supply capacity seems to be more of a limitation.

How does splitting "existing traffic flows" between different routes, with duplicated costs of maintenance, signalling etc make anything "inherently profitable"?

Surely spreading the same income across increased costs reduces profitability?

We understand that you are convinced Beeching "got it wrong" and that you believe many of the closed lines should have been retained but given the level of subsidy much of the existing network requires it's hard to believe any significant proportion of those routes would now break even, never mind be "profitable".

Existing traffic flows across all modes, not necessarily splitting existing rail traffic, although doing this may increase profitability of lesser used routes it will decrease profitability of heavily used ones.

Any line capable of braking even should have been retained if the case for closure was financial since even the most essential service would overall cost nothing to run. Many reopening proposals include business cases on the basis that new services would require no increased subsidy to run.

That wasn't the basis for closure. As we've already noted, many lines were closed before the 60s, some after, and some were slated for closure, then reprieved, then closed. Point is, closures happened over a long time, over several decades in fact, from right back in the 1920s up to the early 1980s. Beeching was obviously the peak of that trend, but it wasn't like Beeching suddenly came in and started ordering closures out of the blue. He may have put his foot on the accelerator, but he didn't change the course the railways were already taking.

The last few closures e.g. Woodhead and March - Spalding very much happened in the early 1980s, but then the tide then very much turned with the failed closure of the Settle - Carlisle and from then on further closures were impossible to justify. By the late 1980s, lines had started to reopen with the Thameslink core, Oxford - Bicester Village, Swindon - Trowbridge, Kettering - Corby, Coventry - Nuneaton and Walsall - Hednesford to name a few. If the accelerator had not been pressed in the 1960s, many more lines may have survived to see the time when they could not be closed, or more trackbeds may not have been sold off and built on.

Being a duplicate route doesn't make a line inherently profitable. Look at the current lines that fit your description. Is the Reading-Taunton line inherently profitable? The West of England line?

The WCML and Settle-Carlisle are a classic case in point. The northern WCML from Lancashire to Carlisle is heavily congested, with all sorts of timetabling compromises having to be made to allow freight to run. According to your theory, it should be 'inherently profitable' to move the freight trains onto the Settle-Carlisle (via Blackburn and Clitheroe) and reduce congestion, improve reliability etc. But it hasn't happened. Because it's actually cheaper and more economical to upgrade the WCML instead.

Not that I'm advocating we close these lines. Far from it. I recognise the important social and potential strategic role these lines can play. But let's not pretend they are actually earning money for the railway.

Say all Reading - Taunton and West of England line traffic was diverted via Bristol Temple Meads and duplicate lines closed (ignoring the intermediate destinations which would be unserved) would the main GWML timetable then become unworkable due to unavoidable congestion which is relieved by the other lines? The West of England line should continue to Plymouth and Bude beyond Exeter (at least it, but not through services to Waterloo, has now been extended back to Okehampton) but the existing network provides a number of diversionary routes for services to the South West to use in cases of disruption, as demonstrated by the 150 which ran from Exeter to Reading via Trowbridge and Melksham recently.

The congested WCML can be upgraded but only to a point. North of Preston is of course only 2 tracks and I don’t believe much of it was ever quadrupled. Taking a fast passenger off the WCML and running it via Blackburn and Clitheroe should free up more capacity for freight on the WCML than putting freight on the Settle - Carlisle does, but then the problem becomes that the Settle - Carlisle and wider Midland Main Line hasn’t been upgraded to the same standard as the WCML, making either that or quadrupling the WCML very expensive. I think the biggest impact at this point would be to requadruple Wigan - Euxton.

That's a veritable smorgasbord of lines. I agree with some but others, no. Why Clapham-Lowgill? Because S&C and Bentham lines are already so busy? And what sort of level of service would you put on Garsdale-Northallerton?

Clapham - Lowgill is a strategic route because the Settle - Carlisle can’t have the capacity for all trains that have come from Blackburn and Clitheroe if some has come from Leeds and Skipton, so some can be sent onto the WCML, which in turn some traffic will have left south of Lowgill including that to Windermere and also fulfils the need to serve Ingleton. Quadrupling just Lowgill - Tebay would then allow traffic from Ingleton to continue to Barnard Castle without creating a bottleneck.

Garsdale - Northallerton is quite a convenient East - West route, but would obviously carry more freight than passenger traffic.

Possibly. Rule of thumb - if there's a busy dual carriageway there's probably a case for a railway on the same corridor. And that's what we have, more or less.

I present to you the A66. If there was a route provided to Ingleton, Hawes or Barnard Castle, the Clitheroe - Hellifield line would suddenly become a lot more useful.

 

[chorleyjeff]

Merseyrail was absolute block with semaphores until 1994 and it managed with a 7 minute frequency in the peaks and a centre turnback at Hall Road, which it hasn’t had since, so this method of signalling was able to sustain a more intensive service.

If a piece of track has simply been removed without resignalling and levers e.t.c. still exist it should be able to be reinstated relatively easily.


Blackburn - Clitheroe - Hellifield passenger services on 10 September 1962, yes a few months before the publication of the Reshaping of British Railways “Beeching” report, but after Beeching became the chairman of the British Railways Board, having been appointed by Ernest Marples 18 months earlier in March 1961, so I think it is the reality yes.

It may not have been part of the “Beeching” round of closures that immediately followed the report but it was certainly closed during the Beeching era.

Neither do I but it would certainly not be 0. The question is rhetorical to some extent.

Effort should be made to encourage more rail journeys to honeypot sites, many of which will be damaged by excessive road traffic and are underserved by rail, including by providing better connections from stations serving urban housing and in other parts of the country.

I may or may not have been.

Of course there are no connections from Southport or Ormskirk to the northbound DalesRaik service, so a Sunday morning Southport to Hawes service running via the reinstated Burscough North Curve and Preston avoiding line at Farington would rectify this. Both the Ormskirk - Preston and Preston - Blackburn lines are operated below capacity largely due to capacity constraints on the WCML, so allowing through trains to run from Liverpool and Southport directly to Blackburn and beyond is a very good idea for connectivity to and within East Lancashire.

I noticed a thread on here recently where someone described difficulty in travelling from Blackburn to Liverpool, a journey for which there is no direct route, when historically there was a choice of Ormskirk-Farington, Boars Head-Chorley, Wigan-Dicconson Lane or Bolton avoiding curve-Entwistle routes. Neither of 2 routes to Bolton are even still open.

Even in the good old days when trains could run directly from Southport to East Lancs ( Turn right at Whitehouse junctions ) there was minimal use of the facility. As I remember a moning train to EL and an evening return. There was also a Liverpool to EL evening train of two portions that split at a station before the EL and Preston lines diverged. So not enough patronage for a full length train. Seems that even before road improvements and mass car ownership there was not much demand for EL to L'pool/S'port services.

 

[The Planner]

Given enough boxes, absolute block can sustain a very intensive service. The resignalling included a small amount of rationalisation but the present arrangement is relatively well designed and can more than cope with the level of service. Power supply capacity seems to be more of a limitation.


The last few closures e.g. Woodhead and March - Spalding very much happened in the early 1980s, but then the tide then very much turned with the failed closure of the Settle - Carlisle and from then on further closures were impossible to justify. By the late 1980s, lines had started to reopen with the Thameslink core, Oxford - Bicester Village, Swindon - Trowbridge, Kettering - Corby, Coventry - Nuneaton and Walsall - Hednesford to name a few.

Except a multitude of boxes is massively resource hungry.
Of all those reopenings you mention, how many were on lines that had been ripped up? Big difference.

 

[507020]

Even in the good old days when trains could run directly from Southport to East Lancs ( Turn right at Whitehouse junctions ) there was minimal use of the facility. As I remember a moning train to EL and an evening return. There was also a Liverpool to EL evening train of two portions that split at a station before the EL and Preston lines diverged. So not enough patronage for a full length train. Seems that even before road improvements and mass car ownership there was not much demand for EL to L'pool/S'port services.

As long as that evening return is late enough for passengers to watch a match at Ewood Park then it is useable. Perhaps daily or twice daily services from Southport to Clitheroe or Windermere are the way to provide connectivity.

Except a multitude of boxes is massively resource hungry.
Of all those reopenings you mention, how many were on lines that had been ripped up? Big difference.

That is a very good point, however signalling using modern methods are nowhere near is nowhere near as resource intensive, so some of the lines which were ripped up because they couldn’t sustain absolute block boxes may be viable now and shouldn’t have been ripped up because doing so didn’t remove the underlying need for them to exist and it will now be more expensive to put them back together than if they were still open now, even if they were ripped up now before anything else is done like at Okehampton.

 

[quantinghome]

Say all Reading - Taunton and West of England line traffic was diverted via Bristol Temple Meads and duplicate lines closed (ignoring the intermediate destinations which would be unserved) would the main GWML timetable then become unworkable due to unavoidable congestion which is relieved by the other lines?

Probably not. We're talking about 2 additional trains per hour from Reading to Taunton. They would probably combine with the additional trains to Bristol via Parkway which were planned.

The congested WCML can be upgraded but only to a point. North of Preston is of course only 2 tracks and I don’t believe much of it was ever quadrupled. Taking a fast passenger off the WCML and running it via Blackburn and Clitheroe should free up more capacity for freight on the WCML than putting freight on the Settle - Carlisle does, but then the problem becomes that the Settle - Carlisle and wider Midland Main Line hasn’t been upgraded to the same standard as the WCML, making either that or quadrupling the WCML very expensive. I think the biggest impact at this point would be to requadruple Wigan - Euxton.

Or you install some more freight loops.

Clapham - Lowgill is a strategic route because the Settle - Carlisle can’t have the capacity for all trains that have come from Blackburn and Clitheroe if some has come from Leeds and Skipton, so some can be sent onto the WCML, which in turn some traffic will have left south of Lowgill including that to Windermere and also fulfils the need to serve Ingleton. Quadrupling just Lowgill - Tebay would then allow traffic from Ingleton to continue to Barnard Castle without creating a bottleneck.

Settle - Carlisle has one train every two hours. It has capacity for all you could conceivably ever want it for.

Garsdale - Northallerton is quite a convenient East - West route, but would obviously carry more freight than passenger traffic.

I present to you the A66. If there was a route provided to Ingleton, Hawes or Barnard Castle, the Clitheroe - Hellifield line would suddenly become a lot more useful.

Actually there may be a case for an additional pennine route. It's a long gap between the Calder Valley and the Tyne Valley not to have an East-West pennine crossing. But only one, and it must connect directly into ECML and WCML to be useful, which rules out Garsdale-Northallerton.

And no, it wouldn't make Clitheroe-Hellifield any more useful. I mean, how? What services would you start running on it?

 

[6Gman]

As long as that evening return is late enough for passengers to watch a match at Ewood Park then it is useable. Perhaps daily or twice daily services from Southport to Clitheroe or Windermere are the way to provide connectivity.

You cannot run a service on the basis of 20 football matches a year.

Once or twice daily services (other than on very long distance routes e.g. Inverness or Penzance) just don't stack up economically.

 

[zwk500]

They reverse on the Down Main. There's not a signalled move into the Up Goods Loop from Settle, if I'm not mistaken.

I thought stone trains out of Ribblehead Quarry ran round in Blea Moor loop? Given the Up Main is not signalled for wrong-road working what would the down arrow in the NESA extract mean for the UGL?

 

[Esker-pades]

Or you install some more freight loops.

That only works to a point. The big intermodals or other heavy freight is far better to be kept moving rather than hopping into a loop every third mile.

 

[Tomnick]

I think there must be: see the SA diagram upthread. Like Ken H I have seen a freight (from Horton) run round and reverse there; RTT has them (but not the passengers) in the UGL, and there's no longer a trailing crossover at the tunnel end.

I thought stone trains out of Ribblehead Quarry ran round in Blea Moor loop? Given the Up Main is not signalled for wrong-road working what would the down arrow in the NESA extract mean for the UGL?

Thanks, both. I'm not sure, to be honest. A recent photo of the box diagram shows the home signal in the Down direction to be a three-aspect colour-light with no subsidiary signal, suggesting that there's no route into the UGL from there. There is a GPL at the north end of the single line that presumably can read into the UGL, but it'd act as a running shunt in the main route from the home signal. Not a problem for anything out of the quarry siding at Ribblehead (the ground frame connection is in advance of the home signal), but trains from Arcow's quarry go in there to run round too so there must be a way!

 

[tbtc]

I would make the observation that there are several honeypot tourist hotspots served by rail where the contribution made by visitors arriving by train is minimal.

Agreed

But then people seem to be able to hold two contradictory beliefs :

• This rural town is struggling, we need to spend hundreds of millions of pounds on building a railway there to regenerate it
• This rural town is booming, we need to spend hundreds of millions of pounds on building a railway there to take advantage of this honeypot

(essentially, some people will always twist inconvenient facts to boost their argument for MOAR RAILWAYS)

With the WCML basically full, surely the Clitheroe - Hellifield route gains strategic importance as effectively a secondary albeit unupgraded WCML

The WCML and Settle-Carlisle are a classic case in point. The northern WCML from Lancashire to Carlisle is heavily congested, with all sorts of timetabling compromises having to be made to allow freight to run. According to your theory, it should be 'inherently profitable' to move the freight trains onto the Settle-Carlisle (via Blackburn and Clitheroe) and reduce congestion, improve reliability etc. But it hasn't happened. Because it's actually cheaper and more economical to upgrade the WCML instead

The congested WCML can be upgraded but only to a point. North of Preston is of course only 2 tracks and I don’t believe much of it was ever quadrupled. Taking a fast passenger off the WCML and running it via Blackburn and Clitheroe should free up more capacity for freight on the WCML than putting freight on the Settle - Carlisle does, but then the problem becomes that the Settle - Carlisle and wider Midland Main Line hasn’t been upgraded to the same standard as the WCML, making either that or quadrupling the WCML very expensive. I think the biggest impact at this point would be to requadruple Wigan - Euxton.

Settle - Carlisle has one train every two hours. It has capacity for all you could conceivably ever want it for

I've said this before, but... the closure of the S&C would have seen a lot of enthusiasts convinced that it would have been a major route if only BR had kept it open... why, we'd have a fast electrified alignment with regular London - Leeds - Glasgow expresses that way, it'd see regular diversions of ECML and WCML expresses, it'd have millions of local passengers per annum, all the freight would go via Ribblehead rathe than over Shap to free up loads of paths on the WCML, maybe something from Nottingham to Kilmarnock too, regular steam specials over Ribblehead to rival the WHL trains over Glenfinnan ... rather than a line that has only sustained a Sprinter every couple of hours

The SELRAP website suggests that Colne - Skipton would see at least two passenger trains an hour (possibly Leeds to Manchester Airport) as well as at least one freight service per hour)

Always easier to dream about just how busy a line would be with a mix of different destinations/ service types etc, if only it was re-opened, than deal with the mundane reality of a route that doesn't need anything more than a bi-hourly Sprinter (despite the fact that "via Appleby" fares are cheaper than via other routes, so passengers have an incentive to go that way)

Many railways were closed before Beeching but I wouldn’t describe these as being part of a programme, more of sporadic closures. Beeching provided direction to a programme, however his direction was incorrect and he closed many of the most important and potentially profitable lines on the network. The fact that a network comprised entirely of closed lines if all presently open lines were closed instead would be fairly useful illustrates where he went wrong.

What is important is strategic importance in that the lines could carry existing traffic flows taking pressure off congested main lines and roads. If this happened it would have made them inherently profitable

So we have to believe that

• Beeching was bad to focus only on profitability, since you have to understand the unquantifiable wider benefits and take a holistic approach and loads of other waffle that excuses heavily loss making railway lines
• Beeching was bad because he closed lots of profitable railways

Of course much of the south east commuter network utilises long distance main lines out of London which also carry freight. The commuter section of the GCML survives, as does the GW&GCJR. As for lines I would have kept, not necessarily the London Extension of the GCR, but certainly Woodhead, the MML Buxton - Bakewell - Matlock and Swinton - Royston - Normanton, Colne - Skipton - Ilkley - Otley - Harrogate - Ripon - Northallerton as one long main line, Clapham - Ingleton - Lowgill, Tebay - Barnard Castle - Darlington (and a route north to Durham), Carlisle - Tweedbank - Edinburgh, Menai Bridge - Caernarfon - Afon Wen, the SWML Exeter - Okehampton - Plymouth and connections to Minehead, Ilfracombe, Bude and Padstow, Bristol - Portishead, Obviously Oxford - Cambridge but also Huntingdon - Cambridge if not Kettering - Cambridge and much more of the GN&GEJR to provide a secondary ECML all the way to Doncaster, Garsdale - Hawes if not Northallerton, Coastal routes including Saltburn - Whitby - Scarborough, Bradford avoiding line and Pudsey Greenside loop line (perhaps instead of the present line), many L&Y lines Bolton - Bury - Rochdale, Bury - Rawtenstall - Bacup and Bury - Ramsbottom - Accrington, Rochdale - Bacup, Blackburn - Padiham - Burnley, Wigan - Chorley - Blackburn, Poulton-le-Fylde - Fleetwood, the North Mersey Branch Bootle - Aintree, Burscough Curves for Southport - Ormskirk and most importantly the West Lancashire Railway Southport - Preston with much commuter traffic to Liverpool, Southport and Preston. I’m sure there are many others which I personally am not aware of

These closures took place over decades, from the 1950s until the 1980s - and would generally have happened regardless of one man

Lumping every closure you can think of together just makes Beeching look fairly reasonable - what actual demand was there between small/rural places like Barnard Castle and Tebay?

You'd be a lot better focussing on a small number of routes that may have been viable longer term (e.g. Bristol to Portishead), because complaining that British Rail closed the line from Ingleton to Lowgill just makes it sound like they got most of the decisions right

This duplication was what had won us the war in the 1940s. When one line was bombed, people were simply able to use another immediately without having to wait for it to be rebuilt.

Sorry... you're suggesting that the Allies won the Second World War because we had lots of superfluous railway lines?