Passengers abandon train at Lewisham with 3rd rails still live.

[alex17595]

Would you not also need a higher up like a COSS to watch over them?

 

[SamYeager]

Somewhat stunned to read that neither of the two main trains involved had been declared a "stranded train" prior to the first passenger egress from 2M50 after 60 plus minutes.

 

[yorksrob]

It would create an imbalance and unfairness. If someone held PTS and went into a grade where it wasn't required, then why should that member of staff be allowed to keep it to their benefit and other members of staff not be given the training ? That would be unfair. It would also cause issues with time off for training, costs spent on one part of the workforce and not others. It will also be a case where those with PTS may not be on duty at the time of an incident. If you wanted to ensure that those with PTS are always on duty then that may lead to an unfair distribution of duties.

If you decided to change role or change job etc then you have to accept that you may not be as qualified or have the same qualifications in your new role. Surely that is part of accepting a new job ?

Would it be acceptable for those who did change to a new job to maintain their competence in their own time and at their own costs ?

Frankly it would be better if as many station staff as possible were qualified in PTS as you never know when it might be needed.

I'm not fussed how it is achieved.

 

[Surreytraveller]

Frankly it would be better if as many station staff as possible were qualified in PTS as you never know when it might be needed.

I'm not fussed how it is achieved.

The frequency with which they would need to go on the track would be so infrequent, that the once-in-a-career time they did, they would have no experience apart from a supervised training course in good weather with no stress, that it would end up being dangerous and likely to contribute adversely to an incident.
Remember the driver at Peckham Rye - they were trained in these scenarios, and still ballsed it up

 

[ComUtoR]

Frankly it would be better if as many station staff as possible were qualified in PTS as you never know when it might be needed.

I agree with Surreytraveller as to the potential risks involved and I would add that the RAIB don't make any recommendation as to additional PTS training for station staff.

Recommendation 4 from the report :

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the availability of Southeastern staff that are competent to support train crews in the event of a railway incident at locations other than in station platforms. This complements recommendation 2 in RAIB report 16/2018 that was placed on Network Rail (South East route) to enable provision of appropriate support to staff on the ground, such as train crew. Southeastern, in consultation with Network Rail (South East route), should review its arrangements and resources for assisting train crews in managing, informing and reassuring passengers on trains that are stopped at locations remote from station platforms

This is about locations that are NOT in platforms. If there was an incident on the track then you would need to get the staff from the platform and out onto the track. This removes resources on the platform, where platform staff are most needed and you need the resources to get them to the incident location. Potentially requiring route knowledge. I am also well aware that Southeastern Metro is a DOO area, yet the report seems to suggest additional train crew. Remember those PTS trained, support staff we had but seem to want to get rid of.....

To me the recommendation suggests more of an 'on call' type of support and will most likely result in on call Managers being trained in PTS. PTS for Platform Staff will only really help when there is an incident in a platform.

I also think that PTS is a bit of a red herring. All it allows is for you to go onto the track. It doesn't give you any form of training for evacuation procedures.

 

[broadgage]

I used to live in the Lewisham area, and heard at the time from several former friends and neighbours who had been caught up in this.

Their main criticisms were that no one in charge seemed to realise just how bad were the conditions on board, and regarded this as just another delay, rather than as an emergency.
Hundreds of passengers forced to stand for hours in appalling conditions, some having had no choice but to wet or soil themselves, is an EMERGENCY and not just another delay.
The average passenger simply cant believe that it can take hours to evacuate to a station that is within sight.
The much reduced train service on the evening in question was also heavily criticised, this undoubtedly made conditions much worse, and may also have caused the stranding since a full service might have stopped the ice building up.
The new trains without toilets are generally accepted to be a backward step. The older networker units have toilets but these were locked out of use, allegedly to manage expectations about the newer trains.

In cases as bad as this, I feel that passengers may have a case for legal action for illegal imprisonment.

And BTW one neighbour was "fined" via the oyster card system for being delayed for hours, it took them a lot of effort to get the money refunded.
They feel that the railway are very quick to extract penalty fares from passengers who have made a mistake, and think that this should work both ways! How about an eighty pound penalty from the railway to each passenger held in such conditions ? With the option of court proceedings.

 

[KingJ]

The older networker units have toilets but these were locked out of use, allegedly to manage expectations about the newer trains.

At the time of this incident, many toilets on Southeastern services were out of order due to full tanks. This was particularly severe on the Networker fleet. There's quite a bit more information on exactly why the tanks were full and unable to emptied on this thread. They were definitely not locked out of order to manage expectations about the Metro Electrostar fleet (which has been around a fair while!), but Southeastern and other parties aren't exactly blameless for the actual reason the toilets were locked out of order either.

 

[broadgage]

Yes, I was well aware of the tragic death of the cleaner. However the general view of the ordinary customers was that this represented a good opportunity to take toilets out of use.
It cant be that hard to find a safe way of emptying the retention tank on an electric train. But simpler just to say "toilets out of use until further notice" It was no doubt convenient that locking toilets on existing trains minimised criticism of the newer units.
"Southern don't do toilets" better get used to it.
Are the toilets working now ? anecdotal reports state that they are not.

 

[MikeWh]

Are the toilets working now ? anecdotal reports state that they are not.

I used one a couple of weeks ago, so they certainly aren't all out of use.

 

[ComUtoR]

It cant be that hard to find a safe way of emptying the retention tank on an electric train.

It wasn't about a safe way to do it. It was about safe access, training, and complete removal of safety critical responsibilities from staff.

Are the toilets working now ? anecdotal reports state that they are not.

Yes they are.

The rest of your post is pure tinfoil hattery.

 

[alxndr]

Would you not also need a higher up like a COSS to watch over them?

I also think that PTS is a bit of a red herring. All it allows is for you to go onto the track. It doesn't give you any form of training for evacuation procedures.

A COSS would be more appropriate than just a bunch of people with PTS, but COSSs aren't trained for evacuations either. It's one thing keeping a bunch of railway people out, quite another a load of panicky passengers. Even taking out "blue hats" (newly qualified PTS holders) can be nervey as they can be less situationally aware.

Simply training up a load of people with PTS and/or COSS isn't the solution.

 

[physics34]

I used to live in the Lewisham area, and heard at the time from several former friends and neighbours who had been caught up in this.

Their main criticisms were that no one in charge seemed to realise just how bad were the conditions on board, and regarded this as just another delay, rather than as an emergency.
Hundreds of passengers forced to stand for hours in appalling conditions, some having had no choice but to wet or soil themselves, is an EMERGENCY and not just another delay.
The average passenger simply cant believe that it can take hours to evacuate to a station that is within sight.
The much reduced train service on the evening in question was also heavily criticised, this undoubtedly made conditions much worse, and may also have caused the stranding since a full service might have stopped the ice building up.
The new trains without toilets are generally accepted to be a backward step. The older networker units have toilets but these were locked out of use, allegedly to manage expectations about the newer trains.

In cases as bad as this, I feel that passengers may have a case for legal action for illegal imprisonment.

And BTW one neighbour was "fined" via the oyster card system for being delayed for hours, it took them a lot of effort to get the money refunded.
They feel that the railway are very quick to extract penalty fares from passengers who have made a mistake, and think that this should work both ways! How about an eighty pound penalty from the railway to each passenger held in such conditions ? With the option of court proceedings.

100% agree. Wasnt it a friday night aswell? Many people having been out on the lash, expecting to get home in a few mins but being stranded with nowhere to go to toilet. A basic human right. False imprisonment as u say

 

[whhistle]

While I understand there was no "go past this signal at danger" signal on the peg, could the train driver and signalman not have come to a clear understanding to draw forward into the station and it would not be recorded as a SPAD?

 

[Taunton]

And BTW one neighbour was "fined" via the oyster card system for being delayed for hours, it took them a lot of effort to get the money refunded. They feel that the railway are very quick to extract penalty fares from passengers who have made a mistake, and think that this should work both ways! How about an eighty pound penalty from the railway to each passenger held in such conditions ? With the option of court proceedings.

That sort of thing is indeed an absolute disgrace.

 

[ComUtoR]

While I understand there was no "go past this signal at danger" signal on the peg, could the train driver and signalman not have come to a clear understanding to draw forward into the station and it would not be recorded as a SPAD?

That is what Emergency Permissive Working is all about and is discussed in the report.

 

[Esker-pades]

While I understand there was no "go past this signal at danger" signal on the peg, could the train driver and signalman not have come to a clear understanding to draw forward into the station and it would not be recorded as a SPAD?

As I understand from the report the 2nd signaller on duty attempted to implement this. But, as we know, they started far too late meaning passengers egressed before such a system could be properly implemented.


EDIT: Emergency Permissive Working as @ComUtoR said. Paragraph 78 onwards.

 

[DerekC]

One question I asked myself after reading the report this morning. When signal control is transferred to a ROC do the integrated control centre functions based at Friars Bridge Court go with it, and if so does that make this kind of incident easier to handle effectively?

 

[rd749249]

Seems as though an early invocation of emergency permissive working into the platform would have saved most, if not all of the drama occurring behind 2M50.

 

[swt_passenger]

One question I asked myself after reading the report this morning. When signal control is transferred to a ROC do the integrated control centre functions based at Friars Bridge Court go with it, and if so does that make this kind of incident easier to handle effectively?

They can. AIUI Wessex ICC was moved from Waterloo to Basingstoke ROC, and the ensuing problems caused by experienced staff not wanting to move were highlighted in one of last year’s reports into SWR/NR operating problems.

 

[Elecman]

Seems as though an early invocation of emergency permissive working into the platform would have saved most, if not all of the drama occurring behind 2M50.

In a situation like this one, the signaller needs to come to a clear understanding that the train infront isn’t going to set back first, before authorising the rear train driver to pass the signal at danger

 

[ainsworth74]

In a situation like this one, the signaller needs to come to a clear understanding that the train infront isn’t going to set back first, before authorising the rear train driver to pass the signal at danger

But such a move would surely only be permitted by the rule book in coordination with the signaller in charge of the section? Who, in this case, would be the person looking after both 2M48 and 2M50 so the only person they would need to come to a clear understanding with is themselves? Surely a MOM can't authorise a set back without the signaller signing off?

Honest question as it just strikes me that at the point at which platform staff confirmed that 2M48 was clear of the platform (18:10) 2M50 had been stood for over thirty minutes so authorising it to pass the signal at danger and proceed with extreme caution would seem, to this armchair expert, to be the right move by that stage.

 

[Surreytraveller]

You make a decision and get it wrong, there will be a collision. A clear understanding would also have to be made with the driver of 2M48, as well as the MOM and any other staff on site. Don't forget, with a train in section, any staff on the track can expect another train not to approach, so there is also a danger of staff being struck.
In addition, the signaller would be suffering a high workload and stress, as will any drivers involved. A recipe for a mistake to be made.
It is easy with hindsight in the comfort of an armchair with no distractions to make a decision.

 

[ainsworth74]

I did find the RAIB commentary on the failure to authorise 2M50 to pass the signal to be interesting and, at the risk of being shouted at, not particularly complimentary of the decision making and communication involved.

It is easy with hindsight in the comfort of an armchair with no distractions to make a decision.

Of course, remarkably easy in fact!

 

[ComUtoR]

2M50 should never have passed L253. For me, that was the most significant decision.

 

[Firestarter]

That is what Emergency Permissive Working is all about and is discussed in the report.

How often is Emergency Permissive Working actually used on the railway?

 

[rd749249]

How often is Emergency Permissive Working actually used on the railway?

I’ve only heard of a colleague doing it once due to a fatality but that’s not the point. There are a finite number of reasons a signal can be passed at danger and both signaller and driver should be fully aware of what they are. I’ve worked permissively before and whilst I appreciate the concerns of a collision, especially in that weather, I’d feel pretty confident I could make a safe move even if only at say 3mph. The rules are, aside from reaching a clear understanding, to proceed at caution, stopping short etc.

But agree, looking at the layout that I’m not familiar with, that not passing L253 could also have been a wise thing to do.

 

[maniacmartin]

I think everyone agrees that, with hindsight, allowing 2M50 to pass L253 was the wrong decision. I can understand how that can happen if that is standard procedure to reduce headway though, as oft repeated actions end up being done on autopilot. I’ve fallen into this trap many times in my own (non-railway) job.

As an outsider, it appears that the railway is so focused on following the standard operating procedure that no-one wants to take the initiative to do something slightly different in the rare circumstances that warrant it, even when it is an option in the rules. Passenger comfort and risk of egress appear to be overlooked. In this case, station staff had confirmed that the previous train had left the station, so I would have thought that emergency permissive working at a very slow speed would have been appropriate.

 

[Taunton]

Just think how aviation, where there is a far greater risk, would have handled it. Controller (who has 101 other tasks) would have talked to the two involved, told each what was going on, and would have reached agreement in about 30 seconds flat.

Meanwhile, back at Lewisham, the report goes on at length about how a Gold Command with Senior Management had been initiated due to the weather. Who seem to have then done ... just what, during the incident?

 

[ComUtoR]

How often is Emergency Permissive Working actually used on the railway?

I dislike the word 'emergency', especially here. It misleads people to believe something special and extreme is happening. As rd749249 has pointed out, the technical list of reasons you can pass a signal is finite and 'Emergency Permissive' is basically an additional one outside of the usual list. We work permissive thousands of times a day and pass signals on a regular basis too.

I think everyone agrees that, with hindsight, allowing 2M50 to pass L253 was the wrong decision. I can understand how that can happen if that is standard procedure to reduce headway though, as oft repeated actions end up being done on autopilot. I’ve fallen into this trap many times in my own (non-railway) job.

It was also in auto mode too, which was also a major contribution. It was a routine decision made without thinking and I understand the situation the Signaller was in.

As an outsider, it appears that the railway is so focused on following the standard operating procedure that no-one wants to take the initiative to do something slightly different in the rare circumstances that warrant it, even when it is an option in the rules.

Surreytraveller highlighted this point well but I will add a little extra. I don't think it is focussed on the standard procedure and its more of being reliant on the procedures. The rulebook really is built on blood. The lessons of the past are hardcoded into us and the rules and procedures have come about because of incidents like this. There is a LOT of faith put in to the system because we are so reliant on someone else doing it precisely. From the smallest thing, such as taking over a train, to coupling procedures and yes, to signalling and track circuit regulations I need to know that the main reason why I'm safe, is because someone else is doing their job correctly. In the report there is a recommendation for a new rule to be created specifically covering stranded trains.

We will be having this exact same discussion when this occurs again but if the rule regarding a stranded train wasn't in place then the discussion will be about rules and procedures not being followed. Up the thread (IIRC) there is a discussion about the '1hr rule' not being followed. It's hard to have both. Follow the rules but also don't follow them :/ The crux of an RAIB report is to discover if the rules were actually followed. Personal liability to break one and become the subject of an RAIB report, to break one and cause an incident and at the extreme end up in prison just highlights the pressure the person up the pointy end is under.

Passenger comfort and risk of egress appear to be overlooked.

I don't think it was. The discomfort was a consequence and could not be averted. A 376 doesn't have toilets and have been in service since 2004(ish) ? The units were out on running lines, there is no buffet car, there are no Guards to assist etc etc. How do you manage passenger comfort in that situation ? You can't. There is no real magic solution. Passenger egress was also a major contribution to this and is mentioned in the report. Just as 2M48 got moving, someone egressed. Just as the juice was being switched back on, someone egressed, just as they were going to use permissive working, someone egressed. The report even mentioned that passengers who did egress, did so in direct contravention to the advice posted in the unit. The railway is desperately trying to educate people not to egress yet, this forum seems to be of the mindset that it is acceptable and passengers should just egress for a multitude of reasons because they can and its false imprisonment if they are kept on the train :/ I have been egressed many times. Passengers will egress at 5 minutes just as much as at 50. When your in this situation, you dread a Passcom or Egress. They are so detrimental and cause more problems.

so I would have thought that emergency permissive working at a very slow speed would have been appropriate.

Whilst we can all agree that permissive working should have been used I will add some more meat to the potential issues. You have a train that just got stuck on the platform you have just routed a train into. The likelihood of that getting stuck is high. With the unit ahead still stuck all you are doing is trapping another unit. With the unit in front on the mainline, stuck, with passengers, your consideration also needs to be about those passengers potentially egressing again into a station where you just authorised a train movement. When you are getting multiple egresses and the power may need to get cut off at any second you are at risk of causing another train to get stranded. It should have been done. But damn its a hard decision to make.

 

[ComUtoR]

Just think how aviation, where there is a far greater risk, would have handled it. Controller (who has 101 other tasks) would have talked to the two involved, told each what was going on, and would have reached agreement in about 30 seconds flat.

Do you get two aircraft landing at the same platform at the same time ?

Meanwhile, back at Lewisham, the report goes on at length about how a Gold Command with Senior Management had been initiated due to the weather. Who seem to have then done ... just what, during the incident?

Too many cocks cooks...